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Summary
In 2010 the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) set out the essence of 
its proposed development agenda for Latin America 
and the Caribbean in Time for equality: closing gaps, 
opening trails, the position document submitted to 
the Commission’s thirty-third session. That document 
served as a basis for proposing an integrated vision of 
development in keeping with the times, drawing on 
historical lessons learned and entailing far-reaching 
changes. This vision is taking root in the region, and it 
has laid the groundwork for further discussion of policy 
content and proposals within ECLAC itself. For Social 
Panorama of Latin America, the main challenge is to 
foster a more in-depth examination of social gaps and 
the mechanisms that reproduce or decrease them.
The previous edition of Social Panorama homed in on 
inequality gaps and their inter-generational reproduction 
and paid particular attention to the formative years of 
individuals, their transition to adult life and the role of 
social expenditure and transfers in meeting the needs of 
new generations during their early years. It showed how 
the life cycle path is determined by differences in skill 
development and how inequality and poverty become 
entrenched as people move from one stage of life to the next. 
The 2011 edition of Social Panorama of Latin America 
takes a more in-depth look at the chain that produces and 
reproduces social gaps; it addresses other spheres as well. 
It focuses on how structural heterogeneity (productivity 
gaps in the national economies), labour segmentation 
and gaps in social protection are linked along the chain. 
Demographic factors such as fertility differentiated by 
education and income level are discussed, as are more 
specific patterns of risk and exclusion like those impacting 
young people in the Caribbean.
These gaps make for an ambivalent scenario in the 
region, combining structural tendencies that reinforce 
them with recent, favourable developments that open new 
possibilities for advancing towards less unequal societies 
with broader access to well-being. 
Poverty and inequality are decreasing in the region; 
the main reasons are, first, rising labour income and, 
second, increasing public transfers to the most vulnerable 
sectors. But the productive gaps are still rigid, and there is 
still little mobility for specific groups in low-productivity 
sectors (especially women in lower-income socioeconomic 
groups) whose income has not increased. Fertility is 
declining substantially and can mean greater possibilities 
for well-being among families with fewer dependents. 
However, the fertility calendar is still stratified according 
to socioeconomic and education levels, with a higher 
adolescent motherhood rate among less-educated women. 
It is plain to see that social expenditure is increasing, as is 
the response (in terms of social spending and protection) 
to mitigate the impacts of the 2008-2009 crisis on the most 
vulnerable sectors. But the social protection systems are far 
from inclusive, and there are gaps in them that reproduce 
vulnerability and stratified access to social security. 
Chapter I discusses recent trends in poverty and income 
distribution in Latin America. It includes a subchapter 
on how the world of work is perceived by the actors in 
it. In keeping with the overall recent trend, poverty and 
indigence declined in the region in 2010 as economic 
growth resumed. Both indicators are at their lowest level in 
the past 20 years. While the main reason for the decrease 
in poverty is the increase in mean household income, the 
decline in inequality was also a significant factor.
The poverty rate for the region in 2010 was 31.4%, 
including 12.3% living in extreme poverty or indigence. In 
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absolute terms, these figures translate into 177 million poor 
people, of whom 70 million were indigent. The figures show 
that, in the wake of the 2009 crisis, economic recovery has 
been reflected (at least in part) in the poverty indicators. 
Indeed, the poverty rate fell by 1.6 percentage points and 
the indigence rate by 0.8 percentage points compared with 
2009. Forecast GDP growth and inflation expectations for 
each country point to a slight drop in the poverty rate in 2011. 
But the indigence rate could increase as higher food prices 
would cancel out the expected rise in household income.
Positive changes towards lower income concentration 
have been seen in recent years, thanks above all to better 
distribution of labour income and the redistributive role 
of the State via cash transfers. While the decrease in 
inequality has been only slight, it does set a favourable 
scenario —especially given the prolonged absence of 
broad distributive improvements. 
There are still issues regarding the way the labour 
market and labour institutions operate in Latin America. 
Perception surveys show that these dysfunctions generate 
feelings of uncertainty and unease among the employed 
population. These feelings are more prevalent among those 
who have precarious jobs or less human capital, those in a 
less favourable socioeconomic position and those who live 
in countries with larger productivity gaps. These groups 
are more likely to fear job loss or perceive a lack of job 
opportunities, a failure to enforce labour laws or a lack 
of social security guarantees. Worker-employer dialogue 
is hindered by low unionization rates (especially among 
less- skilled workers) and mistrust of labour unions (more 
so among business executives and managers).
Chapter II discusses the rapid decline in fertility in 
Latin America over the past five decades, as well as the 
factors contributing to this. It is still invariably the case 
that the lower a woman’s education level, the higher 
her fertility. While fertility has declined recently for all 
education levels, in many countries the rate of decline 
has varied from group to group and is, as a rule, slower 
for less-educated women. The result is that relative 
differences are deepening.
Adolescent fertility has fallen at a much more moderate 
pace than total fertility. In many of the countries of the region 
it even rose during the 1990s while the total fertility rate 
declined significantly. The inequality in fertility between 
groups with different education levels is usually particularly 
marked in the case of adolescent mothers. Evidence of the 
declining percentage of planned births among adolescent 
mothers is encouraging, and it is a powerful argument in 
favour of redoubling public sexual and reproductive health 
policies and programmes targeting this group.
The governments of the region are facing two main 
challenges concerning fertility. On the one hand is the need 
to step up efforts to meet target 5.B of the Millennium 
Development Goals, to achieve, by 2015, universal access 
to reproductive health, thus narrowing the substantial gaps 
in fertility that remain among social groups —especially 
adolescent fertility. On the other hand are the challenges 
posed by declining fertility, which call for re-thinking 
policies and institutions to deal with inexorable changes in 
the family, social and economic structure of the countries.
Chapter III shows how structural heterogeneity 
(caused by productivity gaps), stratification of the decline 
in fertility and gender inequality operate as true factories 
of inequality in the labour markets of Latin America. 
The high structural heterogeneity that marks the 
region’s productive structures results in striking disparities 
between the contribution that each productive sector makes 
to GDP and employment. There is still a close linkage 
between structural heterogeneity and income inequality as 
a rigid pattern that is stable over time. While employment 
in low-productivity sectors has fallen over the past two 
decades, the distance between it and employment in 
medium- and high-productivity sectors has grown. 
The stratified incorporation of Latin American women 
into the labour market means that, instead of narrowing, 
the gap between higher- and lower-income women has 
grown slightly over the past two decades. Greater childcare 
pressure and the glaring lack of protection in this sphere 
for the most vulnerable sectors reflect a rigid circuit of 
inequality. The care burden is also a factor in the relative 
increase of the female unemployment rate compared with 
the rate for men. The youth unemployment rate is still far 
higher than the adult unemployment rate, and the distance 
between the lower and higher quintiles has not changed 
significantly over the past 20 years.
Against this backdrop of multiple labour market 
inequalities, robust State intervention is called for in the 
productive sphere, in labour regulations and institutions, in 
labour market policies and in the redistribution of childcare.
Chapter IV deals with gaps and challenges in the 
social protection systems of the countries of Latin America. 
Limited social security registration coverage and its linkage 
to formal employment means that larger households, those 
headed by women, and rural households have less access 
to contributory protection. And social security coverage 
shortfalls are reproduced in old age. Retirement and pension 
coverage is still quite limited, leaving women and the 
lower-income population more unprotected.
The non-contributory pillar of social protection covers 
approximately 12% of households and equates to 0.25% 
of GDP. But these transfers do seem to target the risks of 
the population and make a big difference for the poorest 
households, thus confirming that their distribution is 
highly progressive.
A combined assessment of the contributory and 
non-contributory pillars in Latin American households 
shows that a large part of the population is excluded from 
the classic model of protection through employment and 
is also not being reached by public welfare transfers. 
While this group does include a proportion of persons 
from higher-income households, just under half of the 
group is in the poorest 40% of the population. 
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Latin America’s weak social protection systems are 
facing tremendous redistributive challenges, with limited 
fiscal capacity and relatively rigid —if any— architectures 
of well-being. Any systemic approach should also draw 
on the contributory pillar and on more or less targeted 
policies to interconnect rights and progress towards truly 
universal —and solidarity-based— protection systems.
Chapter V takes up the recent dynamics of social 
expenditure, its response to the crisis and the outlook 
for broadening retirement and pension coverage in the 
countries of the region over the medium and long term.
For the region as a whole, public expenditure 
(especially social expenditure) has burgeoned over the 
past two decades. The largest increase has been in social 
security and welfare (an increase equal to 3% of GDP), 
followed by education. But among the countries where 
per capita social expenditure is less than US$ 1000, 
the main item of expense is education. It is only in the 
relatively more developed countries that social security 
and welfare account for more. 
The countries reacted to the global financial crisis 
by temporarily expanding public expenditure instead of 
shrinking it as in the past. But the expansion did not always 
have a social focus, although the social repercussions 
were considerable in that they helped prevent increases 
in unemployment and social vulnerability.
The need to develop rights-based social protection 
systems that are, as such, built on contributory and 
non-contributory funding mechanisms and on solidarity-
based pillars for resource distribution clearly calls for 
“re-reforming” many of the social security systems for 
the medium haul (and especially for the long haul), both 
structurally and on the parametric level, and to build up 
social security registration in increasingly formalized 
labour markets. Otherwise, the long-term effect will be 
to make it ever more difficult to fund universal social 
protection in ageing societies with a proportionally 
smaller labour force.
Chapter VI addresses, for the first time in Social 
Panorama, an urgent social issue in the countries of the 
Caribbean: the status of youth in this subregion in terms 
of socio-demographic dynamics, risks, skill development 
and the dynamics of social exclusion and inclusion. 
In the Caribbean, as in Latin America, these are times 
of major challenges in the sphere of youth inclusion. New 
education and employment measures are needed in order to 
improve and balance education achievements with smooth 
passage to employment, reducing gaps in educational 
attainment among young people and employment gaps 
between young people and adults. The demographic 
transition holds opportunities for young people, but it must 
be harnessed in the short term so as to expand capacities 
and productivity and make this generation less vulnerable. 
Young people move from place to place more easily than 
children and older people do, especially in the Caribbean. 
This can be a source of both opportunities and risks. Young 
people in the Caribbean are very much exposed to exogenous 
risks, especially accidents and aggression. And exposure 
to sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, 
is a warning sign that needs to be forcefully addressed.
Public and policy awareness has grown over the 
past few decades; government institutions charged with 
developing youth plans and programmes have been 
created. Strides need to be made on comprehensive 
approaches that can go beyond sector-based rationales, 
taking into account the very nature of the “young actor” 
and encompassing risks, capacities, opportunities and 
modalities of involvement.  
Poverty, inequality and perceptions of the world  
of work in Latin America
 Progress in poverty reduction
Economic activity and employment recovered quickly 
after the 2009 crisis. Latin America’s per capita GDP 
grew by 4.8%, the employment rate rose by 0.6 percentage 
points and the labour force participation rate went up by 
0.3 percentage points. The urban unemployment rate fell 
from 8.1% to 7.3%, which is not only below the average 
for the period 2000-2008 but is also lower than yearly 
figures for the past two decades. The inflation rate rose in 
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all of the countries of the region, with a simple average that 
was 2.8 percentage points above the rate posted in 2009.
In this setting, the regional poverty rate was 31.4%, 
including 12.3% living in extreme poverty or indigence. 
In absolute terms, this translates into 177 million poor 
people, of which 70 million were indigent. Further 
strides in poverty reduction were made in 2010 as the 
poverty rate declined by 1.6 percentage points and the 
indigence rate fell by 0.8 percentage points compared 
with 2009 (see figure 1).
Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1980-2011 a




















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Estimate for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti. The figures above the bars represent the percentage and total number of poor persons (indigent plus non-indigent poor), respectively. 
The figures for 2011 are projections.
Compared with the late 1990s, the picture is still a 
favourable one. Accumulated poverty reduction since 
1999 stands at 12.4 percentage points while the indigence 
rate has come down by 6.3 percentage points. The two 
indicators are down by a total of 17.0 percentage points 
and 10.3 percentage points, respectively, since 1990.
These outcomes mean further progress towards 
achievement of target 1.A of the Millennium Development 
Goals: to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people living in extreme poverty. Latin America’s 
progress towards this goal stands at 91%, calculated 
as the accumulated reduction of indigence between 
1990 and 2010 (10.2 percentage points) divided by the 
decrease implicit in the target (11.3 percentage points). 
This percentage is higher than the time elapsed (80%) to 
the deadline for meeting the target.
Projected GDP growth and inflation expectations in 
each country point to a slight decline in the poverty rate 
in 2011, to 30.4% (about one percentage point below the 
rate for 2010). But the indigence rate could go up because 
any rise in food prices outstripping the other goods in 
the basket would cancel out the expected increase in 
household income (see figure 1).
As of 2010, the data available for 12 countries of 
the region show poverty trending in different directions 
and at different rates over the previous year. Five 
countries posted significant declines in their poverty 
rates; they are Peru (-3.5 points), Ecuador (-3.0 points), 
Argentina (-2.7 points), Uruguay (-2.0 points) and 
Colombia (-1.4 points). In these countries, the indigence 
rate trend reversed as well, with the decline ranging 
from 0.5 percentage points to 1.7 percentage points 
(see table 1).
Honduras and Mexico were the only countries that 
saw a significant increase in poverty and indigence rates: 
1.7 percentage points and 1.0 percentage points for 
Honduras and 1.5 percentage points and 2.1 percentage 
points for Mexico. Because the comparison for Mexico 
is against the measure for 2008, it reflects both the 
substantial expansion of the Mexican economy in 
2010 and the marked contraction of per capita GDP in 
2009 (-7.2%). In Panama, the indigence rate rose by 
1.5 percentage points; the other countries for which data 
are available (the Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
and Paraguay) posted no significant variations in their 
poverty or indigence rates.
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERSONS LIVING IN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, AROUND 2002, 2009 AND 2010
(Percentages)
Country
Around 2002 Around 2009 2010
Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence
Argentina a 2002 45.4 20.9 2009 11.3 3.8 2010 8.6 2.8
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) 2002 62.4 37.1 2007 54.0 31.2 … ... ...
Brazil 2001 37.5 13.2 2009 24.9 7.0 ... ... ...
Chile 2000 20.2 5.6 2009 11.5 3.6 ... ... ...
Colombia b 2002 54.2 19.9 2009 45.7 16.5 2010 44.3 14.8
Costa Rica 2002 20.3 8.2 2009 18.9 6.9 ... ... ...
Dominican Republic 2002 47.1 20.7 2009 41.1 21.0 2010 41.4 20.9
Ecuador a 2002 49.0 19.4 2009 40.2 15.5 2010 37.1 14.2
El Salvador 2001 48.9 22.1 2009 47.9 17.3 2010 46.6 16.7
Guatemala 2002 60.2 30.9 2006 54.8 29.1 …
Honduras 2002 77.3 54.4 2009 65.7 41.8 2010 67.4 42.8
Mexico 2002 39.4 12.6 2008 34.8 11.2 2010 36.3 13.3
Nicaragua 2001 69.4 42.5 2005 61.9 31.9 … ... ...
Panama 2002 36.9 18.6 2009 26.4 11.1 2010 25.8 12.6
Paraguay 2001 59.7 31.3 2009 56.0 30.4 2010 54.8 30.7
Peru c 2001 54.7 24.4 2009 34.8 11.5 2010 31.3 9.8
Uruguay a 2002 15.4 2.5 2009 10.7 2.0 2010 8.6 1.4
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of) 2002 48.6 22.2 2009 27.1 9.8 2010 27.8 10.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
b Figures from the Misión para el empalme de las series de empleo, pobreza y desigualdad (MESEP). They do not include adjustments to the measure of poverty made in 2011 by the 
National Planning Department (DNP) of Colombia.
c Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru.
 Progress in reducing distributive inequality
It is widely known that income distribution in the countries 
of Latin America is among the most unequal in the world. 
Moreover, during the 1990s and early 2000s, inequality in 
the region was marked by stubborn downward rigidity or 
a slight upward trend. There was a turning point in 2002 
and 2003 when inequality began to trend down in many 
countries. While this decrease was slight and not enough 
to change Latin America’s ranking as the most unequal 
region, it was noteworthy in view of the prolonged absence 
of overall distributive improvements.
The trend towards distributive improvement in the 
region did not change in the wake of the economic crisis. 
Before 2008, which basically reflects pre-crisis levels, the 
Gini coefficient was falling by 1% or more per year in 
10 countries, with Guatemala posting the only appreciable 
increase (data to 2006). The figures for 2010, which reflect, 
approximately, the immediate post-crisis scenario, show 
that inequality did not increase significantly in any of the 
11 countries for which there is information. Quite the opposite: 
in three countries (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Mexico and Uruguay) the Gini coefficient fell by more than 
2% per year, and in two other countries (El Salvador and 
Peru) it fell by at least 1% per year (see figure 2).
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GINI INDEX, 1990-2002,  


















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Corresponds to 2004-2006 in Argentina, 2001-2008 in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, 
2000-2006 in Chile, 2001-2004 in El Salvador and 2002-2007 in Honduras.
b  Corresponds to 2006-2010 in Argentina, 2004-2010 in El Salvador and 2007-2010 in 
Honduras.
c  Urban areas.
d  Urban areas only for 1990-2002.
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The decline in inequality in the region over a period 
of several years provides a good opportunity to examine 
the factors behind it. Studies of this issue have tended to 
agree on at least two points. First, that most of the decline 
in inequality can be traced to the labour market, due above 
all to a more equitable distribution of labour income per 
person employed. Second, public cash transfers have been 
a source of income that has helped to deconcentrate per 
capita income distribution.
This issue of Social Panorama assesses these factors 
in the light of available evidence for the countries of 
Latin America for the 2000s. The periods under review 
are those in which income distribution improved most 
significantly in 15 countries of the region. The examination 
focuses on comparing the gaps between the first and 
fifth quintiles for a group of variables, particularly the 
different income streams and labour market indicators. 
To do so, income was broken down by pairs of factors 
in order to simulate what would have happened with 
inequality if one of the factors had not changed during 
the period under review.1 
The first breakdown, where per capita household 
income is the number of adults in the household 
multiplied by the income received by each adult, 
gauges the proportion in which changes in per capita 
income distribution are due to distributive changes 
in the amount of income received or to changes in 
household demographic structure. The results indicate 
that while the demographic factor did help narrow the 
gaps between quintiles, especially in countries with 
the most distributive improvements, its impact was 
slight (see table 2). 
1 Changes in income are broken down in accordance with the 
structure described in Ricardo Barros and others, “Uma análise 
das principais causas de queda recente na desigualdade de renda 
brasileira”, Econômica, vol. 8, No. 1, June 2006. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): OBSERVED AND SIMULATED YEAR-ON-YEAR VARIATION IN THE INCOME  




variation Percentage attributable to:
Year-on-year 
variation Percentage attributable to:
Year-on-year 




























Argentina a 2002-2009 -4.4 82 18 -3.6 55 45 -2.5 150 -50
Brazil 2001-2009 -4.9 93 7 -4.5 58 42 -3.0 120 -20
Chile 2000-2006 -4.2 87 13 -3.6 45 55 -2.4 134 -34
Colombia 2002-2005 -5.2 114 -14 -5.9 95 5 -6.7 79 21
Costa Rica 2002-2005 -4.7 113 -13 -5.3 93 7 -6.2 66 34
Dominican Republic 2004-2007 -2.1 119 -19 -2.5 -58 158 1.6 -71 171
Ecuador a 2005-2010 -3.6 98 2 -3.5 61 39 -2.6 107 -7
El Salvador 2001-2010 -5.8 97 3 -5.6 86 14 -6.3 103 -3
Mexico 2000-2010 -3.1 93 7 -2.9 74 26 -3.0 120 -20
Nicaragua 2001-2005 -7.2 90 10 -6.5 146 -46 -10.7 72 28
Panama 2002-2009 -5.0 109 -9 -5.4 76 24 -5.4 101 -1
Peru 2001-2010 -4.4 85 15 -3.8 70 30 -4.1 88 12
Paraguay 2001-2009 -2.7 52 48 -1.4 -27 127 0.8 42 58
Uruguay a 2004-2010 -3.6 101 -1 -3.6 24 76 -1.3 119 -19
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2002-2010 -7.8 104 -4 -8.1 88 12 -8.8 97 3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
In keeping with findings in the literature, income per 
adult appears as the main factor behind the distributive 
improvement in per capita income. This variable is 
the sum of labour income (per adult) and non-labour 
income (per adult) in the household. In 10 countries, 
labour income was the prevailing factor in the reduction 
of inequality. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua the 
variation in labour income accounted for 90% or more 
of the variation in total income per adult. 
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The distributive change in non-labour income 
accounted for 50% or more of the decline in adult 
income inequality in the Dominican Republic, Chile, 
Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay; in Argentina and Brazil 
it accounted for more than 40%. Non-labour income 
comes from several sources. In countries where such 
income played a more notable redistributive role, it 
comes from public transfers, that is, targeted government 
action through social policy.  
Labour income per adult can, in turn, be expressed 
as the result of multiplying compensation per person 
employed by the employment rate (ratio of the number of 
persons employed to the number of adults). The observed 
decline in labour income inequality per adult is almost 
exclusively due to the first of the two factors. Indeed, 
not only did the employment gap between quintiles 
remain virtually unchanged in several countries: it even 
increased in some of them. 
The distributive improvement in income among 
persons employed is due to several different factors. 
Mentioned as explanations are a steady improvement 
in education distribution and the narrowing wage 
gaps between more highly-skilled and less-skilled 
workers. In some countries, this drop in labour 
income inequality among persons employed may be 
due, to a certain extent, to labour and other policies 
rolled out by the governments in an effort to improve 
distributive equality. 
 Perceptions of the operation of the labour market 
and labour institutions
In Latin America the perception of unemployment as 
the country’s main problem between 1996 and 2009 
changed more or less in line with the evolution of 
real unemployment. The exceptions were the period 
2002-2005, when the decline in real unemployment was 
accompanied by worsening perceptions, and the period 
2005-2008, when the perception of unemployment 
as the country’s main problem fell more than real 
unemployment did.2
Throughout the period from 1996 to 2009, 
unemployment was most frequently mentioned as the 
country’s main problem by the unemployed and own-
account workers, and least frequently mentioned by 
senior and mid-level executives and professionals (see 
figure 3). In 2007, the perceived lack of job opportunities 
was greater among persons in a worse socioeconomic 
situation, among the unemployed and among own-account 
workers. As for age, persons aged 46 and over were more 
likely than younger subjects to perceive that there were 
fewer job opportunities in the country.
2 The information provided in this subchapter is based on special 
tabulations of the Latinobarómetro surveys conducted between 
1996 and 2009 in 18 countries in Latin America.
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT AS THE MAIN PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from Latinobarómetro, 1996-2009.
a Between 1996 and 2003, interviewees had to select the main problem from a predefined 
list. Since 2004, an open question has been used. Data have been available for the 
Dominican Republic available from 2004 onwards. 
b Includes senior management, middle management, independent professionals and 
salaried professionals. 
c Includes those who were temporarily out of work at the time of the interview.
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The region’s low unionization rate, small labour unions 
and infrequent collective bargaining are compounded by 
less experience with unionization among the less-educated 
employed and among wage earners in private companies. 
In addition, distrust of labour unions has remained very 
high for the past 15 years. It is more frequent among 
business managers and directors, an occupational group 
that is also more likely to perceive greater conflict between 
entrepreneurs and workers (see figure 4).
Perceptions concerning enforcement of labour laws 
(labour contracts, dismissal and severance pay, workday 
length, overtime pay and minimum wage) are more 
negative among those living in countries with severe 
structural heterogeneity,3 among the unemployed and 
among own-account workers. Perceptions of the lack of 
social security guarantees are more prevalent among those 
living in countries with severe structural heterogeneity 
and among older persons.
The data available for 1996 and 2009 indicate that 
feelings of uncertainty linked to the possibility of job loss 
tend to be more prevalent during economic contractions 
and less so during expansions, and that they are more 
frequent among persons living in countries with greater 
structural heterogeneity even if the gap has been closing 
in recent years. And the fear of unemployment is greater 
among those with less schooling, among own-account 
workers and among low- and middle-rank employees while 
it is less prevalent among men and among older subjects.
3 Structural heterogeneity refers to profound productivity gaps in the 
national economies, and it is characteristic of the countries of Latin 
America. These gaps are found between large companies, SMEs 
and what is usually largely associated with the informal sector 
(microenterprises, own-account workers and domestic workers). 
For the purposes of this study the countries have been grouped into 
those with moderate structural heterogeneity (Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Uruguay), intermediate structural heterogeneity 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia and Panama) 
and severe structural heterogeneity (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia).
Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES a): LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN 
TRADE UNIONS b AND PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN 








































Lack of confidence in trade unions
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from Latinobarómetro, 1996-2009.
a Data have been available for the Dominican Republic available from 2004 onwards. 
b Question used in the Latinobarómetro survey: How much confidence do you have in 
the trade unions? A lot, some, a little or none? The values reported correspond to the 
percentage who answered that they had little or no confidence in the trade unions.
c Question used in the Latinobarómetro survey: In every country there are differences 
or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, how serious is the 
conflict between employers and workers? Is it very serious, serious, minor, or is there 
no conflict? The reported values correspond to the percentage who answered that 
there was a very serious or serious conflict.
d For the question on confidence in the trade unions, the reported data were obtained 
by combining the observations available for 1996, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
For the question on conflict between employers and workers, the reported data were 
obtained by combining the information for 2007 and 2008. 
Current status and outlook for fertility in Latin America
 Introduction
3 Structural heterogeneity refers to profound productivity gaps in the 
national economies, and it is characteristic of the countries of Latin 
America. These gaps are found between large companies, SMEs 
and what is usually largely associated with the informal sector 
(microenterprises, own-account workers and domestic workers). 
For the purposes of this study the countries have been grouped into 
those with moderate structural heterogeneity (Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Uruguay), intermediate structural heterogeneity 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia and Panama) 
and severe structural heterogeneity (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia).
The demographic evolution of Latin America, especially 
the decline in fertility, provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for economic advancement and for 
improving household living standards in the region. 
The positive effects of this change include the relative 
increase in the potentially productive population and 
the concomitant benefits for the economy, improved 
sexual and reproductive health and broader education and 
employment opportunities for women. But the region’s 
stubbornly high levels of poverty and inequality and 
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their close linkage to low education levels are obstacles 
in the path to reproductive change and the resulting 
decline in fertility. This situation particularly impacts 
adolescent Latin American girls, especially those with 
less education and income. It is therefore important to 
review fertility trends in the region in their economic, 
social and demographic context, so as to spotlight the 
challenges the countries will face in the future.
 Fertility in Latin America
Fertility in Latin America began to plummet in the 
mid-twentieth century as development gained traction 
in the countries of this subregion and brought changes in 
reproductive behaviour. The total fertility rate (TFR) in 
Latin America gradually pulled away from the average in 
less-developed countries and, during the five-year period 
1990-1995, dropped below the world average (figure 5).4 
In the mid-1960s the women of the region were reaching 
the end of their childbearing years with nearly six children 
per woman, that is to say, one child more than the world 
average and twice the number in the more developed 
countries. Since then, rapidly-falling fertility in the region 
has narrowed those gaps considerably: towards 2015 the 
TFR in Latin America and the Caribbean will be 2.1 children 
per women versus 1.7 children in the developed countries.
Figure 5 
WORLD (SELECTED REGIONS): TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 1950-2010
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Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision [CD-ROM], 
Population Division, New York, 2011 
4 The total fertility rate measures the number of children, on average, 
who would be born to a woman belonging to a hypothetical cohort of 
females who, during their childbearing years, gave birth to children 
in accordance with the fertility rates by age groups for the period 
under study and who were not exposed to mortality risks up to the 
end of their child-bearing years (Carlos Welti (ed.), Demografía II, 
Mexico City, Latin American Programme of Population Activities 
(PROLAP)/National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1998.
The decline in fertility in the region always 
surprised researchers by repeatedly exceeding their 
estimates. Initial projections were for a negligible drop of 
0.27 children per woman per five-year period, but the 
actual decline between the 1960s (the turning point for 
the fertility trend in Latin America) and the most recent 
five-year period observed was 0.41 children per woman 
per five-year period. 
Fertility trended down in all of the countries of the 
region. But as is to be expected in a subregion with striking 
economic and social inequalities, the timing and the rate of 
decline differed widely among the countries. The steepest 
drops were in the 1960s and 1970s, and the countries with 
the highest initial levels saw the greatest drops in fertility, 
resulting in a marked convergent trend (see figure 6).
Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA (4 COUNTRIES): FERTILITY IN COUNTRIES WITH 
RATES BELOW REPLACEMENT LEVEL IN 2005-2010










1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Cuba Brazil Chile Costa Rica
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) − Population 
Division of ECLAC on the basis of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Proyección de población”, Demographic Observatory, 
No. 7 (LC/G.2414-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009.
4 The total fertility rate measures the number of children, on average, 
who would be born to a woman belonging to a hypothetical cohort of 
females who, during their childbearing years, gave birth to children 
in accordance with the fertility rates by age groups for the period 
under study and who were not exposed to mortality risks up to the 
end of their child-bearing years (Carlos Welti (ed.), Demografía II, 
Mexico City, Latin American Programme of Population Activities 
(PROLAP)/National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1998.
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The factors that have contributed the most to the 
drop in fertility are those associated with exposure 
to sexual relations, such as not entering a union or 
doing so late, or separating either temporarily or 
permanently; these account for nearly 50% of the 
decline compared with natural fertility.5 But the impact 
of contraceptive use, which accounts for almost 40% of 
the decline, is growing quickly as contraceptives —and 
the use of modern contraceptive methods— become 
more widespread.
5 Natural fertility is the number of children that a fertile woman 
would bear, absent contraceptives or other constraints. For the 
region, this has been calculated at 21 children per woman. 
 The association between education and fertility intensity 
and the fertility calendar
Although the average number of children for all of the 
countries is low, there are still significant differences 
among social groups; this reflects the sharp socioeconomic 
inequalities prevailing in Latin America.
Limited access to education is closely linked to 
socioeconomic inequalities, and it is a barrier to progress 
in the sphere of reproduction. So it is still always the case 
that the lower women’s education level, the higher the 
total fertility rate. In absolute terms, this is most striking 
in Ecuador, Haiti and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
with differences of more than three children between 
uneducated women and those who have reached secondary 
education. This inequality becomes more pronounced 
when taking into account women who have reached higher 
education. While fertility has recently been falling across 
all education levels, different groups have seen different 
rates of decline; in general, the slowest decline has been 
among uneducated women. The result is a deepening of 
relative differences in half of the countries examined here.
In all of the countries considered, the contraceptive 
prevalence rate is lower among women with less schooling. 
This in turn is closely correlated with the unmet demand 
for family planning services. The challenge facing the 
countries of Latin America here is to adopt measures 
and step up efforts to meet target 5.B of the Millennium 
Development Goals: achieve, by 2015, universal access 
to reproductive health.
In Latin America, changes in the age at first marriage 
have been slow, with little variation or a slight increase in 
age. In contrast, the age at which sexual activity begins 
is trending younger and the gap between it and age at 
first marriage is growing. But especially close attention 
should be paid to the younger age at which women are 
bearing their first child, which is, in principle, evidence 
that the Latin American model stands in contrast to the 
patterns for formation of unions and reproduction that 
emerged in the developed countries during the 1960s 
and are regarded as characteristic of the so-called second 
demographic transition.
The foregoing notwithstanding, in Latin America there 
are indeed different patterns for marriage (both formal 
and consensual) and for the initiation of motherhood, and 
they are strongly influenced by education. Women with 
a higher level of education systematically start sexual 
activity at a later age than less-educated women do, and 
they delay the formation of unions and motherhood. The 
fact that women in more privileged social sectors and more 
highly-educated women marry and bear children at a later 
age supports the idea that in these sectors there is more 
autonomy in making sexual and reproductive decisions.
 Outlook for fertility in the light of changes in education
Most of the countries of Latin America have made 
substantial progress over the past few decades in improving 
access to education and increasing the number of years of 
schooling. Because economic and demographic behavior 
usually differs in keeping with education levels, projected 
educational attainment is a key input for economic and 
demographic projections.
This education dynamic is expected to speed up 
the decline in fertility as women attain higher levels 
of education. In a goodly number of countries in Latin 
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America, the fertility gap by level of education is not 
only holding: it is growing. But there are reasons to think 
that these differences will diminish over the long run 
if the decline in fertility among more highly-educated 
women runs its course and fertility among less-educated 
women continues to fall.
Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) show the direct contribution of changes in 
education gaps to falling fertility in four countries 
(Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia) over a 15-year period. While they are not 
yet the dominant force behind the decline in fertility, 
changes in the distribution of educational attainment 
have contributed substantially to the decrease.
Fertility projections based on this distribution 
corroborate the conclusions reached with other 
methodologies: low levels of fertility will increasingly 
shape the region’s demographic and economic 
future. As a result, there will be a sustained decrease 
in the number of births and the age structure will 
gradually skew older. These changes have major 
implications in terms of the care economy, female 
labour participation and dependency relationships 
within families.
 Adolescent fertility: a priority for action and research
It is interesting to see that adolescent fertility is 
declining at a much slower pace than total fertility. 
A look at shorter, more recent periods reveals that 
adolescent fertility rose in almost all of the countries 
in the region during the 1990s (see figure 7) while total 
fertility dropped sharply.
Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): CHANGE IN ADOLESCENT 






























































































































































































Source: J. Rodríguez, Latin America: high adolescent fertility amid declining overall 
fertility”, document presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Adolescents, 
Youth and Development, New York, 21-22 July 2011 [online] http://www.un.org/
esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p01_rodriguez.pdf.
a Percentage of women aged between 15 and 19 years who report having had one or 
more live births.
The most frequently used indicators show that sexual 
activity is starting earlier in adolescence, tending to make 
pregnancy during this stage more likely. This earlier sexual 
activity has not come with earlier unions, meaning that 
premarital sexual activity is on the rise.
The only way to keep these trends from translating into 
higher adolescent fertility is to significantly increase the 
effective use of modern contraceptives during adolescence. 
Although traditional indicators of coverage point to an 
increase, a detailed examination of their use leads to a 
much less encouraging conclusion. Part of the increased 
use of contraceptives is among women who start using 
them after having their first child; obviously, this does 
nothing to prevent adolescent motherhood (although it 
does help avoid second pregnancies). Moreover, use among 
adolescent girls and boys is usually less consistent and 
effective, thus yielding a smaller protective effect than in 
other age groups. Last, protected sexual initiation, which 
is the best predictor of childless adolescence, is still rare 
in a goodly proportion of the countries. 
Unlike prior periods, surveys conducted during 
the 2000s show a systematic drop in the desirability of 
children conceived during adolescence, and lower levels 
of desirability for such births versus total births in most 
of the countries. Evidence of the declining percentage of 
planned births among adolescent mothers is encouraging, 
and it is a powerful argument in favour of redoubling public 
sexual and reproductive health policies and programmes 
targeting this group.
Unequal fertility levels among groups with different 
levels of education are especially striking in the case of 
adolescent motherhood. Education remains a factor that 
protects against adolescent motherhood, but its preventive 
capacity has eroded. Above all, the education threshold for 
minimizing the likelihood of adolescent motherhood has 
shifted from secondary school to the university level. In 
countries where only a minority has access to secondary 
education, reaching that level still yields a sharp drop in 
the likelihood of being an adolescent mother.
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Because progress towards universal secondary 
education in Latin America has not brought labour market 
improvements or a decline in social inequality, a considerable 
portion of the adolescent population attending school has 
low expectations as to the returns and opportunities that 
this increase in the number of years of schooling will bring 
later on in life. For this reason, the losses and costs of early 
motherhood are not fully perceived by a large proportion 
of Latin American adolescents. Along with progress in 
education, advancing towards more egalitarian societies 
with more opportunities for adolescents and young people 
would help bring down the region’s high adolescent fertility. 
 Final remarks
Marked inequalities in fertility according to level of 
education, persistently high adolescent fertility and the 
obvious constraints for contraceptive use among adolescent 
girls and boys despite their desire to limit fertility, all reveal 
shortfalls in prevention and barriers to accessing modern 
contraceptive methods. As ECLAC has repeatedly noted, 
this is the hard core of intergenerational reproduction 
of exclusion and inequality, which is perpetuated by a 
combination of low education levels, lack of childcare 
support, the trajectory of more vulnerable families, greater 
difficulty in earning an income and precarious access to 
social protection networks. Mothers with small children 
and low income levels are precisely the ones who face 
greater difficulties in accessing employment and, when 
they do, end up concentrated in lower-productivity jobs. 
Adolescent motherhood, with low levels of education 
and income, is thus a monumental barrier to productive 
paths and access to well-being throughout life. 
Work, employment and labour markets: factories, 
circuits and hard cores of inequality reproduction
As explained in chapter I, the progress that the region 
has made since 2002 in reducing poverty and, albeit to 
a lesser extent, inequality —and the evidence that rising 
labour income has a lot to do with that progress— provide 
good reason for optimism. 
Gauging how much space there is for Latin America 
to continue to make strides in reducing inequality requires 
an examination of productivity gaps, their impact on labour 
market segmentation and how circuits of inequality operate 
at the intersection of the State, markets and families. This 
linkage shows that even though the aggregate indicators for 
the past few years exhibit encouraging signs, the tendency 
towards wider gaps between higher- and lower-income 
sectors is very rigid. 
 Productive structure and labour markets: another side to  
the structural roots of inequality
The internal markets of the economies of Latin America 
are structurally heterogeneous, i.e., they are extremely 
segmented because of wide productivity gaps. The 
economic structure of the region can be studied in terms 
of three productivity strata (high, middle and low) with 
differing degrees of access to technology and markets. The 
high stratum, encompassing large-scale export activities 
and companies (more than 200 workers) accounts for 
66.9% of GDP and only 19.8% of total employment. 
The middle stratum comprises small and medium-sized 
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enterprises (SMEs) and accounts for 22.5% of GDP and 
30% of total employment. And the low stratum, closely 
associated with what is commonly referred to as the 
informal sector, accounts for one half of employment 
and only 10.6% of GDP (see figure 8).
The implications of this marked disparity between each 
sector’s contribution to GDP and employment are obvious. 
It results in a very unequal distribution of productivity 
(GDP per person employed) that ultimately leaves space 
for extremely heterogeneous appropriation of productivity 
gains among workers and operates as a structural parameter 
for disparities and access to well-being in the region. 
Employment is concentrated in the low-productivity 
stratum but the greater appropriation of gains (participation 
in GDP) is in the high stratum, which absorbs just one 
of every five persons employed. These asymmetries 
are largely responsible for labour income concentration 
in Latin America.
Figure 8 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Infante, “América Latina en el “umbral del desarrollo”. Un ejercicio de 
convergencia productiva”, Working document, No. 14, Inclusive development 
project, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, June 2011.
 Productivity, formality, informality and inequality:  
beyond the dividing lines
Income concentration is a worrisome consequence of 
structural heterogeneity, but it is not the only one. “Productive 
divergence” also leads to considerable labour market 
segmentation as seen in the dividing line between high- and 
low-productivity employment or between formal employment 
(closer to the technology vanguard, with a higher level of 
education, better labour conditions and greater protection 
from labour institutions) and informal employment (with 
less income, a lower education level, instability, limited 
social security coverage and the lack of labour contracts).
It is definitely good news that the dividing line 
between these two sectors has shifted in recent years: 
in 2009 workers in low-productivity sectors accounted 
for 42.7% of the urban employed population. This is an 
improvement over the figure posted around 1990, when the 
employed population in this sector accounted for 48.1% of 
the total. But over the past two decades the dividing line 
between formal and informal employment has become 
sharper. In other words, the gap between higher- and 
lower-productivity workers has grown (see figure 9).
Not only was the drop in informality clearly more 
marked among men than among women, it was also more 
stratified among women and was concentrated above all in 
higher-income women. As a result, 82% of the employed 
women in the poorest 20% of the population work in 
low-productivity sectors. The proportion falls to nearly 
33% in the highest-income quintile. The gap between 
employed women in quintiles I and V peaked in 2009.
Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): REAL WAGES OF THE URBAN 
EMPLOYED POPULATION a BY SECTOR, AROUND  
1990, 2002, 2008 AND 2009 b
(Dollars at constant 2005 prices) 
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Employed in low-productivity sectors c
Employed in medium- and high-productivity sectors d
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Urban employed persons aged over 15 years who declared labour income (does not 
include unpaid workers).
b Weighted average of the countries on which data is available for all of the periods under 
review. Up to 2006, the figures for low- and high-productivity sectors do not include 
Colombia, which does not break down the data by company size. The data shown for 
2008 might not coincide with data published by ECLAC (2010c and 2009a) because 
the Statistics and Economic Projections Division of ECLAC updated the values of the 
poverty lines and income for the database on Colombia that year.
c Refers to persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five 
persons), domestic employees and unskilled self-employed workers, including the 
own-account and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
d This category includes government employees, private employers and wage earners 
in establishments employing more than five persons and self-employed professionals 
and technicians. It does not include domestic employees.
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These widening gaps among women are due in 
part to the many ways in which gender inequality 
intersects the connection between labour markets and 
families. The pattern for resolving the pressure that 
the care burden exerts on households is extremely 
regressive in that it still essentially depends on the 
modalities and resources (economic and family) 
available to them. 
The presence of small children in the household 
pushes lower-income women into informal employment in 
a much larger proportion than for higher-income women. 
This disparity has grown more pronounced over the past 
20 years: for all intents and purposes the proportion of 
lower-income women employed in low-productivity 
sectors has not decreased and stands in contrast to the 
marked decline in the proportion of higher-quintile women 
with small children working in low-productivity sectors 
(see figure 10). 
Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): VARIATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN 
LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS a FOR WOMEN IN HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH CHILDREN AGED 0 TO 5 YEARS, BY INCOME QUINTILE, 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments 
employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled self-employed workers, 
including the own-account and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
b Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007; for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, to eight major cities, plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, 
to Asunción and the Central Department; for Uruguay, to urban areas; and for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, they refer to the national total.
 Access to employment and inequality: the gender  
and generational viewpoint
Rising female labour-force participation is perhaps one 
of the most dramatic changes taking place in the labour 
markets of Latin America over the past 20 years. But here, 
too, the highly stratified process exposes a regressive 
pattern that is operating as a powerful transmitter of 
inequalities in the region. 
A long-term look shows that the labour participation 
gap between women in the poorest sectors with small 
children (aged 5 and under) and those with children aged 
6 to 14 has been growing since 2002. This confirms that 
for the most vulnerable women the burden of caring for 
smaller children is still an obstacle in the path to labour 
market insertion. And the gap between women in the 
highest and lowest quintiles living in households where 
there is a childcare burden has been growing steadily since 
1994 —both for women with small children and for those 
in households with children aged 6 to 14. In both cases 
the disparity is now the highest it has been since 1994, 
pointing to a hardening of this rigid circuit of inequality.
Unlike labour-force participation, unemployment is 
more closely associated with economic cycles, and there 
is a direct linkage between fluctuations in unemployment 
and stages of the cycle. But perhaps most relevant here is 
the fact that from cycle to cycle some sectors systematically 
lose out. This reflects unequal capacities for coping with the 
effects of unemployment; in other words, certain groups are 
more vulnerable to economic downturns while others are 
better able to weather cyclical economic contractions.
Unemployment is more concentrated among women, 
and, again, among lower-income women. Because of this 
divergence, in 2009 unemployment among lower-income 
women was five times higher than among women in the 
highest quintile. 
Several developments are behind this widening 
inequality gap. The incorporation of women into the 
labour market adds pressure for female employment, 
and less-educated women encounter more barriers to 
accessing employment at a time when not enough jobs 
are being created. But in the most vulnerable sectors the 
demand for care can work against access to employment. 
The unemployment rate tends to be higher among women 
living in households with smaller children. Here, as well, 
the gap between them and women with children of an 
age for which there is a formal, more structured supply 
of schooling grows slightly as income levels fall. This is 
increasingly the case since 2000 (see figure 11).
27Social Panorama of Latin America • 2011
The other group in which unemployment is at the 
most worrisome levels is young people. According to 
household survey data, in 1990 the unemployment rate 
among young people aged 15 to 24 was almost twice 
that for the population overall. Not only has this gap not 
narrowed: it seems to have grown since 2005. Moreover, 
unemployment is much higher among young people 
from lower-income households than among the higher 
quintiles, and this gap has not changed significantly in 
the past 20 years. 
Figure 11 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR WOMEN AGED 15 TO 49 YEARS, BY INCOME QUINTILE  
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Quintile I: With children aged 5 years and under in the household
Quintile I: With children and adolescents aged 6 to 14 years in the household
Quintile V: With children aged 5 years and under in the household
Quintile V: With children and adolescents aged 6 to 14 years in the household
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
Note: Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia relate to 1989; for Colombia and 
Panama, to 1991. 
b The data for Brazil and Nicaragua relate to 1993; for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c The data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 1999 and 
those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
d Data for Honduras relate to 2003; for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2004; for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. The figure for 2007 does not include data for El 
Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua relate to 2005; for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina relate to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, to eight major cities, plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asunción and the Central Department; and for Uruguay to urban areas. 
e Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia relate to 2007; for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina relate to Greater Buenos Aires; for the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities, plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asunción and the Central Department; and for Uruguay to urban areas.
 The State at the intersection of labour markets and families
In view of this picture, State intervention should be considered 
in at least four areas. The first involves advancing towards a 
comprehensive policy for productive development grounded 
in appropriate macroeconomic regimes, development 
policies and market-based microeconomic incentives, as 
well as robust intervention in industrial and technological 
policy and in policies for supporting SMEs. 
The second area is labour market regulation and 
institutions. The region’s “dual” regulatory model is, 
without question, a major obstacle to facilitating the 
appropriation of productivity gains by lower-income 
workers and to breaking down the barrier between insiders 
and outsiders that ends up creeping into social protection.
The third relevant axis is linked to State efforts to 
decouple access to well-being from labour market status, 
which entails promoting greater equality across sectors. 
Measures such as labour intermediation, competencies 
certification, training initiatives (focused, in the case 
of young people, on the transition from the education 
system to the world of work), unemployment insurance 
and mechanisms facilitating access by the unemployed 
to non-contributory protection systems are some of the 
options for decommodifying access to employment.
Lastly, the States should play an active role geared 
towards distributing childcare. This would eliminate a 
substantial barrier to labour participation and performance 
among women with small children. It is up to social 
protection to facilitate access to a network of care services 
that, while still quite limited in many of the countries of 
the region, needs to be improved and expanded. 
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Social protection and inequality: cracks, rigidities, 
open ground and opportunities
Public social expenditure in Latin America has grown 
steadily since the 1990s (see chapter V). Many countries 
have thus been able to enhance and stabilize social 
policies despite very small tax revenues for many 
States. But the findings set out in the previous chapter 
add a question mark to the capacity and leeway that 
social protection systems will have in the future for 
curtailing the structural channels of transmission of 
inequality. The region’s social protection systems are 
facing an enormous, complex challenge. But, perhaps 
like never before, the current situation holds a new 
opportunity for transforming social protection as needed 
to make it a more effective tool for breaking the legacy 
of inequality. 
In order to assess the systemic performance 
of social protection in the face of inequality, the 
following pages focus on the cracks and rigidities in 
social protection systems in Latin America, and on the 
margins and opportunities for action against the many 
faces of inequality.
 Contributory linkages and social protection in Latin America
Protection for workers and their families
For some time now there has been agreement that the 
region’s labour markets have not managed to become 
the grand entrance to social protection systems. The high 
degree of informality and weak labour regulations and 
institutions affect access to social security coverage through 
employment: at present, about half of the employed are 
registered with social security, and a large majority of 
them work in the formal sector.
A case in point is the decline in social security 
registration between 1990 and 2002 (from 52.4% to 
49%) and the subsequent rise (to 53.2 % in 2009, which 
is even slightly above the level posted in 1990). The 
trend was not the same across sectors, though. During 
the downturn, the proportion of employed persons with 
contributory protection in the low-productivity sector 
fell more than in the medium- and high-productivity 
sector. And when the economic cycle led to a new upturn 
in registration, recovery was more robust in the formal 
sector and far more moderate in the informal sector. This 
differential evolution turned access to social protection 
into another factor contributing to the widening gaps 
between the two sectors.
Beyond coverage for the employed, the contributory 
rationale is not only to protect workers but also to protect 
their families in some way, through health insurance. 
Indeed, it is not only the better-educated workers with 
higher wages who access social protection systems. Those 
with fewer dependents (or those in smaller households) 
do, as well. By contrast, those without access to social 
security are, predominantly, lower-income workers, 
employed women with small children, younger workers 
and workers in larger households. 
A look at the data from the standpoint of households 
not only exposes lower levels of social security coverage 
(43% of the households have at least one member who 
is registered, and only in 32% of all households is the 
head of household or spouse registered); gender and 
generation gaps come to the fore as well. Social security 
coverage for households headed by men (49.5%) is 
significantly higher than the average, while coverage 
for households headed by women is lower, at 41.3% (see 
figure 12). Comparing the proportion of children living 
in households with contributory coverage with the labour 
force overall shows that the former are at a systematic 
disadvantage: half (50.2%) of the population aged 15 to 
59 lives in households with at least one member registered 
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for social security. For the population under age 15 the 
level drops to 43.4% (see figure 13). Deeper differences 
surface when comparing the population living in urban 
and rural areas; the latter are at a disadvantage.
Figure 12 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLDS WITH SOME 
TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY AFFILIATION, BY SEX OF HEAD  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
Figure 13 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH SOME TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY AFFILIATION, BY AGE 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
Protecting older adults by transfers: between 
the contributory base and non-contributory 
compensation
Social security coverage limitations and shortfalls 
are reproduced in old age. In the simple average 
for the countries of the region, barely 1 in 10 Latin 
Americans aged 65 or older (40%) received retirement 
or pension benefits in 2009 despite the jump in the 
proportion of the population with such coverage over the 
past decade.
Women and men have unequal access to retirement 
and pension benefits, due to a combination of factors. 
Differential insertion in the labour force, the feminization 
of informality, social security registration shortfalls in 
some sectors with a higher proportion of women and a 
persistently low activity ratio among women are some 
of the factors that determine the chances that women 
will have protection when they reach old age. This is 
convincing proof that gender inequalities carried over 
from the active years transfer to old age in a relatively 
linear fashion.
Figure 14 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED 65 YEARS 
AND OVER RECEIVING A PENSION OR RETIREMENT BENEFITS, 



















































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a Simple average for the countries with data for both years under consideration. The data 
for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008; the data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; 
those for Bolivia (Plurinational State of) refer to eight major cities plus El Alto; those for 
Ecuador, to urban areas; those for Paraguay, to Asunción and the Central Department; 
and those for Uruguay, to urban areas. 
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 The non-contributory pillar: scope and adequacy  
of welfare transfers
High levels of poverty and inequality, plus the low 
fiscal capacity of the States, place the countries in a 
difficult position because public expenditure needs are 
very high and not enough real effort is being made to 
cover the broad sectors of the population that have no 
current income guarantees nor any source of insurance 
for the future. The non-contributory pillar (public welfare 
transfers) covers some 12% of households and equates 
to 0.25% of GDP. But these transfers do seem to target 
the risks of the population and make a big difference 
for the poorest households; this confirms the highly 
progressive distribution of public welfare transfers 
despite coverage constraints.
Narrowing the focus to lower-income households that 
receive public welfare transfers and have no members 
registered with social security shows that a higher 
proportion of them are headed by women. Almost 4 of 
every 10 households (38.4%) in the poorest quintile that 
receive transfers and have no access to social security 
are headed by women —a relatively high percentage 
compared with the 27% of households in this quintile 
that are headed by women (see figure 15). 
Figure 15 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLDS IN THE 
FIRST INCOME QUINTILE NOT COVERED BY CONTRIBUTORY 
PROTECTION, PENSION OR RETIREMENT SCHEMES, BUT 
RECEIVING PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS, BY SEX OF  



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a Simple average. Data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru 
and Plurinational State of Bolivia are not included. The data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador refer to urban areas. The data for Guatemala refer 
to 2006, for Honduras, to 2007 and for Mexico, to 2008.
 Cracks and omissions in social protection systems
Regionwide, an average of 43% of households are 
relatively integrated, employed and covered by some 
sort of contributory protection. A very small proportion 
of this sector (an average of 4% across the region) has 
“mixed” coverage in that they have at least one member 
registered with social security and receive some sort of 
public welfare transfer (see figure 16).
The proportion of households that only receive 
retirement or pension benefits (8%) is just as small and, 
as is to be expected, is higher in countries with more 
advanced retirement or pension systems (Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Uruguay). And, as seen above, 12% of the 
households in the region are protected by non-contributory 
welfare transfers alone. 
What is perhaps most relevant here is the large 
proportion of households receiving no form of public 
protection at all: on average, 36% of the households in 
the 13 countries examined have no members registered 
with social security and are not receiving public 
welfare transfers or retirement or pension benefits. 
In the more-developed countries, households without 
protection range from 9% (Costa Rica and Uruguay) 
to 20% (Argentina). By contrast, the poorer countries, 
with lower per capita GDP, less fiscal capacity and 
worse formal dependency ratios, rank near the regional 
average and, in some cases, far exceed it (households 
without protection stand at 58% in El Salvador, 63% 
in Guatemala and 69% in Paraguay).
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Figure 16 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF 
HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE OF ACCESS TO SOCIAL PROTECTION, 





























































































































Contributory protection only (heads of household and/or others)
Mixed protection
Non-contributory protection only
Only retirement benefits or pension income
No protection
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a Data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia are not included either because insufficient information is available on 
public welfare transfers to households to develop typologies, or because the variable 
show inconsistencies. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for 
Ecuador refer to urban areas. The data for Guatemala refer to 2006, for Honduras, to 
2007 and for Mexico, to 2008. 
These households are clearly overrepresented 
in the lower-income quintiles. But a significant 
percentage of the population in the middle and high 
sectors is in the same situation. On average for 
14 Latin American countries, 48% of the population 
in the first two quintiles receives no public social 
protection at all; the proportion for the next two 
quintiles is 38%, and it is 30% for the fifth quintile. 
So it would seem that the lack of protection has 
different meanings. One, for those in the middle and 
higher quintiles, might refer to “cream skimming” 
the public protection systems in combination with 
market-based self-insurance and out-of-pocket 
expenditures. But the most likely meaning is that a 
majority proportion of the unprotected in the middle 
and high segments comprises workers in medium- and 
high-productivity sectors (and, perhaps to a certain 
extent, to those in low-productivity sectors) lacking 
access to social security or labour contracts as discussed 
in previous sections.
 Social protection and its systemic role in the face 
of inequalities
The initial conclusion from this analysis is that reducing 
inequality cannot be left up to social protection alone. It 
is the third link in the chain that generates and reproduces 
inequalities. The first is structural heterogeneity as the 
“factory” of inequality; the second is rigid labour market 
segmentation. The three links are interdependent and 
require an integrated approach.
The second conclusion is that there is little leeway 
in the social protection systems because of their relative 
rigidity. This rigidity is determined by fiscal capacity and 
the space that the countries have for expanding social 
expenditure, and by the ability to change distributive 
options that were chosen in the past when the risk structures 
was different from those now operating in most of the 
countries. Within the bounds of social protection, several 
policy lines can help further these goals.
First, in several countries the contributory pillar is in 
need of reinforcement either through protection reform or 
through new devices, enhancing unemployment insurance 
regimes and making major changes to retirement and 
pension systems.
Second, there is a clear need to strengthen the non-
contributory pillar. Direct income transfers to the poorest 
are effectively targeting efforts towards the most vulnerable 
sectors. These transfers are an important tool for checking 
the decline in income and consumption capacity among the 
most vulnerable and for combating the juvenilization of 
poverty and reducing inequalities early in life. Subsidized 
contributions to insurance systems (essentially, social 
security and health and guaranteed effective access to 
basic services) are a critical part of this pillar.
Last, the data provided expose high levels of 
precariousness among the region’s older adult population. 
There is no getting around the importance of transferring 
income to vulnerable persons aged 65 and older. And there 
should be no giving up on the idea of moving towards a 
universal transfer scheme for this stage of life combined 
with contributory transfers based on pension systems.
The inequalities highlighted in this chapter call for a 
new, rights-based approach where the challenge is to build 
universal social protection networks. This challenge also 
calls for a contributory pillar and policies that fill in the 
gaps and, by targeting the most vulnerable groups, put the 
missing pieces in the puzzle of the universal right to well-
being. To put it another way, and in view of the data set out 
here, the effort to strengthen and reform the architectures 
of well-being in Latin America should be guided by the 
goal to achieve universal basic social protection. 
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Trends in social spending, expenditure in times of crisis 
and prospects for universal social security floors
 Long-term trends
Public spending and especially social spending have 
risen sharply in Latin America in the past two decades: 
already figuring fairly steadily in macroeconomic 
priorities up to 2006-2007, public spending then surged 
in 2008 and 2009 as the authorities took pre-emptive 
action to stave off the effects of the global financial 
crisis. With this fresh effort to increase public spending, 
both the absolute amounts allocated to social spending 
and their weight in GDP reached a two-decade high 
as the first decade of the new century came to a close 
(see figure 17).
Figure 17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): TOTAL 
PUBLIC SPENDING a AND SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING, AND 
SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING AS A PROPORTION OF 
TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009
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Total public spending as a percentage of GDP
Social public spending as a percentage of GDP
Social spending as a percentage of public spending
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a Official figures using a functional classification of spending, which may not coincide 
with those obtained from an economic classification of spending.
With total public spending remaining relatively 
stable, social spending has accounted for a growing 
percentage of that total: from 45% in 1990-1991 to 
58% by the turn of the century and 63% by 2006-2007. 
The slight decline in the percentage in the most recent 
biennium considered (2008-2009) chiefly reflected 
the relatively steeper increase in non-social spending, 
mainly in 2008. Public spending soared again in 
2009, with a spike in social spending (9.3% over the 
2008 level).
The situation varies considerably from one country 
to the next. In 2008-2009, the macroeconomic priority 
attached to social spending varied significantly with 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, 
Paraguay and Peru spending less than 10% of GDP, 
while Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay 
spent twice as much. This gap exists although all 
countries have boosted social spending relative to 
GDP since the 1990s. 
The countries’ varying levels of development and tax 
burdens —and hence their very different general public 
budgets and, specifically, social budgets— lead to wide 
disparities in per capita allocations for social fields such 
as education, health, social security and welfare. At one 
end of the spectrum, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia achieve very low per capita spending (less than 
US$ 300) while, at the other end, the countries with the 
highest per capita social spending (over US$ 1,000) are 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Uruguay. On average, the countries with 
the highest social spending manage to allocate up to 
eight times as much as those with the tightest budgets 
(see figure 18).
The variation in social spending by sector shows 
an increase in all the major items, which have thus felt 
to a greater or lesser extent the procyclical variations 
associated with the performance of the region’s 
economies. Even so, this growth has been uneven: 
social security and social welfare are the categories 
with the greatest increases (equivalent to as much as 
three percentage points of GDP), accounting for more 
than half of the overall rise in public social spending 
(see figure 19).
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Figure 18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER 
CAPITA SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009 a





























































































































BPS NFPS PS GSB GG BCG CG
Simple average (21 countries) 
1990-1991: 459 (US$ 2005)
Simple average (21 countries)
2008-2009: 981 (US$ 2005)
981
459
Weighted average (21 countries): 
(dollars at constant 2005 prices)
2008-2009         981
2006-2007         853
2004-2005         740
1998-1999         655
1994-1995         581
1990-1991         459
Simple average (21 countries):
(dollars at constant 2005 prices) 
2008-2009           748
2006-2007           616
2004-2005           526
1998-1999           438
1994-1995           375
1990-1991           315
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a BPS, budgetary public sector; NFPS, non-financial public sector; PS, public sector; GSB, 
General State budget; GG, general government; BCG, budgetary central government; 
CG, central government.
Figure 19 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC 
SOCIAL SPENDING BY SECTOR, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a Increase in spending between the periods 1990-1991 and 2008-2009 in percentage 
points.
The second-highest spending increase was recorded 
in education, whose share in GDP climbed by just over 
50%. But education spending has not escaped volatility 
either since, together with the health sector, it usually bears 
the brunt of fiscal adjustments, especially in the form of 
capital expenditure cuts and current expenditure freezes, 
the latter chiefly through the public-sector wage bill. 
Moreover, the public health budget had shown little 
growth in the past two decades. This has to do partly 
with the trend in several countries towards expansion of 
private-sector delivery of health services in the framework 
of reforms introduced following the structural adjustment 
of the 1980s. But it also reflects the fact that health 
spending is highly procyclical and has a significant capital 
expenditure component that is heavily penalized during 
economic downswings or periods of flat growth. Lastly, 
housing and other social expenditure (notably, water and 
sanitation) show the least public spending growth owing 
in part to the progressive privatization of investments in 
sanitation infrastructure and the tendering out of building 
contracts for social housing schemes in which public 
financing is combined with private (by households, 
through easier access to mortgage facilities). 
Where the parameters of public spending are bound 
by the economic cycle, social and non-social public 
spending fluctuations are usually driven by the country’s 
economic performance. Thus, the procyclicality of public 
spending (and much of social spending), rigidities in 
budget appropriations and the tendency to privatize certain 
items of expenditure conspire against steadier progress 
with social policies and social protection systems aimed 
at reducing inequality, all of which perpetuates the gaps 
and cracks identified in the preceding chapter. 
Prudential fiscal management is a key element in 
long-term economic development, but the over-adjustments 
which commonly occur in public and social expenditure 
during economic downswings dampen those very processes 
that prudential fiscal management seeks to safeguard. 
As a rule, social public spending reductions outnumber 
falls in growth in the region: between 1991 and 2009, 
there were 48 instances of absolute reductions in social 
public spending in the various countries and in 88% of 
these cases (42), the cut exceeded the decline in GDP 
(even during periods when GDP continued to expand).
Yet social spending is less sensitive to the business cycle 
than non-social public spending and the budget overall. 
Thus, even with its procyclical traits, social spending has 
weathered economic fluctuations better than non-social 
public budgetary allocations. So the countercyclical impact 
of social public spending is materialized asymmetrically, 
inasmuch as spending needs to be procyclical in boom 
periods, expanding in schemes conducive to ensuring the 
universal exercise of social rights —with an eye to long-
term financial sustainability— and more countercyclical 
in economic downturns.
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 The financial crisis and social spending in the region
In an effort largely unprecedented in magnitude to 
counter the international financial crisis, most of the 
region’s countries adopted measures, in most cases on a 
temporary basis, to increase public spending and tackle 
the hardships caused by the global financial crisis and 
its repercussions. Many of these measures sought to 
alleviate the impact of the crisis on the real economy, 
sustain activity in local and regional economies, and 
curb the rise in unemployment and poverty. 
The most widely used fiscal measures were tax 
cuts, hikes in subsidies and tax benefits, and increases 
or early disbursement of public spending allocations. 
In the social and production spheres, governments also 
boosted resources for building housing and water and 
sanitation projects, promoting the SME and agricultural 
sectors (facilitation of loans and concessionary repayment 
horizons), strengthening labour policies (unemployment 
insurance, hiring subsidies, employment schemes) and 
funding social programmes, especially conditional 
transfer programmes. 
Not all the countries expanded their public spending 
in 2009: the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Uruguay all cut back 
on public spending although Dominican Republic was the 
only country to do so significantly (by 10.7% compared 
with 2008). But both this last country and Cuba had seen 
expenditure rise in 2008 by much more than the reduction 
in 2009. Several of the remaining countries, including 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay and 
Peru, stepped up their spending by over 10% in 2008 
and 2009. Brazil, Ecuador and Honduras boosted their 
spending by over 7% (see table 3).
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL GROWTH IN GDP, TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING,  






Argentina 0.9 16.8 8.5 13.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 3.4 ... ... 2.9
Brazil -0.6 8.3 9.7 8.7
Chile -1.7 16.6 12.8 15.3
Colombia 1.5 16.4 16.3 16.4
Costa Rica -1.3 14.7 -0.2 5.1
Cuba 1.4 1.5 -5.6 -1.9
Dominican Republic 3.5 -6.5 -14.0 -10.7
Ecuador 0.4 28.5 4.5 9.8
El Salvador -3.1 2.4 37.1 20.9
Guatemala 0.5 15.9 -7.0 4.7
Honduras -2.1 11.6 2.7 7.0
Jamaica -3.0 -3.7 -0.3 -1.1
Mexico -6.0 5.6 7.0 6.2
Nicaragua -1.5 4.3 -0.7 2.0
Panama 3.2 17.1 -5.6 4.8
Paraguay -3.8 26.0 29.6 27.8
Peru 0.9 15.9 8.8 12.1
Trinidad and Tobago a -3.5 ... ... ...
Uruguay 2.6 10.5 -32.7 -0.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -3.3 8.9 -8.3 -0.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a No data available for 2009.
The rise in fiscal spending occurred mainly in non-
social sectors, however, except in Brazil, El Salvador 
Mexico and Paraguay, where social spending rose faster 
than non-social spending. In Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Cuba and Uruguay, the spending cuts fell 
mainly upon non-social items, which favoured a sharp 
expansion in social spending. Jamaica reduced all types of 
spending, with the most significant cuts in social spending. 
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Dominican Republic also compressed its expenditures, 
with the sharpest cuts in non-social areas. Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama increased their total 
public spending even while cutting social spending and 
in the remaining countries, social expenditures grew more 
slowly than other spending items. 
Lastly, among the 10 countries for which information 
is available for 2010 (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru), public spending appears to have been reduced 
in only four (Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Honduras), but 
continues to expand in the others.
 Social security in the region and prospects for establishing a 
universal floor for pension and retirement benefits
In most countries of the region, the social contributions 
administered by the public sector are insufficient for the 
State to finance all retirement benefits and pensions. 
Nevertheless, upon analysis it appears that the combined 
collection potential of the public and private systems in 
most of the countries is enough to fund more —or even 
much more— than the existing pension and retirement 
benefit commitments: at current levels of social security 
membership and coverage, only five countries generate 
or will generate an annual deficit up to 2030 (see table 4).
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PROJECTED ANNUAL BALANCES OF SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME  
AND EXPENDITURE, 2012-2015-2020-2025 AND 2030 a
(Percentages of GDP)
Country 2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 Long-term situation
Argentina 4.7 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 Small surplus
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 Surplus maintained
Brazil 3.6 3.2 2.3 1.4 0.3 Small surplus
Chile 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -1.3 Progressive deficit
Colombia 1.9 1.6 1.0 0.3 -0.4 Progressive deficit
Costa Rica 0.7 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 Progressive deficit
Dominican Republic 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 Small surplus
Ecuador 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 Progressive deficit
El Salvador 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 Surplus maintained
Guatemala 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 Surplus maintained
Honduras 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 Surplus maintained
Mexico 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 Progressive deficit
Nicaragua 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 Surplus maintained
Panama 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 Small surplus
Paraguay 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.1 Small surplus
Peru 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 Small surplus
Uruguay 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 Small surplus
Average 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.5 --
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries 
and Economist Intelligence Unit [online] www.eiu.org, for the official GDP figures and growth projections for the countries. 
a Projections are based on the assumption that levels of social security membership and coverage recorded in the surveys and the participation rates and contribution parameters remain 
the same, while GDP and numbers of employed and of the older population vary and wages increase in real terms by half the rate of GDP growth.
Given these estimates, the question is whether and to 
what extent it would be possible to use part of cumulative 
social security funds not just to institute a solidarity-based 
pillar among retirees but also to gradually establish a 
universal minimum pension for all older persons. As 
shown in figure 20, the average cost in 2012 would be 
1.7% of that year’s GDP and this percentage would fall to 
1% of GDP on average if it were limited to the aggregate 
cost of a targeted minimum pension for underprivileged 
older persons.
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Figure 20 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): COST OF A UNIVERSAL 
PENSION AND A TARGETED PENSION FOR  






































































































































Universal pension Targeted pension
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries and Economist Intelligence Unit [online] www.eiu.org for 
the official GDP figures and growth projections for the countries.
a Pension equivalent to the value of the national poverty line. The targeted pension 
is for older persons living in households with a per capita income equal to or below 
1.8 poverty lines.
The various projections and simulations of scenarios 
for social security financing and expenditure indicate that, 
on the basis of potential levels of social contributions, the 
vast majority of countries are in a position to finance a 
targeted pension for vulnerable older persons in the short 
term. Some could even contemplate a universal pension, 
but this would call for more robust social security systems 
supported by stronger labour markets, greater labour force 
participation, a more dynamic formal sector and broader 
social security enrolment.
Nevertheless, in the long term, social security systems 
would have to be redesigned by means of a new wave of 
reforms, especially in those countries that implemented 
structural reforms based on the partial or total privatization 
of the social security system and on an expansion of 
resources through new fiscal covenants. Such a strategy 
would facilitate the introduction of solidarity-based pillars 
in the systems (redistribution among retirees, financing of 
non-contributory pensions, award of a basic pension). But 
even this might be insufficient: several countries would 
need to change their parameters, mainly by increasing the 
contributory burden (and possibly by changing the share 
paid by workers, employers and the State), ensuring as far 
as possible that this is achieved without diminishing the 
amount of old age, disability and death benefits.
Caribbean youth: exclusion and vulnerability
 Demographic profile of Caribbean youth
Young people (aged from 15 to 29 years) represented a 
quarter of the total population of the Caribbean in 2010, 
just under the Latin American average, although the 
proportion ranges from 30% at the upper extreme (Belize 
and Haiti) to approximately 20% at the lower extreme 
(Cuba and Puerto Rico). It is projected that the region’s 
young population as a proportion of the total will decline 
gradually in the years to come.
This forms part of what is known as the demographic 
dividend (see chapter I), a phenomenon which has begun 
in all Caribbean countries, but has already come to an end 
in the United States Virgin Islands while in Guyana it is 
expected to last until 2050. The dividend offers unique 
opportunities, which may be exploited by promoting 
social investment in the youngest sectors of the population 
in order to emphatically strengthen their inclusion in 
education, health and training policies.
Migration is another phenomenon that has a significant 
impact on young people and on population dynamics in 
the Caribbean. In general, while the emigration of young 
people is very high in this subregion, it is lower than 
that of adults. According to data from 2000, people aged 
15 to 24 years in Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
make up almost a quarter of the total migrant population.
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With regard to youth mortality, exogenous causes 
(homicides, accidents and suicides) account for just 
over half of deaths among young people aged between 
15 and 29 in the Caribbean. The subregion has one of 
the highest murder rates, comparable to Central America, 
South America and Southern Africa. The countries with 
the highest rates are the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Table 5 
THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EMIGRATION BY AGE GROUP AND SEX, 2000-2001
(Percentages)
Country
Age group (male) Age group (female)
Under 15 




years 15-24 years 25-44 years 45-64 years
65 years 
and over
Antigua and Barbuda 5 8 35 34 18 6 10 40 29 15
Bahamas …  13 49 25 13 …  16 56 21 7
Barbados … 4 20 38 38 … 4 21 41 34
Belize …  22 46 24 8 …  25 49 19 7
Bermudas …  7 41 38 14 …  7 40 38 15
Dominica 12 10 36 24 18 13 11 36 23 17
Grenada 4 5 32 32 27 4 8 30 31 27
Jamaica 10 25 42 10 4 10 23 38 14 5
Montserrat … 11 25 32 32 … 15 27 24 34
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 8 39 33 20 … 11 38 29 22
Saint Lucia … 13 37 29 21 … 16 39 26 19
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … 7 38 33 22 … 11 41 28 20
Turks and Caicos Islands … 8 42 38 12 … 12 47 29 12
Trinidad and Tobago … 26 41 24 9 … 25 38 26 11
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of census data of the 2000-2001 round, Thomas-Hope, Elizabeth, “Regional special topic 
monography on international migration, based on the analysis of the 2000 round census data of eighteen Caribbean countries”, Greater Georgetown, secretariat of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), 2009.
 Youth and poverty: the risks of early emancipation
As in Latin America, poverty in the English-speaking 
Caribbean generally has a greater impact on the child 
population (under 15 years). Despite this, in Antigua and 
Barbuda 25.4% of people living in extreme poverty and 
22.6% of all poor people are aged from 15 to 29 years. 
In Saint Lucia, just over a quarter of the poor are young 
(from 15 to 29 years). This percentage is lower in the 
Cayman Islands (22%) but not in Grenada or Trinidad 
and Tobago, where a third of those living in poverty 
are young (aged between 15 and 29). In Belize, 21% of 
all poor are aged from 15 to 24, while just over half of 
Belizeans aged 14 to 17 are living in poverty.
From a life-cycle perspective, there is a highly significant 
correlation between the increased likelihood of living in 
poverty and emancipation at an early age from the youth 
phase, when the role of head of household or spouse is 
assumed. Data from some countries show that in the first 
income quintiles the proportion of young people aged 
around 20 who are heads of household or spouses is much 
higher than the percentage of young people of the same age 
in the higher quintiles. This phenomenon underscores the 
findings presented in chapter IV: social protection excludes 
some particularly vulnerable segments of the population 
and of the life cycle, and penalizes low-income sectors. 
 Sexual and reproductive health
Estimates indicate that around 30% of adolescents in 
the English-speaking Caribbean subregion have had 
sex. On average, men who have sexual relations during 
adolescence do so from the age of 11, and women from 
the age of 14-15. Moreover, around half of sexually 
active adolescents report that their first sexual experience 
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was non-consensual, while almost a third of sexually 
active adolescents have multiple sexual partners. This 
presents policymakers with enormous challenges in 
terms of providing timely information and preventing 
sexual violence and assisting the victims.
One of the characteristics of the Latin America 
and the Caribbean region is a stubbornly high teenage 
maternity rate when compared to fertility rates for the 
population as a whole, as discussed in chapter II. However, 
the fertility rate among adolescent mothers (ratio of 
the number of births to total number of women in this 
age group) is markedly lower in the Caribbean than in 
Latin America: of the 19 countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean whose rate is lower than 61 births per 
1,000 inhabitants among women aged 15 to 19 years, 
17 are located in the Caribbean and only Belize, Guyana 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines come close to the 
Latin American average.
HIV/AIDS is a priority for the Caribbean countries, 
given its high incidence. The prevalence of HIV among 
young people and adults (from 15 to 49 years), which 
equates to 1% of the total population, is the second-highest 
in the world, surpassed only by sub-Saharan Africa. A 
prevalence of 0.1 in Cuba contrasts sharply with countries 
in which the prevalence is over 1%, such as the Bahamas 
(3.1%), Barbados (1.4)%, Belize (2.3%), Haiti (1.9%), 
Jamaica (1.7%), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.5%). 
Although the number of new cases of HIV infection in 
the subregion has fallen slightly over the past decade, it 
is estimated that between 220,000 and 270,000 people 
are living with HIV, of whom approximately 53% are 
women. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, women 
make up 75% of new cases among people aged 15 to 
24, while in Jamaica the ratio of infected women to men 
in this age group is 3 to 1.
HIV is a particularly important issue for the young 
Caribbean population. Approximately 83% of HIV cases 
are diagnosed in people aged 15 to 54; a third of them 
are found among people aged between 25 and 34. Given 
that the disease has an eight-year incubation period, it 
may be inferred that almost a third of new HIV cases 
occur among 15-24-year-olds. As to condom use, recent 
studies indicate that 90% of sexually active adolescents 
in the English-speaking Caribbean region have used a 
condom, but only 16%-25% report doing so regularly. 
When the group under examination is restricted to women 
aged 15 to 24 in countries such as Belize, the Dominican 
Republic, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, almost 50% 
used condoms during their most recent sexual encounter, 
a relatively high percentage in comparison with some 
Latin American countries, but very low considering the 
increased risk of HIV infection.
 Youth unemployment
At the start of the previous decade, although young people 
(men and women) aged 15 to 24 years represented 20% 
to 30% of the workforce in Caribbean countries, they 
accounted for between 40% and 60% of the unemployed. 
Likewise, unemployment rates among young people (aged 
15 to 24) in some countries of the subregion were two 
to four times those of the adult population. According to 
recent data, this situation has not changed significantly.
Failure to create the right conditions for young people 
to find decent employment reduces their opportunities, 
limits their present and future development and in many 
cases heightens existing levels of inequality and poverty. 
In Antigua and Barbuda, for instance, 80% of unemployed 
men aged between 25 and 29 live in poverty, on less than 
US$ 2.51 a day (in general, 30.6% of the total unemployed 
population in that country live on less than that amount).
Table 6 
THE CARIBBEAN (8 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYED YOUTH  
AGED FROM 15 TO 24 YEARS








Saint Lucia 2004 40.0
Trinidad and Tobago 2008 42.0
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), LABORSTA database, 2011. 
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 Institutional framework for youth policies
The institutional framework and public policies on 
youth have been strengthened over the past two decades. 
In some Caribbean countries, specific government 
departments are responsible for establishing links with 
government and civil society bodies involved in youth 
issues. Some government ministries, while not being 
exclusively devoted to youth issues, do include these 
matters among their primary objectives. For some 
Caribbean governments, youth issues and the institutional 
response fall within the jurisdiction of different agencies. 
They are directed by action plans that bring together, in 
a single public youth policy, the different activities of 
the government, and the private sector in some cases. 
In general, however, as in Latin America, more progress 
is needed on comprehensive approaches that rise above 
sectoral perspectives, as is the nature of the young 
actor, in whom risks, abilities, opportunities, systems 
of belonging and forms of participation come together. 
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Chapter I
Poverty, inequality and perceptions  
of work in Latin America
A.  Poverty
In 2010, as economic growth recovered, poverty and indigence in the region fell to their lowest 
levels in 20 years. Although the drop in poverty has been mainly due to average household 
income growth, declining inequality has also been making an increasing contribution.
Per capita GDP in Latin America grew by 4.9% in 
2010. This outcome was the result of a combination 
of situations ranging from high growth rates in some 
countries to falling output in others. The highest growth 
rates were in Paraguay (13.1%), Argentina and Uruguay 
(8.1%), followed by Peru (7.5%), Brazil (6.8%) and the 
Dominican Republic (6.3%). Per capita output in Haiti 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela fell by 6.6% 
and 3.0%, respectively (see table I.1).
GDP growth was driven by domestic demand, 
in the form of higher investment and private-sector 
consumption, and external demand, as manifested by 
substantial export growth in a number of the region’s 
countries  (ECLAC, 2011a).
1.  Economic context
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Table I.1 

































2000-2008 2.6 13.5 3.7 9.6 2000-2008 -1.1 … … 17.2
2009 -0.2 8.7 11.7 7.7 2009 1.2 … … 2.1
2010 8.1 7.7 12.9 10.9 2010 -6.6 … … 6.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Honduras
2000-2008 1.7 7.8 -1.2 5.4 2000-2008 3.0 … … 8.4
2009 1.6 7.9 3.8 0.3 2009 -4.1 4.9 … 3.0
2010 2.4 6.5 … 7.2 2010 0.8 6.4 … 6.5
Brazil Mexico
2000-2008 2.4 9.5 -1.1 6.9 2000-2008 1.6 4.4 2.3 5.1
2009 -1.1 8.1 1.3 4.3 2009 -7.2 6.6 0.6 3.6
2010 6.8 6.7 2.1 5.9 2010 4.8 6.4 … 4.4
Chile Nicaragua
2000-2008 3.1 9.0 1.6 3.8 2000-2008 2.0 8.8 0.0 9.2
2009 -2.6 9.7 4.8 -1.4 2009 -2.7 10.5 5.8 1.8
2010 4.2 8.2 2.3 3.0 2010 3.2 9.7 1.3 9.1
Colombia Panama
2000-2008 2.6 15.2 1.2 6.5 2000-2008 4.2 12.8 -1.5 2.7
2009 0.0 13.0 1.1 2.0 2009 2.2 7.9 2.7 1.9
2010 2.9 12.4 2.5 3.2 2010 5.9 7.7 1.9 4.9
Costa Rica Paraguay
2000-2008 2.7 6.0 0.3 11.3 2000-2008 0.9 9.8 0.2 8.8
2009 -2.6 8.5 7.7 4.0 2009 -5.5 8.2 4.5 1.9
2010 2.8 7.1 2.1 5.8 2010 13.1 7.8 0.7 7.2
Cuba Peru
2000-2008 5.9 2.7 5.0 2.8 2000-2008 4.2 9.0 0.7 2.7
2009 1.4 1.7 4.6 -0.1 2009 -0.3 8.4 3.1 0.2
2010 2.1 2.5 3.0 1.5 2010 7.5 7.9 2.6 2.1
Ecuador Dominican Republic
2000-2008 3.7 8.7 … 16.5 2000-2008 3.7 16.1 … 13.5
2009 -0.7 8.5 … 4.3 2009 2.1 14.9 … 5.7
2010 2.5 7.6 … 3.3 2010 6.3 14.3 … 6.3
El Salvador Uruguay
2000-2008 2.1 6.3 … 4.0 2000-2008 2.4 13.0 -1.0 9.0
2009 -3.6 7.1 3.5 -0.2 2009 2.2 7.6 7.3 5.9
2010 0.9 ... 1.0 2.1 2010 8.1 7.1 3.3 6.9
Guatemala Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
2000-2008 1.2 5.0 -0.9 7.5 2000-2008 2.6 12.7 -1.8 21.0
2009 -1.9 … 0.1 -0.3 2009 -4.8 7.8 -6.6 26.9
2010 0.3 … 2.8 5.4 2010 -3.0 8.6 -5.2 27.4
Latin America
2000-2008 2.3 9.5 ... 8.6
2009 -3.1 8.1 ... 3.7
2010 4.9 7.3 ... 6.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Based on per capita GDP in dollars, at constant 2005 prices. 
b For the 2000-2008 period, the Guatemala data only cover 2002-2004. In Honduras, the 2000-2008 data start from 2001. The Peru unemployment data are for the city of Lima.
c  The coverage of this index is usually very incomplete. In most countries it covers only formal workers in the industrial sector. 
d  Year-on-year changes to December. The regional aggregate is the simple average of these changes. 
43Social Panorama of Latin America • 2011
The employment situation was better than in 2009. 
The employment rate (the ratio between the number of 
people in work and the working-age population) rose 
by 0.6 percentage points to 54.9%, although this trend 
was not seen in all the countries. Whereas this indicator 
rose by 0.4 percentage points in South America, it 
fell by 0.2 percentage points in Mexico and Central 
America. During 2010, furthermore, there was a rise 
of 0.3 percentage points in the participation rate (the 
ratio between the economically active population and 
the working-age population). The downward trend in 
the two variables since mid-2008 was thus reversed 
(ECLAC, 2011a).
The urban unemployment rate fell from 8.1% to 7.3%, 
leaving it below not only the 2000-2008 average but all 
the annual values of the past 20 years. Unemployment 
fell by about 1.4 percentage points in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, but rose 
by 0.8 percentage points or more in Cuba, Honduras and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Average wage growth was positive in real terms 
in 13 of the 14 countries with information available in 
2010, the one exception being the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. In nine of them, however, wage growth was 
lower than in 2009.
A feature of 2010 was a rise in inflation in all the 
countries of the region. The simple average of their 
inflation rates was 6.5%, or 2.8 percentage points more 
than in 2009. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had 
the highest rate (27.4%), followed by Argentina (10.9%). 
Although no other country had two-digit inflation, the 
number of countries with inflation rates below 5% fell 
from 16 to 8 between 2009 and 2010. The increase 
in inflation was driven mainly by food and beverage 
prices, which on average rose 1.8 times as much as 
those for other products. This is a particularly important 
consideration when it comes to measuring indigence, 
as described below.
The 2011 projection is for regional GDP to grow 
by 4.7%, giving a 3.6% rise in per capita GDP. The 
recovery seen in the region since mid-2009 is thus 
continuing, albeit with slower growth than in 2010. The 
unemployment rate is expected to fall even further, and 
inflation to carry on trending upward.
2. Recent evolution of poverty
The poverty level in the region was 31.4% in 2010, 
including 12.3% of the population living in extreme 
poverty or indigence. In absolute terms, these figures 
represented 177 million people in poverty, of whom 
70 million were indigent (see figure I.1).
Figure I.1 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1980-2011 a





















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Estimate for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti. The figures above the bars are the percentages and total numbers of poor people (indigent plus non-indigent poor). The 2011 figures 
are projections.
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Box I.1 
METHOD USED TO MEASURE POVERTY
According to the approach used in this report 
to estimate poverty, a person is classified 
as “poor” when the per capita income 
of that person’s household is below the 
“poverty line” or minimum income needed 
to meet a person’s basic needs. Poverty 
lines, expressed in each country’s currency, 
are calculated from the cost of a basket of 
goods and services using the “cost of basic 
needs” method.
Whenever the necessary data were 
available, the cost of the basic food 
basket was estimated for each country 
and geographical area; this basket 
encompasses the goods required to 
cover people’s nutritional needs, taking 
into account consumption habits, the 
actual availability of foodstuffs and their 
relative prices, as well as price differences 
between metropolitan areas, other urban 
areas and rural areas.
To this value, the “indigence line”, was 
added the amount of money needed by 
a household to meet its basic non-food 
needs in order to calculate the total value 
of the poverty line. This involved multiplying 
the indigence line by a constant factor: 
2 for urban areas and 1.75 for rural areas.a
In most cases, data on the structure of 
household consumption of both foodstuffs 
and other goods and services came from 
household budget surveys carried out in 
the countries.b Because those surveys were 
conducted in earlier years than the poverty 
estimates, indigence lines and poverty lines 
have been updated to reflect cumulative 
changes in the consumer price index (CPI). 
Up to December 2006, the same factor was 
applied to both lines. Since 2007, however, 
the indigence line has been adjusted to 
reflect changes in the food CPI, whereas 
the part of the poverty line that corresponds 
to non-food spending is adjusted by the 
relevant CPI. Since 2007, therefore, the 
differential between the indigence and 
poverty lines has ceased to be constant.
Family income data have been taken 
from household surveys conducted in 
each country in the years corresponding 
to the poverty estimates presented in this 
edition. In line with usual ECLAC practice, 
the data have been corrected to account 
for non-response to some income-related 
questions by wage earners, the self-
employed and retirees, and to mitigate 
probable underreporting biases. This latter 
operation was carried out by comparing 
the income items in surveys with estimates 
based on the household income and 
expenditure accounts in each country’s 
system of national accounts, prepared 
for this purpose using official information.
Income here means total current 
income, i.e., income from wage labour (in 
both money and kind), self-employed work 
(including self-supply and the consumption 
value of products generated by the 
household), property income, retirement 
and other pensions and other transfers 
received by households. In most countries, 
household income also includes an imputed 
rental value for owner-occupied dwellings.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a The sole exceptions to this general rule were Brazil and Peru. For Brazil, the study used the indigence lines estimated for each area of the country as part of a joint project 
conducted by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and ECLAC in the late 1990s. For Peru, the 
indigence and poverty lines used were estimates prepared by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) under the Programme for the Improvement of Surveys and 
the Measurement of Living Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean as implemented in that country.
b When data obtained by processing a recent survey of this type were not available, other relevant information on household consumption was used.
The figures indicate that the economic recovery 
since the 2009 crisis has been at least partly reflected in 
the poverty indicators, with the poverty rate falling by 
1.6 percentage points and the indigence rate by 
0.8 percentage points from their 2009 levels. These 
declines meant that the number of people living in 
poverty and indigence fell by some 7 million and 3 
million, respectively.
Comparisons with the late 1990s are favourable. 
The cumulative reduction in poverty since 1999 is 
12.4 percentage points, while indigence has fallen 
by 6.3 percentage points. Since 1990, furthermore, 
the two indicators have fallen by a total of 17.0 and 
10.3 percentage points, respectively.
Projections for GDP growth and the expected 
evolution of inflation in each country suggest that the 
poverty rate will fall slightly in 2011 to 30.4%, about a 
percentage point below the 2010 rate. Conversely, the 
indigence rate could actually rise, with the increase 
in food prices counteracting the expected growth in 
household incomes (see figure I.1).
The differences in the poverty and indigence 
dynamics are partly due to the way food prices have 
been changing relative to other goods and services. 
This is because indigence lines, which measure the 
cost of a basic basket of foodstuffs, are updated year 
by year in accordance with the change in the food CPI, 
while the non-food component of the poverty line is 
updated in accordance with the relevant CPI.1 Much 
as happened between mid-2006 and mid-2008, food 
prices increased by more than those for other goods 
in 2010. In this case, however, the differences were 
slightly less marked. Whereas food prices increased 
by 2.3 times as much as those of non-food goods in 
2007 and 2008, in 2010 the difference was 1.8 times 
(taking a simple average of each country’s price indices) 
(see figure I.2).
1 This method of updating the indigence and poverty lines has been 
applied since 2007. Formerly, both lines were updated using the 
same price deflator, so that the relationship between them stayed 
constant over time. 
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Figure I.2 





























Food CPI Non-food CPI Food/Non-food
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Simple average of price indices for 18 countries of the region. Year-on-year changes 
to December.
The findings described imply further progress 
towards attainment of the first Millennium Goal, which 
is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people in extreme poverty. Dividing the total planned 
reduction in indigence (11.3 percentage points) by 
the cumulative reduction between 1990 and 2010 
(10.2 percentage points) shows that Latin America is 
91% of the way towards achieving this. This is more 
than the elapsed percentage of the time allowed for 
meeting the goal, which is 80%.
Information for 2010, available in 12 countries of 
the region, reveals poverty rates both rising and falling 
in differing degrees relative to the previous year.2 Five 
countries recorded substantial declines in their poverty 
rates: Peru (-3.5 points), Ecuador (-3.0 points), Argentina 
(-2.7 points), Uruguay (-2.0 points) and Colombia 
(-1.4 points). In these countries indigence rates also fell, 
by between 0.5 and 1.7 percentage points.
Honduras and Mexico were the only countries 
whose poverty and indigence rates rose substantially, 
by 1.7 and 1.0 percentage points in the first case and 
1.5 and 2.1 percentage points in the second. In the case 
of Mexico, it should be noted that the comparison was 
with the 2008 figures. Consequently, it reflects not only 
the considerable expansion of the Mexican economy 
2 Data are also available for Costa Rica. However, these are from 
a new household survey and are not strictly comparable with the 
earlier ones (see box I.2).
in 2010, but also the sharp contraction in per capita 
GDP in 2009 (-7.2%). The indigence rate in Panama 
increased by 1.5 percentage points, while the other 
countries with information available (the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador and Paraguay) did not register 
significant changes in their poverty and indigence rates 
(see figure I.3).
Figure I.3 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL CHANGE IN POVERTY 












































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Urban areas.
b Annual change between 2008 and 2010.
In most cases, the poverty gap and poverty gap 
squared indices bear out the trends described on the 
basis of the poverty and indigence rates, and the 
magnitude of the changes in these is similar. Panama 
is an exception, as despite the absence of significant 
changes in the poverty rate it registers an appreciable 
rise in the poverty gap squared index, revealing a 
worsening of the situation among the poorest. The 
poverty gap squared index also rose by slightly more 
than the poverty rate in Mexico. Conversely, the poverty 
gap and the poverty gap squared fell by more than the 
poverty rate in the countries where this last indicator 
declined substantially. It should be recalled that the 
poverty gap index is formulated to include not only the 
percentage of poor people but also the gap between the 
average income of the poor and the poverty line, while 
the poverty gap squared index also takes account of how 
this income is distributed among the poor (see box I.3 
and table I.A1 in the annex to chapter I). 
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Box I.2 
RECENT CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SERIES
With a view to improving the instruments 
available for public policy design and 
monitoring, institutes of statistics make 
changes from time to time in the household 
surveys they implement. Although these 
changes usually represent an advance, 
the comparability of series across time 
may be affected. At least three countries 
have made changes to their surveys in 
recent years.
In 2009, the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) in 
Argentina made some changes to the 
way information from the Permanent 
Household Survey (EPH) was treated for 
the series running from 2003 onward (the 
year the survey was made continuous 
rather than half-yearly as before). These 
changes include the cal ibrat ion of 
expansion factors, the method used to 
correct for non-responses to the income 
questions, and the construction of income 
aggregates for items that are not of monthly 
recurrence. The new 2004-2010 data 
series, incorporating these adjustments, 
is included in this edition along with data 
up to 2002, even though the two series 
are not strictly comparable.
In July 2006, the Major Integrated 
Household Survey (GEIH) replaced the 
Continuous Household Survey (ECH) 
in Colombia as an information source 
for household living conditions. The 
various changes, such as enlargement 
of the domains studied, the change in 
informant type and the increase in the 
number of questions and alterations in 
their wording, made it necessary to splice 
the employment, income and poverty 
figures from the two sources, a task 
which was carried out by the Mission 
for the splicing of employment, poverty 
and inequality series (MESEP). MESEP 
also carried out a review of the poverty 
measurement criteria, the result being 
a new 2002-2010 series.a Although 
the figures in this edition of the Social 
Panorama incorporate the modifications 
carried out for splicing purposes, they 
refer to the old DNP poverty estimate 
and not the recent update.
In Costa Rica, the National Institute 
of Statistics and Censuses has been 
implementing the National Household 
Survey (ENAHO) instead of the Multipurpose 
Household Survey (EHPM) since 2010. The 
methodological changes introduced mean that 
the findings of the new ENAHO 2010 are not 
directly comparable with those published on 
the basis of the previous survey. The country 
expects to produce a spliced historical series 
soon. Consequently, the Costa Rica figures 
for 2010 are not comparable with the series 
up to 2009.
In Paraguay, the Department of 
Statistics, Surveys and Censuses (DGEEC) 
readjusted the expansion factors of the 
Permanent Household Survey (EPH) for 
the years from 2003 to 2008 as a way of 
offsetting the non-response rate observed in 
that period. The data included in this edition 
incorporate those readjustments.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a See [online] http://www.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=DXInD1TENeU%3d&tabid=337.
Box I.3 
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING POVERTY
The poverty measurements used in this 
document belong to the family of parametric 
indices proposed by Foster, Greer and 





















where n represents population size, q 
denotes the number of people with income 
below the poverty or indigence line (z) and 
the parameter a > 0 assigns differing levels 
of shortfall between the income (y) of each 
poor or indigent individual and the poverty 
or indigence line.
When a takes the value 0, expression 
(1) corresponds to the headcount ratio (H), 
which indicates the percentage of people with 




When a equals 1, the expression yields 
the poverty (or indigence) gap (PG), which 
weights the percentage of poor (or indigent) 
people by how far their incomes fall short 

















Lastly, when a has the value 2, a greater 
relative weight is assigned in the final result 
to those who fall furthest below the poverty 
(or indigence) line by the method of squaring 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of James Foster, Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke, “A class of decomposable poverty 
measures”, Econometrica, vol. 52, No. 3, 1984.
Changes in the regional poverty rate are derived 
from the changes observed in the countries as described 
above and from the projections produced for countries 
where information is not available. On this occasion, 
the regional aggregate is particularly sensitive to these 
projections, as they had to be applied to the region’s two 
most populous countries (Brazil in 2010 and Mexico 
in 2009). In fact, almost half of the drop in regional 
poverty is the result of the projected decline in poverty 
in Brazil.3 Again, about a third of the reduction in 
3 The National Household Survey (PNAD) was not carried out in 
Brazil in 2010 because it was a census year. The poverty projection 
for that year uses evidence from the 2010 Monthly Employment 
Survey (PME) and from per capita GDP and price indices.
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regional poverty between 2009 and 2010 stems from 
Mexico, since the projection used to construct the 
regional aggregate in 2009 puts poverty in Mexico 
that year at a level some 2 percentage points higher 
than the figure observed in 2010.
The evolution of poverty over a longer period, 
between 2002 and the most recent available estimate, 
Figure I.4 









































































































































































































Poverty rate Poverty gap Poverty gap squared
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
3.  Factors underlying changes in poverty
Two different methodological approaches are used to 
analyse changes in poverty. The first of these disaggregates 
any variation in poverty and indigence rates into two 
components, growth in average income (“growth 
effect”) and changes in the way this income is distributed 
(“distribution effect”). The latter involves assessing the role 
played by the different sources contributing to household 
income and paying special attention to the labour market 
factors accounting for changes in earnings. In both cases, 
a comparison is made between the 2002-2008 period, 
prior to the economic crisis, and the 2002-2010 period, 
encompassing the crisis.4
As indicated in earlier editions of the Social 
Panorama, poverty reduction has been made possible by 
the complementarity of the growth and distribution effects. 
4 The use of long periods makes changes in the poverty rate large 
enough for the decomposition analyses described to be carried out.
During the 2002-2010 period, nine countries reduced poverty 
mainly because of average income growth, while in six it 
was the distribution effect that predominated. The growth 
effect was particularly important in Argentina, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Honduras, where it 
accounted for 80% or more of the decline in poverty. The 
contribution of the distribution effect is rarely as great. 
Even when it is the predominant factor, its contribution 
to the decline in poverty is usually under 60%. It did 
exceed 100% in El Salvador and Mexico, but both are 
countries where the total change in the poverty rate was 
very small (see table I.2).
A comparison of the 2002-2008 and 2002-2010 
periods shows a rise in the influence of distributive 
changes in reducing poverty in a number of countries. In 
both Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the 
distribution effect came to outstrip the growth effect, with 
its contribution rising from 45% to 55%, and it increased 
substantially in another three countries.
 
shows a general trend towards lower poverty in the 
region’s countries. According to the poverty gap and 
poverty gap squared indices, the net exit of people from 
poverty and indigence that took place in that period 
was accompanied by a rise in the average incomes of 
the poor and a smaller distributional disparity among 
them (see figure I.4).
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Table I.2 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN POVERTY AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE GROWTH  
AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS, 2002-2008 AND 2002-2010
(Percentages)
2002-2008 a 2002-2010 b
Change in poverty
(percentage points)
Percentage contribution to total change Change in poverty
(percentage points)
Percentage contribution to total change
Growth Distribution Growth Distribution
Argentina c -20.6 81 19 -36.8 80 20
Brazil -11.7 56 44 -12.7 46 54
Chile -6.5 33 67 -8.7 44 56
Colombia -8.0 87 13 -9.9 83 17
Costa Rica -3.8 23 77 -1.3 ... ...
Dominican Republic -2.8 >100 <0 -5.7 >100 <0
Ecuador c -10.1 75 25 -11.9 78 22
El Salvador -1.4 <0 >100 -2.3 <0 >100
Honduras -8.4 71 29 -9.9 86 14
Mexico -4.6 90 10 -3.1 <0 >100
Panama -9.2 48 52 -11.1 46 54
Paraguay -2.8 73 27 -4.9 66 34
Peru -18.6 74 26 -23.4 73 27
Uruguay c -1.4 76 24 -6.8 56 44
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -21.0 56 44 -20.8 45 55
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
 a Covers the periods 2002-2006 in Argentina, 2001-2008 in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, 2000-2006 in Chile, 2001-2004 in El Salvador and 2002-2007 in Honduras.
 b Covers the periods 2001-2009 in Brazil, 2000-2009 in Chile, 2002-2009 in Costa Rica and 2001-2010 in El Salvador, Paraguay and Peru.
 c Urban areas.
The findings described imply that since the 
economic crisis, whose greatest effects were felt 
in 2009, poverty reduction has not only continued but 
has been accompanied by greater redistribution. While 
the changes observed are small in size, they do indicate 
that countries have scope to deal with adverse economic 
situations by safeguarding the living conditions of the 
most disadvantaged in society.
Both in the period prior to the crisis (2002-2008) and in 
the 2008-2010 period, poverty reduction came mainly from 
rising earnings. Other income sources, particularly transfers, 
also contributed, but to a lesser degree. In the second period, 
however, transfers played a much more important role. In 
fact, they were the main source of poverty reduction in Chile 
and Panama and played an important role in Argentina, 
Colombia and the Dominican Republic (see figure I.5).
Figure I.5 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL CHANGES IN TOTAL PER CAPITA INCOME IN POOR HOUSEHOLDS,a  



















































































































































































Earnings Transfers Other income Total income
A. 2002-2008 b B. 2008-2010 c
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The percentage of the population analysed is the same in both periods and corresponds to the 2002 poverty rate.
b Covers the periods 2002-2006 in Argentina, 2001-2008 in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, 2000-2006 in Chile, 2001-2004 in El Salvador and 2002-2007 in Honduras. In Honduras, the 
“other income” item includes all non-work income.
c Covers the periods 2006-2010 in Argentina, 2008-2009 in Brazil, 2006-2009 in Chile, 2008-2009 in Costa Rica, 2004-2010 in El Salvador and 2007-2010 in Honduras.
d Urban areas.
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Changes in per capita earnings can be expressed as 
the product of changes in earnings per person employed 
and the percentage of people employed. In the 2002-2008 
period, the rise in employment contributed to earnings 
growth, but less so than the change in the remuneration 
of those employed. In the 2008-2010 period, covering 
the economic crisis, employment fell in nine of the 
region’s countries, this being counteracted in some of 
them by growth in the earnings of those employed. 
Colombia, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay are exceptions, 
as employment among poor households increased in the 
recent period (see figure I.6).
Figure I.6 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL CHANGE IN THE COMPONENTS OF PER CAPITA  

















































































































































































A. 2002-2008 b B. 2008-2010 c
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The percentage of the population analysed is the same in both periods and corresponds to the poverty rate in 2002. E = earnings; W = employed population; N = total population.
b Covers the periods 2002-2006 in Argentina, 2001-2008 in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, 2000-2006 in Chile, 2001-2004 in El Salvador and 2002-2007 in Honduras. In Honduras, the 
“other income” item includes all non-work income.
c Covers the periods 2006-2010 in Argentina, 2008-2009 in Brazil, 2006-2009 in Chile, 2008-2009 in Costa Rica, 2004-2010 in El Salvador and 2007-2010 in Honduras.
d Urban areas.
B. Distributive inequality
The countries of Latin America are characterized by highly inequitable income distribution. In 
recent years there has been a favourable shift towards a lessening of the inequality of income 
distribution, mainly as a result of improved distribution of earnings and the redistributive role 
played by the State through cash transfers. 
It is a very well-known fact that income distribution in 
Latin America is among the world’s most unequal. Although 
certain methodological details limit the comparability of 
inequality indicators across countries and regions (see 
box I.4), this does not change the fact that the region’s 
average Gini index is higher than any other’s. Although 
the Latin American countries display differing degrees 
of income concentration, their individual Gini indices 
are all above the average for any of the regions analysed 
except sub-Saharan Africa (see figure I.7).
1. Recent inequality trends
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Box I.4 
COMPARABILITY OF INCOME MEASUREMENTS
The measurement of income in household 
surveys presents a number of challenges that 
particularly affect the potential for making 
valid and significant comparisons of inequality 
figures between countries.
One of these difficulties, which is 
particularly significant when it comes to 
making comparisons with other regions of 
the world, stems from the use of spending 
rather than income as an indicator of well-
being. This variable, which is routinely used 
in some developing countries, has a less 
unequal distribution than income.
The different characteristics of the 
household surveys used to measure 
income are also a very important factor in 
comparability. The type of survey used, the 
reference period for income and the amount 
and comprehensiveness of the income 
flows measured can have a significant 
effect on inequality indicators. In addition, 
the countries follow different imputation 
practices when correcting for non-response 
to income questions, and the characteristics 
of these have varying impacts on inequality 
measurements.
For the estimates presented here, ECLAC 
has carried out an adjustment procedure to 
diminish the effect of underreporting of income 
in surveys. This consists in multiplying income 
from each source by a factor that matches 
the discrepancy vis-à-vis the corresponding 
per capita income as reported in the national 
accounts. This procedure increases average 
incomes and generally alters their distribution 
too. In particular, it tends to yield higher 
values for inequality, chiefly owing to the 
fact that the capital income gap is imputed 
exclusively to the wealthiest quintile.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Figure I.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: GINI 
CONCENTRATION COEFFICIENT, AROUND 2009 a













































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries; World Bank, World Development Indicators [online] http://
databank.worldbank.orgddp/home.do. 
a The regional data are expressed as simple averages, calculated using the latest 
observation available in each country for the 2000-2009 period. 
b Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
According to the most recent figures, the lowest-income 
40% of the population receives an average of 15% of 
total income, while the 10% of the population at the top 
of the distribution receives a third of total income. The 
average income of the wealthiest quintile is 18.3 times 
that of the poorest quintile.
Distributional inequality manifests itself heterogeneously 
in the region’s countries. The income share of the four poorest 
deciles is highest in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Uruguay, at around 20% or slightly over, while this 
share does not exceed 12% in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. 
In the first two countries mentioned, meanwhile, the share 
of the wealthiest decile does not exceed 25%, whereas in 
Brazil and Guatemala it is close to 40% (see figure I.8).
Figure I.8 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCOME SHARE BY GROUPS 

















































































































Deciles 1 to 4 Deciles 5 to 7 Deciles 8 and 9 Decile 10
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Figures are for 2010, except in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (2007), Brazil (2009), 
Chile (2009), Costa Rica (2009), Guatemala (2006) and Nicaragua (2005).
b Urban areas.
Just as the scope for comparing inequality across 
regions is limited, so is the scope for comparisons between 
countries. The differences in the characteristics of the surveys 
used to measure household income and the criteria used by 
the countries to deal with outlying values and correct for 
non-response to questions about income may substantially 
affect measurements of inequality (see box I.4). Again, 
conditions of strict “dominance” commonly do not obtain 
between different countries’ income distributions; in other 
words, one distribution may be more equitable than another 
for one subset of the population and more inequitable for 
another, yielding different country rankings depending 
on the indicator used (see box I.5). Taking these caveats 
into account, a regional overview of inequality ranks the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay as the 
countries with the least concentrated income, while the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia and Guatemala 
are at the other extreme (see figure I.9).
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Box I.5 
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING DISTRIBUTIONAL INEQUALITY
A wide range of indicators can be 
used to  measure the degree o f 
concentrat ion of  a g iven income 
distribution. This chapter uses three of 































































where n = population size, yi = per capita 
income of the ith individual, μ = mean income, 
and log denotes the natural logarithm.
The Theil index can be decomposed 





























where Y = total income of the population, Yj 
= total income of group j, N = total population 
and Nj = population of group j. The first 
component represents intra-group inequality 
and the second inter-group inequality.
The best-known of the indices used 
to analyse income distribution is the Gini. 
Its formulation is expressed graphically, as 
it corresponds to the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the equidistribution line. 
The greater the income concentration, the 
larger this area will be and the higher the 
value of the indicator.
Despite its popularity, the Gini index 
does not satisfy the transfer sensitivity 
principle, a desirable property for inequality 
indicators. According to this principle, 
inequality should decrease more in response 
to a progressive transfer of income (i.e., 
from a wealthier household to a poorer 
one) between poor individuals than when 
the transfer takes place between wealthy 
individuals. This makes it advisable to 
supplement the analysis with other indicators 
that do conform to this principle, such as 
the Theil and Atkinson indices.
With all three indicators, the higher the 
value, the higher the inequality. However, 
whereas the Gini and Atkinson indices 
take values in the range of [0,1] (where 
0 corresponds to absolute equity and 
1 represents absolute inequity), the maximum 
value of the Theil index is the log of population 
size, which exceeds 1. Furthermore, the 
formulation of the Atkinson index employs 
an additional parameter called the “inequality 
aversion” parameter (ε). The higher the 
value used, the higher the weighting given 
to observations in the lower part of the 
distribution, with the most commonly used 
values being between 0.5 and 2.0.
All inequality indicators are ordinal, so 
their values are not comparable. Furthermore, 
as each of these indicators measures partial 
aspects of inequality, they can generate 
different rankings for the distributions. The 
ranking of a group of distributions can be 
considered definitive only if it does not 
vary when there is a change in the index 
used. The best procedure, therefore, is to 
treat inequality indices as complementary 
to one another and analyse their results in 
combination.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Frank Cowell, “Measuring Inequality”, LSE Handbooks in Economics, Prentice 
Hall, 2000.
Figure I.9 


































































































































































































































Gini Theil Atkinson (1.5)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Figures are for 2010, except in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (2007), Brazil (2009), Chile (2009), Costa Rica (2009), Guatemala (2006) and Nicaragua (2005).
b  Urban areas.
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Figure I.11 









































































Gini index Theil index Atkinson index (ε=1.5)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Data for urban areas in Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay. Light blue lozenges indicate that the change between the two years is not statistically significant. The data cover the periods 
2001-2009 in Brazil, 2000-2009 in Chile, 2002-2009 in Costa Rica and 2001-2010 in El Salvador, Peru and Paraguay.
During the 1990s and up until the early 2000s, 
inequality in the region was characterized either by 
marked downward rigidity or a slight upward trend. 
Over this period, the largest reduction in the Gini index 
was in Uruguay, but the rate of change hardly exceeded 
0.5% a year. In contrast, inequality increased by half 
a percentage point or more annually in six countries 
(see figure I.10).
Figure I.10 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GINI INDEX, 1990-2002,  

















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Covers the periods 2002-2006 in Argentina, 2001-2008 in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, 
2000-2006 in Chile, 2001-2004 in El Salvador and 2002-2007 in Honduras.
b Covers the periods 2006-2010 in Argentina, 2004-2010 in El Salvador and 2007-2010 
in Honduras.
c Urban areas.
d Urban areas in the 1990-2002 period only.
The years 2002 and 2003 were a turning point when 
inequality began to trend downward in a large group of 
countries, whether measured by the income shares of the 
groups at the bottom and top of the distribution or by 
synthetic indicators of inequality. Although the decline 
in inequality has been small, and has not been enough 
to change Latin America’s status as the world’s most 
unequal region, it is nonetheless positive, especially in the 
wake of a prolonged period when general distributional 
improvements were lacking.
The trend towards better distribution in the region 
has not changed since the economic crisis. Up until 2008, 
which can be taken roughly to represent the situation prior 
to the start of the crisis, the Gini index fell at a rate of 1% 
or more a year in 10 countries and rose appreciably only 
in Guatemala (according to data available up to 2006). The 
figures for 2010, roughly reflecting the situation immediately 
after the crisis, indicate that inequality did not increase 
substantially in any of the 11 countries with information 
available. On the contrary, the Gini index fell at a rate of 
over 2% a year in three of them (Mexico, Uruguay and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and at least 1% a 
year in another two, El Salvador and Peru (see figure I.10).
Consequently, if we consider the cumulative changes 
between 2002 and 2010 (or 2009, depending on the 
information available), 11 countries presented distributional 
improvements within their inequality levels, irrespective 
of the indicator used to measure them: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(see figure I.11).
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The decline in inequality in the region over a number of 
years represents a propitious opportunity, and one that is 
unprecedented in recent decades, to explore the factors 
underlying this trend. Studies that have addressed the issue, 
using different methodologies, tend to be in accord on at 
least two aspects. One is that the most important driver 
of the decline in inequality has been the labour market, 
essentially through more equitable distribution of earnings 
per person employed. Explanatory factors mentioned to 
account for this include the progressive improvement in 
the distribution of education and the reduction in pay gaps 
between more and less skilled workers. The second aspect 
highlighted is that public cash transfers have been a source 
of income which has helped to reduce the concentration 
of the per capita income distribution (Lustig, López-Calva 
and Ortiz-Juarez, 2011).
In Argentina the main factor behind the decline in 
inequality between 2002 and 2009 was indeed the lessening 
of inequality in earnings (because of factors such as a 
decline in the education “premium”, lower unemployment 
and a higher minimum wage), followed by the increase in 
non-work incomes in the poorest households (essentially 
because of greater access to retirement benefits, the rise in 
minimum retirement pensions and the extension of social 
programmes) (Gasparini and Cruces, 2010).
In Brazil, the decline in inequality between 2003 
and 2007 derived from improved distribution of both 
earnings for those in work and of non-work income. 
Depending on the inequality indicator used, earnings 
accounted for some 52% of the fall in inequality, as 
measured by the Gini index, or 41% if the ratio between 
the top and bottom quintiles is used. Meanwhile, half the 
distributional improvement in earnings per employed 
person stemmed from the interaction between declining 
educational inequality and the narrowing of pay gaps 
between educational levels. The reduction in different 
forms of pay discrimination (by race and gender) and 
wage differentials between geographical areas and sectors 
of activity was also an important factor in explaining the 
decline in inequality (Barros and others, 2010a). The 
public transfers contributing most to the distributional 
improvement include social security benefits (30% of the 
total reduction) and non-contributory transfers, such as 
the Continuing Benefit and Bolsa Família, each of which 
contributed about 10% to the reduction in inequality 
(Barros and others, 2010b).
In the case of Mexico, the lessening in the concentration 
of earnings per employed person was the predominant 
factor in the decline in total inequality, coming to account 
for 66% of the change in the Gini coefficient in the 
2000-2006 period. As in the cases mentioned earlier, this 
improvement was associated with a narrowing of the pay 
gap between more and less skilled workers. Non-work 
incomes, meanwhile, accounted for some 15% of the 
reduction in the Gini coefficient between 2000 and 2006 
(Esquivel, Lustig and Scott, 2010).
CEDLAS (2009) presents a decomposition analysis 
for eight countries of the region. According to the results, 
the changes that have occurred owe more on the whole to 
alterations in the distribution of income per adult than to 
demographic shifts (number of adults per household). The 
distribution of income per adult, meanwhile, is mainly 
determined by changes in the distribution of earnings. 
Besides the countries already mentioned, this was found to 
be the case in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chile, 
which improved their distributional situation between the 
mid- and late 2000s.
This section illustrates some of the elements identified 
in the literature on the basis of the evidence available for 
the countries of Latin America in the 2000s. The periods 
analysed are those when income distribution improved most 
significantly in 15 countries of the region. The analysis 
focuses on comparing the gaps between the first and fifth 
quintiles in respect of a group of variables, particularly 
different income flows and labour market indicators.5
The procedure adopted consists in decomposing income 
by different pairs of factors and then simulating what 
would have happened to inequality if one of the elements 
had remained unchanged during the period analysed. The 
factors considered in the decomposition are as follows: per 
capita household income is decomposed by multiplying 
the proportion of adults in the household by the income 
each adult receives;6 income per adult is disaggregated 
as the sum of earnings (per adult) and non-work income 
(per adult) in the household; lastly, earnings per adult are 
calculated as the product of remuneration per employed 
person and the employment rate (ratio between the number 
working and the number of adults) (see box I.6).
5 For simplicity’s sake, the income gap is calculated by first adding 
up the sum total of income in each quintile and then dividing 
it by the number of people in the quintile, instead of the more 
usual method of averaging out the per capita income of people 
in the quintile.
6 Adults are deemed to be people of working age, i.e., those 
aged 15 and over.
2. Factors related to distributional changes
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Box I.6 
DECOMPOSITION METHODOLOGIES
Decomposition of changes in inequality
According to Barros and others 
(2006), per capita household income can 
be expressed in terms of its immediate 
determinants as follows:
Per capita household income (y) = Proportion of adults in household (a) * Income per adult in household (r) (1)
Income per adult in household (r) = Earnings (t) + Non-work income (o)    (2)
Earnings (t) = Remuneration per worker (w) * Proportion of people in work (u)    (3)
The simulation analysis centres on 
what would happen with the distribution of 
the variable on the left of the equation if one 
of the variables on the right had remained 
unaltered during the period analysed. For 
this, it calculates each of the variables 
described at the aggregate level for each 
quintile at two different points in time, t0 
and t1. Then it calculates the dependent 
variable of an equation by combining an 
independent variable observed in period t1 
with an independent variable observed in 
period t0, for each quintile. 
For example, to simulate per capita 
income in period t1, assuming that income 
per adult in the household remained constant, 
y’1 = a1 * r0 is calculated for the first and 
fifth quintiles. The difference between the 
gap between quintiles resulting from this 
simulated variable and the gap actually 
observed represents the contribution to 
inequality of the proportion of adults in the 
household.
Decomposition of the Gini coefficient 
by source
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) suggest 
decomposing the Gini index as the sum over 
different income sources (k) of the product 




 is the share of income source k in the total;
 = ,(),() is the Gini correlation coefficient between income source k and total income y;
 is the Gini coefficient of income source k, measured for all households and not just for recipients of income from this source.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ricardo Barros and others, “Uma análise das principais causas de queda recente 
na desigualdade de renda brasileira”, Econômica, vol. 8, No. 1, June 2006; Fernando Medina and Marco Galván, “Descomposición del coeficiente de Gini por fuentes de 
ingreso: Evidencia empírica para América Latina 1999-2005”, Estudios estadísticos y prospectivos series, No. 63 (LC/L.2911/E), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.08.II.G.45.
The results of the simulation are shown in table I.3. 
For each of the income variables to be decomposed, it 
indicates the annual change observed in the gap between 
the top and bottom quintiles and between the start and 
end years, and the percentage of this change attributable 
to each factor analysed.
The first decomposition, considering per capita 
household income as the product of the proportion of 
adults in the household and the income received by each 
adult, makes it possible to evaluate the extent to which 
changes in per capita income distribution are the result of 
distributive changes in the amount of income received or 
of alterations in the demographic structure of households.
The results indicate that, while the demographic 
factor did contribute to a narrowing of the gaps between 
quintiles, particularly in the countries with the greatest 
distributional improvements, its effect was slight. Paraguay 
was the only country where the change in the percentage 
of adults per household accounted for close to 50% of the 
decline in the per capita income gap. In the other countries, 
the contribution of this factor did not exceed 20%, and 
in some it actually worsened distribution.
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Table I.3 
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Argentina a 2002-2009 -4.4 82 18 -3.6 55 45 -2.5 150 -50
Brazil 2001-2009 -4.9 93 7 -4.5 58 42 -3.0 120 -20
Chile 2000-2006 -4.2 87 13 -3.6 45 55 -2.4 134 -34
Colombia 2002-2005 -5.2 114 -14 -5.9 95 5 -6.7 79 21
Costa Rica 2002-2005 -4.7 113 -13 -5.3 93 7 -6.2 66 34
Dominican Republic 2004-2007 -2.1 119 -19 -2.5 -58 158 1.6 -71 171
Ecuador a 2005-2010 -3.6 98 2 -3.5 61 39 -2.6 107 -7
El Salvador 2001-2010 -5.8 97 3 -5.6 86 14 -6.3 103 -3
Mexico 2000-2010 -3.1 93 7 -2.9 74 26 -3.0 120 -20
Nicaragua 2001-2005 -7.2 90 10 -6.5 146 -46 -10.7 72 28
Panama 2002-2009 -5.0 109 -9 -5.4 76 24 -5.4 101 -1
Peru 2001-2010 -4.4 85 15 -3.8 70 30 -4.1 88 12
Paraguay 2001-2009 -2.7 52 48 -1.4 -27 127 0.8 42 58
Uruguay a 2004-2010 -3.6 101 -1 -3.6 24 76 -1.3 119 -19
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2002-2010 -7.8 104 -4 -8.1 88 12 -8.8 97 3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
This finding might seem surprising, since demography 
has been singled out as one of the factors contributing most 
to the improvements in the poverty situation seen in the 
region since the 1990s (ECLAC, 2008). The percentage 
of adults per household has in fact risen by an average 
of some three percentage points in the countries and 
periods analysed. This increase, which is equivalent to a 
decline in the demographic dependency rate, translates 
into a rise in per capita household income that has indeed 
been instrumental in bringing down poverty. This change 
in family structures has been fairly homogeneous across 
all income groups, however, which explains why it has 
done so little to reduce the gap between the highest and 
lowest quintiles.
As would be expected from the findings recorded in 
the literature cited, income per adult emerges as the main 
driver of per capita income distribution improvements. This 
variable is the sum of earnings (per adult) and non-work 
income (per adult) in the household. In 10 countries, 
earnings played a preponderant role in reducing inequality. 
In Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, changes in earnings 
accounted for 90% or more of changes in total income 
per adult.
Changes in the distribution of non-work income 
accounted for 50% or more of the reduction in adult 
income inequality in Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay, and for over 40% in 
Argentina and Brazil. Non-work income comes from 
sources of various kinds and includes public transfers 
(retirement benefits and pensions, subsidies and poverty 
reduction programmes, among others) and private ones 
(such as transfers from other households and remittances), 
capital income (rents from property and interest 
received, for example) and imputed rent. A common 
characteristic in countries where this income played a 
more prominent redistributive role is that it originated 
in public transfers, i.e., in specific government action 
through social policy. In Argentina, the improvement 
in non-work income distribution has been due almost 
exclusively to an extension of the coverage and increase 
in the amount of non-contributory retirement benefits. 
In Brazil, most of the change has come from monetary 
transfers to households as part of the Bolsa Família 
programme, in line with the findings of other studies. In 
Chile, the distributive improvement has come both from 
retirement benefits and pensions and from government 
subsidies. In Ecuador, the whole of the distributional 
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improvement has come from the Human Development 
Grant, while in Panama it has come from retirement 
benefits and public subsidies.
Earnings per adult can be expressed as the product of 
remuneration per employed person and the employment 
rate (the ratio between the number of people in work 
and the number of adults). The lessening of inequality 
observed in earnings per adult is almost exclusively due 
to the first of these two factors. Indeed, the gap in the 
employment rate between quintiles not only remained 
virtually unchanged in several countries, but actually 
increased in some.
Figure I.12 


















































































Change in earnings gap
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The periods and geographical coverage for each country are as detailed in table I.3.
During periods when inequality diminished, the average 
employment rate rose in virtually all the countries, the 
exceptions being Ecuador and Mexico. Although no direct 
relationship is observed between the narrowing of gaps in 
earnings per employed person and increases in average 
employment, inequality did decline by more in countries 
with larger increases in the first quintile employment 
rate. Accordingly, even though remuneration may have 
been the main factor in the distributional improvements 
observed in the recent period, it is clear that job creation 
in the poorest strata has had a direct effect in reducing 
inequality (see figure I.12).
The improvement in income distribution for those in 
work originated in factors of different types. A number of 
recent studies have highlighted the reduction in educational 
inequality and in the pay gap between education levels. 
The earnings differential attributable to one additional 
year of education has indeed been falling systematically 
in the region. Furthermore, the Gini coefficient for years 
of study was found to have fallen by an average of 1.2% in 
most of the countries over the periods analysed. Although 
this process did not occur exclusively during the period 
of distributional improvement, but has been going on 
steadily for longer, the argument has been made that, in 
certain countries at least, the relative supply of skilled 
labour has accelerated since the beginning of the century 
(López-Calva and Lustig, 2010). In any event, periods 
of more rapidly declining inequality do not necessarily 
coincide with those in which the dispersion of years of 
education narrowed most quickly (see figure I.13).
Some countries have also deployed wage policies 
that may have contributed to the reduction in the 
inequality of earnings. In Brazil, minimum wages were 
increased significantly, which seems to have produced 
a noticeable improvement in the pay of workers most 
disadvantaged by the distribution. Something similar 
happened in Argentina, although a more important 
role may have been played by direct wage-setting 
policies, brought in at the start of the effort to improve 
and intensify collective bargaining. In the case of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the inclusion of 
public transfers in wages has played a prominent role.
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Figure I.13 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL CHANGE IN THE GINI INDEX FOR YEARS OF STUDY AND  



































































































































































A. Gini index B. Earnings gap between higher education 
and primary education
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The periods and geographical coverage in each country are as detailed in table I.3.
3.  Characteristics of income distribution
Income distribution can be characterized from different 
perspectives. This section deals mainly with two: 
assessment of the contribution of each income source 
to total inequality and analysis of the relationship 
between particular individual characteristics and the 
inequality of income generated in the labour market.
(a) Inequality by income source
Total household income is constructed as the sum of 
income from different sources, including earnings and 
income from transfers, capital and perhaps imputed rent 
and other items. It is possible to analyse the contribution 
of each income source to total inequality using the model 
prepared by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). According 
to this, the contribution of a particular source to total 
inequality is obtained by multiplying three factors: 
its relative weight in total income, its Gini index and 
its “Gini correlation” with total income (see box I.6). 
Earnings from paid work are the most important source, 
as they represent an average of 77% of total income. Thus, 
it is not surprising that the bulk of income inequality is 
due to earnings. Some 76% of inequality as measured by 
the Gini index derives from this source (see table I.4).
Transfers, both public and private, represent 13% of 
total household income, although their relative weight 
varies considerably between the region’s countries. The 
contribution of this source to total inequality is 12% 
across the region as a simple average, but also differs 
appreciably between countries.
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Table I.4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CONTRIBUTION OF EACH INCOME SOURCE TO TOTAL INCOME  
AND TOTAL INEQUALITY, AROUND 2010
(Percentages)
Country Year
Earnings Transfers Capital income Other income
Income Inequality Income Inequality Income Inequality Income Inequality
Argentina a 2010 75 74 11 5 8 15 6 6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 78 75 14 15 3 5 5 5
Brazil 2009 60 54 22 22 9 14 10 10
Chile 2009 81 86 11 5 4 6 4 3
Colombia 2010 78 74 13 15 3 4 6 6
Costa Rica 2009 83 82 11 9 4 6 2 2
Dominican Republic 2010 83 85 7 4 3 5 7 7
Ecuador 2010 85 85 12 11 3 4 ... ...
El Salvador 2010 83 87 16 13 1 1 ... ...
Guatemala 2006 75 76 13 13 2 2 11 9
Honduras b 2010 76 76 ... ... ... ... 24 24
Mexico 2010 63 63 10 9 5 9 22 19
Nicaragua 2005 83 79 16 20 1 2 ... ...
Panama 2010 82 83 16 14 2 3 ... ...
Paraguay 2010 88 88 10 9 2 3 ... ...
Peru 2010 72 73 8 9 3 4 18 14
Uruguay 2010 60 61 20 20 6 5 13 14
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2010 81 76 ... ... 5 10 14 14
Simple average 77 76 13 12 4 6 6 6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
b “Other income” includes all non-work income.
The case of transfers exemplifies how the factors 
involved in the decomposition may act in divergent directions. 
On the one hand, transfers are a highly concentrated 
income source, as there is a large percentage of households 
whose income is zero because they are not beneficiaries of 
retirement benefits, pensions, remittances or cash transfer 
programmes. Consequently, the effect of this factor of the 
decomposition is to increase overall inequality. On the 
other, insofar as transfers go to less well-off households, 
their Gini correlation with total income will be smaller than 
that of other sources, which will reduce the contribution of 
this source to overall inequality. In practice, income from 
this source combines flows with different redistributional 
implications. Whereas retirement benefits tend to be 
regressive, as they reproduce the inequality of earnings, 
cash assistance programmes are highly redistributive. 
Consequently, the contribution of transfers to overall 
inequality is not much different from their share of income, 
at least when the regional average is taken.
Capital income represents an average of 4% of 
total income and 6% of total inequality. Because it is 
characterized by great concentration, the contribution 
of this source to total inequality is greater than its total 
income share in all the countries. Lastly, the shares 
of total income and total inequality accounted for by 
“other income” are similar, with both averaging some 
9% across the region.
(b) Inequality of earnings
Earnings inequality, a variable whose relationship 
with the characteristics of people in employment is 
analysed in this section, may be more or less pronounced 
than per capita income inequality. Per capita income 
inequality is more pronounced in 11 countries and 
less in seven. In any event, both variables presented 
a similar trend between 2002 and 2010. Panama and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stand out as 
countries where the distribution of earnings improved 
by more than that of total income, while the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras are examples of the opposite 
(see figure I.14). 
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Figure I.14 

































































































































































































A. Gini index, around 2010 B. Annual change in the Gini index, 2002-2010
(percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
The way earnings are distributed is closely related 
to the characteristics of those in employment. It is thus 
interesting to evaluate the degree to which earnings 
inequality derives from differences in characteristics such 
as sex, age and educational level.
The analysis uses the Theil index to measure 
inequality, as it can be decomposed additively for 
different population subgroups, unlike the Gini index 
and other indicators. The contribution of each population 
group to total inequality is determined both by its level 
of inequality and by its share of total income. The sum 
of each group’s contributions gives rise to the “intra-
group” component of inequality, i.e., the component 
deriving from the dispersion of income in each group. 
There is also an “inter-group” component, which shows 
inequality deriving from differences between groups’ 
average incomes. The sum of the two components gives 
the Theil index for the whole population (see box I.5).
Decomposition by sex reveals that, on average, 66% 
of income inequality among those in work relates to the 
income received by men. Levels of inequality between 
men and women are not very different, although large 
differences favouring one or another of the two groups 
are observed in some countries (see figure I.15). It 
does seem clear that the large contribution of the male 
population to inequality is due to its greater share of the 
labour market and thence of total income. Men’s share 
of total earnings is about 68%.
Figure I.15 



































































































































































































































A. Around 2002 B. Around 2010
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Employed people aged 15 and over.
b Urban areas.
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The inter-group factor, i.e., inequality arising from 
the difference in average incomes between men and 
women, accounted for an average of 3% of total inequality. 
Nonetheless, this small percentage is not representative 
of the gender earnings gap, as it does not take account 
of the fact that women average more years of education 
than men in most of the region’s countries. When average 
incomes are compared between people of different sexes 
with a similar education level, the pay gap affecting women 
becomes plain (see table A-23 of the statistical annex). 
In comparison with 2002, recent figures show a slight 
increase in the contribution of the female population to total 
earnings inequality. This is mainly because the earnings 
share of women grew in the interim, by an average of 
2 percentage points. Although the relationship between 
men’s and women’s inequality indicators did not change 
on average, appreciable changes one way or the other 
were recorded in 10 countries.
In the breakdown of earnings inequality by years of 
education, the inter-group factor presents a high level of 
heterogeneity between countries. Whereas in Argentina, 
the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela the difference in average earnings 
between different educational levels accounts for just 12% 
or less of total inequality, the proportion is in excess of 
30% in Brazil, Colombia and Honduras (see figure I.16). 
Figure I.16 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): DECOMPOSITION OF INEQUALITY IN EMPLOYED PEOPLE’S EARNINGS  





















































































































































































































































A. Around 2002 B. Around 2010
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Employed people aged 25 and over.
b Urban areas.
The working population was grouped into four 
levels by the number of years of education completed, 
roughly corresponding to the primary cycle (ages 0 to 6), 
the secondary cycle (ages 7 to 12), the technical higher 
education cycle (ages 13 to 15) and the university cycle 
(ages 16 and over). Generally speaking, the contribution 
of each education level to inequality is determined mainly 
by the educational structure of the workforce. In countries 
such as Argentina and Chile, where the population with six 
years of education or less represents a small percentage 
of the workforce, this group contributes less than 5% to 
total inequality. Conversely, the inequality share of this 
group exceeds 30% in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay, 
countries where 50% or more of those in work (aged 
25 and over) have no more than six years of schooling.7
7 It should be borne in mind that the results of the decomposition by 
educational level depend on the number and size of the categories 
constructed. The fewer the categories, the broader and more diverse
The most important change when the findings are 
compared with those from around 2002 is the decline in 
the specific weight of the inter-group factor. That is, the 
difference in average incomes between educational levels 
represents a lesser contribution to total inequality. This 
is consistent with what was stated earlier regarding the 
narrowing of gaps associated with the education premium 
as one of the factors accounting for the lessening of 
earnings inequality.
The distributional inequality of earnings has a fairly 
well-defined pattern in the region’s countries. The incomes 
of younger people are more equitably distributed than 
those of the rest, and inequality tends to increase with 
age. At the regional level, the Theil index is 6% higher 
for people aged 30 to 44 than for people aged 15 to 29. 
Inequality for people aged 45 to 59 is 42% higher than 
 the set of people in each of them will be, and this will translate 
into an increase in the intra-group component and a reduction in 
the inter-group component.
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for the young, and this percentage rises to as much 
as 92% for people aged 60 and over whose earnings 
distribution is most unequal.
Furthermore, earnings rise with age, both because 
unemployment is lower among older workers and because 
average pay per worker is higher. Income peaks among 45- to 
59-year-olds and then declines in age groups above that.
The conjunction of these two factors means that the 
contribution of the youngest to total inequality (averaging 
18%) is much smaller than the percentage of working 
people in this age group (averaging 32%). The contribution 
of 30- to 44-year-olds to inequality (averaging 32%) is 
similar to the share of the employed population they 
account for (averaging 35%). This group and the 45 to 
59 group contribute most to earnings inequality. Lastly, 
employed people aged 60 and over contribute an average 
of 12% of inequality, whereas they represent only 9% of 
those in work (see figure I.17).
Figure I.17 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Employed people aged 15 and over.
b Urban areas.
C. Perceptions of how the labour market  
 and its institutions function
Latin America continues to be affected by problems with the functioning of the labour market 
and its institutions. These problems create feelings of uncertainty and unease among working 
people, particularly those who have unstable and informal jobs, possess less human capital, 
are in a worse socioeconomic situation and live in countries affected by severe structural 
heterogeneity. These are the groups most likely to fear losing their jobs and perceive that 
there are few work opportunities, that employment laws are flouted and that social security 
guarantees are lacking. Dialogue between businesses and workers is hindered by the low rate 
of union membership, especially among the least skilled workers, and by mistrust of unions, 
which is greatest among company executives and managers.
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Although the economic recovery in 2010 positively 
influenced the workings of the labour market, with the 
employment index rising and unemployment falling, the 
world of work continues to be one of the main factors 
in the reproduction of inequality in Latin America. The 
heterogeneity of the production structure is really a 
continuum whose two extremes are a small section of 
the population with high productivity, pay and social 
protection, on the one hand, and a sector dominated by 
poor employment conditions, lower pay and limited 
access to social protection, on the other. Again, both 
unemployment and employment in the low-productivity 
sector of the economy continue to affect the young and 
the poorest women most.
Objectively measurable segmentations and divides 
in Latin American labour markets have been examined 
in great depth. The same is not true of differences in 
perceptions of the labour market that might derive 
from the different positions and experiences of people 
in that market. This section will seek to provide some 
inputs regarding this facet of the problem, addressing: 
(a) perceptions of job opportunities and the severity of 
unemployment; (b) some perceptions of how well labour 
market institutions work (unionization, compliance 
with employment law); and (c) feelings of uncertainty 
and well-being or unease associated with work. This 
review will concentrate on detecting subjective divides 
associated with subjects’ position in the labour market, 
whether through direct measurements (employment 
or job type) or indirect ones (sex, age and education, 
among others).
It should be pointed out that the limitations of the 
data make this essentially an exploratory exercise. 
The source of subjective information is the 1996-2009 
Latinobarómetro survey, which was not designed to 
measure perceptions of how labour markets work. 
The discontinuity of some important questions (which 
means that series are incomplete or, in the case of some 
variables, that information is only available for one year), 
alterations to the wording of some relevant questions 
(making comparisons difficult) and constraints on sample 
sizes (making disaggregation by groups within each 
country unadvisable) are some of the limitations on the 
information available. Thus, we have preferred to work 
with analyses aggregated at the regional level (which 
raises the difficulty that certain conclusions might not 
be valid for some countries) and with indicators that 
have the longest time coverage possible.
1. Perceptions of employment and unemployment
From the standpoint of economic evolution, the 1996-2009 
period can be divided into three stages: one of turbulence 
(1996-2002), one of steady growth (2003-2008) and 
a more recent one in which the effects of the global 
financial crisis unleashed in mid-2008 made themselves 
felt. Within the first phase, growth slowed in 1998, and 
this was followed by stagnation in 1999 and recovery 
in 2000. After a 0.4% expansion in 2001, GDP dropped 
by 0.6% in 2002. The period between 2003 and 2008 was 
unprecedented in the region’s history, with six consecutive 
years of steady economic growth. This period ended in 
2009 when, in the context of the international crisis, the 
region experienced a drop of 3% in per capita GDP.
Generally speaking, unemployment and employment 
rates in the region have tracked the economic cycle. 
Unemployment rose between 1998 and 2002 before 
declining systematically between 2003 and 2008 (the 
unemployment rate in the latter year was the lowest in the 
whole period studied) and rising again in 2009, although 
the impact of the international crisis on the labour market 
was less than initially expected. Other aspects that need to 
be taken into account are the higher unemployment rates 
affecting the poorest women and young people, as these 
gaps have persisted and even widened in recent years 
(see chapter III of the present document).
One of the few subjective indicators on which 
information does exist for almost all the years in the 
1996-2009 period is the proportion of people regarding 
unemployment as their country’s greatest problem.8 
8 Posing an open question about the main problem facing the country 
makes respondents less likely to focus on labour market problems 
other than unemployment (low wages, job instability) than if a 
closed question including these other aspects is used. Between 
1996 and 2003, for example, 9% of Latinobarómetro respondents 
mentioned low wages as the country’s main problem, whereas 
between 2004 and 2009 (years when the open question was used) 
only 1.4% on average did so. The same is true of job instability 
(values of 5.5% and 0.7%, respectively). Conversely, the numbers 
citing unemployment as the main problem do not greatly alter 
when the question is changed (22.7% and 23.1% in 1996-2003 
and 2004-2009, respectively).
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Figure I.18 shows that this perception varies roughly 
in line with actual unemployment in the region (simple 
correlation of 0.67), with the exception of the 2002-2005 
period, when the proportion seeing unemployment as the 
main problem rose from 25.3% to 29.9% even as actual 
unemployment fell from 11.5% to 9.7%. In the period 
immediately following (from 2005 to 2008), the perception 
of unemployment as the main problem fell more quickly 
than actual unemployment. Thus, the recovery which 
followed the crisis of 2001 and 2002 originally took 
place in a context of deteriorating expectations about 
the capacity of the economy to generate jobs, and then 
in a situation of “accelerated adjustment” of perceptions 
regarding the behaviour of unemployment.
Figure I.18 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT AS THE COUNTRY’S MAIN PROBLEM a b  







































1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Perception of unemployment Actual unemployment
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from Latinobarómetro, 1996-2009 and 
CEPALSTAT database [online] http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?idioma=i.
a Between 1996 and 2003, respondents had to choose the main problem from a list of 
predetermined questions. An open question began to be used in 2004.
b Data for the Dominican Republic have been available since 2004.
c Simple average for 18 countries of Latin America.
In contrast with the situation depicted by the objective 
unemployment figures, the perception that lack of work 
is the main problem was not significantly greater among 
the poorest young people and women than among the 
population generally. Between 1996 and 2006, the average 
perception that unemployment was the country’s main 
problem reached 25.3% among women with two or three 
unmet basic needs (UBNs) and 24.7% among people aged 
15 to 29 with two or three UBNs,9 values that are very 
9 UBNs are an education level that falls short of complete primary 
schooling and lack of sewage and drinking water services.
close to the 24.2% for the whole Latinobarómetro sample. 
However, there are differences by occupational situation: 
between 1996 and 2009, the unemployed were more likely 
than any of the other groups to say that unemployment 
was the country’s main problem, followed by own-account 
workers. Conversely, the group composed of mid- and 
high-ranking executives and professionals were less likely 
to identify unemployment as the country’s main problem 
than the other groups (see figure I.19).
Figure I.19 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION THAT 
UNEMPLOYMENT IS THE COUNTRY’S MAIN PROBLEM, BY 
OCCUPATIONAL SITUATION OF RESPONDENTS,a 1996-2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2009.
a Between 1996 and 2003, respondents had to choose the main problem from a list of 
predetermined questions. An open question has been used since 2004. Data for the 
Dominican Republic have been available since 2004. 
b Includes high- and mid-ranking executives and employed and self-employed professionals.
c Includes people declaring they were temporarily jobless at the time of the interview.
Another indicator is people’s perceptions of job 
opportunities in the country. When regressions are carried 
out for 2007, 2008 and 2009, with sex, age, socioeconomic 
situation, education and employment situation being 
taken as predictors of perceptions of job opportunities, 
the finding is that the perception that job opportunities 
are available is correlated with household ownership of 
goods (see figure I.20). Perceptions of job availability are 
also found to be lower among the unemployed and, to 
a lesser extent, own-account workers. At the same time, 
they are greater among young people aged 15 to 29 and 
also among those aged between 30 and 45, as compared 
to people aged 46 and over. No significant statistical 
differences are identified by sex.
64 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Figure I.20 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION THAT JOB OPPORTUNITIES ARE LACKING IN THE COUNTRY, a  
BY AGE AND OWNERSHIP OF GOODS,b 2007, 2008 AND 2009
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30 to 45 
Age 46
and over
1 or no goods 2 to 4 goods 5 to 6 goods 7 to 8 goods
2007 2008 2009
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2007, 2008 and 2009.
a The percentages are of people who chose the answer “not sure at all” to the question: “How sure can people be of finding work in your country?” The other possible answers were: 
completely, fairly or not very sure.
b The indicator of goods ownership and access to basic services in the household includes ownership of (1) refrigerator, (2) washing machine, (3) fixed-line telephone, (4) computer, 
(5) piped hot water, (6) car, (7) sewer system and (8) mobile telephone. 
Thus, employment status and household socioeconomic 
situation are associated with perceptions of job availability 
and with the importance ascribed to unemployment as a 
problem in the country. It is striking that there is apparently 
no difference between the sexes in their perceptions of job 
opportunities and the seriousness of the unemployment 
problem, which suggests that, for a large proportion of 
women, labour market problems are not as troubling as 
the “hard data” might suggest, something that could be 
explained by the persistence of beliefs and stereotypes 
regarding traditional gender roles.10 In turn, the greater 
pessimism about job opportunities among people aged 
46 and over may be due to their finding it harder to 
apply for and obtain jobs than others with the same 
qualifications because of the age limits usually included 
among the specifications for job applicants. The same 
factor may explain the greater optimism of the young 
(see figure I.21).
10 In traditional gender role models, it is men who are supposed to 
be the main (if not only) breadwinners, making it more essential 
for them to find work.
Figure I.21 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTIONS OF HOW  
LIKELY SOMEONE UNDER 30 IS TO BE ACCEPTED AND 
PROMOTED IN A JOB COMPARED TO SOMEONE  
OVER 30,a BY OCCUPATION TYPE, 2008
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44
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2008.
a The question used in Latinobarómetro 2008 is: “Would you say that someone under 30 
is more likely, as likely or less likely to be promoted or accepted in a job than someone 
over 30 with the same skills or qualifications?”
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Perceptions of how well labour market institutions 
work need to be analysed in the light not only of the 
employment situations and trajectories defining subjects’ 
working experiences but also of some contextual 
elements that are important in the region’s countries, 
such as institutional systems in labour markets and 
the heterogeneity of the production structure in the 
countries of Latin America (see chapter III for more 
detailed information on the latter).
The heterogeneity of the production structure affects 
the workings of labour market institutions. Segmentation 
is manifested in productivity and pay gaps between sectors 
integrated into the international economy and those oriented 
towards the domestic market. Levels of formal working 
and access to social security are relatively high in the 
former and low in the latter. Reforms to labour market 
institutions, most of them implemented during the 1990s, 
fomented labour market deregulation and flexibility with 
a view to boosting efficiency and job creation (Weller, 
2009), and they were associated with a trend towards more 
unstable and informal employment conditions and loss 
of access to social protection. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that some countries which initially brought in 
reforms later reversed them.
One consequence of the reforms ought to be the 
erosion of employee negotiating power, manifested in 
lower rates of union membership and a reduced capacity 
for collective bargaining, but the information available 
is not conclusive. The most that can be said about Latin 
America is that only a minority of wage earners are 
unionized, that union density is lower than in developed 
countries with welfare States on the social democratic 
model, and that unions are much smaller than in developed 
countries (with the exceptions of Japan and the Republic 
of Korea), which suggests considerable fragmentation (see 
table I.5). In most of the region’s countries, furthermore, 
collective bargaining only covers between 8% and 10% 
of wage earners (ECLAC, 2011b).
2.  Perceptions of the workings of labour  
market institutions
Table I.5 
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES) AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: INDICATORS OF UNIONIZATION AMONG WAGE EARNERS
Country
Union density a Average union size b
Year Percentages Year Percentages Year Average
Latin America
Argentina ... ... 2006 37.6 ... ...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c ... ... 2006 26.6 ... ...
Brazil 1988 27.7 2007 20.9 1988 y 1992 1 677
Chile d 1990 13.4 2008 11.9 1991-2008 81
Colombia 1997 28.7 ... ... 1984-1997 187
El Salvador 1992 21.7 2008 11.9 ... ...
Guatemala 1991 10.4e 2006 12.9 1980-1992 98
Mexico ... ... 2008 17.0 ... ...
Nicaragua 2006 4.1 ... ...
Uruguay ... ... 2006 19.0 ... ...
Developed countries
Denmark 1994 93.6 2008 99.2 1987-2004 18 942
Finland 1990 88.1 2006 68.0 1989-2004 21 473
Sweden 1991 97.6 2007 73.6 1989-2005 59 149
Norway 1996 73.3 2006 52.9 ... ...
Germany 1991 34.8 2007 19.9 ... ...
Spain ... ... 2007 14.5 ... ...
United States 1990 16.1 2007 11.4 ... ...
United Kingdom f 1992 36.2 2007 28.0 1980-1998 31 927
New Zealand 1992 28.8 2008 20.8 1985-2004 3 390
Republic of Korea 1990 18.4 2006 10.0 1980-2008 273
Japan 1990 25.2 2007 18.0 1980-2008 170
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), Collective Bargaining: Negotiating for Social 
Justice High-level Tripartite Meeting on Collective Bargaining, Geneva, 19-20 November 2009, Geneva, 2010 and the Dialogue Data database [online] http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/dialdata.htm.
a Percentage of the population in wage employment. 
b Year-on-year average. 
c Percentage of total employment.
d Percentage of wage earners in the private sector. 
e Percentage of the wage-earning population, ECLAC estimate based on the Dialogue Data database [online] http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/dialdata.htm.
f Value supplied by the country. 
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Argentina and Brazil, with their higher levels of 
union density and collective bargaining, are exceptions 
in the region (ECLAC, 2011b). Mention should also be 
made of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which has 
the second-highest union density of all the region’s 
countries. The other side of the coin is Chile, which 
was a pioneer of labour-market reform11 and, with El 
Salvador, had the lowest rate of union membership and 
smallest average union size in Latin America at the end 
of the last decade. In all the countries, public-sector 
workers are better placed as regards unionization and 
collective bargaining than the rest of the workforce 
(ECLAC, 2011b).
Combining with low union density, the small 
size of unions and the limited incidence of collective 
bargaining is the fact that unionization is more common 
among more highly educated workers and employees 
in public-sector enterprises (see figure I.22). Thus, 
the people most in need of union membership as a 
mechanism for increasing their bargaining power and 
gaining access to protection and rights are actually the 
least likely to have been unionized. Nonetheless, the 
indicator presented is not a measure of current union 
membership, but illustrates the difficulty of unionizing 
less highly educated workers and those employed by 
private-sector firms. Kaztman (2010) suggests that 
unionization gaps associated with skill levels reflect 
segmentation processes in labour markets that magnify 
the differences in the options available for constructing 
collective social capital.12
Figure I.22 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EXPERIENCE OF 
PARTICIPATION IN UNIONS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS BY 
EDUCATION LEVEL AND EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, 2007 a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2007.
a The figures given are the sums of the percentages of people stating they participate 
actively in unions, stating they are members but not active participants, and stating 
they participated at some time in the past.
11 Chile’s labour-market reforms were implemented between 1978 
and 1981. They recognized the right for unions to organize only 
at the firm level, and they promoted voluntary membership and 
union pluralism, fomenting the creation of unions within firms. 
Anything that constrained employers’ power to manage and run 
their firms was excluded from the purview of collective bargaining, 
and the right to strike was limited to 60 days; after this period, the 
employer’s proposals would be applied. In some sectors of activity, 
such as health care and national security, striking was banned.
12 Given that skills are positively associated with the capacity to make 
collective demands, greater diversity of skills in a single workplace 
would increase the opportunities for the unskilled to participate 
in organizations that would enable them to uphold their interests 
and rights. Conversely, working alongside peers whose levels of 
educational capital are uniformly low will reduce opportunities of 
access to organizational support in the effort to secure protections 
and rights (Kaztman, 2010).
A further factor is mistrust of unions, which has 
stood at a very high level for the last 15 years in Latin 
America (in 1996, the percentage of people saying they 
had little or no confidence in unions was 70%, while 
in 2009 it was 67%). Mistrust of unions13 may not only 
discourage membership among workers but also create 
an adverse climate for the creation of unions within 
firms. Figure I.23 shows that high-level executives 
(managers and directors) are the occupational group that 
most distrust unions and perceive the greatest conflict 
between employers and workers. In practice, this must 
represent a serious obstacle to social dialogue, since an 
acceptance of unions among employers and managers 
is essential if these are to be created and maintained. 
In any event, these data should be interpreted with 
caution, both because sample sizes for the high-level 
executive group are limited and because information 
from a number of years is aggregated, which may 
conceal changes over the course of the period studied.
In this situation, it is unsurprising that perceptions of 
compliance with employment law (including provisions 
relating to the signing of employment contracts, dismissal 
and redundancy payments, length of the working day, 
overtime payments and the minimum wage) are more 
negative among people living in countries with severe 
structural heterogeneity and among the unemployed 
and own-account workers. Conversely, perceptions 
are more positive among those living in countries 
with moderate and intermediate levels of structural 
heterogeneity and among wage earners. In any event, 
the similarity of the values for wage employees in the 
public and private sectors contrasts with the higher 
incidence of unionization and collective bargaining in 
the public sector, something that ought to be manifested 
13 A similar tendency is seen with respect to other institutions.
11 Chile’s labour-market reforms were implemented between 1978 
and 1981. They recognized the right for unions to organize only 
at the firm level, and they promoted voluntary membership and 
union pluralism, fomenting the creation of unions within firms. 
Anything that constrained employers’ power to manage and run 
their firms was excluded from the purview of collective bargaining, 
and the right to strike was limited to 60 days; after this period, the 
employer’s proposals would be applied. In some sectors of activity, 
such as health care and national security, striking was banned.
12 Given that skills are positively associated with the capacity to make 
collective demands, greater diversity of skills in a single workplace 
would increase the opportunities for the unskilled to participate 
in organizations that would enable them to uphold their interests 
and rights. Conversely, working alongside peers whose levels of 
educational capital are uniformly low will reduce opportunities of 
access to organizational support in the effort to secure protections 
and rights (Kaztman, 2010).
13 A similar tendency is seen with respect to other institutions.
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in better compliance with employment legislation in 
that sector. Perhaps what evens out perceptions is that 
the criteria used by wage workers in public-sector 
enterprises to gauge compliance with employment laws 
are more stringent than those applied by private-sector 
wage workers.
Figure I.23 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES) a: MISTRUST OF UNIONS b  
AND PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN EMPLOYERS  


































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2009.
a Data for the Dominican Republic have been available since 2004. 
b Question used in the Latinobarómetro survey: “Can you tell me how much confidence 
you have in unions: a lot, some, not much or no confidence?” The values recorded 
are the percentages saying they had not much or no confidence in unions.
c Question used in the Latinobarómetro survey: “In all countries there are disagreements 
or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, how severe is the 
conflict between employers and workers: very severe, severe, slight or non-existent?” 
The values recorded are the percentages saying this conflict was very severe or 
severe.
d For the question about confidence in unions, the data recorded were obtained by 
aggregating the observations available for 1996, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
For the question about conflict between employers and workers, the data recorded 
were obtained by aggregating the information for 2007 and 2008. 
Again, a recurrent element in objective assessments 
of contributory social protection, in contexts marked 
by structural heterogeneity, has been the finding that 
access to social security is inadequate everywhere 
(ECLAC, 2006, 2010). As of 2009, in fact, just 46% 
of working Latin Americans were affiliated to social 
security systems, with rates being lowest in countries 
with severe structural heterogeneity (ECLAC, 2011b). 
Figure I.25 shows a convergence between the diagnosis 
based on “objective” data and the one based on perceptions: 
social security is rated negatively more often by those 
living in countries with severe structural heterogeneity 
than by those living in countries with moderate and 
intermediate heterogeneity. The greater frequency of 
negative perceptions in older age groups should also be 
noted, a situation that is more pronounced in countries 
with severe structural heterogeneity.
Figure I.24 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION, BY EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION OF RESPONDENTS AND THE STRUCTURAL 
HETEROGENEITY OF THE COUNTRY,a 2006
(Simple averages, scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = total non-compliance 























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2006 and ECLAC, 
“Empleo y protección social. Borrador para comentarios”, 2011, unpublished.
a The countries were classified by ECLAC (2011a) on the basis of criteria such as productivity 
gaps between sectors of activity, percentages of employment in these, the relative 
contribution of sectors to GDP and some performance indicators (per capita income, 
employment, inequality and poverty) related to the structure of the labour market. This 
exercise yielded the following groups: moderate structural heterogeneity: Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay; intermediate structural heterogeneity: Brazil, 
Colombia, Panama and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and severe structural 
heterogeneity: Plurinational State of Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru.
b Unweighted additive scale constructed on the basis of four questions about compliance with 
employment law in: (1) the signing of employment contracts; (2) dismissal and redundancy 
payments; (3) working hours and overtime; (4) payment of the minimum wage. The internal 
consistency of the scale is 0.89 (alpha coefficient), the scale is one-dimensional and the 
questions are correlated by a factor that accounts for 76% of variability.
Figure I.25 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTION THAT SOCIAL 
SECURITY IS NOT GUARANTEED,a BY AGE GROUPS AND 
STRUCTURAL HETEROGENEITY OF THE COUNTRY,b  
2007, 2008 AND 2009
(Percentages stating that people cannot be sure of  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2007, 2008 and 
2009, and ECLAC, “Empleo y protección social. Borrador para comentarios”, 
2011, unpublished.
a  The percentages are of people answering “not sure at all” to the question: “To what 
extent is social security guaranteed in your country?”. The other possible answers are: 
completely, reasonably or not sure.
b  Country groups: moderate structural heterogeneity: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Uruguay; intermediate structural heterogeneity: Brazil, Colombia, Panama and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and severe structural heterogeneity: Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru.
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Although differences by age are not as great in countries 
with lower levels of heterogeneity, it is possible to offer 
some conjectures that might be helpful for future studies 
and that have policy implications. The fact that social 
security is rated more negatively by the older population 
does not seem hard to explain, as this population has to 
cope directly with the difficulties of life without a pension 
or with retirement benefits that are inadequate to meet basic 
needs or maintain their pre-retirement standard of living.14 
Conversely, young people might feel that problems related to 
social security are not very important, because at their stage 
in life they are very far from retirement and also because 
they might underestimate the future consequences of not 
having income when they come to leave the workforce.
In summary, problems with the workings of labour 
market institutions (manifested in low levels of unionization, 
14 This greater perception among older adults that social security 
guarantees are lacking is no small difficulty, since the capacity for 
organization, mobilization and negotiation has been weakened by 
this stage of the life cycle (we are not speaking here of the “elite” 
of older adults).
collective bargaining and access to social security) have 
their subjective correlative in strong perceptions of 
conflict between employers and workers, in mistrust of 
unions (particularly on the part of high-level executives 
and managers), in the perception that employment laws 
are widely flouted and in the belief that social security 
is far from guaranteed (chiefly among those living in 
countries with greater structural heterogeneity). These data 
contrast with the progress made by the region’s countries 
in ratifying international conventions on decent work,15 
something that highlights a divide between the de jure 
and the de facto situation, and with it the need for action 
to improve labour market institutions and organization, 
worker bargaining power and access to rights, with a view 
to moving towards an effective social dialogue between 
employers and workers.
15 If the idea of decent work is taken as a parameter, the region 
evinces very advanced levels of ratification of international 
conventions, and recent trends are positive. As of 2010, the Latin 
American countries had made considerable progress in this field, 
with ratification of the eight basic conventions increasing from 
93% to 97% (ECLAC, 2011).
3. Feelings of uncertainty and well-being or unease  
associated with work
Attention has begun to be paid in recent years to 
feelings of uncertainty associated with work, which can 
erode people’s quality of life.16 The possible sources of 
insecurity are many, operate at different levels and can be 
interrelated. One is the destruction of jobs associated with 
the economic cycle. Another source, found especially 
in economies characterized by structural segmentation 
and heterogeneity, is employment in low-productivity 
jobs, where lack of protection, job instability and 
low incomes are the norm. A third source, which has 
been studied for its psychosocial effects in developed 
economies (Salama, 2005), are changes in models of 
work organization in the formal sector, involving the use 
of technologies that replace human labour, outsourcing 
of services, and increasingly flexible pay and working 
conditions. A final source of insecurity are the changes 
driven by the information society, with human capital 
accumulation becoming a vital asset for securing more 
stable and better-paid jobs.
The incidence of the first two sources of uncertainty 
can be visualized in figure I.26. People’s fear of losing 
their jobs in the next 12 months tends to rise at times of 
16 There is evidence from the developed countries that greater job 
insecurity is associated with mental health problems and difficulties 
in family relationships (Burchell, 2005). 16 There is evidence from the developed countries that greater job 
insecurity is associated with mental health problems and difficulties 
in family relationships (Burchell, 2005).
economic contraction and fall during years of expansion. 
Throughout the period analysed, this fear was greater 
among people living in countries with intermediate and 
severe structural heterogeneity than among those living 
in countries with moderate structural heterogeneity. 
Nonetheless, the dominant trend in both groups of 
countries has been towards a considerable lessening 
of people’s fear of losing their jobs, a situation that is 
more marked in countries with intermediate or severe 
heterogeneity. This has translated into a narrowing of the 
divide between countries with different levels of structural 
heterogeneity as regards the fear of unemployment.
The effect of insecure and informal working conditions 
on people’s fear of losing their jobs can be analysed from 
microdata, in conjunction with other factors, such as the 
respondent’s education level, sex and age. To this end, a 
regression covering the whole Latinobarómetro sample 
from 1996 to 2006 was carried out. The analysis made 
it possible to establish that people with less education, 
14 This greater perception among older adults that social security 
guarantees are lacking is no small difficulty, since the capacity for 
organization, mobilization and negotiation has been weakened by 
this stage of the life cycle (we are not speaking here of the “elite” 
of older adults).
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own-account workers and low- and mid-level employees 
were significantly more afraid of losing their jobs (see 
figures I.27 and I.28). Furthermore, fear of becoming 
unemployed was lower among men and older people 
(see table I.A-4 in the annex to chapter I).
Figure I.26  
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES) a: FEAR OF LOSING JOB IN THE 
NEXT 12 MONTHS,b BY STRUCTURAL HETEROGENEITY  
OF COUNTRY,c 1996-2009





































1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Moderate heterogeneity Intermediate or severe heterogeneity
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2009 
and ECLAC, “Empleo y protección social. Borrador para comentarios”, 2011, 
unpublished.
a Data for the Dominican Republic have been available since 2004. 
b  The question asked in Latinobarómetro is: “How worried would you say you are about 
becoming jobless or unemployed over the coming months, or are you currently without 
work?” The calculation excludes those stating they were currently without work.
c  Groups of countries: moderate structural heterogeneity: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Uruguay; intermediate structural heterogeneity: Brazil, Colombia, Panama 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; severe structural heterogeneity: Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru.
Figure I.27 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES) a: FEAR OF BECOMING 
JOBLESS IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS,b BY  
EDUCATION LEVEL, 1996-2009













































1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Incomplete basic education Incomplete secondary education
Complete higher education
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2009.
a Data for the Dominican Republic have been available since 2004.
b The question asked in Latinobarómetro is: “How worried would you say you are about 
becoming jobless or unemployed over the coming months, or are you currently without 
work?” The calculation excludes those stating they were currently without work.
Figure I.28 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES) a: FEAR OF BECOMING 
JOBLESS IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS,b BY EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION, 1996-2009




































1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Own-account workers
Employees
High- and mid-ranking executives, professionals
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2009.
a Data for the Dominican Republic have been available since 2004. 
b The question asked in Latinobarómetro is: “How worried would you say you are about 
becoming jobless or unemployed over the coming months, or are you currently without 
work?” The calculation excludes those stating they were currently without work.
In any event, the indicator for fear of becoming 
jobless is a proxy for the uncertainty associated with the 
workings of the labour market and business cycles, and 
is not enough to determine whether the new production 
structures are making it harder for people to form life plans 
in the expectation of being able to establish a permanent 
working relationship with substantial levels of social 
protection (Kaztman, 2010). Further studies are thus 
needed to form a more definite idea as to whether some 
groups —particularly the most vulnerable— have put away 
the notion of “lifetime employment” when making their 
life plans. In any event, in those countries of the region that 
have been characterized for some time by severe structural 
heterogeneity, the guarantee of lifelong employment has 
been restricted to minority groups, and it is therefore 
possible that the hypothesis is more applicable to countries 
that at some point in time created the conditions in which 
a large segment of the population could obtain jobs that 
were more or less secure and stable over time.
Another matter of interest is the relationship between 
employment and some indicators of subjective well-being. 
In this case there are two elements to be considered. First, 
people have internalized the idea that material aspirations 
are met by well-paid, stable and protected jobs. On this 
logic, those who are unemployed or uncertainly employed 
face barriers to social integration and the affirmation 
of their identities and self-esteem (Kaztman, 2010). 
At the same time, these people might experience a gap 
between aspirations and expectations, resulting in reduced 
subjective well-being (ECLAC, 2007). Second, work 
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experience appears to have ceased to be the main source 
of autonomous improvements in well-being, owing to 
the devaluation of the credit given by society to skills 
acquired in the workplace (Kaztman, 2010).
The 2007 Latinobarómetro study included for the 
first time a question about people’s satisfaction with 
their work, which may serve to analyse the relationship 
between employment type and well-being as measured 
by subjective indicators. It should be pointed out that 
this is not the only way of exploring this relationship, 
but it was selected as being the only question available 
in the Latinobarómetro investigation that allows this 
association to be approached directly.17 It should also be 
considered that, in intrinsic terms,18 subjects’ assessment 
of their own satisfaction with their work is necessarily a 
measure of how far they perceive it to be falling short of 
some threshold of comparison (which may be absolute or 
relative). One of the risks to the reliability of measures of 
this kind is that expectations may adapt (declining intensity 
of response to a reiterated stimulus or “treatment”). If 
this risk materializes, subjects with very different jobs 
will present similar levels of satisfaction with their work.
Figures I.29 and I.30 reveal significant differences in 
work satisfaction by employment type and education level, 
indicating that adaptation does not do away with the effects 
of the quality of the jobs taken or education level attained. 
Thus, satisfaction with work is greatest among professionals 
and mid- and high-ranking executives and lowest among 
farmers and fishermen. Again, those with incomplete or 
complete higher education are more satisfied than people 
17 Questions about satisfaction form part of the cognitive aspect of 
the tradition of subjective well-being (the other branch within this 
aspect analyses flows of pleasure and pain). There is also another, 
parallel, tradition of psychological well-being dealing with feelings 
of self-realization (the eudemonia perspective). It should also be 
noted that satisfaction with work and with life generally are not 
identical: someone may be happy with their work and dissatisfied 
with their life. See Villatoro (2011) for further details.
18 Extrinsic satisfaction includes assessment of aspects relating to 
the organization of work, such as working hours, pay and physical 
working conditions (Moreno-Jiménez and Hidalgo, 2011).
with incomplete basic education. Figure I.30 also shows 
that the satisfaction gap associated with education has the 
greatest incidence among women aged 15 to 29, which could 
be linked to the greater instability and informality of the 
jobs done by young women with fewer years of schooling, 
or to a feeling on the part of these women that they have 
been “forced” (by economic necessity) to enter the world 
of work early. This last issue requires further research.
Figure I.29 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SATISFACTION WITH WORK  
BY OCCUPATION TYPE,a 2007
(Averages, scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = totally dissatisfied  




















and mid- and 
high-ranking 
executives 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2007.
a Post hoc comparison of means yields three groups that differ significantly in their levels 
of occupational satisfaction: (1) farmers, fishermen and own-account workers; (2) low-
ranking employees and business owners; and (3) mid- and high-ranking executives 
and professionals.
17 Questions about satisfaction form part of the cognitive aspect of 
the tradition of subjective well-being (the other branch within 
this aspect analyses flows of pleasure and pain). There is also 
another, parallel, tradition of psychological well-being dealing 
with feelings of self-realization (the eudaimonic perspective). 
It should also be noted that satisfaction with work and with life 
generally are not identical: someone may be happy with their 
work and dissatisfied with their life. See Villatoro (2011) for 
further details.
18 Extrinsic satisfaction includes assessment of aspects relating to 
the organization of work, such as working hours, pay and physical 
working conditions (Moreno-Jiménez and Hidalgo, 2011).
Figure I.30 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SATISFACTION WITH WORK BY SEX, AGE AND EDUCATION LEVEL, 2007




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 2007.
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Annex
Table I.A-1  




Households Population Households Population
Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG) Gap squared (FGT2) Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG)
Gap squared 
(FGT2)
Argentina c 1990 d 16.2 21.2 7.2 3.4 3.5 5.2 1.6 0.8
1999 16.3 23.7 8.6 4.3 4.3 6.6 2.1 1.1
2002 34.9 45.4 21.1 12.8 13.9 20.9 8.4 4.6
2009 8.1 11.3 4.7 2.9 3.0 3.8 1.9 1.4
2010 6.3 8.6 3.4 2.1 2.4 2.8 1.4 1.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1989 e 48.9 52.6 24.5 15.0 21.9 23.0 9.7 6.1
1999 54.7 60.6 33.9 24.1 32.5 36.5 20.3 14.7
 2002 55.5 62.4 34.4 23.8 31.7 37.1 19.5 13.5
 2007 47.2 54.0 27.8 18.2 27.2 31.2 14.5 9.7
Brazil 1990 41.4 48.0 23.5 14.7 18.3 23.4 9.7 5.5
1999 29.9 37.5 17.0 10.2 9.6 12.9 5.3 3.3
2001 30.0 37.5 17.4 10.7 10.0 13.2 5.8 3.8
2008 19.9 25.8 10.7 6.3 5.8 7.3 3.3 2.2
2009 19.3 24.9 10.5 6.2 5.7 7.0 3.2 2.2
Chile 1990 33.3 38.6 14.9 8.0 10.7 13.0 4.4 2.3
 1998 17.8 21.7 7.5 3.8 4.6 5.6 2.0 1.1
 2003 15.3 18.7 6.3 3.2 3.9 4.7 1.7 1.0
 2006 11.3 13.7 4.4 2.2 2.7 3.2 1.1 0.7
 2009 9.8 11.5 4.0 2.2 3.3 3.6 1.5 1.0
Colombia 1994 47.3 52.5 26.6 17.5 25.0 28.5 13.8 9.1
1999 48.7 54.9 25.6 15.7 23.2 26.8 11.2 6.9
2002 f 48.2 54.2 26.3 16.5 17.6 19.9 8.8 5.6
2009 f 39.3 45.7 20.8 12.7 14.3 16.5 7.2 4.6
2010 f 37.8 44.3 19.7 11.8 12.8 14.8 6.4 4.0
Costa Rica 1990 23.6 26.3 10.7 6.5 10.0 10.1 4.8 3.4
 1999 18.2 20.3 8.1 4.8 7.5 7.8 3.5 2.3
 2002 18.6 20.3 8.4 5.2 7.7 8.2 3.9 2.7
 2008 14.8 16.4 5.8 3.1 5.2 5.5 2.2 1.4
 2009 16.8 18.9 6.9 3.9 6.4 6.9 3.0 2.0
Dominican Republic 2002 42.2 47.1 20.9 12.6 18.2 20.7 8.8 5.3
2009 37.8 41.1 18.5 11.0 19.8 21.0 8.0 4.5
 2010 38.0 41.4 18.7 11.1 19.2 20.9 8.2 4.6
Ecuador c 1990 55.8 62.1 27.6 15.8 22.6 26.2 9.2 4.9
1999 58.0 63.5 30.1 18.2 27.2 31.3 11.5 6.3
2002 42.6 49.0 20.8 11.8 16.3 19.4 6.9 3.7
2009 34.1 40.2 15.6 8.3 12.9 15.5 5.0 2.6
2010 31.4 37.1 14.2 7.5 11.9 14.2 4.6 2.4
El Salvador 1995 47.6 54.2 24.0 14.3 18.2 21.7 9.1 5.6
 1999 43.5 49.8 22.9 14.0 18.3 21.9 9.4 5.8
 2001 42.9 48.9 22.7 14.0 18.3 22.1 9.5 5.7
2009 41.8 47.9 19.4 10.5 14.1 17.3 5.7 2.7
 2010 40.2 46.6 18.8 10.0 13.3 16.7 5.2 2.3
Guatemala 1989 63.0 69.4 35.9 23.1 36.7 42.0 18.5 11.2
1998 53.5 61.1 27.3 15.4 26.1 31.6 10.7 5.1
2002 52.8 60.2 27.0 15.4 26.9 30.9 10.7 5.5
2006 46.7 54.8 25.5 15.2 22.7 29.1 11.3 5.8
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Country Year
Poverty b Indigence
Households Population Households Population
Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG) Gap squared (FGT2) Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG)
Gap squared 
(FGT2)
Honduras 1990 75.2 80.8 50.2 35.9 53.9 60.9 31.5 20.2
 1999 74.3 79.7 47.4 32.9 50.6 56.8 27.9 17.5
 2002 70.9 77.3 45.3 31.2 47.1 54.4 26.6 16.2
2009 60.0 65.7 34.7 22.7 36.2 41.8 19.5 11.8
 2010 61.2 67.4 36.6 24.2 37.0 42.8 20.1 12.1
Mexico 1989 39.0 47.7 18.7 9.9 14.0 18.7 5.9 2.7
1998 38.0 46.9 18.4 9.4 13.2 18.5 5.3 2.2
2002 31.8 39.4 13.9 6.7 9.1 12.6 3.5 1.4
2008 27.9 34.8 12.0 5.7 8.2 11.2 3.2 1.3
Nicaragua 1993 68.1 73.6 41.9 29.3 43.2 48.4 24.3 16.2
 1998 65.1 69.9 39.4 27.3 40.1 44.6 22.6 15.1
 2001 63.0 69.4 37.1 24.5 36.5 42.5 19.2 12.0
 2005 54.4 61.9 29.1 17.3 26.8 31.9 12.3 6.5
Panama 1991 c 26.0 31.0 12.8 7.6 9.5 10.8 5.0 3.3
1999 c 15.8 19.5 7.0 3.8 4.6 5.5 2.2 1.3
2002 30.0 36.9 16.8 10.2 14.4 18.6 7.6 4.3
2009 20.6 26.4 10.0 5.2 8.2 11.1 3.8 1.9
2010 19.4 25.8 10.6 5.9 8.9 12.6 4.6 2.3
Paraguay 1990 g 36.8 43.2 16.1 8.0 10.4 13.1 3.6 1.5
 1999 50.3 59.0 29.1 18.4 25.0 31.8 14.1 8.6
 2001 50.7 59.7 28.7 18.0 25.2 31.3 13.7 8.2
 2009 50.1 56.0 26.0 15.8 26.7 30.4 12.7 7.4
 2010 48.0 54.8 25.4 15.5 26.0 30.7 12.9 7.6
Peru 1997 40.4 47.5 20.7 12.0 20.3 25.0 10.1 5.6
1999 42.3 48.6 20.6 11.7 18.7 22.4 9.2 5.1
2001 h 48.7 54.7 24.7 14.5 20.4 24.4 9.6 5.2
2009 h 30.3 34.8 12.9 6.5 9.9 11.5 3.5 1.6
2010 h 27.0 31.3 11.1 5.5 8.2 9.8 2.8 1.2
Uruguay c 1990 11.8 17.9 5.3 2.4 2.0 3.4 0.9 0.4
1999 5.6 9.4 2.7 1.2 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.2
2002 9.3 15.4 4.5 1.9 1.3 2.5 0.6 0.2
2009 6.5 10.7 2.9 1.2 1.1 2.0 0.4 0.2
2010 5.0 8.6 2.3 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.3 0.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1990 34.2 39.8 15.7 8.5 11.8 14.4 5.0 2.4
1999 44.0 49.4 22.6 13.7 19.4 21.7 9.0 5.5
2002 43.3 48.6 22.1 13.4 19.7 22.2 9.3 5.7
2009 23.3 27.1 9.9 5.4 8.8 9.8 3.8 2.4
 2010 23.7 27.8 9.9 5.3 9.3 10.7 3.9 2.4
Latin America i 1990 41.0 48.4 … … 17.7 22.6 … …
1999 35.4 43.8 … … 14.1 18.6 … …
2002 36.1 43.9 … … 14.6 19.3 … …
2009 26.2 33.0 … … 10.0 13.1 … …
2010 24.9 31.4 … … 10.3 12.3 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a H = headcount index; PG = poverty gap; FGT2 = Foster, Greer and Thorbecke index.
b Includes households (individuals) in a situation of indigence or extreme poverty.
c Urban areas.
d  Greater Buenos Aires.
e Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto.
f Figures from the Mission for the splicing of employment, poverty and inequality series (MESEP). These figures do not include the modifications to the poverty measurement made in 
2011 by (MESEP).
g Asunción metropolitan area.
h  Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. These values are not comparable with those of earlier years owing to the change in the sampling framework 
of the household survey.
i  Estimate for 18 countries of the subregion plus Haiti.
Table I.A-1 (concluded)
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Table I.A-2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1990-2010 a
Country Year Average income b
Total income share (percentages)
Ratio of average per 
capita income 
(multiples) c
Poorest 40% Next 30% 20% below wealthiest 10% Wealthiest 10% D
10 / D(1 to 4) Q5 / Q1
Argentina d 1990 e 10.6 15.0 23.7 26.7 34.6 13.5 13.5
1999 11.3 15.8 22.1 25.3 36.8 16.2 16.6
2002 7.3 14.4 20.5 24.6 40.5 19.0 20.7
2009 16.1 15.5 24.6 27.8 32.1 15.0 16.6
2010 17.9 16.0 24.4 27.0 32.6 15.1 16.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1989 f 7.7 12.1 21.9 27.9 38.1 17.1 21.4
1999 5.6 9.3 24.1 29.6 37.0 26.7 48.1
 2002 6.1 9.5 21.4 28.3 40.8 30.3 44.2
 2007 6.1 11.2 25.2 28.2 35.4 22.2 31.5
Brazil 1990 9.4 9.6 18.5 28.0 43.9 31.2 35.0
1999 11.3 10.0 17.4 25.4 47.2 32.0 35.6
2001 11.0 10.3 17.4 25.5 46.8 32.2 36.9
2008 12.1 12.7 19.2 24.7 43.4 23.8 26.2
2009 11.8 13.2 20.3 25.5 41.0 21.1 23.9
Chile 1990 9.5 13.2 20.8 25.3 40.7 18.2 18.4
 1998 13.7 13.0 20.4 26.6 40.0 19.1 19.7
 2003 13.6 13.8 20.8 25.6 39.8 18.8 18.4
 2006 14.4 14.6 21.6 26.7 37.1 15.9 15.7
 2009 14.5 14.4 21.2 26.0 38.4 16.3 15.9
Colombia 1994 7.7 9.9 21.3 27.0 41.8 26.8 35.2
1999 6.7 12.4 21.6 26.0 40.0 22.3 25.6
2002 6.9 10.9 21.2 27.2 40.7 27.1 32.9
2009 7.1 11.8 22.5 26.3 39.4 23.1 28.0
2010 7.3 12.0 22.3 26.6 39.1 23.4 27.7
Costa Rica 1990 9.5 16.7 27.4 30.2 25.7 10.1 13.1
 1999 11.4 15.3 25.7 29.7 29.3 12.6 15.3
 2002 11.7 14.4 25.6 29.7 30.3 13.7 16.9
 2008 11.1 15.4 25.2 28.4 31.0 12.5 13.5
 2009 11.5 14.3 24.3 28.5 32.9 14.8 16.4
Dominican Republic 2002 6.9 12.7 22.7 26.9 37.7 17.8 20.7
2009 8.4 10.7 21.5 27.5 40.3 24.3 28.0
 2010 7.9 11.3 22.1 28.7 37.9 20.1 23.9
Ecuador d 1990 5.5 17.1 25.4 26.9 30.6 11.4 12.3
1999 5.6 14.1 22.7 26.5 36.7 17.2 18.4
2002 6.7 15.5 24.3 26.1 34.1 15.7 16.8
2009 7.4 16.4 25.1 26.6 31.9 13.6 14.3
2010 7.7 16.5 24.7 26.9 31.9 12.6 13.2
El Salvador 1995 6.2 15.5 24.8 27.0 32.7 14.1 16.9
 1999 6.6 13.8 25.0 29.1 32.1 15.2 19.6
 2001 6.7 13.5 24.7 28.7 33.1 16.2 20.3
2009 5.8 16.6 25.2 26.8 31.4 12.0 13.0
 2010 5.6 17.8 26.4 27.7 28.1 10.3 11.4
Guatemala 1989 6.0 11.8 20.9 26.9 40.4 23.6 27.4
1998 7.1 14.3 21.6 25.0 39.1 20.4 19.8
2002 6.8 14.1 22.4 27.3 36.2 18.6 19.3
2006 7.6 12.8 21.8 25.7 39.7 22.0 23.9
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Country Year Average income b
Total income share (percentages)
Ratio of average per 
capita income 
(multiples) c
Poorest 40% Next 30% 20% below wealthiest 10% Wealthiest 10% D
10 / D(1 to 4) Q5 / Q1
Honduras 1990 4.3 10.2 19.7 27.1 43.0 27.4 30.7
 1999 3.9 11.8 22.9 29.0 36.3 22.3 26.5
 2002 4.3 11.4 21.7 27.6 39.3 23.6 26.3
2009 5.1 12.0 23.8 29.5 34.7 18.7 23.3
 2010 5.1 11.4 22.7 29.3 36.6 20.7 25.2
Mexico 1989 8.6 15.8 22.5 25.1 36.6 17.2 16.9
1998 7.7 15.0 22.7 25.6 36.7 18.4 18.5
2002 8.2 15.7 23.8 27.2 33.3 15.1 15.5
2008 8.6 16.0 24.0 25.6 34.4 16.1 16.0
2010 7.4 17.7 25.4 27.2 29.7 12.8 13.3
Nicaragua 1993 5.2 10.4 22.8 28.4 38.4 26.1 37.7
 1998 5.6 10.4 22.1 27.0 40.5 25.3 35.1
 2001 5.8 12.0 21.7 25.6 40.7 23.6 27.5
 2005 6.5 14.3 24.0 26.2 35.5 17.2 18.6
Panama 1991 d 11.1 14.1 23.9 29.3 32.7 16.8 20.1
1999 d 12.9 15.6 25.2 27.8 31.4 14.0 15.9
2002 9.8 12.2 23.6 28.0 36.2 20.1 25.7
2009 10.4 14.7 25.5 28.3 31.5 15.3 18.2
2010 10.2 15.2 26.1 27.0 31.7 14.4 17.6
Paraguay 1990 g 7.7 18.7 25.7 26.8 28.8 10.2 10.6
 1999 6.3 13.2 23.5 27.6 35.7 19.1 23.2
 2001 6.3 13.5 23.6 26.2 36.7 19.5 23.2
 2009 5.6 13.7 25.3 28.3 32.7 14.7 18.3
 2010 5.8 13.8 24.3 26.2 35.7 17.1 20.0
Peru 1997 7.5 13.3 24.7 28.7 33.3 17.9 20.8
1999 7.5 13.3 23.1 27.1 36.5 19.5 21.7
2001 6.4 13.4 24.6 28.5 33.5 17.4 19.3
2009 8.0 15.9 26.5 28.4 29.2 12.4 13.7
2010 8.1 16.6 26.5 28.1 28.8 11.4 12.5
Uruguay d 1990 9.9 18.9 23.3 22.5 35.3 11.0 10.5
1999 11.9 21.6 25.5 25.8 27.1 8.8 9.5
2002 9.4 21.7 25.4 25.6 27.3 9.5 10.2
2009 9.8 21.9 26.0 26.1 26.0 8.6 9.1
2010 10.1 22.8 26.3 26.4 24.5 8.2 8.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1990 8.9 16.7 25.7 28.9 28.7 12.1 13.4
1999 7.2 14.5 25.0 29.0 31.5 15.0 18.0
2002 7.1 14.3 25.0 29.5 31.2 14.5 18.1
2009 8.6 18.9 27.9 28.3 24.9 8.6 10.2
 2010 7.9 20.3 29.0 28.6 22.1 7.6 9.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Households throughout the country ranked by per capita income.
b Average monthly household income in multiples of the per capita poverty line.
c D (1 to 4) represents the lowest-income 40% of households, while D10 represents the highest-income 10% of households. The same notation is used for quintiles (Q), representing groups 
of 20% of households.
d Urban total.
e Greater Buenos Aires.
f Eight principal cities and El Alto.
g Asunción metropolitan area.
Table I.A-2 (concluded)
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Table I.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCOME CONCENTRATION INDICATORS, 1990-2010 a
Country Year
Percentage of 







(ε = 0.5) (ε = 1.0) (ε = 1.5)
Argentina c 1990 d 20.5 0.501 0.555 0.216 0.360 0.473
1999 22.2 0.539 0.667 0.250 0.410 0.530
2002 24.3 0.578 0.724 0.282 0.464 0.593
2009 21.4 0.510 0.549 0.219 0.377 0.509
2010 20.9 0.509 0.559 0.220 0.373 0.499
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1989 e 20.6 0.537 0.574 0.243 0.430 0.600
1999 29.5 0.586 0.658 0.293 0.537 0.738
 2002 28.6 0.614 0.776 0.322 0.556 0.738
 2007 27.2 0.565 0.611 0.269 0.493 0.709
Brazil 1990 26.6 0.627 0.816 0.324 0.528 0.664
1999 25.9 0.640 0.914 0.341 0.537 0.663
2001 26.1 0.639 0.914 0.340 0.536 0.665
2008 24.3 0.594 0.808 0.298 0.477 0.604
2009 23.9 0.576 0.716 0.277 0.455 0.586
Chile 1990 20.4 0.554 0.644 0.255 0.422 0.546
 1998 21.0 0.560 0.654 0.261 0.430 0.553
 2003 19.5 0.552 0.674 0.257 0.418 0.535
 2006 18.5 0.522 0.568 0.228 0.381 0.497
 2009 17.4 0.524 0.585 0.231 0.384 0.501
Colombia 1994 26.0 0.601 0.794 0.308 0.517 0.684
1999 21.8 0.572 0.734 0.275 0.450 0.603
2002 24.8 0.594 0.753 0.293 0.487 0.640
2009 24.3 0.578 0.706 0.279 0.469 0.702
2010 23.8 0.578 0.694 0.278 0.468 0.738
Costa Rica 1990 19.4 0.438 0.328 0.152 0.286 0.412
 1999 20.7 0.473 0.395 0.179 0.328 0.457
 2002 21.2 0.488 0.440 0.193 0.349 0.491
 2008 18.5 0.473 0.427 0.183 0.323 0.439
 2009 20.3 0.501 0.474 0.204 0.358 0.485
Dominican Republic 2002 22.1 0.537 0.569 0.236 0.404 0.536
2009 24.3 0.574 0.677 0.273 0.455 0.589
 2010 25.2 0.554 0.603 0.253 0.433 0.572
Ecuador c 1990 17.4 0.461 0.403 0.173 0.306 0.422
1999 18.8 0.526 0.567 0.228 0.381 0.498
2002 19.6 0.513 0.563 0.222 0.371 0.487
2009 19.5 0.485 0.471 0.194 0.334 0.446
2010 19.4 0.485 0.471 0.195 0.335 0.445
El Salvador 1995 22.0 0.507 0.502 0.213 0.377 0.525
 1999 24.2 0.518 0.496 0.224 0.416 0.601
 2001 24.4 0.525 0.528 0.232 0.423 0.602
2009 20.3 0.478 0.440 0.189 0.333 0.449
 2010 20.1 0.454 0.372 0.168 0.304 0.419
Guatemala 1989 22.7 0.582 0.736 0.282 0.460 0.590
1998 20.0 0.560 0.760 0.273 0.428 0.534
2002 17.9 0.542 0.583 0.239 0.401 0.515
2006 24.7 0.585 0.773 0.291 0.467 0.590
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Country Year
Percentage of 







(ε = 0.5) (ε = 1.0) (ε = 1.5)
Honduras 1990 26.1 0.615 0.817 0.317 0.515 0.649
 1999 25.7 0.564 0.636 0.263 0.451 0.603
 2002 26.5 0.588 0.719 0.288 0.476 0.608
2009 27.7 0.548 0.581 0.249 0.437 0.584
 2010 27.7 0.567 0.625 0.265 0.458 0.601
Mexico 1989 19.7 0.536 0.680 0.248 0.400 0.509
1998 22.9 0.539 0.634 0.245 0.403 0.515
2002 21.2 0.514 0.521 0.218 0.372 0.485
2008 19.9 0.515 0.599 0.227 0.375 0.485
2010 19.2 0.481 0.458 0.192 0.335 0.448
Nicaragua 1993 27.4 0.582 0.671 0.270 0.458 0.619
 1998 26.8 0.583 0.731 0.285 0.481 0.654
 2001 23.8 0.579 0.783 0.288 0.470 0.620
 2005 22.6 0.532 0.614 0.241 0.402 0.526
Panama 1991 c 22.0 0.530 0.543 0.228 0.398 0.534
1999 c 21.7 0.499 0.459 0.202 0.361 0.490
2002 26.6 0.567 0.616 0.266 0.466 0.618
2009 24.8 0.523 0.522 0.226 0.398 0.533
2010 25.4 0.519 0.529 0.226 0.401 0.543
Paraguay 1990 f 16.4 0.447 0.365 0.161 0.287 0.386
 1999 25.4 0.558 0.659 0.264 0.452 0.601
 2001 25.3 0.558 0.673 0.265 0.450 0.610
 2009 24.5 0.512 0.527 0.220 0.388 0.529
 2010 24.4 0.533 0.666 0.248 0.416 0.557
Peru 1997 25.5 0.532 0.567 0.238 0.414 0.553
1999 23.6 0.545 0.599 0.249 0.424 0.560
2001 23.9 0.525 0.556 0.231 0.397 0.527
2009 21.8 0.469 0.414 0.181 0.325 0.442
2010 21.3 0.458 0.399 0.174 0.311 0.424
Uruguay c 1990 17.4 0.492 0.699 0.227 0.349 0.441
1999 19.0 0.440 0.354 0.158 0.286 0.393
2002 19.6 0.455 0.385 0.169 0.301 0.412
2009 17.9 0.433 0.352 0.154 0.276 0.375
2010 16.9 0.422 0.327 0.145 0.262 0.359
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1990 20.1 0.471 0.416 0.183 0.327 0.446
1999 21.6 0.498 0.464 0.202 0.363 0.507
2002 22.4 0.500 0.456 0.201 0.361 0.507
2009 18.4 0.416 0.302 0.137 0.254 0.358
 2010 17.2 0.394 0.264 0.123 0.233 0.337
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Calculated from the per capita income distribution of people throughout the country.
b  Includes people with zero income.
c  Urban total.
d  Greater Buenos Aires.
e  Eight principal cities and El Alto.
f  Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table I.A-4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PREDICTORS OF THE FEAR OF BECOMING JOBLESS, PROBIT ORDINAL REGRESSION, 1996-2006
Dependent variable:
Fear of losing job in the next 12 months:
1 = Completely or fairly unconcerned
2 = Somewhat concerned
3 = Very concerned
Coefficient Significance a
Sex
Male = 1 -0.065 0.000***
Female = 2 0.000 .
Education
Incomplete primary education = 1 0.319 0.000***
Complete primary education = 2 0.274 0.000***
Incomplete secondary education = 3 0.245 0.000***
Complete secondary education = 4 0.180 0.000***
Incomplete higher education = 5 0.088 0.000***
Complete higher education = 6 0.000 0.000***
Age
Age 15 to 29 = 1 0.128 0.000***
Age 30 to 45 = 2 0.113 0.000***
Age 46 and over = 3 0.000 .
Occupation
Farmer, fisherman = 1 0.020 0.302
Self-employed, own-account worker = 2 0.124 0.000***
Employee = 3 0.057 0.000***
Business owner = 4 -0.015 0.313
Mid- or high-ranking executive, professional = 5 0.000 0.302
Nagelkerke’s R squared = 1.5%
n = 100366 (valid cases)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro database, 1996-2006.
 a  Asterisks (***) mean that the coefficient is significant at 99.9%.
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Chapter II 
Current situation and outlook  
for fertility in Latin America
A.  Introduction
The decline in fertility in Latin America provides an unprecedented opportunity for economic 
growth and better household living standards in the region. The positive impact of fertility 
decline is not limited to reducing household size; more important, it completely transforms 
the age structure of the population and provides countries, for a considerable period of 
time, with a large and growing potentially productive population combined with a shrinking 
economically dependent population. 
Besides the fall in the number of births, lower fertility 
leads to improvements in mother and child health 
and broader education and employment opportunities 
for women. These advantages make households less 
vulnerable and provide women with more autonomy in 
reproductive decision-making, creating a virtuous circle 
linking demographic trends with socioeconomic progress.
At the same time, as will be shown in the following 
chapters of this edition of Social Panorama, emerging 
demographic trends, with a steadily ageing population, 
have significant implications in terms of the care economy 
and dependency ratios within families.
The high levels of poverty and inequality in the 
region, which are closely linked to low levels of education, 
mean that substantial segments of the population still 
face barriers to accessing sexual and reproductive health 
information and services and exhibit high unwanted 
fertility. The situation is particularly worrying in the 
case of adolescent girls in Latin America. In a context 
of family vulnerability and limited support in raising 
children, high fertility at a young age makes it difficult 
to enter the labour market, find employment and access 
social protection mechanisms. 
Education is a key policy variable for promoting 
universal access to sexual and reproductive health and 
can help break the vicious cycle of fertility, poverty and 
exclusion. Education helps change reproductive behaviour 
and reduces the likelihood of adolescent motherhood. 
Substantial efforts should be made not only to increase 
education coverage but also to ensure that education 
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effectively helps women —especially adolescent girls— make 
informed, independent decisions on reproductive matters.
All of the above underlines the importance of analysing 
fertility trends in Latin America and how they fit into 
the economic, social and demographic context, in order 
to spotlight the achievements and, especially, pinpoint 
the challenges that countries will face in the short and 
medium term in this regard.
B.  Fertility in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The decline in fertility in Latin America has repeatedly exceeded estimates. Although the main 
factors behind this decline relate to exposure to sexual relations, the use of contraception has 
had a rapidly increasing impact, partly due to growing contraceptive prevalence and partly 
due to the use of modern methods. Although the downward trend has been a general one, the 
onset and pace of the decline have varied between countries in the region.
In the mid-twentieth century, fertility began to decline 
markedly in Latin America as development gathered 
steam in the region and led to changes in reproductive 
behaviour. The high initial fertility levels held considerable 
potential for decline.  
As shown in figure II.1, the total fertility rate (TFR) 
in Latin America gradually moved away from the average 
for the less developed regions and, during the five year 
period 1990-1994, fell below the global average).1 In the 
mid-1960s, women in the region came to the end of their 
childbearing years with around six children per woman, 
or one child more than the global average and double 
the figure for the more developed countries. Since then, 
the rapid decline in fertility in the region has narrowed 
the gap considerably: by 2015, the total fertility rate in 
Latin America and the Caribbean will be 2.1 children per 
1 The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children 
who would be born to each woman belonging to a hypothetical 
cohort of women who have not been exposed to mortality risks 
from the time of birth up until the end of their reproductive life 
and are subject to the age-specific fertility rates for the population 
concerned (Welti, 1998). 
woman, compared with 1.7 in developed countries. In 
general, fertility levels in the major regions of the world 
have been converging since the 1950s. There is now a 
significantly narrower gap with the developed countries, 
which began their demographic transition in the late 
eighteenth century and by 1950 were already recording 
rates of fewer than three children per woman while the 
global average was around five children per woman (see 
figure II.1).2
The decline is widespread at the regional level, but 
Central America continues to record fertility rates above 
the regional average; they are, however, similar to the 
global average and lower than the average in the less 
developed countries.  
2 The demographic transition theory seeks to provide a general 
explanation of the decline in mortality and fertility rates as a result of 
industrialization and modernization. Industrialization and, in particular, 
modernization, lead to improved living and health conditions and, 
therefore, lower mortality rates. This decline causes demographic 
pressures within families because, at the same fertility level, the 
number of surviving children increases. This in turn causes families 
to lower their fertility rates in the medium term (Welti, 1998).
1. Current levels and trends in the global context
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Figure II.1 
world (selected regions): total fertility rate, 1950-2010
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Source:  United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010 revision [CD-ROM], Population Division, New York, 2011.
2. the surprisingly sharp drop in fertility in latin america
The decline in fertility in Latin America has surprised 
the experts by repeatedly exceeding their estimates. 
Projections for the region based on the component 
method thus had to be revised several times because 
the assumptions regarding the rate of decline in fertility 
systematically fell short of the actual decrease (see 
figure II.2).3 In 1973, taking into account the level and 
relative stability of fertility in the subregion until then, it 
was assumed that although fertility levels would start to 
fall, it would be a gradual downtrend; the total fertility 
rate was put at 5.9 children per woman in 1965-1970 and 
3 The component method entails analysing the historical evolution 
of the determinant variables for demographic trends (fertility, 
mortality and migration) and developing hypotheses regarding 
future trends. It uses the balancing equation, which establishes the 
balance between the population at a given starting point plus the 
number of births, minus the number of deaths, plus immigrants, 
minus emigrants, to estimate the population at the ending point. 
The balancing equation is disaggregated by sex and age and enables 
each cohort to be tracked from a given starting point or base study 
year for a given period (CEPAL, 2007).
projected to drop to 3.9 in 1995-2000. In 1982, the estimate 
for 1995-2000 was revised downwards to 3.1 (nearly one 
child less than projected). But even then, the subregion 
was not expected to reach replacement level fertility 
within the projection horizon (up to 2025).4 When the 
projections were revised in 2008 it was clear that fertility 
levels were below all forecasts and that the region would 
reach the replacement level in 2005-2010. 
Although initial projections pointed to a slight 
decline of 0.27 children every five years, in reality, from 
the 1960s  —which marked the turning point in fertility
4 A total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 children per woman corresponds 
to the replacement level of a population because, given that the 
proportion of female births is just under 0.50, this means that each 
woman bears a daughter who will replace her. 
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5 The period in which dependency rates fall —known as the 
demographic dividend— is a time-lag period and is followed by 
a period in which rates rise again as population ageing speeds up. 
See ECLAC (2008a, 2008b and 2010). 
3. disparities within Latin America
Fertility rates are declining in all countries in the region, 
but, as is to be expected in a region with significant 
internal economic and social inequalities, the onset and 
the pace of the decline differ markedly between countries. 
Those with very low fertility rates that are below the 
replacement level (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Cuba) 
illustrate the diverse trajectories of the decline in fertility 
in Latin America. In Costa Rica, for example, the fertility 
rate began to decline in 1965 and has plummeted from 
seven children per woman in 1965 to two children per 
woman at present. Declines of this magnitude entail not 
only significant changes in macroeconomic terms but also 
radical transformations in family life, family burdens and 
the organization of society itself. 
By contrast, in Cuba the total fertility rate stood at 
around four children per woman at the start of the second 
half of the twentieth century and then began to drop sharply, 
especially between 1970 and 1980. It has been below the 
replacement level since the 1980s (see figure II.3). In 
the projections made 30 years ago, it was assumed that
fertility levels would not reach the replacement level in 
any country, except Cuba, before 2025. But even in the 
case of Cuba the projection was fairly conservative, since 
the total fertility rate was expected to be 2.1 children per 
woman in 2005-2015. The  actual rate was 1.5. 
Figure II.3 
LAtIn AMerICA (4 CoUntrIes): FertILIty trends In 
CoUntrIes wIth rAtes BeLow the repLACeMent  
LeveL In 2005-2010
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Figure II.2 
LAtIn AMerICA: totAL FertILIty rAte (tFr), BAsed  
on dIFFerent projeCtIons, 1950-2030
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1974; Demographic Bulletin, No. 31, 1983; and Demographic Observatory, 
No. 7, 2009.
Note: The solid lines represent estimated data, and the dotted lines projected data.
trends in Latin America— to the last period observed 
(2005-2010), fertility declined at a rate of 0.41 children 
per five-year period.
The positive consequences of this accelerated 
decline in fertility have exceeded all expectations: 
the rapid fall in economic dependency ratios (the 
portion of the population comprising economically 
dependent age groups, i.e., young people and older 
people, relative to economically active age groups) 
is boosting the potential for social investment.5 
The proximate determinants of the drastic decline in 
fertility in Latin America include those relating to sexual 
activity and contraception. Box II.1 summarizes these 
factors, which will be analysed in more detail below. 
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Box II.1 
proXIMAte deterMInAnts oF reprodUCtIve ChAnge In LAtIn AMerICA
Changes in the fertility of populations 
have been the subject of several studies 
designed to identify the underlying behaviour 
patterns. In the mid-twentieth century, 
Davis and Blake (1956) defined a series of 
variables referred to as intermediate fertility 
variables; they are related to exposure to 
sexual relations, the risk of conceiving, 
pregnancy and successful birth. Since then, 
several variants have emerged based on 
different approaches and the availability of 
information to measure fertility, including the 
framework developed by Bongaarts (1978) 
to analyse the proximate determinants 
of fertility.a 
The demographic and health surveysb 
currently available for several countries in 
the region can be used to examine the 
impact of the proximate determinants 
on the decline in fertility. In general, the 
main factors driving the decline in fertility 
are those related to exposure to sexual 
relations, such as not forming a union or 
delaying it to a later age, together with 
temporary or permanent separations. In 
simulations carried out in several countries, 
these factors account for around 50% of 
the decline compared with natural fertility.c 
The second most important factor (the use 
of contraception) accounts for around 40% 
of the difference, but the relative effect 
of contraception is increasing rapidly, as 
is to be expected given the widespread 
growth in contraceptive prevalence and 
the increasing use of modern contraceptive 
methods (see table). 
Despite the marked progress in the use 
of contraception in the region, from the point 
of view of Millennium Development Goal target 
5.B (universal access to reproductive health), 
there is still much to be done to ensure the 
availability of contraceptive methods and 
universal access to them. In fact, there is still 
substantial unmet demand for contraception 
in the region (see table).d In Haiti, for example, 
more than one third of sexually active women 
who were not using contraception had wanted 
to delay the birth of their last child or their last 
pregnancy, or did not want any more children. 
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia the figure 
is one in every five women. As shown in 
the table below, and as explained further in 
section E of this chapter, the figures are even 
higher among adolescents aged 15 to 19.




Colombia Haiti Honduras Nicaragua Peru Dominican Republic
2008 2010 2004-2005 2005-2006 2001 2004-2008 2007
Contraceptive prevalence among women living with a partner
Not using contraception 39.4 20.9 68.3 34.8 31.4 28.0 27.1
Total use 60.6 79.1 31.7 65.2 68.6 72.0 72.9
Modern methods 33.7 72.7 23.5 56.1 64.3 47.5 69.6
Traditional methods 27.0 6.4 8.2 9.1 4.3 24.4 3.3
Unmet demand for contraception
Aged 15-19 37.7 20.1 52.4 25.8 19.8 17.7 28.0
Total 20.2 7.0 37.5 16.9 14.6 8.1 11.4
Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from the most recent Demographic 
and Health Surveys (DHS) available.  
a  See Bongaarts (1978 and 1982) and Stover (1998). For a summary of these approaches, see Ruiz and others (2005).
b  The demographic and health survey programme has been conducted since 1984 as a follow-up to the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys 
(CPS), an important component being issues relating to maternal and child health. So far, 45 surveys have been conducted in Latin America.
c  Natural fertility denotes the number of children a fertile woman would bear, absent contraceptives or any other constraints. For Latin America, the figure is 21 children per woman.
d  Unmet demand refers to the use of contraceptive methods for determining the number, spacing and timing of children.
 In general, there is a relationship between high initial 
fertility rates and rapid decline, although it has changed 
over time. During the 1950s, most countries recorded high 
fertility levels and a slow rate of change, and fertility even 
rose in some cases such as Costa Rica and Argentina. In 
others it remained stable (Uruguay) or dropped slightly, 
causing a slight rise in the regional average.  
In the subsequent decades, the rate of decline was 
significant in most countries. In Costa Rica, for example, 
the fertility rate dropped by 40% between 1960-1964 
and 1970-1974. In the 1980s and 1990s, fertility rates in 
the region were low or intermediate and the decline was 
more moderate, at between 15% and 30%, although Cuba 
still saw a decline of nearly 50%. In the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, the large majority of countries 
recorded low or very low fertility levels and a low rate of 
decline. In short, the sharpest general decline in fertility 
in the region took place in the 1960s; although there 
are still disparities between countries, the relationship 
between a high initial fertility rate and a sharp rate of 
decline has led to a clear convergence in fertility levels 
in Latin America. 
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As explained in the previous section, fertility has declined 
steadily in the countries of Latin America. Although the 
intensity and timing of the change have varied, there 
is now a trend towards convergence. Within countries, 
however, there are still significant disparities in the average 
number of children born in different social groups; this 
reflects the socioeconomic inequalities that continue to 
define Latin America as one of the most unequal regions 
in the world.  
Numerous studies have shown the link between 
structural factors and fertility: on average, poor, 
marginalized women, whether living in rural or urban 
households, have a higher number of children. This is also 
the case with indigenous peoples, whose fertility rates are 
systematically higher, although in this case the figures 
have to be interpreted in the light of coexisting factors 
of inequality and cultural ideals that value high fertility. 
The structure of Latin American societies and the 
socio-economic conditions in which couples live have 
an impact on the proximate variables of fertility (age at 
union, the use of contraception, the practice of abortion, 
duration of breastfeeding, and others) and without a doubt 
help maintain the gap in levels of this variable. However, 
in the past three decades socio-economic factors and 
demographic trends have behaved relatively independently. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, little progress was made in 
combating poverty, and income distribution indicators 
remained the same or even regressed (ECLAC, 2003; 
ECLAC, 2005). Several countries nonetheless recorded 
fertility declines across social groups.
Despite persistent poverty, levels of education have 
risen in the subregion (see section D). This highlights 
once more the close link between fertility and education. 
Furthermore, in recent decades, the gender gap has 
narrowed significantly in terms of access to education and 
educational achievement, which is helping to empower 
women and enhance their access to resources and therefore 
improve their capacity to make individual or negotiated 
decisions concerning their sexual and reproductive life. 
Increasing education coverage is not enough in itself: the 
key is how education serves to enhance decision-making 
and disseminate information.  
Given the important and well-documented role of 
education in promoting changes in reproductive behaviour, 
it is useful to examine developments over the past decade, 
the extent to which schooling is contributing to the decline 
in the number of children and how this is influencing 
other direct fertility factors, such as timing.6 
6 The manner in which fertility is spread throughout the reproductive 
period is referred to as timing, i.e., the age at which motherhood 
begins in a cohort of women, the ages at which they have subsequent 
children and the age at which childbearing ends. 
C. the link between education and fertility 
 intensity and timing 
The lower a woman’s level of education, the higher her fertility; this is still invariably the case. 
While fertility has recently fallen among women of all levels of education, in many countries 
the rate of decline has differed across groups and is usually slower for less-educated women. 
As a result, the relative differences are deepening. By and large, contraceptive prevalence is 
lower among women with lower levels of schooling, and this is closely linked to the unmet 
demand for family planning services.
1. Fertility and education in Latin America 
85Social Panorama of Latin America • 2011
As shown in table II.1, it is invariably the case 
that the higher women’s educational levels the lower 
the total fertility rate. In absolute terms, the sharpest 
contrast is seen in Ecuador, Haiti and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, where women with no education have 
upwards of three children more than those who have 
completed secondary education. Based on the most recent 
surveys conducted in each country, the average number 
of children born to women with no formal education is 
at least double the number born to women who have 
completed secondary education. The widest gaps are in 
Brazil, Haiti, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Guatemala. The difference is even more marked if 
the comparison takes into account women who have 
completed higher education. According to the latest 
surveys, such women have fewer than two children 
in Brazil (1 child), Colombia (1.4 children), Peru 
(1.9 children) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
(1.9 children), so women with no education have between 
three and four times as many children as those with 
higher education. 
Nonetheless, fertility has continued to decline 
recently, regardless of the level of education. In Paraguay 
and Honduras, it has fallen by more than two children in 
each of the educational brackets considered. The pace of 
the decline has varied among groups, however, and has 
generally been less sharp among women with no education. 
Consequently, the relative disparities have not only persisted 
over time —in half of the countries examined, they have 
become more pronounced (see table II.1).  
Table II.1  
LAtIn AMerICA (12 CoUntrIes): totAL FertILIty rAte By LeveL oF edUCAtIon, Most reCent FIgUre And ten yeArs BeFore
(Number of children per woman)
Country Year
Total fertility rate (TFR) TFR gap  between women 
with no education and those 
with secondary or higherNo education Primary Secondary or higher
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2008 6.1 4.7 2.6 2.3
1998 7.1 5.7 2.9 2.4
Brazil 2006 4.2 2.8 1.7 2.5
1996 4.9 3.3 2.1 2.3
Colombia 2010 4.3 3.2 2.0 2.2
2000 4.0 3.6 2.2 1.8
Dominican Republic 2007 3.9 3.0 2.2 1.8
1996 5.0 3.7 2.5 2.0
Ecuador  2004 5.9 4.1 2.6 2.3
1994 6.2 4.4 2.7 2.3
El Salvador  2008 3.7 3.0 2.0 1.9
1998 4.8 3.6 3.0 1.6
Guatemala  2008 5.2 3.8 2.3 2.3
1998 6.8 5.2 2.9 2.3
Haiti 2005 5.9 4.3 2.4 2.5
1994 6.1 4.8 2.5 2.4
Honduras  2005 4.9 3.8 2.2 2.2
1996 7.1 6.1 4.3 1.7
Nicaragua  2006 4.4 3.2 2.0 2.2
1998 5.7 4.2 2.5 2.3
Paraguay  2008 3.9 3.1 2.1 1.9
1998 6.2 5.8 4.5 1.4
Peru  2009 4.4 3.6 2.3 1.9
2000 5.1 4.1 2.2 2.3
Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC, on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
The wealth of cultural, economic and social 
opportunities afforded by education is also reflected in 
the proximate determinants of fertility, especially the use 
of contraception. The link between education and the use 
of contraception is illustrated in figure II.4, which shows 
that in several countries contraceptive prevalence is 
significantly larger among more highly-educated women. 
In countries where contraceptives are more widely used 
(figure II.4A), contraceptive prevalence ranges from 
55%-72% for uneducated women living in a union to 
70%-80% for women with a higher level of education.7
7 Current use of contraception according to level of education can 
mask another type of inequality linked to the type of contraceptive 
methods to which women have access (traditional methods or 
modern ones). Inequalities with regard to timing may also exist, 
such as lower contraceptive prevalence in the first sexual encounter 
among less-educated women compared with those with more years 
of schooling.  
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Figure II.4 
LAtIn AMerICA (11 CoUntrIes): CUrrent ContrACeptIve prevALenCe In CoUntrIes wIth nArrower  
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Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC, on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Moreover, in countries with significant fertility gaps 
according to women’s educational levels, there are also 
marked inequalities in terms of access to family planning 
methods (see figure II.4B). An extreme case is Haiti, 
where the general prevalence is very low but the rate is 
as high as 40% for more-educated women versus only 
25% for those with no formal schooling. This suggests 
that they have more limited access to family planning 
services. In Guatemala and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, only 40% of women with no education who 
live in a union use contraception, compared with 70% of 
educated women. In Ecuador, contraceptive prevalence 
ranges from 50% to 80%. 
The latter three countries have a substantial 
indigenous population, whose women tend to be the 
most disadvantaged by poor access to the education 
system and other factors. Contrary to stereotypes, 
however, qualitative studies conducted in Guatemala, 
Ecuador and the Plurinational State of Bolivia show that 
indigenous women do not reject family planning (there 
is a branch of traditional knowledge on contraception, 
mainly associated with medicinal herbs) but rather reject 
the ideology and the manner in which it is administered 
under government and biomedical programmes (Oyarce, 
Ribotta and Pedreros, 2010; Rodríguez, 2010; Schuler, 
Choque and Rance, 1994; Enge, 1998). The main obstacles 
include poor quality services and the lack of cultural 
appropriateness, as pointed out by various indigenous 
women’s organizations, which are increasingly putting 
sexual and reproductive health on their agendas. 
Despite the disparities, it is clear that in all countries 
women with less schooling have more children and are 
less likely to use contraception. Moreover, previous 
studies have demonstrated the close link between 
contraceptive prevalence and unmet demand for family 
planning services. There are numerous advantages 
to being able to decide the number and timing of 
children. Besides reducing the number of births, it 
improves mother and child health and expands women’s 
education and employment opportunities, which in turn 
reduces poverty. Thus, the figures given here reflect 
the persistent gaps in ensuring the right to sexual and 
reproductive health; these gaps  directly or indirectly 
restrict the exercise of other economic and social rights. 
In this regard, the countries of Latin America face the 
challenge of implementing measures and stepping 
up efforts to attain Millennium Development Goal 
target 5.B: achieve universal access to reproductive 
health by 2015.8
8 When the Millennium Development Goal targets were expanded 
in 2005, a target was included on universal access to reproductive 
health.
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In Latin America, falling fertility rates and longer life 
expectancy have ushered in major changes within families, 
the most significant being a decrease in the average size 
of households, an increase in the number of childless 
nuclear family units and the number of one-person 
family units, and a rise in the number of family units 
made up of persons at more advanced stages of the life 
cycle. Conjugal union continues to be the form of adult 
life chosen by most women and men in the subregion, 
although there is a gradual tendency to continue to delay 
this deeply entrenched cultural option. 
As mentioned earlier, exposure to sexual relations is 
one of the factors that have the greatest impact on fertility 
levels and trends. Thus, it is useful to consider patterns 
such as age at sexual initiation and age upon entering a 
union, by education level, and to see how these are linked 
to the beginning of motherhood.
 In Latin America, the age at start of marital life 
has varied little or increased slightly. For example, in 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia the median age at first 
union went up from 20.3 years (in 1989) to 20.6 years 
(in 2008); in Colombia, it went from 20.8 years in 1986 
to 20.9 years in 2010. In Peru, over a period of just over 
20 years, it moved up slightly, from 20.5 years to 21.0 years. 
By contrast, the general trend is for sexual activity 
to start at a younger age and for the gap between this 
initiation and the age at first marriage to widen, although 
these changes are, as a rule, gradual. The decline in the 
age of first sexual relations is more marked in some 
countries, such as Colombia, where the median age fell 
from 19.4 years in 1986 to 18.2 years in 2010, and Haiti, 
where it declined from 19 years in 1994 to 17.9 years in 
2004-2005.
One noteworthy change, however, is the lower age at 
which women now tend to give birth to their first child. 
Surveys conducted recently in seven countries of the 
region (Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) 
reveal that in the last few years the median age at which 
women give birth to their first child has fallen, with this 
age decrease ranging from 0.2 years in Haiti to 1.4 years 
in Brazil. In 1996, half of Brazilian women had had their 
first child before the age of 22.4; by 2006, the age had 
dropped to below 21 years.
The above trends indicate that the Latin American 
model contrasts with the patterns of formation of unions 
and reproduction that emerged in the developed countries 
in the 1960s and are considered to be typical of the second 
demographic transition. Among the typical features of the 
second transition are, precisely, postponement of unions 
and the tendency to initiate motherhood at an older age.9 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, various types of 
marriage patterns —formal or consensual— exist in Latin 
America and these, together with the timing of starting 
motherhood, are strongly influenced by education. As 
shown in table II.2, women with a higher level of education 
systematically become sexually active at a later age than 
less-educated ones, and they delay forming unions and 
becoming mothers. Honduras, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia are the countries with the most glaring 
inequalities. In these countries, more than half of the 
young women aged 25 to 29 with a higher education have 
not yet entered a union or had any children, while half 
of the uneducated young women have already formed 
a union and had their first child by the age of 18 (Peru 
and Honduras) or by the age of 20 (Plurinational State of 
Bolivia).10 In Colombia, half of the young women aged 
25 to 29 with higher education form a union for the first 
time after the age of 26 and have their first child towards 
the age of 29. At the other extreme, the median age of 
young women with no formal schooling is 17 years for 
the first union and around 18 years for the birth of their 
first child.   
Table II.2 compares the median ages of the cohorts 
of younger women (aged 25 to 29) with respect to cohorts 
of older women (45 to 49) and shows that irrespective of 
their level of education, women now tend to have their 
first sexual encounter at a younger age. There is also a 
trend towards forming the first union and bearing the first 
child at a younger age, both among uneducated women and 
among those who have completed primary or secondary 
education. But among more highly-educated women 
9 Other features of the second demographic transition are growing 
rates of cohabitation and extramarital parenthood, and an increase 
in the dissolution of unions and in the existence of blended families. 
However, these elements lie beyond the scope of this chapter.   
10 Note that for Honduras, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
it has not been possible to determine the median age upon the first 
union and birth of the first child among more highly-educated young 
women aged 25 to 29 because half of them have not yet formed a 
union or had any children.
2. sexual initiation and motherhood: education as a factor  
in maintaining gaps 
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there is a clear tendency to postpone these milestones.11 
Population censuses provide further insight by comparing 
the percentage of women who have not yet had children at 
two different census years. As shown in box II.2, in Mexico 
11 For several countries, it was not possible to compute the median age 
at formation of the first union or birth of the first child for highly-
educated young women aged 25 to 29 because more than half of 
them had not yet formed a union or had any children. This means 
that, in these cases, the median age at which these milestones occur 
is higher for the 25-to-29-year age group than for the 45-to-49-year 
age group.
and Panama there is a trend towards delaying motherhood 
(and even an increase in lifetime nulliparity), strongly 
influenced by the level of education; the most significant 
variations are seen among the most highly-educated women. 
Table II.2 
LAtIn AMerICA (6 CoUntrIes): MedIAn Age At FIrst seXUAL InterCoUrse, ForMAtIon oF FIrst UnIon And FIrst ChILd,  
By LeveL oF edUCAtIon, For woMen Aged 25 to 29 And 45 to 49
(Years)
First sexual intercourse First union Birth of first child
Current age Current age Current age
25-29 45-49 25-29 45-49 25-29 45-49
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2008
Uneducated 19.0 18.5 20.4 20.1 19.7 20.9
Primary 17.6 18.1 19.0 19.9 19.4 20.5
Secondary 18.6 19.3 20.9 21.5 20.9 21.8
Higher 21.7 21.8 a 24.1 a 24.7
Colombia 2010
Uneducated 14.9 16.2 17.0 18.3 17.9 19.3
Primary 16.0 18.1 17.9 20.1 18.5 20.5
Secondary 17.4 19.9 20.3 22.6 20.5 22.8
Higher 18.5 21.3 26.2 26.2 28.9 27.6
Brazil 2006
Uneducated 16.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0
Primary 16.0 17.5 16.5 18.5 18.0 19.5
Secondary 17.1 19.1 18.5 21.0 19.6 22.1
Higher 18.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 25.0 26.0
Honduras 2005-2006
Uneducated 16.4 16.8 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.0
Primary (1-3) 16.9 17.2 17.5 17.7 18.6 18.9
Primary (4-6) 17.7 18.3 18.4 18.7 19.4 20.0
Secondary 19.7 21.0 20.5 21.4 21.6 22.6
Higher 22.7 23.1 a 24.0 a 25.3
Peru 2009
Uneducated 16.1 17.1 17.8 19.4 18.5 20.1
Primary 16.7 17.6 18.4 19.3 18.7 20.1
Secondary 18.4 19.0 20.9 21.7 21.2 22.1
Higher 20.8 22.1 a 26.4 a 27.3
Dominican Republic 2007
Uneducated 15.8 15.7 16.2 16.2 17.7 19.0
Primary (1-4) 15.6 16.9 15.8 17.5 17.5 19.2
Primary (5-6) 16.2 17.4 16.6 18.0 18.3 20.1
Secondary 18.0 19.9 18.8 20.7 20.7 22.8
Higher 20.1 23.6 22.9 24.5 a 26.9
Source:  CELADE-Population Division of ECLAC, on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
a  The median could not be computed because half of the women aged 25 to 29 have not yet entered a union or had children.
towards convergence in the beginning of sexual activity 
among young women of different educational levels. 
And there is clear divergence in the age at marriage 
and at birth of the first child. The divergence deepens 
as education levels rise. Figure II.5 illustrates this 
pattern for women aged 30 to 34 in four countries of 
the region; the largest gaps occur with respect to age 
at start of sexual activity compared with age at birth 
of first child. 
This pattern implies a certain polarization in fertility 
timing depending on the level of education, with higher 
education marking a turning point. There is a trend 
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Box II.2  
InCreAsIng nULLIpArIty (woMen who hAve no ChILdren)
An additional indicator of changes in 
childbearing patterns is the percentage 
of women who have never had children. 
Population censuses are an important 
source for this indicator as they present 
a broad disaggregation of other relevant 
variables such as women’s education 
levels and age without being constrained 
by the number of cases or by sampling 
errors, as occurs with surveys. According 
to the two censuses conducted in Mexico 
and Panama, the percentage of childless 
women increases with their level of 
schooling, irrespective of age, although 
the increase is most obvious among young 
women (see figures 1 and 2). Access to 
higher education is the turning point. In 
Mexico, more than half (54%) of 30-year-
old women who have completed university 
studies (at least 17 years of education) 
still have not had children, compared with 
only 15% of those with less than 7 years 
of schooling. In Panama, 47% of more 
highly-educated 30-year-old women are 
nulliparous, compared with 8% for those 
who have completed a total of 6 years 
of schooling. 
Figure 1 


















0-6 7-9 10-12 13-16 17-22
A. Women aged 30 B. Women aged 40
Figure 2 

















10-12 13-16 17-220-6 7-9
Years of schooling
10-12 13-16 17-22
A. Women aged 30 B. Women aged 40
While the nulliparity rate among women 
with 12 years or less of schooling did not 
change significantly in the intercensal periods 
considered in figures 1 and 2, there is 
clearly a period effect among women with 
more education (13 years or over). In other 
words, for both younger and older women of 
childbearing age, the percentage of women 
with higher education who have still not had 
children was higher in the most recent census 
than in the previous one. These changes 
over time indicate that these women have 
been delaying childbearing. In the future, 
this postponement will probably lead to an 
increase in lifetime nulliparity.
Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC.
The fact that women from more privileged social 
sectors and those with higher levels of education tend 
to delay the age at which they marry and become 
mothers suggests that women in these sectors have 
greater autonomy in making sexual and reproductive 
decisions. Moreover, national averages suggest that 
changes in the age at which women first marry and 
become mothers have been slight. As more and more 
women pursue higher studies, however, it is highly 
likely that changes will intensify in the next few years 
and that this will have a greater impact on fertility 
levels in the region. 
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Figure II.5 
LAtIn AMerICA (4 CoUntrIes): MedIAn Age At FIrst seXUAL InterCoUrse, At FIrst UnIon And At BIrth oF FIrst ChILd, 
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Source:  CELADE-Population Division of ECLAC, on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
d. Future outlook for fertility based on changes  
 in education levels
Over the past decades, educational distribution has evolved rapidly in most Latin American 
countries. At the same time, the difference in fertility by level of education has not just 
persisted but has actually deepened in some countries. Sharper declines in fertility rates may 
therefore be expected as a larger proportion of women attain higher levels of education. Fertility 
forecasts based on educational distribution within the population confirm the conclusion 
that the demographic and economic future of the region will increasingly be shaped by low 
fertility levels, with all that this implies in terms of the care economy, female labour-force 
participation and dependency ratios within families.
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Over the past decades, educational distribution has evolved 
rapidly in most Latin American countries. Various data 
sources and studies confirm this trend (UNESCO, 2011; 
Barro and Lee, 2010; Lutz and Samir, 2011). The changes 
in the level of education are evident in the national 
population censuses, which are the principal source of 
information for the estimates prepared by the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and by 
Barro and Lee (2010).12 Data from a single census reveal 
differences in the level of education by age, attributable 
to earlier expansions in the education system. These data 
serve not only as a record of past changes but also as 
inputs for projecting future changes (see Miller, 2006). 
Figure II.6 shows the distribution of educational 
levels by five-year age groups for Mexican women in 
2010, based on estimates from Barro and Lee (2010). 
Educational distribution by age has changed significantly. 
Among older women, the percentage who never attended 
school is significant: 39% in the case of the group aged 
75 and over. This proportion has diminished progressively 
in younger cohorts to stand at zero for the youngest (aged 
20 to 24). The opposite trend is observed for the proportion 
of women attending university. Among older women, 
the proportion is very small (less than 3% among those 
aged 75 and over), but it has increased steadily among 
the youngest cohorts to peak in the 20-to-24-year-old 
cohort, in which over one in four women have some 
level of post-secondary education. These differences 
by age are mainly the reflection of the expansion of the 
education system over time, although the higher survival 
rates among more-educated persons and differences in 
migration patterns also have a bearing. 
The rapid transition in education observed in Mexico is 
also seen in several countries in the region. The experience 
of the countries in Latin America has been varied in the past 
30 years. Some countries at the forefront of educational 
attainment in 1980 showed little subsequent progress, 
while others that started with low levels of education 
progressed rapidly in the past three decades. Thus, the 
development of national education systems since 1980 
has varied considerably across the region. 
12 Barro and Lee’s studies present estimates of the levels of education 
by age and sex in 146 countries, between 1950 and 2010. 
Figure II.6 
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Source:  R. Barro and J.W. Lee, “A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 
1950–2010”, NBER Working Paper, No. 15902, 2010.
Figure II.7 reveals this heterogeneity by showing 
for various countries in the region the average number 
of years of education of women aged 25 to 29 (the peak 
childbearing age group in these countries) in 1980 and, 
one generation later, in 2010, on the basis of data from 
Barro and Lee (2010). The education systems expanded 
rapidly, which was reflected in the average increase of 
3.5 years of schooling among women aged 25 to 29. 
The sources of data for these estimates usually vary 
from one country to another and, as indicated earlier, 
Barro and Lee’s estimates of the levels of education and 
changes over time normally differ from those produced 
by IIASA.13 However, both sources noted the general 
pattern of rapid change in education in Latin America 
and, in particular, its remarkable expansion in some 
countries. The Plurinational State of Bolivia is a case 
in point: since 1980, the average number of years of 
schooling among women aged 25 to 29 has increased 
by 7 years. Brazil and Mexico, for their part, have 
shown gains of 6 years and 5.5 years, respectively, 
since that year.
13 The IIASA studies provide estimates of the levels of education by 
age and sex for 120 countries between 1970 and 2000, as well as 
projection scenarios between 2005 and 2050. 
1. Changes in educational distribution among women  
in Latin America
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Figure II.7 
LAtIn AMerICA (20 CoUntrIes): AverAge nUMBer oF yeArs 
oF sChooLIng AMong woMen Aged 25 to 29, 1980 And 2010
(Number of years)
Bolivia (Plur. State of)   5.3
12.3   Bolivia (Plur. State of)
12.2   Chile
Chile, Cuba   8.5
11.6   Cuba
Argentina   8.3
11.4   Argentina
Mexico, Dominican Rep.   4.8
10.4   Mexico, Panama
Panama   7.3
Paraguay   5.7
El Salvador   3.9
  9.5   El Salvador, Brazil
Brazil   3.5
Uruguay   8.6
  9.4   Dominican Rep., Uruguay
Peru   6.5
  9.2   Peru
Colombia   5.2
  9.0   Costa Rica, Colombia
Ecuador, Costa Rica   6.6
  8.5   Ecuador
Honduras   4.2
  8.2   Honduras
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)   6.2
  7.6   Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Nicaragua   2.5
  7.0   Nicaragua
Guatemala   2.8
  4.9   Guatemala
Haiti   1.6
  3.4   Haiti
1980 2010
Source:  R. Barro and J.W. Lee, “A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 
1950–2010”, NBER Working Paper, No. 15902, 2010.
To the extent that economic and demographic trends 
usually vary with the level of education, projections of 
educational distribution are important inputs for economic 
and demographic projections. For example, changes in 
the educational distribution of the labour force generate 
conditions that favour more accelerated economic growth, 
insofar as a more educated labour force is usually more 
productive. In the same way, changes in educational 
distribution will probably bring about a faster decline in 
fertility because more highly-educated women tend to 
have lower fertility. 
The following section considers the extent to which 
changes in educational distribution have helped to speed 
up the decline in fertility.
2. how changes in educational distribution contribute  
to the decline in fertility
As the level of education of women in the region has been 
rising, fertility has been declining rapidly, as indicated in 
the previous sections. It has also been shown that levels of 
education correlate inversely with fertility, since fertility 
is lower among women who are more highly educated.
One theory is that disparities in fertility according 
to level of education are linked to modernization. The 
idea is that the disparities noted are temporary and reflect 
differences in access to and participation in modern life. 
Modernization is initially concentrated in urban areas 
among people with a higher level of education, but then 
extends to the whole of society. Thus, low fertility rates 
are recorded first among the most educated strata of 
society, but over time they spread to all other groups. 
Consequently, a look at the current reproductive behaviour 
of women with a university education shows the future 
course of fertility for all women. Based on this theory, 
the disparities that exist today will eventually disappear 
as modernization spreads throughout society. 
An alternative theory is that education acts as a 
stratification mechanism and an institution that ultimately 
groups the population by types of employment. Employment 
opportunities for women with a low level of education 
tend to revolve around occupations that do not compete 
directly with motherhood, whereas women with a high 
level of education tend to focus on professions that do. 
According to this theory, disparities in fertility levels 
according to level of education will persist over time. 
In reality, both mechanisms tend to operate at the same 
time. In fact, as seen in table II.1, in many countries in 
Latin America, the disparities in fertility rates according 
to level of education are not only still present but are 
becoming sharper. Nonetheless, there are grounds to 
think that the disparities could lessen in the long term: the 
decline in fertility among more educated women could 
eventually stop, whereas fertility among less-educated 
women could continue to decline.
Data from demographic and health surveys were 
used to determine the direct contribution of changes in 
educational distribution to the decline in fertility in four 
countries (Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia) over a period of 15 years. Two hypothetical 
fertility levels were calculated for each country. The first 
was the fertility level that the country would reach if the 
fertility patterns in each education group remained the same 
but educational distribution changed. The second was the 
fertility level that the country would reach if educational 
distribution remained the same but the fertility patterns 
in each education group changed. This made it possible 
to assess the magnitude of the rate effect (the impact of 
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the decline in fertility in each education group) and the 
composition effect (the impact of changes in educational 
distribution) on the variations in fertility levels.
Figure II.8 shows the findings for the four countries. 
The decline in the total fertility rate was sharpest in Brazil, 
where the rate dropped by 1.9 children per woman, but 
was still significant in the other countries, which showed 
declines of 1.3 children in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
1.0 children in Peru and 0.8 children in Colombia. In Brazil, 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the decline in 
fertility was mainly due to changes in fertility rates within 
the education groups (rate effect), whereas in Colombia 
the magnitude of the rate and composition effects was the 
same. Although not the dominant driver of the decline in 
fertility, changes in educational distribution (composition 
effect) contributed substantially to the decline: 0.7 births 
in Brazil, 0.4 births in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Colombia, and 0.2 births in Peru. 
Figure II.8 
LAtIn AMerICA (4 CoUntrIes): totAL FertILIty rAte 
deCLIne, Broken down Into the rAte eFFeCt And the 
CoMposItIon eFFeCt over A perIod oF 15 yeArs
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Bolivia (Plur. State of), 1994-2008
Brazil, 1991-2006
Decline in total fertility rate (Number of children per woman)
Rate effect: Due to the decline in fertility 
within each education group
Composition effect: Due to change 
in educational distribution
Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division 
of ECLAC, on the basis of data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
3. Future trends in education and impact on fertility
The projections made by the United Nations Population 
Division show the possible course of fertility in the 
future. These projections are based on the general decline 
in fertility noted in all countries, weighted for specific 
patterns in the country concerned. Specifically, they use 
a Bayesian hierarchical model to determine the rate of 
change in the total fertility rate from its current level. 
The projections for Latin America indicate that fertility 
levels will soon drop below the replacement level14 in a 
growing number of countries. 
Another approach to studying future fertility trends in 
Latin America is to project fertility based on educational 
distribution within the population. By way of example, 
projections based on this method are set out below for 
Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. The forecasts are based on both future changes in 
educational distribution across the population and changes 
in fertility rates within each education group. Changes 
in the educational composition of the female population 
of childbearing age were based on projections made by 
IIASA. It was assumed that fertility rates will continue 
declining in each education group at the pace seen over 
14 The level at which a generation will be unable to replace itself. 
See footnote No. 4.
the past 15 years and will converge towards the lowest 
fertility rates recorded among the most highly educated.
In Brazil, fertility among women with a university 
education in the 40-to-49 age bracket stood at 1.5 children 
per woman in 2006, compared with a current rate of only 
1.0 child per woman. 
The rate of 1.0 child per woman is likely to be 
temporary, owing to the delay in motherhood, and could rise 
to 1.5 children per woman for this cohort. Fertility in the 
other education groups is assumed to drop to 1.5 children 
per woman, at the rate historically observed in Brazil.
In fact, for the four countries covered by this exercise, 
the rate of 1.5 children per woman was established as the 
minimum admissible rate for the group with a university 
education. In the four countries, fertility among women with 
a university education is currently below the replacement 
level: 1.5 children per woman in Colombia, 1.6 children in 
Peru and 1.9 children in the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Figure II.9 shows the findings of these projections 
(blue lines), together with the official United Nations 
projections (red lines). In general, the findings based on 
the two methodologies are similar in predicting a sharp 
decline in fertility in the future. In both cases, fertility is 
expected to drop to 1.6 births in Brazil and 1.9 births in 
Colombia over the next 20 years. 
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Figure II.9 
LAtIn AMerICA (4 CoUntrIes): FUtUre sCenArIos For deCLInIng FertILIty
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D. Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2010-2030
Source:  United Nations, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision” [CD-ROM], Population Division, 2011; Projections based on education: Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, model for projecting fertility 
based on the educational distribution of the population.
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru, it 
was found that, taking into account the rapid changes 
in educational distribution, fertility will decline even 
more quickly to reach 2.4 children per woman in 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia by 2030 (around 
0.2 births below the United Nations projection) and 
1.65 children per woman in Peru by 2030 (around 
0.3 births below the United Nations projection). But 
the main conclusion drawn from this analysis is that 
the findings support the prediction that low fertility 
levels will increasingly shape the demographic and 
economic future of the region.
Table II.3 outlines several key characteristics of this 
low-fertility future. At present, fertility levels are below 
the replacement level in five countries in Latin America: 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay. Within the next 
15 years, eight more are expected to cross that threshold: 
Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. Within 
one generation, fertility rates will drop below the replacement 
level in virtually every country in Latin America.
The emergence of low fertility levels in the region 
will have several consequences. In demographic terms, 
the number of births is steadily falling. In most countries 
in the region, the birth rate has already peaked and is 
now declining. For example, the highest number of 
births recorded in Cuba was in 1965, while in Brazil it 
was in 1983 and in Peru it was in 1991 (see table II.3). 
These large cohorts are being replaced by cohorts with 
successively fewer births, and this is causing gradual 
population ageing. As will be explained in the following 
chapters, these changes entail major implications in terms 
of the care economy, female labour-force participation 
and family dependency ratios.
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Table II.3  
LAtIn AMerICA (20 CoUntrIes): MAIn FeAtUres oF Low FertILIty 
Country Year in which births peaked Year in which fertility fell below the replacement level a
Year in which the country 
became an aged economy b
Cuba 1965 1979 2005
Chile 1962 2000 2022
Brazil 1983 2005 2026
Costa Rica 1989 2005 2026
Uruguay 1974 2009 2019
El Salvador 1979 2016 2041
Mexico 1991 2017 2033
Argentina 1993 2018 2025
Colombia 2007 2021 2031
Ecuador 2000 2024 2036
Peru 1991 2024 2038
Nicaragua 1992 2025 2044
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2010 2025 2037
Dominican Republic 2006 2027 2040
Panama 2005 2027 2034
Haiti 1996 2040 2050
Honduras 2018 2040 2049
Paraguay 2020 2042 2048
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2028 2053 2050
Guatemala 2053 2071 2050
Source:  Columns 1 and 2: United Nations, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision” [CD-ROM], Population Division, 2011; Column 3: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from national transfer accounts.
a  Total fertility rate below 2.1 children per woman.
b  Year in which consumption by older people (over 60 years of age) outstripped consumption by children (aged 0-14).
The economic impact of population ageing is illustrated 
perfectly by the year in which countries will become aged 
economies, that is, the year in which economic consumption 
by older people will outstrip consumption by children. 
According to projections made using data from the National 
Transfer Accounts project, Cuba has already been an aged 
economy for several years (see table II.3 and box II.3). 
Within the next 15 years, another five countries are expected 
to allocate more resources to older people than to children: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. Within 
15 years after that, another seven countries are expected 
to pass this threshold, and within one generation aged 
economies will be the dominant economic form in Latin 
America, as well as in most of the world. 
Box II.3 
the nAtIonAL trAnsFer ACCoUnts projeCt
Since 2007, the Latin American and Caribbean 
Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population 
Division of ECLAC has been coordinating 
the regional project on national transfer 
accounts for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(see [online] http://www.cepal.org/celade/
transferencias_intergeneracionales) with 
financial support from the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) of 
Canada and the University of California at 
Berkeley. The project is being implemented 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, as 
part of the global National Transfer Accounts 
(NTA) project coordinated by the Center for 
the Economics and Demography of Aging 
of the University of California at Berkeley 
and the Population and Health Studies 
Program of the East-West Center in Hawaii. 
Thirty-four countries from different regions 
of the world are currently participating in 
the global project (see [online] http://www.
ntaccounts.org).
The National Transfer Accounts system 
offers a comprehensive approach to 
measuring aggregate economic flows 
between age groups over time. The accounts 
include flows associated with capital 
accumulation and transfers, and distinguish 
transfers mediated by public institutions 
from those relying on private institutions. 
Estimates are mostly based on household 
surveys relating to income, spending, assets, 
the workforce and transfers, in addition 
to detailed administrative records from 
government bodies. Aggregate flows are 
estimated in accordance with the United 
Nations System of National Accounts.
Economic activity varies considerably 
according to age, so changes in the age 
structure of the population in future decades 
will have a major impact on national economies, 
public budgets and national debt. The National 
Transfer Accounts methodology provides a 
basis for long-term fiscal forecasts, which are 
of particular interest to governments owing to 
(i) the importance of long-term investments, 
for example in public education; (ii) the need 
for a long-term approach to tackling many 
social issues, such as inequality, which could 
entail decades of concerted efforts; and (iii) the 
marginal corrections or adjustments produced 
by this approach, which are not only politically 
more feasible but also prevent an unfair 
burden from falling on any one generation in 
particular and enable smooth transitions in 
fiscal policies and public spending.
Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)96
(a) Regional trends: sub-Saharan Africa and  
Latin America 
The expansion of the list of targets under the 
Millennium Development Goals, which was approved 
by political leaders at the World Summit in 2005 and 
implemented in 2007, added a new target for universal 
access to reproductive health, and the adolescent fertility15 
15 Adolescent fertility is measured by means of a traditional demographic 
rate that records the intensity of reproduction of adolescents during 
a calendar year. It is calculated as the ratio of live births that year to 
mothers between 15 and 19 years of age (numerator) to the average 
population of girls of the same age during the same year. Live 
births to mothers under 15 years of age are typically included in the 
numerator, as a result of which the figure overestimates fertility in 
the 15-19 age group, although nearly always only slightly because 
there are very few births to girls under 15 years of age. For the 
purposes of interpretation, a rate of 70 per 1,000, for example, 
means that, assuming that a woman cannot have more than one 
child in a calendar year, 70 in every 1,000 adolescent girls between 
15 and 19 years of age became mothers in that calendar year. By 
contrast, adolescent motherhood is measured by a proportion that 
shows the relative frequency of this attribute (becoming a mother) 
among adolescent girls at a given point in time. It reflects the relative 
risk of motherhood for a given population. If it is calculated for 
the exact age of 20 years, it indicates the probability of becoming 
a mother during adolescence. When censuses are used as a source, 
the numerator is mothers aged 15 to19 who report that they have 
had one or more live births. When specialized surveys are used 
(Demographic and Health Surveys or International Reproductive 
Health Surveys), the numerator normally corresponds to women 
aged 15 to19 who report that they have had one or more live births 
and women who are pregnant for the first time. In both cases, the 
denominator is all women aged 15 to19.
rate as one of its indicators. Since then, follow-up reports 
on the Millennium Development Goals have indicated 
that the subregion with the highest adolescent fertility 
rates in the world is sub-Saharan Africa, where it is about 
120 births per 1,000 women in this age group. Latin America 
has the second highest rate, which is still over 80 per 
1,000, followed by the Caribbean, where the rate stands at 
70 per 1,000. The average rate in the developed countries 
is currently 24 per 1,000; in developing countries it is 
54 per 1,000 (see figure II.10). 
Figure II.10 
WORLD (12 REGIONS): ADOLESCENT FERTILITY RATE,  
1990, 2000 AND 2008
(Number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19)














Source:  United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011, New York, 
2011 [online] http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/11_MDG%20Report_EN.pdf.
E. Adolescent fertility: a priority for action  
 and research
Adolescent fertility has fallen at a much more moderate pace than total fertility. In many countries 
in the region it even rose during the 1990s, whereas the total fertility rate declined significantly. 
The inequality in fertility levels between groups with different education levels is usually 
particularly marked in the case of adolescent mothers. Evidence of the declining percentage of 
planned births among adolescent mothers offers a powerful argument in favour of bolstering 
public policies and programmes on sexual and reproductive health targeting this group.
1. Adolescent fertility trends
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While the total fertility rate remains high in sub-Saharan 
Africa, in Latin America it has declined sharply in recent 
decades. Consequently, the high adolescent fertility in Latin 
America is regarded as an anomaly at the global level. 
This is a trend shared by nearly all countries in the region, 
which stand out because of adolescent fertility rates that 
are considerably higher than might be expected based on 
their total fertility rates (Rodríguez, 2011). In general, these 
findings suggest that structural socio-economic changes, 
cultural shifts and public programmes that encouraged 
the rapid, sustained decline in total fertility have not had 
the same effect on adolescent fertility. 
(b) National trends: disparities and variations according 
to period
Fertility has declined in Latin America across all 
age groups, and there is no doubt that adolescent fertility 
rates in the region are currently lower than they were 
when fertility began to decline steadily in the mid-1960s.
However, when the decline in total fertility is 
compared with the decline in adolescent fertility, a clear 
pattern emerges: adolescent fertility has fallen much 
more slowly. In a few countries, especially in those in 
which total fertility declined first, such as Argentina and 
Uruguay, adolescent fertility is even higher now than in 
1960 (Rodríguez, 2011). A look at fertility trends over 
more recent, shorter periods shows that in the 1990s nearly 
all countries in the region recorded a rise in adolescent 
fertility, even though total fertility was falling sharply. 
Figure II.11 shows the changes in adolescent motherhood 
between the 1990s and 2000s. The 2010 round of censuses 
will show the latest trends in adolescent motherhood. In 
the meantime, censuses carried out in Panama and Mexico 
in 2010 show varying trends: a slight rise in adolescent 
fertility between 2000 and 2010 in Mexico contrasting 
with a decline in Panama in the same period. 
Based on the percentage of first-time adolescent mothers 
or first-time pregnant adolescents recorded in specialized 
surveys conducted in the 1980s or 1990s and the 2000s, 
the picture is mixed: in six countries adolescent fertility has 
declined but in five it has risen (see table II.4). In short, the 
figures confirm the distinctive path of adolescent fertility 
and its resistance to downward change in many countries 
in the region in the past two decades.
Figure II.11 
LAtIn AMerICA (17 CoUntrIes): vArIAtIon In AdoLesCent 
Motherhood Between the 1990 CensUs roUnd  

































































































































































































Source:  J. Rodríguez, “Latin America: high adolescent fertility amid declining overall 
fertility”, document presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Adolescents, 
Youth and Development, New York, 21-22 July 2011 [online] www.un.org/esa/
population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p01_rodriguez.pdf.
a  Percentage of women aged 15 to 19 who report in the census that they have given 
birth to one or more live children. 
Table II.4 
LAtIn AMerICA (11 CoUntrIes): Mothers or FIrst-tIMe eXpeCtAnt Mothers AMong woMen Aged 15 to 19,  
BAsed on sUrveys CArrIed oUt In 1985-1999 And 2005-2010 
Country and survey dates
Surveys conducted between 
1985 and 1999 (1)
Surveys conducted between 
2005 and 2010 (2)
Variation a 
(2) - (1) 
(percentage) (percentage points)
Bolivia (Plurinational State of): Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 2008 and 1989 17.2 17.9 0.7
Brazil: National Demographic and Health Survey (PNDS) 2006, DHS 1986 13.3 22.3 9.8
Colombia: DHS 2010, DHS 1986 13.6 19.5 5.9
Dominican Republic: DHS 2007, DHS 1996 22.7 20.6 -2.1
Ecuador: Demographic and Maternal and Child Health 
Survey (ENDEMAIN) 2004, DHS 1987 17.0 19.4 2.4
El Salvador: National Family Health Survey (FESAL) 2008, DHS 1985 26.6 22.8 -3.8
Guatemala: DHS 2008, DHS 1987 22.8 21.8 -1.0
Haiti: DHS 2005-2006, DHS 1994-1995 14.5 14.0 -0.5
Nicaragua: International Reproductive Health Survey (IRHS) 2006, DHS 1998 27.0 25.2 -1.8
Paraguay: IRHS 2008, DHS 1990 16.8 11.6 -5.2
Peru: Continuous National Demographic and Health Survey (ENDES) 2009, DHS 1986 12.7 13.7 1.0
Source:  Macro International Inc., “MEASURE DHS STATcompiler”, May 2011 [online] http://www.measuredhs.com; Brazil: Ministry of Health, “Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saúde 
da Criança e da Mulher (PNDS), 2006. Relatório”, Brasilia, 2008, p. 126; Colombia: PROFAMILIA, “Informe de la Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud (ENDS) 2010”, 
Bogota, 2011, p. 114; Peru: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), “Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (ENDES) Continua, 2009 Informe principal”, Lima, 
2010, p. 88.  
a  A positive value signifies an increase.
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(a) Proximate determinants
It is very difficult to analyse the proximate determinants 
of adolescent fertility because of the difficulties encountered 
in estimating the frequency of sexual activity and the 
effective use of contraception (Rodríguez, 2009). 
With regard to sexual activity, the indicators most 
often used —none of which accurately reflect the full 
exposure to risk— suggest that sexual activity during 
adolescence is increasingly common, which tends 
to increase the likelihood of adolescent pregnancy. 
Table II.5 shows the cumulative percentages of women 
who are sexually active at the start, in the middle and 
at the end of the period regarded as adolescence in this 
text. Almost without exception (Guatemala is one of the 
exceptions) the percentages have risen for all age groups 
between the 1980s and the 2000s. It also shows that while 
women are becoming sexually active at a younger age, 
they are not entering unions any earlier, which implies 
an increase in premarital sexual activity. The increasingly 
weaker link between sexual initiation in adolescence and 
adolescent union means that the analysis and calculations 
are focused on sexually active adolescents, regardless of 
whether they are in a union. At the same time, however, 
union patterns are still relevant, since sexual activity in this 
context is more likely to result in a pregnancy and birth.
2. determinants of adolescent fertility
Table II.5 
LAtIn AMerICA (11 CoUntrIes): woMen Aged 20-24 who were In A UnIon By the Age oF 15, 18 or 20 yeArs,  
And who hAd ever hAd seXUAL InterCoUrse By the sAMe Age, two poInts In tIMe
(Percentages)
Countries, years and variationa during  
the reference period
Married women Women who had ever had sexual intercourse
Age 15 Age 18 Age 20 Age 15 Age 18 Age 20
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2008 3.2 21.7 35.8 6.6 40.1 62.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1989 5.1 23.7 40.7 9.5 36.9 56.9
variation 1989-2008 -1.9 -2.0 -4.9 -2.9 3.2 5.6
Brazil 2006 10.5 35.6 50.1 14.4 58.4 78.7
Brazil 1986 3.7 21.8 39.5 6.1 29.8 48.1
variation 1986-2006 6.8 13.8 10.6 8.3 28.6 30.6
Colombia 2010 5.6 23.0 37.2 13.8 60.3 82.2
Colombia 1986 4.3 23.3 37.2 6.1 30.9 49.0
variation 1986-2010 1.3 -0.3 0.0 7.7 29.4 33.2
Ecuador 2004 3.8 22.2 40.9 9.2 37.6 58.1
Ecuador 1987 5.8 26.0 43.9 8.4 32.1 50.9
variation 1987-2004 -2.0 -3.8 -3.0 0.8 5.5 7.2
El Salvador 2008 5.0 25.4 42.4 10.7 40.4 60.5
El Salvador 1985 6.2 37.7 58.5 6.7 32.9 48.6
variation 1985-2008 -1.2 -12.3 -16.1 4.0 7.5 11.9
Guatemala 2002 8.1 35.0 50.4 12.2 41.7 57.6
Guatemala 1987 12.4 41.2 60.0 13.9 44.7 62.5
variation 1987-2002 -4.3 -6.2 -9.6 -1.7 -3.0 -4.9
Haiti 2005-2006 5.6 29.9 47.9 13.5 53.4 72.9
Haiti 1994/1995 4.8 23.8 44.8 9.2 40.8 61.8
variation 1994/1995-2005/2006 0.8 6.1 3.1 4.3 12.6 11.1
Honduras 2005-2006 10.8 38.8 54.4 12.3 45.4 64.0
Honduras 1996 7.9 36.8 55.8 10.4 44.1 63.1
variation 1996-2005/2006 2.9 2.0 -1.4 1.9 1.3 0.9
Paraguay 2008 1.8 17.0 33.7 8.1 47.8 76.6
Paraguay 1990 3.1 24.2 40.5 5.3 38.6 60.8
variation 1990-2008 -1.3 -7.2 -6.8 2.8 9.2 15.8
Peru 2009 3.4 19.0 34.2 7.1 38.7 61.1
Peru 1986 2.3 19.9 35.8 5.7 28.8 47.5
variation 1986-2009 1.1 -0.9 -1.6 1.4 9.9 13.6
Dominican Republic 2007 13.8 39.6 53.7 16.3 51.0 70.8
Dominican Republic 1996 10.8 37.6 53.4 12.5 42.1 59.3
variation 1996-2007 3.0 2.0 0.3 3.8 8.9 11.5
Source:  Macro International Inc., “MEASURE DHS STATcompiler”, May 2011 [online] http://www.measuredhs.com; Brazil, age at first union: Ministry of Health, “Pesquisa Nacional 
de Demografia e Saúde da Criança e da Mulher (PNDS), 2006. Relatório”, Brasilia, 2008, p. 161; age at first sexual relation: special processing of the database; El Salvador: 
Salvadoran Demographic Association (ADS), “Informe final de la Encuesta Nacional de Salud Familiar (FESAL) 2008”, San Salvador, 2009, p. 169; Paraguay: Paraguayan Centre 
for Population Studies (CEPEP), “Informe Nacional de Demografía y Salud Sexual y Reproductiva (ENDSSR) 2008”, p. 115; Peru: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics 
(INEI), “Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (ENDES) Continua, 2009 Informe principal”, Lima, 2010, p. 123 (first union) and p. 126 (first sexual relation).
a  Percentage points.
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The only way to keep these trends in the two 
intermediate variables described above from leading to 
a rise in adolescent fertility is to significantly increase 
the effective use of modern contraception in adolescence. 
Although the traditional coverage indicators show an 
increase in contraceptive use, a detailed analysis yields 
a far less encouraging conclusion. First, because the 
increased use of contraception is partly the result of women 
who start to use it after having their first child, which 
obviously does nothing to prevent adolescent motherhood 
(although it does prevent a second pregnancy). Second, 
the use of contraception tends to be less effective and 
less consistent among adolescents, so increased use has 
a smaller protective effect than in other age groups. Last, 
the most relevant indicator for predicting an adolescence 
without children —contraceptive use at first intercourse— is 
still extremely low in many countries.16 
With regard to abortion, what little evidence there is for 
the region is fragmented. Only recently have international 
demographic and health surveys and reproductive health 
surveys included questions on abortions; the findings 
are pending technical validation. Official statistics 
from Cuba, where abortion is legal, suggest that it has a 
significant impact on adolescent fertility levels, but that 
early motherhood is nonetheless more common than 
might be expected based on the country’s low fertility 
rate.17 In Chile, where abortion is illegal, recent data show 
that 6% of women who have had unplanned pregnancies 
have undergone at least one abortion (INJUV, 2010). The 
percentage is much higher based on male responses, but 
responses from men on these matters tend to be less reliable 
and less consistent. The lack of information means that 
this proximate determinant has to be excluded from the 
analysis herein despite its importance.
(b) Unwanted fertility and sexual and reproductive 
rights: a critical issue
In Latin America there is a long tradition of studies 
and researchers suggesting that adolescents who become 
pregnant want to have children and, in particular, that
16 For example, in El Salvador in 2008 fewer than one quarter of 
women aged 15-24 used modern contraceptives in their first sexual 
relationship (“Informe final de la Encuesta Nacional de Salud 
Familiar (FESAL) 2008”). In Ecuador in 2004 the proportion was 
lower than 10% (see [online] www.measuredhs.com.) 
17 In 2000, the adolescent fertility rate was 50 per 1,000, which is low 
for Latin America but high when compared with the total fertility 
rate for that year, which stood at 1.6. The adolescent pregnancy rate 
for the year was estimated at almost 200 per 1,000. The difference 
between the pregnancy rate and the fertility rate is almost entirely 
due to intentional abortion (Rodríguez, 2005).
they want to do so more than people of other ages.18 The 
arguments underpinning this view range from demography 
(that is, birth order, because first order births are more 
desired and most births to adolescent mothers are first 
order births), to anthropology (cultural norms that prize 
early reproduction), to sociology (early motherhood as an 
option that provides meaning and a life plan, particularly 
in contexts with few or no alternatives) (Oliveira and 
Vieira, 2010; Binstock and Pantelides, 2006; UNFPA/
CENEP, 2005; Stern, 1997).
These arguments —probably valid in the past— are not 
supported by the current evidence. Figure II.12 shows how 
the desirability of children changed in the five years prior 
to each survey, among adolescents and among all women 
aged 15 to 49. Surveys conducted during the 1980s and 
1990s bear out the greater desirability hypothesis given 
that in all countries the percentage of births described 
as “wanted at the time” was higher for births to women 
under the age of 20. Surveys carried out during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, however, point to (i) a 
systematic and significant drop in some countries in the 
desirability of children conceived during adolescence; 
and (ii) lower levels of desirability for births during 
adolescence compared with all births in most countries.
Figure II.12 
LAtIn AMerICA (11 CoUntrIes): desIrABILIty a oF ALL 
pregnAnCIes And pregnAnCIes BeFore 20 yeArs  






















































































































































































Aged 15 to 19 Total
Source:  Macro International Inc., “Demographic and Health Surveys, Measure DHS 
STATcompiler” [online] http://www.measuredhs.com [date of reference: 
7 June 2011]; Ministry of Health of Brazil, “Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia 
e Saúde da Criança e da Mulher (PNDS) 2006. Relatório”, Brasilia, 2008, 
table 6; National Institute of Statistics and Informatics of Peru (INEI), “Encuesta 
Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (ENDES) Continua, 2009. Informe principal”, 
Lima, 2009, table 6.11
a  At the time of birth.
18 “… with few exceptions, more pregnancies are labeled as wanted 
or even planned among the 15-19 age group of mothers than among 
any other age group” (Guzmán and others, 2011, p. 43).
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These findings are highly relevant for policy purposes, 
since they signal a greater need for sexual and reproductive 
health services, in particular access to contraception (see 
box II.4). They also suggest that there is considerable 
scope for programmes promoting preventive behaviour 
with regard to teenage pregnancy. In the 1960s, the high 
levels of unwanted fertility detected by surveys under 
the programme of comparative fertility surveys in Latin 
America (PECFAL) conducted among women from a 
number of Latin American cities (CELADE/CFSC, 1972) 
led to the establishment of family planning programmes 
in the subregion. The evidence regarding the decline in 
planned births among adolescent mothers is an incentive 
and a powerful argument for stepping up reproductive 
and sexual health public policies and programmes for 
this group.
3. Adolescent fertility in Latin America: an expression  
of social inequalities
Box II.4 
dIFFICULtIes enCoUntered By LAtIn AMerICAn AdoLesCent gIrLs In ACCessIng ContrACeptIon
Unders tand ing  the  reasons  why 
contraception is not used in the first 
sexual relation is important for devising 
sexual and reproductive health policies 
and programmes targeting adolescents. If 
contraception were not being used because 
of an explicit desire to have children, policies 
would need to focus more on expectations, 
given that programmes to increase access 
to contraception would have no effect 
as long as those expectations remained 
unchanged. However, data show that this 
appears not to be the case and that the 
reasons for not using contraception in the 
first sexual relation have little to do with 
a desire to have children and more to do 
with a lack of prevention and with barriers 
to accessing contraception. The lack of 
prevention is illustrated by responses such 
as “Did not expect to have sex” (32.2%, El 
Salvador, 2008, “Informe final de la Encuesta 
National de Salud Familiar (FESAL) 2008”, 
table 7.12); “Failure to take precautions” 
(44.1%, Paraguay, 2008, “Informe final 
de la Encuesta Nacional de Demografía 
y Salud Sexual y Reproductiva (ENDSSR) 
2008”, table 7.13) and “Irresponsibility” 
(28.1%, Chile, 2009, special processing 
of the data from the National Youth 
Survey (ENAJU) 2009).a  The barriers to 
accessing contraception are reflected in 
responses such as “Was not aware of 
methods” (15.2% in Paraguay and 15% 
in El Salvador), “Partner objected” (8.2% 
in El Salvador) and “Could not obtain a 
method” (Chile, 9.3% of girls and 16% of 
boys). The desire to have a child was cited 
as a reason for not using contraception 
by 12.2% of respondents in El Salvador, 
5.7% in Chile and 4.6% in Paraguay. In 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay, a 
distinction is made between marital sexual 
initiation (in a union) and premarital sexual 
initiation (outside a union), and the reasons 
given for not using contraception vary 
between the two groups, with married 
adolescents more likely to respond that they 
wanted children. This is the main reason 
cited in the 2008 survey carried out in 
El Salvador.b 
These data reinforce the strong 
association between sexual activity, 
union and pregnancy in adolescence. 
On the one hand, sexual activity before a 
union is becoming more common, which 
in principle reduces the importance of a 
union as a factor explaining adolescent 
fertility. But, on the other hand, a large 
proportion of Latin American adolescent 
girls, especially poor ones, form unions 
early and in many cases they already have 
explicit expectations of early reproduction, 
as a result of which union continues to 
signal early reproduction. This is especially 
clear in the case of early unions resulting 
from cultural norms, such as among many 
indigenous populations, but it also seems to 
be the case for some poor urban adolescent 
girls, who see union and forming a family, 
i.e., having children, as a way of obtaining 
their own space and a life plan in a context of 
limited alternatives.c
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a In the case of the 2009 survey conducted in Chile, up to three reasons were accepted, as a result of which the sum of the percentages could exceed 100% (National Institute of 
Youth (INJUV), 2010).
b Premarital sexual initiation does not mean initiation with a casual partner. In the case of the 2008 survey in El Salvador, for example, the sexual partner of women aged 15-24 
who had their first sexual relationship before marriage was in 91.4% of the cases a stable partner and in only 1.5% of the cases was it a casual relationship (“Informe final de la 
Encuesta Nacional de Salud Familiar (FESAL) 2008”, table 7.7).
c It is not clear, however, that early union and reproduction enables young people to acquire their own space or a life plan. In fact, the evidence available suggests that the reverse 
is true given the increase in the proportion of single adolescent mothers and adolescent mothers who live with their parents and have not set up a household of their own.
The disparities in fertility levels between different 
education groups tend to be far more pronounced in the 
case of adolescent motherhood. The close correlation 
between education and adolescent motherhood has raised 
expectations that the predicted expansion in secondary 
and university education coverage in the region will be 
accompanied by a sustained decline in adolescent fertility. 
Simply because of a statistical composition effect, more 
years of schooling do in fact tend to reduce aggregate levels 
of adolescent fertility and motherhood (Rodríguez, 2009). 
This effect has been seen, for example, in recent data from 
the 2010 Panama census. The census shows that 15.5% of 
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girls aged 15 to 19 were already mothers —less than the 
17.2% recorded in 2000 and the 16% in 1990 (see figure 
II.11). However, when this percentage is disaggregated 
by level of education, an increase in all categories is 
observed, with the exception of the “no education” group 
(see figure II.13). The composition effect is the reason 
behind these contradictory trends. If it were not for the 
expansion in schooling between 1990 and 2010 (during 
which the proportion of adolescents with a low level of 
education, in other words without a secondary education, 
fell from 34% to 17%) the adolescent motherhood rate 
would have been 20.8% in 2010, far higher than the 
15.5% recorded that year and the 16% recorded in 1990.
Panama’s experience is not unique. Figure II.14 
shows that, when the data are separated by education 
group, adolescent motherhood has risen almost across 
the board in most countries in the region. While the trend 
in the national percentage for adolescent motherhood is 
less clear-cut, this is due to the composition effect, which 
arises from the declining proportion of adolescents with 
low levels of education, who, as has been explained and 
demonstrated, continue to experience far higher levels of 
adolescent motherhood than highly educated adolescents.
Figure II.13 
pAnAMA: Mothers Aged 15-19 ACCordIng to LeveL  

























Source:  Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population 
Division of ECLAC, on the basis of census microdata.
These data sound an alarm bell for Latin America. 
Without a doubt, education continues to be a factor 
protecting against adolescent motherhood. But it seems 
to have lost some of its preventive effect. Above all, the 
educational threshold needed to provide a close-to-zero 
probability of adolescent motherhood has shifted from 
secondary school to university. This is much more marked 
in countries where secondary education is widely available, 
since socio-economic disparities in these countries are 
increasingly expressed as a distinction between adolescents 
who enter higher education and those who do not. In 
countries where only a minority of adolescents have 
access to secondary education, attaining this level still 
prompts a sudden drop in the likelihood of becoming an 
adolescent mother.
Figure II.14 
LAtIn AMerICA (12 CoUntrIes): vArIAtIon In AdoLesCent 
























































































































































No education Primary Secondary or higher
Source:  ICF Macro, “Demographic and Health Surveys, Measure DHS STATcompiler” 
[online] http://www.measuredhs.com [date of reference: 5 May 2011]; Profamilia, 
“Informe de la Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud (ENDS) 2010”, Bogota, 
2011, table 5.9.1; National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru, 
“Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (ENDES) Continua, 2009. Informe 
principal”, Lima, 2009, table 6.11. 
a  Girls aged 15-19 years who are mothers or pregnant.
Given that progress towards providing universal 
secondary education in Latin America has not been 
accompanied by improvements in the job market or 
a decrease in social inequality (ECLAC, 2010b), a 
large proportion of the adolescent population attending 
school has low expectations regarding the benefits and 
opportunities that these extra years of study will bring. 
They find it difficult to find good jobs; they see going 
to university as difficult or financially unfeasible, 
and alternative paths to personal fulfilment based on 
economic and domestic emancipation seem out of 
reach. Because of these factors, a segment of Latin 
American adolescents (boys and girls) does not see the 
losses and costs associated with early motherhood as 
being so important. As such, structural change in the 
form of a more equal society that offers adolescents 
and young people more opportunities should clearly 
foster a decline in the subregion’s high adolescent 
fertility rate.
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F. Conclusion
Despite the widespread decline in fertility, significant disparities persist between social groups 
within countries. They reflect the socio-economic inequalities that continue to define Latin 
America as one of the most unequal subregions in the world. In particular, it is still invariably 
the case that the higher a woman’s education level, the lower her fertility. 
Given the strong link between level of education and 
family income level, the tendency for lower-income women 
to have more children signals, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, significant inequalities in access to 
employment and social protection. Women with a larger 
number of dependent children, especially in the 0-5 age 
group, and in particular those in the lowest quintiles, face 
more obstacles in entering the labour market, finding work 
and accessing social protection mechanisms. This results 
in a negative cycle of inequality and exclusion where 
different fertility patterns are linked to social exclusion 
throughout the life cycle. Thus, the gaps are becoming 
wider and the inequalities sharper.
Despite the persistent, significant differences in 
fertility levels according to level of education in Latin 
America, in most of the countries in the region women’s 
educational distribution has improved rapidly in recent 
decades and has contributed considerably to reducing total 
fertility levels. In fact, as women increasingly participate 
in secondary and higher education, it is very likely that 
fertility rates will plummet in the future, supporting the 
view that low fertility levels will increasingly shape the 
economic and demographic future of the region.
The changes in reproductive behaviour that 
triggered the rapid, sustained decline in total fertility 
have not had the same impact on all age groups of Latin 
American women. The decline in adolescent fertility 
has been especially slight. Fertility of girls aged 15 to 
19 in Latin America is more than three times higher 
than the average in developed countries and 1.5 times 
higher than the average in developing countries. Even 
more serious is the fact that in nearly all countries in 
the region, fertility in this age group rose in the 1990s. 
Despite the desire of adolescents to limit fertility, 
restrictions relating to their use of contraception lead 
to a lack of prevention and to obstacles in accessing 
modern contraceptive methods.
The stubbornly high adolescent fertility is much 
more marked among adolescents with a lower level of 
education and those from low-income families. As ECLAC 
has repeatedly pointed out, this group constitutes a “hard 
core” of intergenerational reproduction of exclusion and 
inequality that combines low education levels, a lack of 
childcare support, increased family vulnerability, greater 
difficulties in carrying out income-generating activities 
and precarious access to social protection networks.
In summary, governments in the region are facing two 
major challenges relating to fertility. First, they need to 
step up efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goal 
target 5.B to guarantee universal access to reproductive 
health by 2015 with a view to closing the significant 
gaps in fertility levels between social groups. To that 
end, improving education coverage and structure should 
be a top priority. Education helps to change reproductive 
behaviour throughout the entire population and helps prevent 
adolescent motherhood. However, it is clear that increasing 
education is not enough in itself. It is also necessary to 
analyse how education enhances decision-making and 
the availability of information.  
Second, governments should anticipate the challenges 
posed by —and the consequences of— the new low-
fertility context in the subregion, by adapting policies 
and institutions in order to deal with inexorable changes 
in the structure of families, society and the economy.
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Chapter III
Work, employment and labour markets: 
factories, circuits and hard cores  
of inequality reproduction 
A.  Introduction
Recent achievements in poverty reduction and income concentration make it necessary to 
gauge how much space there is for Latin America to continue to make strides against one of 
the factors that is most hindering progress: inequality. Structural heterogeneity, stratification 
of the fertility decline and gender inequality operate as true factories of inequality in the labour 
markets of Latin America. Where these factors overlap they form circuits of reproduction of 
inequalities: the circuit that operates in the gaps between formal and informal workers, the 
one that links this inequality to gender disparities, the ones that shape differential behaviours 
among certain groups (such as women and young people) in the face of unemployment and 
the one that structures inequalities in labour-force participation. This dynamic gives rise 
to hard cores of inequality and vulnerability that embed in certain sectors, such as young 
low-income women with small children, low-income young people and workers (especially 
women) in low-productivity areas.
As explained in chapter I, the progress that the region 
has made since 2002 in reducing poverty and, albeit to 
a lesser extent, inequality —and the evidence that rising 
labour income has a lot to do with that progress— are 
good reason for optimism. 
In the labour markets, female participation has 
risen sharply; productivity has been increasing and is 
on its way back to the levels seen in the region before 
the “lost decade” began (Weller, 2009). After the 
critical early 2000s, economic growth led to steadily 
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rising employment rates, declining unemployment and 
slightly expanding formal employment (ECLAC, 2009). 
Despite the fallout from the 2008 crisis (ECLAC/ILO, 
2009), by late 2009 the labour markets were showing 
clear signs of recovery thanks largely to job protection 
policies implemented in several countries in the region 
(ECLAC/ILO, 2011). 
There are two complementary approaches to examining 
the present and future implications of this favourable 
scenario. Obviously, we must look at the formulas that 
made these achievements possible, the policy instruments 
that have proven to be the most effective and, above all, 
the relevance and sustainability of the efforts that the 
countries of the region have made to contain the effects 
of the most recent crisis. But we must also gauge how 
much space there is for Latin America to continue to make 
strides against one of the factors that is most hindering 
progress: inequality. 
Such an examination requires pinpointing the 
sources of these inequalities and the circuits through 
which they are transmitted. This chapter shows that the 
headway made this decade in terms of labour income 
and its distributive and poverty reduction impact is 
butting up against “hard limits” in the form of structural 
features associated with the tremendous gaps in labour 
force productivity, as well as access and performance 
difficulties in extremely segmented labour markets. For 
that very reason, progressing toward convergence and 
higher labour income also requires more equal productivity 
levels and broader access to high-quality employment, 
paying particular attention to specific groups that are at 
a clear disadvantage.
This edition of Social Panorama proposes that the 
mechanisms and circuits operating at the point where 
the State, markets and families intersect and interact are, 
following the classic idea of Esping-Andersen (1990 and 
1999), at the root of the relative rigidity of inequality 
during periods of growth. This chapter looks at some of 
these mechanisms and circuits as they are reflected in the 
operation of labour markets and in the inequalities these 
harbour; they are the product of the interplay between 
the structural and temporal components of the spheres 
of well-being.
One of those structural components (examined 
in depth in the previous chapter) is the generation of 
inequalities due to changes in fertility and the stratified 
patterns accompanying these changes. This dynamic 
is creating differential dependency relationships in 
Latin American societies, making some sectors more 
vulnerable and, in some spheres, widening the gaps 
between the higher-income population segment and the 
most vulnerable one. 
But there is no question that inequality in Latin 
America is also the result of long-standing productive 
and labour factors. The labour market is a prime source 
of both well-being and risk for people in the region, and 
it is there that structural phenomena have helped to make 
the mechanisms that generate and reproduce inequalities 
even more rigid (Filgueira, 2007; Infante, 2011). 
This chapter looks at the legacies of inequality in the 
productive sphere, highlighting the impacts of structural 
heterogeneity on labour market segmentation. In keeping 
with the analytical approach of previous editions of Social 
Panorama, it goes on to examine the interaction between 
the State, markets and families, focusing on the relative 
inelasticity of inequality in Latin America and arguing 
that this inelasticity is rooted in structural factors that are 
not new. This is exactly why it is brought to the fore by 
a close examination of aggregate indicators taking other 
key variables into consideration. This approach yields a 
clearer understanding of why the gaps between lower- and 
higher-income segments have not only not narrowed but 
seem to be increasing in some aspects despite encouraging 
signs from aggregate indicators (essentially, income 
concentration) in recent years.
The analysis is grounded in three basic assumptions: 
The first one, which has already been outlined, is 
that the demographic and productive processes that have 
shaped the history of Latin America over the years have 
a lot to do with the generation and rigid reproduction 
of inequalities. As both processes transfer to the labour 
markets they drag along old inequalities that combine to 
generate new ones. A diachronic assessment is therefore 
a necessity. 
The second assumption is that State intervention 
can be extremely effective in reducing the structural 
inequalities that transfer to the labour markets. So, the 
lack of —or skewed— intervention goes a long way 
towards explaining the emergence of factories and 
circuits of inequality at the juncture between markets 
and families. 
The third and final assumption is that at the centre 
of the intersection between families and labour markets, 
gender inequality plays a key part. The distribution of 
roles between men and women, trade-offs between paid 
and unpaid work, discrimination and historical patterns 
of dominance all come into play at the point of contact 
between the State, markets and families, and they tend 
to reinforce the structural legacy of inequality and open 
new spaces for new disparities.  
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The characteristics of the labour market reflect relatively 
durable underlying structures deriving from demographic 
and productive transformations over time (such as those 
examined in the previous chapter). This second structural 
conditioning factor explains a goodly portion of the 
inequalities that determine how Latin America’s labour 
markets operate. While this facet is frequently discussed 
in studies it is not often tied into analyses of well-being 
and social inequality in the region. This section seeks 
to go beyond this approach, building on the ideas set 
forth in Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails 
(ECLAC, 2010a) and focusing once more on the notion 
of structural heterogeneity —a cornerstone of the ECLAC 
school of thought.
1. Productivity and economic structure
In every country, technical progress occurs at different rates 
in the various sectors and technology and opportunities for 
innovation are unevenly distributed (ECLAC, 2010a). But 
these differences are far more marked in Latin America 
than in the developed economies, and the sectors and agents 
that lag behind are not catching up with the “frontrunners” 
despite the rise in average productivity. Even within 
sectors that in aggregate terms could be considered to 
have medium or high levels of productivity there are still 
strata of companies and employment where productivity 
is extremely low. All in all, the internal markets of the 
economies of Latin America are not homogeneous; in 
other words, they are structurally heterogeneous.2
ECLAC research in the 1960s and 1970s already 
revealed profound differences in productivity both
2 To trace the conceptual development of the notion of structural 
heterogeneity, see Durán (2011).
between and within productive strata and sectors. These 
differences had to do with slow technological progress and 
the unequal distribution of that progress among sectors 
(Pinto, 1965 and 1975). Four decades later and albeit with 
somewhat different traits, evidence still confirms this 
phenomenon (ECLAC, 2010a): the economic structure of 
the region can be seen as consisting of three productivity 
strata with differing degrees of access to technology and 
markets. These strata have dissimilar characteristics, as 
discussed below. 
The first stratum, the high one, encompasses 
large-scale export activities and companies (more than 
200 workers) capturing a decisive portion of the local 
market and whose productivity per employed person 
approaches the average for the developed economies. 
Modern operations expand dynamically far above the 
average, but they have little effect on job creation and 
are not much linked with the other productive strata. The 
high stratum is more capital- and technology-intensive 
B. Production structure and labour markets: another   
 side to the structural conditioning of inequality 1
The high degree of structural heterogeneity that marks the region’s productive structures 
results in striking disparities between the contribution that each productive sector makes to 
GDP and employment. This creates an extremely unequal distribution of productivity and, 
ultimately, an extremely unequal appropriation of gains among workers. The linkage between 
structural heterogeneity and income inequality casts a rigid pattern that is stable over time.
1 The content of this section is based on Infante (2011).
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and is thus more productive, and it has more formalized 
labour relations. The persons employed in the high stratum 
include large public and private corporate employers and 
their workers, as well as self-employed professionals 
and technicians. This stratum currently accounts for 
66.9% of GDP and only 19.8 % of total employment 
(see figure III.1).
The middle stratum is one step down in terms of 
technological advances and productivity. Average-
productivity sectors comprise slow-growth activities with 
few linkages to high-productivity ones. Because their 
participation in growth is only tangential, growth —no 
matter how robust— does not yield the expected outcomes 
for this segment in terms of production and employment. 
This stratum comprises small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs); productivity per person employed is similar 
to the average for the countries. As figure III.1 shows, 
this stratum accounts for 22.5% of GDP and 30% of 
total employment.
Figure III.1  
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): STRUCTURAL 
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High stratum Middle stratum Low stratum
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Infante, “América Latina en el “umbral del desarrollo”. Un ejercicio de 
convergencia productiva”, Working document, No. 14, Inclusive development 
project, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, June 2011.
Last, there is a low stratum with minimal levels of 
productivity and income. This stratum comprises the 
informal sector, which includes low-productivity economic 
units that are barely mechanized, have very low capital 
density and use extraordinarily outdated technology. It 
includes enterprises with up to five workers, unskilled 
own-account workers, family workers and domestic 
workers. Labour relations in this stratum are not very 
structured because workers can freely enter and leave 
informal activities —anyone can start or stop working in 
them. And in family microenterprises, the roles of worker 
and entrepreneur usually overlap in practice. This stratum 
currently accounts for one half of employment and only 
10.6% of GDP (see figure III.1).
This means that a significant proportion of employed 
persons is in the low stratum, which accounts for a 
negligible portion of GDP while, on the other hand, 
the high (or large corporate) stratum, which employs a 
very small fraction of the labour force, accounts for a 
very high percentage of GDP. This unequal distribution 
of the labour force among productive strata is due to 
the low capacity of the more modern, advanced sectors 
to absorb labour force, driving surplus labour towards 
less-productive sectors. This dynamic is heightened when 
the labour supply in an economy is relatively elastic, 
i.e., where changing demand keeps wages at very low 
levels (Durán, 2011).
The implications of this marked disparity between 
the contributions of each sector to GDP and employment 
are obvious: it leads to an extremely unequal distribution 
of productivity (measured in terms of GDP per person 
employed) and, in the final analysis, leaves room for an 
extremely unequal appropriation of gains among workers.
The data in figure III.2 show that GDP per person 
employed in the high stratum is 16.3 times that of the low 
stratum and 4.5 times GDP per person employed in the 
middle stratum. GDP per person employed in the middle 
stratum is 3.7 times that of the low-productivity stratum. 
Figure III.2  
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High stratum Middle stratum Low stratum
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Infante, “América Latina en el “umbral del desarrollo”. Un ejercicio de 
convergencia productiva”, Working document, No. 14, Inclusive development 
project, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, June 2011.
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The process described above acts as a structural parameter 
for disparities and access to well-being in the region, 
explaining in part the relative inelasticity of inequality 
in times of greater growth. 
The mechanism is a simple one. In each quintile, per 
capita income is made up of income per person employed 
and the respective employment-population ratio. Income 
per person employed depends on productivity, which is, 
in turn, a function of the composition of employment per 
productive strata in each quintile. Hence, for example, 
employment in the lower quintiles has a high proportion 
of persons employed in the low-productivity stratum. 
By contrast, in the higher quintiles a large fraction of the 
persons employed are in the high-productivity stratum. 
This sequence would seem to explain much of the income 
differential and the unequal distribution of income.
The distribution of per capita income in three groups 
of countries ranked according to their degree of structural 
heterogeneity makes this relationship obvious.3 In countries 
with moderate structural heterogeneity (Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay), per capita income in 
the fifth quintile is 13.1 times that of the first quintile. 
In countries with intermediate structural heterogeneity 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia 
and Panama) per capita income in the fifth quintile is 
15.8 times that of the first quintile. Last, in the group 
with severe structural heterogenity (Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), 
the difference is as much as 18.5 times (see figure III.3).
In keeping with the above, the Gini coefficient in 
countries with moderate structural heterogeneity is the 
lowest of the three groups (49.7). In the group with 
intermediate structural heterogeneity it is 52.2; in the 
group of counties with severe structural heterogeneity 
the Gini coefficient is 53.3. 
The joint evolution of structural heterogeneity and 
income concentration over time confirms how rigid this 
mechanism is. As figure III.4 shows, the dispersion of 
productivity in the region (an indicator of sectoral inequality) 
between 1990 and 2008 and the Gini coefficient have 
both evolved along similar patterns). 
3 This ranking is based on several indicators of economic performance, 
employment and structural heterogeneity: GDP per capita, GDP 
per person employed, employment-population ratio, composition 
of GDP and employment per productive stratum and productivity 
per productive stratum. 
Figure III.3  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Infante, “América Latina en el “umbral del desarrollo”. Un ejercicio de 
convergencia productiva”, Working document, No. 14, Inclusive development 
project, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, June 2011, and special tabulations of household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries.
Figure III.4 
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Dispersion index of productivity in Latin America
Gini coefficient
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for 
equality: closing gaps opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 
2010; and Social Panorama of Latin America 2009 (LC/G.2423-P), Santiago, 
Chile, 2010.
a  Simple averages for 11 counties: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
b The dispersion index —or coefficient of variation— of productivity is the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the arithmetic mean of the productivity indices in the different 
sectors of the economy. Higher index values reflect greater sectoral inequality of 
productivity, that is, a greater distance between sectors in terms of productivity levels.
2. Heterogeneity, inequality, distributive rigidity and well-being
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C. Productivity, formality, informality and inequality:   
 beyond the dividing lines 4
Structural heterogeneity increased during the early 
1990s (the dispersion index went from 0.94 to 1.24) 
and, despite a slight drop between 1998 and 2008 (1.14 
in 2003 and 1.05 in 2008), remained above the level 
posted in 1990. This was in the context of an aggregate 
increase in average productivity starting in the second 
half of the 1990s. The Gini coefficient pattern is 
identical: an upward trend peaking in 1998, a barely 
perceptible drop in the 2000s and a more noticeable 
decline in 2008 (0.50).
Income concentration also leads to marked labour market segmentation, manifested, among 
other ways, in the dividing line between medium- and high- productivity employment and 
low-productivity employment. Employment in low-productivity sectors has fallen off over 
the past two decades, but the distance between it and the medium- and high-productivity 
sectors has increased. Women (especially low-income women with a care burden) account for 
an increasingly large proportion of employment in low-productivity sectors, with a marked 
concentration of labour income. Not only have these patterns not been corrected: in some 
spheres they seem to have deepened. 
The traits of each of these sectors and the gaps between 
them in Latin America have been studied extensively.6 
Research shows that the medium- and high-productivity 
sector is usually closer to the technology vanguard and has 
the greatest concentration of workers with higher levels of 
education and accumulated skills, better working conditions 
(access to social security, employment contracts) and 
greater protection provided by labour institutions. Their 
income is also usually higher, although they are still very 
much underpaid with relation to their levels of productivity 
(Durán, 2011). By contrast, workers in the low-productivity 
sector have lower levels of education; according to recent 
data, almost three out of four (73.5%) workers who have 
not completed primary school are found in this sector 
while more highly-educated employed persons account
6 See, for example, PREALC (1987), ILO (2002 and 2009), Tokman 
(2006 and 2007).
5 the second, special tabulations of data from the household surveys 
conducted in the countries were prepared (hence, a breakdown 
between the medium- and high-productivity strata cannot be 
provided because of the way in which company size is recorded 
in these surveys).
4 In keeping with the empirical approach that ECLAC has been 
following for several years, in this document the measure of work 
in low-productivity sectors is regarded as a proxy for informality 
in Latin America. This definition is based on the argument that 
“productive heterogeneity generates and maintains the informal 
sector” (ECLAC, 2009: 109). It is true that this indicator does not 
consider important dimensions of the notion of informality such 
as social protection and outsourcing, both of which are linked to a 
view of informality as a source of breaches of basic labour rights 
(ECLAC, 2009). This implies that there is no perfect overlap 
(although there is a significant one) between low productivity as 
measured here and the broader notion of informality. With this 
qualification in mind, and for the sake of discussion and readability, 
the two terms are used interchangeably in this section. 
Income concentration is a worrisome consequence 
of structural heterogeneity, but it is not the only one: 
productive divergence also leads to considerable labour 
market segmentation, one of the signs of which is the 
dividing line between medium- and high-productivity 
employment and low-productivity employment.5
5 The data used in the previous section to define the three productive 
strata differ from those used in the present section to measure the 
number of workers in medium-high and low-productivity sectors. 
In the previous section, the indicator was constructed on the basis of 
aggregate data from the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 
the second, special tabulations of data from the household surveys 
conducted in the countries were prepared (hence, a breakdown 
between the medium- and high-productivity strata cannot be 
provided because of the way in which company size is recorded 
in these surveys).
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7 Data from 2008, selected countries.
their labour conditions are marked by instability, limited 
social security coverage, precariousness and the lack of 
formal contracts.8 
8 According to data from 2009, registration with social security 
in this sector was barely 22%, and only slightly more than 
one of every four wage earners (28.5%) had a formal contract 
(ECLAC, 2011b)
for slightly more than one in ten (13.6%).7 Income for 
persons employed in this sector is usually considerably 
lower than for those employed in the formal sector, and 
1. Progressive stratification and widening gaps
It is definitely good news that the dividing line between 
these two sectors has shifted in recent years: in 2009 
workers in low-productivity sectors accounted for 
42.7% of the urban employed population. This is better 
than the figure posted around 1990, when the employed 
population in this sector accounted for 48.1% of the total 
(see figure III.5). 
Figure III.5 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES):  URBAN POPULATION 
EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY AND MEDIUM- AND  













1990 2002 2006 2008 2009
Low productivity Medium and high productivity 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Low-productivity sectors include persons employed in microenterprises (establishments 
employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, 
including the self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical 
skills. Medium- and high-productivity sectors include government employees, private 
employers and wage earners in establishments employing more than five persons and 
own-account professionals and technicians. This category does not include domestic 
employees.
b  Weighted average of the countries on which data is available for the periods under 
review.
Nevertheless, this evolution should not mask other, 
far less encouraging, signs that the data reveal. Over the 
past two decades the dividing line between employment 
in higher- and lower-productivity sectors has become 
sharper. In other words, the gap between them has grown.
As already noted in other ECLAC publications, the 
compensation gap between the two sectors is wider than 
in 1990 (ECLAC, 2009 and 2010c). Average monthly 
labour income for persons employed in low-productivity 
sectors was US$ 297 in 2009; for persons employed in 
medium- and high-productivity sectors it was US$ 565. 
These figures confirm that during the recent period of 
economic growth, the upward trend in real compensation 
for employed persons and wage earners was largely due to 
the performance of income in higher-productivity sectors; 
these increases have, essentially, not trickled down to 
the informal sector (ECLAC, 2010c) (see figure III.6).
Figure III.6  
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): REAL WAGES OF THE URBAN 
EMPLOYED POPULATION, a BY SECTOR, AROUND 1990, 2002, 
2008 AND 2009 b
(Dollars at constant 2005 prices)
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Employed in low-productivity sectors c 
Employed in medium- and high-productivity sectors d 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Urban employed persons over 15 who declared labour income (does not include unpaid 
workers).
b  Weighted average of the countries on which data is available for all of the periods under 
review. Up to 2006, does not include Colombia, which does not break down the data 
by company size. Data for 2009 do not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico or Nicaragua.
c  Refers to persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five 
persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, including the 
self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
d  This category includes government employees, private employers and wage earners 
in establishments employing more than five persons and own-account professionals 
and technicians. It does not include domestic employees.
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The key to understanding this aggregate evolution 
seems to lie in what happened within each sector. Between 
1990 and 2009, the proportion of persons employed in 
low-productivity sectors went from 40% to 32% in the 
highest-income quintile (quintile V); the drop in the lowest 
quintile (quintile I) was not nearly as sharp —from 72% 
to 69%. The decline in the proportion of the employed 
population in low-productivity sectors took place primarily 
over the past 10 years except for the highest quintile, 
where it had already fallen off sharply between 1990 
and 2000. In other words, the decrease in the proportion 
of the population employed in low-productivity sectors 
over the past two decades was more favourable to the 
higher-income sectors (see figure III.7a).
Figure III.7 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): URBAN EMPLOYED POPULATION, BY PRODUCTIVITY SECTOR a AND INCOME QUINTILE,  
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A. Urban population employed 
in low-productivity sectors
B. Latin America (17 countries): urban population employed 
in medium- and high-productivity sectors
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
Does not include data for Colombia. 
a  The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, 
including the self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills. The medium- and high-productivity sectors include government employees, private 
employers and wage earners in establishments employing more than five persons and own-account professionals and technicians. This category does not include domestic employees.
b  The data for Mexico refer to 1989; for Panama to 1991; for Nicaragua, to 1993; and for El Salvador, to 1995.
c  The data for Chile refer to 2000 and those for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 2001. 
d  The data for Nicaragua refer to 2005; those for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007; and those for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data 
for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, o eight major cities plus El Alto; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the national total.
The obvious flip side of this trend is the widening gap 
between the higher and lower quintiles in higher-productivity 
sectors. Over the past two decades, the difference between 
the percentage of the population employed in the highest 
and lowest quintiles of medium- and high-productivity 
sectors went from 32 percentage points to 38 percentage 
points (see figure III.7.b). 
All things considered, the reason for the widening 
dividing line between employment in higher- and 
lower-productivity sectors appears to lie in the 
increasing stratification within them. In the former, 
the proportion of higher-income workers is growing. 
In the latter, there is a decrease that is seen above all 
in the higher quintiles and is far less marked among 
the lower-income employed. 
This process, resulting from somewhat skewed 
employment generation dynamics combined with the 
marked disparity in skills development (ECLAC, 2011a), 
is plain to see in two worrisome phenomena. They are 
(i) the link between informality and poverty and indigence; 
and (ii) differential patterns between the two sectors in 
terms of labour income concentration. 
It comes as no surprise that low productivity is more 
linked to poverty than productive employment, since 
labour income in low-productivity sectors is often not 
enough to avoid poverty9 (ECLAC, 2010c). Above all, 
it is no surprise that the linkage is stronger now than 20 
years ago despite the aggregate decline in poverty in the 
9 This depends in part on the number of dependents (which tends to be 
larger in these workers’ households), but it also reflects the income 
levels these employed persons attain and the trade-off (especially 
for women) between paid work, income from paid work and the 
care burden in the household (ECLAC, 2010b).
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region. Between 1990 and 2009 there was a sharp rise 
in the proportion of indigent and poor persons employed 
in low-productivity sectors (from 73% to 80% and from 
56% to 60% respectively), and the percentage of workers 
in these sectors who are not poor fell from 44% to 40% 
(see figure III.8). 
Figure III.8 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): URBAN EMPLOYED 
POPULATION IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS, a BY  
POVERTY CATEGORY, WEIGHTED AVERAGE,  




















1990 b 2000 c 2009 d
Indigent Non-indigent poor Non-poor
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. Does not include data for Colombia. 
a  Includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five 
persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, including the 
self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
b  Data for Guatemala, Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are for 1989; those 
for Panama refer to 1991; for Nicaragua, to 1993; and for El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay 
refer to 1999; for Nicaragua, to 2001; and for the Dominican Republic, to 2002. 
d  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005; for Guatemala, to 2006, for Honduras and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the 
Central Department; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the national total.
The greater distance between higher- and lower-
productivity employment is also reflected in the differential 
labour income concentration between the medium- and 
high-productivity sector and the low-productivity one. 
Gini coefficient calculations for the former show upward 
behaviour between 1990 and 2000 (from 0.45 to 0.48) 
with a decline in the past decade that places the current 
value slightly below the one for the early 1990s (0.44). 
By contrast, the Gini coefficient for labour income 
among persons employed in low-productivity sectors has 
remained virtually unchanged and is currently slightly 
below the value for 1990 (0.56).
Two facts stand out, however: (i) labour income is 
far more concentrated in the informal sector than in the 
formal one; and (ii) the distance between the two has not 
changed since 1990, although when it did (in 2000), it 
was because the Gini coefficient for the formal sector 
worsened, not because of declining inequality in the 
informal sector. The latter fell by barely one point in 
the 1990s and is currently at the same level as in 2000 
(see figure III.9).
Figure III.9  
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): GINI COEFFICIENTS  
FOR LABOUR INCOME OF EMPLOYED PERSONS,  
BY SECTOR OF ACTIVITY, SIMPLE AVERAGE,  
















1990 a 2000 b 2009 c
Total employed Low productivity
Medium- and high productivity
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. Does not include data for Colombia. 
a  Data for Guatemala, Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989; those 
for Panama to 1991; for Nicaragua, to 1993; and for El Salvador, to 1995. 
b  Data for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay 
refer to 1999; for Nicaragua, to 2001; and for the Dominican Republic, to 2002. 
c  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005; for Guatemala, to 2006; for Honduras and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the 
Central Department; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the national total.
These trends would seem to show that variations in 
labour income concentration in the region follow the same 
pattern as in the formal sector —they essentially mirror 
the evolution of labour income in the sector. By contrast, 
labour income concentration in the low-productivity 
sector has barely changed and has shown to be highly 
rigid over time. 
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2. Gender inequality rigidities: a potential key
less-educated workers. These two factors together are 
driving an ever-larger wedge between the higher and 
lower quintiles that, while affecting both sexes, impacts 
women more. 
As can be seen in figure III.10, employment 
stratification in low-productivity sectors rose for men 
and women alike and the gap between higher- and 
lower-income quintiles increased. In 1990 the informality 
differentials between male workers in quintile I and 
quintile V were nearly 27 percentage points. Twenty 
years later, the distance is 4 percentage points greater. 
The variation among women is similar, but inequality 
is at even more worrisome levels (45 points in 1990 and 
49 points in 2009). 
The examination so far shows how important it is to 
explore labour-related sources of inequality. But, as 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, behind these 
trends there is another factor operating in the region’s 
distributive rigidity: the dividing line between low- and 
medium- and high-productivity sectors is intersected by 
another line —the one that divides women from men. 
The proportion of women employed in low-productivity 
sectors is 52.5%, compared with 44.1% for men. This 
gender gap is far from narrowing; it has grown slightly in 
the past two decades. The decline in informality clearly 
favoured men over women.  
Informal employment is highly stratified and, as 
noted earlier, concentrated above all among lower-income, 
Figure III.10  
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED URBAN POPULATION IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS, a  
BY SEX AND INCOME QUINTILE, WEIGHTED AVERAGE, AROUND 1990,  2000 AND 2009
(Percentages)






















1990 b 2000 c 2009 d
A. Men B. Women
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
Does not include data for Colombia. 
a  The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, 
including the self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
b  Data for Guatemala, Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989; those for Panama to 1991; for Nicaragua, to 1993; and for El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999; for Nicaragua, to 2001; and for the Dominican Republic, to 2002. 
d   Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005; those for Guatemala, to 2006, for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, 
to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; 
and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the national total.
As a result, 82% of the employed women in the poorest 
20% of the population work in low-productivity sectors. 
The proportion falls to nearly 33% in the highest-income 
quintile. The gap between employed women in quintiles 
I and V peaked in 2009.
These trends are seen in very high levels of labour income 
concentration among women employed in low-productivity 
sectors, with a Gini coefficient that rose by two points (from 
0.55 to 0.57) between 1990 and 2009. This figure stands in 
contrast to the Gini coefficient for labour income for men 
working in the same sector, which is not only lower but 
decreased between 1990 and 2009 (see figure III.11). While 
labour income concentration for women employed in the 
formal sector is lower than for men working in the same sector, 
their Gini coefficient rose more as inequality increased (in 
2000) but subsequently declined less in the latest available 
measure. In short, it was more elastic during the economic 
downturn but less elastic during the growth period.
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Figure III.11 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR 
LABOUR INCOME, EMPLOYED POPULATION BY SEX AND 
PRODUCTIVITY a OF THE SECTOR OF ACTIVITY, SIMPLE 



















1990 b 2000 c 2009 d
Men working in low-productivity sectors
Men working in medium- and high-productivity sectors
Women working in low-productivity sectors
Women working in medium- and high-productivity sectors
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. Does not include data for Colombia. 
a  The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises 
(establishments employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled 
own-account workers, including the self-employed and unpaid family members with 
no professional or technical skills.
b  Data for Guatemala, Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989; those 
for Panama to 1991; for Nicaragua, to 1993; and for El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay 
refer to 1999; those for Nicaragua to 2001; and for the Dominican Republic, to 2002. 
d  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005; those for Guatemala, to 2006; for Honduras and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the 
Central Department; and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the national total.
This increase and the greater rigidity in labour 
income concentration for women are due in part to 
the many —and overlapping— points at which gender 
inequality intersects the connection between labour 
markets and families.
The pressure that the care burden exerts on 
households is resolved by an extremely regressive 
pattern because it continues to fall essentially on the 
modalities and resources (economic and family) at 
their disposal to cope with it. As examined in the 
2009 edition of Social Panorama, the demand for 
care operates as a severe constraint on labour-force 
participation and employment among women in 
the most vulnerable sectors (ECLAC, 2010b). In 
the middle sectors, the declining fertility rate and 
the use of family and social networks to care for 
dependents become frequently-used adaptation 
strategies. In the high sectors, the demand for care 
can be met with family support or by buying care 
services on the market, to be provided at home or 
elsewhere (ECLAC, 2010b). The age of the children 
living in the household does not seem to make much 
of a difference in employment in the highest-income 
sectors; it conditions employment for women in 
the middle sectors, and it clearly becomes a major 
obstacle for the poorest women (ECLAC, 2010b) 
(see figure III.12). 
Figure III.12 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGED 15 TO 49, BY INCOME QUINTILE AND AGE OF CHILDREN  
IN THE HOUSEHOLD, WEIGHTED AVERAGE, AROUND 2009 a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala or Peru. 
a  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; for Uruguay, to urban areas; and 
for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the national total.
b  The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, 
including the self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical skills.
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But this pattern changes when looking at the distribution 
of income in low-productivity sectors; it does not operate 
in the lower-income strata but does seem to affect women 
employed in the informal sector in the higher quintiles. 
As figure III.12.b shows, for the lowest-income quintile 
the employment rate in low-productivity sectors among 
women living in households with small children is even 
slightly higher than for women living in households with 
children aged 6 to 14 (46% and 43%, respectively). But 
this trend changes significantly from the second quintile 
on, where the burden of caring for smaller children once 
again operates as a constraint for employment, even in the 
low-productivity sector. 
This could be showing that the presence of children 
under five is usually an obstacle to employment insertion, 
but in the lower quintiles it might operate in the opposite 
direction and drive lower-income women into informal 
employment (ILO/UNDP, 2009). Informal employment 
might, in principle, make it somewhat easier to reconcile 
labour and domestic life in terms of time, schedules and 
mobility (ILO/UNDP, 2009). But it is essentially the lack of 
facilities and public services, especially public systems to care 
for children, older adults and persons with disabilities, that 
is behind the biases observed. These tasks, which primarily 
fall to women (and above all to lower-income women), 
make informality and low-productivity occupations the 
only employment option open in these sectors.
A look at the evolution of this datum over the medium 
term makes it clear how rigid this mechanism is. As figure 
III.13 shows, the levels of informal employment among 
low-income women with small children have gone virtually 
unchanged over the past 20 years, unlike the marked decline 
that has taken place in the medium-income sectors (10% 
decline between 1990 and 2009) and, above all, in the 
higher-income sectors (20% decline during the period). 
Figure III.13  
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES):  VARIATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS a FOR WOMEN  
IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN AGED 0 TO 5,  
BY INCOME QUINTILE, WEIGHTED AVERAGE,   
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Colombia, El Salvador Guatemala or Peru. 
a  The low-productivity sector includes persons employed in microenterprises (establishments 
employing up to five persons), domestic employees and unskilled own-account workers, 
including the self-employed and unpaid family members with no professional or technical 
skills.
b  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Mexico refer to 1989, and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991.
c  Data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Uruguay refer to 1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
D. Unequal labour-force participation  
 and unemployment
The stratified incorporation of Latin American women into the labour market means that, 
instead of narrowing, the gap between higher- and lower-income women has grown slightly 
over the past two decades. Greater childcare pressure and the glaring lack of protection in this 
sphere for the most vulnerable sectors reflect a rigid circuit of inequality that is far from being 
broken. The care burden is also a factor in the relative increase of the female unemployment 
rate compared with the rate for men. The youth unemployment rate seems to be increasingly 
higher than the adult unemployment rate, and the distance between the lower and higher 
quintiles has not changed significantly over the past 20 years.
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The previous section showed some of the facets of 
inequality among the employed population. It illustrated 
the influence of labour segmentation and the rigidity 
with which this segmentation operates when combined 
with inequalities (as in assets and human and social 
capital) within families. But such an analysis provides 
only a partial explanation. How structural heterogeneity 
operates on the ability of labour markets to absorb 
unemployed or inactive labour force must be taken 
into consideration, as must the hubs of inequality 
arising from the process. The next two sections address 
these issues.
1. Labour-force participation at the crossroads: recent trends
The increase in female labour-force participation is perhaps 
one of the most drastic changes taking place in the labour 
markets of Latin America over the past 20 years. For the 
typically active ages of 25 to 54, female labour-force 
participation has increased by nearly 18 percentage points. 
By contrast, male labour-force participation has declined 
slightly. This trend has narrowed the distance between 
the two, taking it from 47 percentage points in 1990 to 
28 percentage points in 2009. 
The 2009 edition of Social Panorama already argued 
that this advance is indispensable because it represents a 
significant increase in the contribution that women make 
to total household income. It is often this contribution that 
keeps them from falling into poverty (ECLAC, 2010b). And 
the process is irreversible because it mirrors the profound, 
long-term cultural and demographic transformations 
taking place: female autonomy, declining fertility, rising 
educational credentials (ECLAC, 2010b). The 2009 edition 
also stressed that this is a highly stratified development 
reflecting an extremely regressive pattern: labour-force 
participation rates for lower-income women, who usually 
have more children (see the previous chapter), are 
significantly lower than for women in higher quintiles. 
The core reasons for stratified labour participation 
are the same as those already set out for the female bias 
and low income levels associated with low-productivity 
employment. In the poorest sectors, the demand for care 
exerts pressure and leads to the unequal distribution of 
paid and unpaid work in households, puts the burden of 
caring for dependents on women and holds them back 
from entering the labour market (ECLAC, 2010b). 
A look at the data makes this phenomenon clear: 
in 2009, 48% of lower-income women aged 25 to 54 
participated in the labour market while the proportion 
for women in the same age bracket but in the highest 
income quintile was 79%. But figure III.14 also shows 
that this is the widest gap since 1990 and that it has been 
growing steadily since 2000. In this sphere, too, inequality 
is threatening to take root and spread. 
Figure III.14  
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): LABOUR MARKET 
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AGED 25 TO 54, BY  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989, and for Colombia 
and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993 and those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c   Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996, while those for Nicaragua refer to 1998. 
d  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; those for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 2001; 
and those for Chile, to 2003. 
f   Data for Honduras refer to 2003; those for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia refer to 2004; and those for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. The data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 
2005, and those for Argentina, Chile and Mexico refer to 2006. Data for Argentina 
refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities, 
plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central 
Department; and for Uruguay, to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007; those for the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Mexico refer to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; 
for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities, plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to 
urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
Two developments are at work in this pattern: 
(i) stagnant growth affecting all of the social sectors; and 
(ii) a recent trend change in the lower-income quintiles, 
where for the first time in nearly 20 years the latest 
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measure available shows that labour market participation 
is not only not growing but that it is declining slightly. 
Interpreting these trends is complicated and beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, some reflections on 
their implications and possible causes are in order.
The evolution of the indicator in the most vulnerable 
sectors sets off a warning bell. The incorporation of 
women in the labour market significantly increases their 
contribution to total household income10 and is often what 
allows that household to exit poverty (ECLAC, 2010b), 
so any halt in this process (a critical one for the poorest 
families to attain minimal levels of well-being) in the 
medium term would be cause for concern. 
The problem is that a more detailed look at the 
relationship between labour market participation and the 
childcare burden does not yield an encouraging long-term 
picture. As can be seen in figure III.15, the gap between 
women in the poorest sectors with smaller children (aged 
5 and under) and those with children aged 6 to 14 has 
been growing since 2002. This confirms that for the most 
vulnerable women the burden of caring for smaller children 
is still an obstacle in the path to labour market insertion 
(ECLAC, 2010b). And the gap between women in the 
highest and lowest quintiles living in households where 
there is a childcare burden has been growing steadily 
since 1994. This holds for women with smaller children 
and for those in households with children aged 6 to 14; 
in both cases the gap is now the widest it has been since 
1994 (see figure III.15). 
In short, the stratified pattern in which women with a 
greater childcare burden and lower income are “penalized” 
more is not a new one, and it does not seem to have 
improved over the past few decades. Far from it: the data 
show that this rigid circuit of inequality is hardening. 
The recent economic crisis might help explain recent 
trends, perhaps because it has changed expectations 
for entering the labour market. Rising unemployment 
(especially among women) can be discouraging or act as 
a disincentive for working for those who, while inactive, 
would be willing to work if the opportunity arose. It is 
true that, so far, the indicator has not been sensitive, at 
least in aggregate terms, to prior economic crises. But as 
participation increases and approaches a “ceiling,” the 
variations associated with economic growth could start 
to be more frequent.  
One last factor to bear in mind is the conditional cash 
transfer programmes that have become more widespread 
in the past few years. There has been some debate about 
the way that some of them target women as receivers 
of the economic benefit, requiring that they shoulder 
10 According to a study recently published by ECLAC, the percentage 
of households where a woman is the primary contributor of income 
has risen slightly in the past few years (Rico and Maldonado, 2011).
the commitment to comply with the conditions (such 
as health care and vaccinations for the children in the 
household). Making women the receivers of cash transfers 
does seek to favour their direct access to income and, 
in the final analysis, promote their economic autonomy. 
And it is held that women should receive the income 
because they are the ones in charge of caring for the 
children and making decisions in this regard. But this 
approach has sparked considerable debate (Molyneux, 
2008; Martínez Franzoni and Voreend, 2010) in that 
the requirements and paperwork for obtaining these 
benefits take up women’s time and might discourage 
those who face systematic obstacles from entering the 
labour market (ECLAC, 2010d). Although there is 
still little research on this and more evidence would 
be needed, it cannot be ruled out that these initiatives 
might be acting like a new, unexpected obstacle to 
labour market participation.
Figure III.15  
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): LABOUR MARKET 
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AGED 15 TO 49, FIRST AND  
FIFTH INCOME QUINTILES BY AGE OF CHILDREN,  
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Quintile I: With children aged 5 years and under in the household
Quintile I: With children and adolescents aged 6 to 14 years in the household 
Quintile V: With children aged 5 years and under in the household
Quintile V: With children and adolescents aged 6 to 14 years in the household
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989; those for Colombia 
and Panama refer to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993 and those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c   Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996; those for Nicaragua, to 1998. 
d  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 2001; and 
for Chile, to 2003. 
f  Data for Honduras refer to 2003; for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
to 2004; and for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005 
and for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities, plus El Alto; 
for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; 
and for Uruguay to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007; those for the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Mexico refer to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; 
for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, to 
urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay 
to urban areas.
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2. Unemployment: “outside the outside” and farther apart
Unemployment is closely linked to economic cycles, 
and there is a direct link between variations in the 
unemployment rate and stages of the cycle. Extensive 
research on this relationship in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has shown how economic crises have had a 
direct impact, with unemployment rates rising and then 
tending to fall during the recovery. But perhaps most 
relevant to an examination of inequality is the fact that 
from cycle to cycle some sectors systematically lose out. 
This reflects unequal capacities to cope with the effects of 
unemployment; in other words, certain groups are more 
vulnerable to economic downturns while others are more 
able to weather the shocks. 
Unemployment is more concentrated among women. 
Not only does the female unemployment rate tend to be 
higher than the male unemployment rate, but the gap 
between the two has been growing steadily over the past 
few years. In 1990, the male unemployment rate was 
approximately 80% of the female unemployment rate. 
Nearly 20 years later, with some fluctuation, the male 
unemployment rate stands at just 65% of the rate for 
women, i.e. the unemployment rate is 35% higher for 
women than for men (see figure III.16).
The long-term trend also points to deepening 
unemployment inequality among women. Beyond the 
fluctuations associated with economic cycles in the region, 
the gap between women in the highest and lowest quintiles 
narrowed slightly during the 1990s but began to widen 
again in 2000. As a result, in 2009 the unemployment 
rate for lower-income women was five times higher than 
for women in the highest quintile, at 21% versus 4% (see 
figure III.17).
Several developments are fueling this increase in 
inequality. The incorporation of women into the labour 
market adds pressure for female employment; this is 
compounded by the fact that less-educated women encounter 
more barriers to accessing employment at a time when not 
enough jobs are being created. This dynamic is clearly fed 
by the skills deficits and the social definition and gender 
segmentation of occupations that hinder women’s access 
to certain professions (ECLAC, 2010d). 
But in the most vulnerable sectors the demand for 
care can also be working against access to employment.11 
11 The care burden has traditionally had a visible impact on labour-
force participation. But the trends showing the effects of this 
variable on the unemployment rate for women in lower-income 
quintiles reveal the need to continue to fine-tune the measure of 
labour participation and its meanings. This entails better capturing 
As figure III.18 shows, the unemployment rate tends 
to be higher among women living in households with 
smaller children. Here, as well, the gap between them 
and women with children of an age for which there is a 
formal, more structured supply of schooling grows slightly 
as income levels fall. Moreover, this trend has become 
more pronounced since 2000.
Figure III.16  
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
(POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER), BY SEX, WEIGHTED 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996 and those for Nicaragua, to 1998. 
d  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua to 2001; and 
for Chile, to 2003. 
f  Data for Honduras refer to 2003; those for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, to 2004; and those for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005 
and those for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for 
Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and 
for Uruguay to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, 
to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
the many ways in which women’s unpaid work combines with 
activities that are at the border of what is usually regarded as 
labour participation, how care can act as a disincentive to looking 
for a job and the varying degrees of willingness to work among 
the inactive.
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Figure III.17  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996 and those for Nicaragua, to 1998. 
d  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua to 2001; and 
for Chile, to 2003. 
f  Data for Honduras refer to 2003; those for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, to 2004; and those for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005 
and those for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for 
Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and 
for Uruguay to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, 
to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
The other group in which unemployment is at 
worrisome levels is young people.12 As some studies 
have suggested, youth unemployment seems to be the 
first to increase during economic crises and the last 
to decrease during periods of growth (Tokman, 1997; 
ECLAC, 2010c), making it a particularly hard core in 
the chain that reproduces inequalities (ECLAC, 2010b). 
12 This chapter focuses on youth unemployment as a key circuit in 
the generation and reproduction of inequalities that are seen in the 
labour markets but are rooted in historical patterns that leave this 
segment of the population especially unprotected and translate into 
multiple tensions associated with youth emancipation. While this 
chapter does not explore these hard cores of inequality in depth, 
there are many studies that clearly show what a complex issue this 
is. ECLAC has made significant contributions along these lines. 
See, for example, ECLAC/OIJ (2004 and 2008), ECLAC (2011a).
Figure III.18  
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Quintile V: With children aged 5 and under in the household
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
d  Data for Honduras refer to 2003; those for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, to 2004; and for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. Data for 2007 do not include 
data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005. 
e  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, 
to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
According to household survey data, in 1990 the 
unemployment rate among young people aged 15 to 24 
was almost twice that for the population overall. Not only 
has this gap not narrowed significantly: it seems to have 
grown since 2005 (see figure III.19). 
Higher education credentials are playing a key role in 
increasing youth unemployment rates (UNDP, 2001; ECLAC, 
2011a). ECLAC has provided conclusive evidence that for 
quite some time the intermediate education cycle has not 
operated as a bridge to access to employment (ECLAC/OIJ, 
2004 and 2008; ECLAC, 2004; ECLAC, 2011a). Because 
this is strongly correlated to productive structure stability 
and structural heterogeneity, job creation is not keeping pace 
with the region’s progress in education (ECLAC, 2010c).
It goes without saying that high youth unemployment 
rates can spark considerable frustration. Over the medium and 
long term they can impact social cohesion and the general 
flow of new generations into society as a whole (United 
Nations, 2003, ECLAC/OIJ, 2008), hindering  access to 
employment and thus to social protection at a key point in 
the life cycle when the emancipation process begins.
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Figure III.19  
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
BY AGE GROUP, WEIGHTED AVERAGE, 1990-2009
(Percentages)
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55 to 64 65 and over Total
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996 and those for Nicaragua, to 1998. 
d  Data for Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer 
to 1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 2001; and 
for Chile, to 2003. 
f  Data for Honduras refer to 2003; those for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, to 2004; and for Argentina and Chile, to 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005 
and for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; 
for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; 
and for Uruguay to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, 
to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
Because unemployment at these ages is quite stratified 
and particularly affects the lower-income sectors, it is a 
substantial obstacle to skill accumulation and, in the final 
analysis, to raising productivity in the new generations. 
Unemployment is much higher among young people from 
lower-income households than among those in the higher 
quintiles. Once again, the greatest cause for concern lies in 
the fact that the gap between the lower and higher quintiles 
has not changed significantly in the past 20 years. In other 
words, the gap between lower-income and higher-income 
groups is not narrowing. Quite to the contrary: in 2009 it 
was wider than ever, at 17 percentage points (see figure 
III.20). This is because the uptick in aggregate youth 
unemployment is due to a differential increase between 
quintiles, where the lower-income sectors seem to get 
the short end of the stick (the unemployment rate for this 
group went from 13% to 27% between 1990 and 2009).
Figure III.20  
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 
YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24, BY INCOME QUINTILE, 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE, 1990-2009 
(Percentages)








Quintile I Quintile II Quintile III Quintile IV Quintile V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries. Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. 
Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for 
Colombia and Panama, to 1991. 
b  Data for Brazil and Nicaragua refer to 1993; those for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and El Salvador, to 1995. 
c  Data for Brazil, Chile and Mexico refer to 1996 and those for Nicaragua, to 1998. 
d  Data for Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay refer to 
1999 and those for Nicaragua, to 2001. 
e  Data for Paraguay refer to 2000; for Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 2001; and 
for Chile, to 2003. 
f  Data for Honduras are for 2003; for El Salvador and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
from 2004; for Argentina and Chile, from 2006. 
g  Does not include data for El Salvador. Data for Colombia and Nicaragua refer to 2005 
and for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, to 2006. Data for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; 
for Ecuador, to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; 
and for Uruguay to urban areas. 
h  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador, 
to urban areas; for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department; and for Uruguay, 
to urban areas.
These trends become even more complex when 
factoring in the fact that —as with other age brackets— for 
young people aged 15 to 24 the female unemployment 
rate is higher than the male unemployment rate. Indeed, 
the gender gap (the distance between unemployment 
curves for young men and young women) is far from 
narrowing; it grew wider between 1990 and 2009 (see 
figure III.21).
As with the more adult population, unemployment 
among the young is more stratified for women than 
for men. Not only do the data confirm this greater 
inequality (the curves are steeper for women), but 
they show that between 1990 and 2009 the trend has 
deepened to a much greater degree among women than 
among men. 
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Figure III.21  
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24, BY INCOME QUINTILE AND SEX,  
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A. Youth unemployment rate, 1990 a B. Youth unemployment rate, 2009  b
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
Does not include data for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala or Peru for any of the years. 
a  Does not include data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, El Salvador or Nicaragua. Data for Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are for 1989; for Colombia and Panama, 
from 1991. 
b  Data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; for 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight major cities plus El Alto; for Ecuador and Uruguay, to urban areas; and for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central Department.
Box III.1 
OVERLAPPING VULNERABILITIES AND PERSISTENT INEQUALITY: FEMALE HOUSEHOLD HEADSHIP, WORK, CARE AND POVERTY
Latin American women are at a disadvantage 
in the labour market, where the sexual 
division of labour, the unequal distribution of 
unpaid work and occupational segmentation 
act as determinants of the link between 
employment, gender and poverty (Arriagada, 
1998). These variables influence the stratified 
incorporation of women into the world of 
work, employment and medium- and high-
productivity occupations. The evidence 
provided in this chapter confirms the obstacles 
that lower-income women face and that set 
them apart from their peers in higher quintiles 
and, obviously, from men (ECLAC, 2010d).
In lower-income households there are 
usually more children than in higher-income 
ones, so these women are living in households 
with more children and adolescents. As the 
previous chapter showed, the total fertility 
rate is significantly lower among women 
with secondary or higher education than 
among those who have not completed the 
primary cycle. In some countries (Ecuador, 
Haiti, the Plurinational State of Bolivia) the 
difference can even be more than three 
children (see chapter II).
Because of these configurations, on 
top of dealing with a heavier care burden 
these women have lower per capita income 
because they live in larger households. This 
makes it far more difficult to find market-based 
solutions to family member care needs.
The picture becomes even more 
complicated when taking into consideration 
the fact that these women are more vulnerable 
to poverty when they are heads of single-
parent households, which are increasing in 
number and tend to be found more in the 
lower-income sectors. According to data 
from a recent study, single-parent households 
headed by women in the first income quintile 
went from 13.8% in 1990 to 18.8% in 2008 
(Rico and Maldonado, 2011, page 38).
Given this web of variables and patterns 
in these sectors, it comes as no surprise that 
these women are subject to greater tensions 
than other women are. They must reconcile 
paid work with family responsibilities but have 
fewer monetary and family resources to do 
so (and often lack a spouse in the household 
to share the unpaid work). Add to this the 
fact that they are usually less educated and 
tend to lack appropriate skills and the picture 
becomes bleak indeed.
The examination set out in this chapter 
provides forceful evidence of the need for 
this hard core of inequality to continue to 
be front and centre in the debate on public 
policies geared towards combating poverty 
and reducing inequality. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Irma Arriagada, “Latin American families: convergences and divergences in models 
and policies”, CEPAL Review, No. 65 (LC/G.2033-P), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1998; ECLAC, What kind of State? What kind of equality? (LC/G.2450(CRM.11/3)), Santiago, 
Chile, 2010; and N. Rico and C. Maldonado, “¿Qué muestra la evolución de los hogares sobre la evolución de las familias en América Latina?”, Las familias latinoamericanas 
interrogadas. Hacia la articulación del diagnóstico, la legislación y las políticas, Seminarios y conferencias series, No. 61 (LC/L.3296-P), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2011.
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E. The State at the intersection of labour markets  
 and families 
The State is at the hub of this web of factories, circuits and hard cores of inequality. It is 
robust and targeted State intervention that makes it possible to address inequalities and leave 
more or less space for combating the structural legacy. Decisive State intervention should be 
considered in the productive sphere, in labour regulations and institutions, in labour market 
policy and in redistributing childcare. 
The foregoing pages looked at labour inequality 
in Latin America, examining the role of structural 
heterogeneity, the stratification of declining fertility 
and gender inequality as factories of inequality. Where 
these factors overlap they form circuits of reproduction 
of inequalities: the circuit that operates in the gaps 
between formal and informal workers, the one that links 
this inequality to gender disparities, the ones that shape 
differential behaviours among certain groups (such as 
women and young people) in the face of unemployment 
and the one that structures inequalities in labour-force 
participation. This dynamic gives rise to hard cores of 
inequality and vulnerability that become entrenched in 
certain sectors, such as young low-income women with 
small children, low-income young people and workers 
(especially women) in low-productivity sectors. The 
main steps in this sequence are illustrated below (see 
diagram III.1).
 Diagram III.1 
















Formal sector: Growing 
proportion of employment, 
with higher income and less 
inequality
Widening gaps between 
the two: average income 
and labour income 
inequality in each sector
Increasing inequality and multiple 
deepening of labour segmentation: 
Gaps: (i) between women and men 
(higher proportion of women than men in 
the informal sector); (ii) between women 
with and without small children; 
(iii) between income quintiles
Informal sector: Declining 
proportion of employment, but 
with lower income and more 
inequality
Female unemployment: 
Regressive stratification of 
female unemployment, 
widening gaps between 
higher-and lower-income 
sectors
Youth unemployment: Regressive 
stratification and increasing inequality.






Juvenilization of poverty, 
accumulation of risks
Female labour participation: Regressive 
stratification of labour participation and 
employment. 
Recent stagnation of labour participation 
in lower-income sectors
Gender inequality: Unequal distribution of 




Young low-income women 
with small children
Low-income young people
Workers in low-productivity 
sectors 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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The State is at the hub of this web of factories, circuits 
and hard cores of inequality. Beyond these processes, it 
is robust and targeted State intervention that makes it 
possible to address inequalities and leave more or less 
space for combating the structural legacy.
In the light of this analysis, there are at least four 
areas in which State intervention should be considered. 
The first is the high degree of structural heterogeneity 
in the region and the pressing need to act on this first link 
in the chain of reproduction of inequalities feeding into 
the labour market. This calls for advancing towards a 
comprehensive policy for productive development grounded 
in appropriate macroeconomic regimes, development 
policies and market-based microeconomic incentives. It 
is also necessary to intervene decisively on three fronts: 
(i) industrial policy, for fostering the consolidation of 
productive linkages and the requisite investments and 
to better capitalize on the potential for learning during 
periods of higher growth; (ii) technology policy, for 
promoting access to innovation and technology based on 
a long-term approach and for creating an “environment 
that is conducive to rapid learning and structural change 
favouring more dynamic technology sectors” (ECLAC, 
2010a); and (iii) policies for supporting small and medium-
sized enterprises, to foster their development, promote 
their access to innovation and technology and facilitate 
financial support and access to credit. Latin American 
experience in developing such policies has been mixed. 
While some efforts have been promising, the achievements 
are still far from obvious. Such outcomes highlight the 
need to strengthen the institutional capacities of the States 
of the region to improve policy design, implementation 
and assessment, influence the price structure and ensure 
more horizontal access to innovation.  
The second area is labour market regulation and 
institutions. Latin America has serious labour institution 
shortcomings and some unfinished business in the area of 
labour market regulation. There are substantial gender and 
age biases, as well as large sectors of workers who are not 
benefiting from core labour standards. The region’s “dual” 
regulatory model is, without question, a major obstacle 
to lower-income workers being able to appropriate gains 
in productivity and to breaking down the barrier between 
insiders and outsiders that creeps into social protection.
Implementers of public policy should view labour 
market segmentation as closely linked to structural 
heterogeneity. Ignoring this link means that labour 
institutions will not bridge the different productive strata 
and that policies will be designed as if the labour market 
were homogeneous. Instead of contributing to productive 
convergence they will exacerbate the gaps between 
productivity and compensation, making real distributive 
justice impossible.
Rapid economicgrowth and rising labour productivity 
create the conditions for generating high-quality employment 
with rights but do not ensure that this will happen. Rather, 
labour institutions should be designed so as to create and 
enhance virtuous circles between the two factors (Weller 
and Roethlisberger, 2011). This requires, on the one hand, 
ensuring that a portion of the gains in productivity goes 
to improving labour conditions (in the form of higher 
wages, other monetary benefits and non-monetary aspects 
of employment quality). On the other hand, it involves 
enhancing subjective and objective aspects of employment 
quality that can increase productivity, such as job training 
and other factors that influence job satisfaction and personal 
commitment. Legal regulation and collective bargaining 
are mechanisms that further these goals.
The third relevant axis is linked to what States can 
do to decouple access to well-being from labour market 
status and thus promote greater equality across sectors. 
Labour market policy has a crucial role to play here: for 
example, as a tool that can be very effective in combating 
unemployment in the hardest hit sectors. Measures such 
as labour intermediation, competencies certification, 
training initiatives (focused, in the case of young people, 
on transitioning from the education system to the world 
of work), unemployment insurance and mechanisms for 
helping the unemployed access non-contributory protection 
systems are some of the options for decommodifying 
access to employment. Emergency public jobs programmes 
and labour-intensive public works perform the same 
function (ECLAC/ILO, 2009), as do measures that support 
self-generation of employment. It is especially important 
to develop active policies that facilitate access to the 
first job and introduce labour market incentives through 
positive action geared towards improving employment 
access for the young.
 Last, these findings indicate that the States of the 
region still have much unfinished business regarding 
intervention in basic aspects of protection and well-being 
that have, traditionally, been left up to families. Advancing 
towards defamilization is essential for reducing inequalities 
between men and women and for combating the growing 
gaps among women that are rooted in older divides.
In many Latin American households there is still 
a division of labour that assigns the role of head of 
household and breadwinner to the man and the role 
of mother and housewife to the woman. This leads 
to profound inequalities between men and women. 
Because the access that families have to “solutions” 
for this tension is extremely stratified on the basis of 
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income, inequality between higher-income women and 
women in the lower-income quintiles is not only not 
diminishing —in some spheres it is growing. 
Clearly linked to this are the key role that social 
protection can play in reinforcing action and the 
redistributive role of the State regarding childcare. It is 
up to social protection to facilitate access to a system 
of care services that is still quite limited in many of the 
countries of the region and needs to be improved and 
expanded (Pautassi and Rico, 2011). But such initiatives 
should go farther, to promote the creation of national 
public care systems.
This would correct, up to a point, the pattern of 
inequality in female participation in the labour market. 
Not only that: it would cushion the impacts of the care 
crisis on unemployment for lower-income women and 
the prevalence of informal employment among them, 
creating an environment that would allow them to 
delegate dependent care to specialized services. The 
importance of advancing in this direction is confirmed 
by conclusive international evidence of the positive 
impacts that expanding the supply of care services has 
on freeing the female labour force and improving its 
labour insertion (with the resulting increase in income). 
The efforts that the countries of the region make in 
the sphere of childcare services should be grounded in 
three premises. First, there is an obvious need to start 
with measures targeting the most vulnerable sectors, 
those that are most affected by the tension between 
paid and unpaid work. But that tension is also found in 
medium- and high-income sectors and it blocks access to 
jobs in the formal sector and to higher-quality employment. 
Second, it would seem that the creation and expansion 
of the supply of care services should be aligned with the 
needs of the different productive strata and —within the 
low-productivity sectors— focus on those that can yield 
the best outcomes in terms of female labour insertion. 
Last, companies should be involved in the supply of care; 
the provision of services should be mandatory (Pautassi 
and Rico, 2011).
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Chapter IV
Social protection and inequality:  
cracks, rigidities, open ground  
and opportunities
A.  Introduction
Many of the Latin American countries have increased their social spending significantly 
in the past few years. Yet the region’s structural lag is such that any conclusions about the 
performance of social protection in breaking the chains of inequality transmission may be 
drawn only with caution. So it is important to form a picture of the systemic performance 
of social protection in reducing inequality in Latin America, by looking at the cracks and 
rigidities in the region’s social protection systems while also identifying the open ground and 
opportunities for tackling the many faces of inequality. 
Chapter III examined some of the mechanisms which 
appear to be driving the generation and reproduction of 
labour-related inequalities in Latin America. Great structural 
heterogeneity, a stratified decline in fertility rates and 
gender inequality overlap to form perverse combinations 
of poverty, informality, care burdens and generational gaps. 
The region is thus dragging a heavy anchor when it comes 
to reducing inequality in its labour markets.
 Even in this scenario, however, there are encouraging 
signs. A steady rise in public social spending in the 
region since the 1990s has made it possible to increase 
the coverage and stability of social policies in many 
countries, although the State’s tax revenues is limited in 
some cases (ECLAC, 2010a and 2010b). But the findings 
set forth in chapter III suggest the need for caution in 
drawing conclusions about how effective social protection 
has been in breaking cycles of inequality transmission 
and how much ground still lies open for further progress 
in this direction.
The region’s social protection systems certainly face 
huge and very complex challenges. Yet current conditions 
offer a greater opportunity than ever before to rethink 
social protection and carry forward the changes needed 
to make it a more effective instrument in breaking the 
hereditary chain of inequality. 
The time for this task is ripe for several reasons.
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First, the last few years have unquestionably provided 
favourable conditions for implementing long-term development 
strategies. The region has enjoyed steady economic growth 
and achieved stronger macroeconomic balances. Its main 
socioeconomic indicators have also improved (see chapter I). 
Second, Latin America still has opportunities to tap the 
demographic dividend created by its falling demographic 
dependency ratio —the increase in the economically active 
population proportionally to the dependent population— 
which also has implications for household size (ECLAC, 
2005 and 2009a; Bertranou, 2008). 
Third, conditions are relatively favourable for 
overhauling social policy. In the last few years, the orthodox 
thinking of the 1980s and 1990s appears to have receded 
in favour of new ways of perceiving the role of the State 
vis-à-vis social protection, poverty and inequality (ECLAC, 
2010a). Perhaps the clearest sign of this lies in the past 
decade’s wave of policies implemented to strengthen 
the non-contributory pillar of social protection and the 
more universalist approach taken to extending rights and 
benefits in terms of health care, pensions and the coverage 
of basic services (ECLAC, 2010b). 
Lastly, the legacy of specific policies and instruments 
left by the response to the 2008 crisis represents another 
opportunity for the region. This latest crisis appears to 
have precipitated a shift that was already beginning to 
happen in the State’s role in practice, as countercyclical 
policies were implemented to contain social costs at the 
low part of the cycle and rapid response capacities were 
built up to avoid asset losses in the most vulnerable sectors 
(ECLAC, 2009b and 2010b; ECLAC/ILO, 2011). This 
legacy and its associated lessons offer fresh ground for 
policy innovations and improvements, which must not 
be allowed to lie fallow.
This chapter offers analytical routes towards tapping 
the favourable conditions described above and towards 
building a systemic perspective, looking at both factors 
which hinder the action of social protection systems and 
the ground which lies open for action to tackle the many 
aspects of inequality. 
The chapter first examines the scope and stratification 
of contributory social protection, on the basis of social 
security registration and its impact on households, then 
analyses the protection afforded to older persons in 
retirement. There follows a brief description of the extent 
of non-contributory social protection and its adaptation 
to the risk profile of the population. Next, the combined 
coverage of the two pillars is examined to develop a 
more systemic approach, looking especially at sectors 
which are currently covered by neither. The last section 
portrays the systemic performance of social protection in 
terms of the various dimensions of inequality and offers 
policy alternatives aimed at correcting their main cracks 
and omissions.
B. The contributory link and social protection  
 in Latin America 
The association between employment and social protection has generated major challenges in 
Latin America, which determinedly emulated the contributory model developed in the European 
countries even though its starting point was much further behind. Limited registration in social 
security systems and the fact that they operate only through the channel of formal employment 
has resulted in precisely the most numerous, female-headed and rural households having least 
access to social protection through the contributions mechanism. In addition the shortfalls 
of social security coverage are reproduced in old age. Pension and retirement benefits still 
have very limited coverage and leave women and those on low incomes with least protection.
The close link between employment and social protection 
arose from the consolidation of welfare States in post-war 
Europe. It is based on a model in which male breadwinners 
in two-parent families provided economic sustenance for 
their family group, while women mainly cared for children 
and older persons and were entitled to social protection as 
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dependants. Thus the notion of “job-related” protection 
(Tokman, 2006, p. 40) or “formal-employment-related 
protection” (Cecchini and Martínez, 2011) was consolidated, 
in which workers and their families were protected against 
the risks associated with employment (or the lack of it), 
the life cycle and retirement (through retirement benefits 
and pensions) and disease (through health coverage). 
This model has encountered a number of difficulties 
in the developed world. In the 1970s, the oil price shock 
eroded governments’ fiscal capacities, at the same time as 
production and occupational structures began to change 
(OECD, 2007a), regional disparities grew up in the 
labour market, unemployment rates rose and forms of 
employment became more diverse, with more temporary 
and part-time work and self-employment (OECD, 1999 
and 2010). Lastly, women’s growing participation in the 
labour market —and, thus, their ability to access social 
protection in their own right— coincided with a time 
of deep transformations in family composition (OECD, 
2007b), a drop in fertility rates and a significant increase 
in life expectancy (OECD, 2009c). These shifts led to the 
formation of hard cores of vulnerability for which the 
classic contributory model of employment and protection 
was unprepared. A mismatch gradually became apparent in 
many countries between the existing welfare architecture 
and the risks facing the population (Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Esping-Andersen and others, 2002; Pierson, 2001).
These same problems have arisen in an even 
worse form in Latin America, which firmly adopted the 
contributory model despite being far behind the European 
countries in terms of urbanization, industrialization and 
consolidation of formal labour markets (Tokman, 2006; 
Filgueira, 2007). In the case of Latin America, however, 
the difficulties have run much deeper because the region’s 
structural inequalities have not only doomed the model 
to failure but have in fact transformed it into a catalyst 
of inequities.
The highly heterogeneous production structure in 
Latin America and its translation into segmented and 
asymmetric labour markets, extensive informality, 
unemployment rates and the inequality associated with 
women’s incorporation into the labour market have led 
in quite a linear fashion to inequalities in access to social 
protection. This has produced a clear dividing line between 
insiders and outsiders with respect to the contributory 
protection model, the main route of access to protection 
from the State. 
As a result, Latin America has succeeded in setting up 
only a weak correlation between employment and social 
protection. Accordingly, policies not only fail to even out 
the inequalities passed on by the production structure 
and the labour markets, but also create new circuits of 
exclusion that further entrench the original inequities. 
This section examines some of the main traits of this 
contributory model from two angles: the protection of 
workers and their families (based on analysis of social 
security registration) and the protection of older persons 
(based on the coverage of retirement and pension transfers).
1. Protection of workers and their families 1
1 Although, as ECLAC has frequently noted, access to health services 
is a key component of the contributory model of social protection 
(Mesa-Lago, 2005), the forms of organization of the health sector 
in the region encompass a broad variety of institutions, models 
of financing and regulations and different combinations between 
public and private stakeholders and social security systems. In some 
countries, social security is recognized as a universal right for all 
workers, making health care an equally universal right. This has 
resulted in a form of service provision that is unevenly structured 
between the public and private sectors but nevertheless forms part 
of a single system combining financing from general revenues with 
non-contributory financing. Brazil is the foremost example of this 
set-up. A second financing model combines general revenues with 
social security contributions. This category includes Costa Rica, 
which has an integrated system with contributory financing and a 
single level of coverage provided through social security (Costa Rican 
Social Security Fund). Here the system complements workers’ and 
employers’ contributions, covers a percentage of the contribution of 
independent workers and encompasses the low-income sectors with 
no contributory capacity. Chile and Colombia also have systems 
with a certain level of integration, although the contributory and 
non-contributory pillars are combined in slightly different ways 
in these countries. Mexico and Uruguay, too, have made reforms 
recently which move in that direction. A third type of system seen 
in the region has little or no articulation between public financing 
and social security, with quite fragmented social security systems 
existing alongside one another. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Panama and Plurinational State of Bolivia have models of this sort 
(ECLAC, 2006). With such diverse models, it is difficult to identify 
contributory health coverage through household surveys, which 
are the main source for analysis used in this chapter. Accordingly, 
this section uses social security affiliation (not health coverage) 
as a reference, on the assumption that social security enrolment 
provides some sort of health coverage for workers and their families.
The evidence has been suggesting for some time that 
labour markets in the region have not become the 
grand entrances to social protection systems that they 
were supposed to be (Marco, 2004; ECLAC, 2006; 
Tokman, 2006; Bertranou, 2008). The access of the 
working population to social security coverage through 
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employment is limited by extensive informality, weak 
regulations and the existing labour institutions, such 
that today just under half (46%) of those employed are 
enrolled in a social security scheme.  
Registration with social security is highest among 
wage-earners in the public sector (91.4%) and the 
private sector (67.9% and 72.2%, for professional and 
non-professional workers, respectively). Just over half 
(53%) of formal sector employers and only 28.4% 
of independent professionals are enrolled in a social 
security scheme. In low-productivity sectors social 
security registration stands at 23.6% for employers (small 
and medium-sized enterprises), 22.7% for domestic 
employees and a meagre 8% for unskilled independent 
workers (see figure IV.1).
Figure IV.1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED POPULATION 
REGISTERED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, BY CATEGORY 








































































































































Medium- and high-productivity sectors
Low-productivity sectors
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
The fact that social security coverage is strongly 
associated with labour formality 2 reflects the “dual” 
functioning that arises from the articulation of two key 
links in the chain of inequality explored earlier: structural 
heterogeneity and labour market segmentation (see 
chapter III). But this structural root does not explain 
why the slight increase in formal employment in the past 
two decades has not produced a similar rise in social 
security registration, which in 2009 was still close to 
2 As in chapter III and in order to facilitate reading and discussion, 
the classifications of low-productivity and medium- or high-
productivity workers are used indistinctly from the classifications 
of formal and informal workers. As explained in chapter III, the 
data used are based on the first of these classifications, which was 
developed by ECLAC. Although this is considered to be a good 
proxy for formality and informality, clearly the data used here miss 
out some important dimensions of informality. 
the 1990 level. The inconsistency can undoubtedly be 
attributed to a variety of factors, including economic 
cycles, biases in new employment creation and weak 
labour institutions and regulations—especially in terms 
of rules and conditions for formalizing social security 
contributions.3
An illustrative example in this connection is that in 
16 countries which have data from four measurements 
(1990, 2002, 2006 and 2009), social security registration 
decreased between 1990 and 2002 (from 52.4% to 49%) 
then began to rise (reaching 53.2% in 2009, which was 
actually slightly higher than in 1990) (see figure IV.2). The 
pattern was dissimilar in the formal and informal sectors, 
however. While registration was falling, the proportion 
of employed persons with contributory protection fell 
more rapidly in the low-productivity sector than in the 
medium- and high-productivity sectors. And when the 
economic cycle began to fuel a recovery in enrolment 
levels, registration climbed more strongly in the formal 
than in the informal sector. This differentiated evolution 
has turned social protection into an additional wedge 
driving the two sectors apart (see figure IV.3).
The “dual” functioning which divides the higher- and 
lower-productivity sectors is not neutral and the boundary 
between social security insiders and outsiders shows 
some heavy biases.
Figure IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES):  EMPLOYED POPULATION 
REGISTERED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, WEIGHTED 












1990 2002 2006 2009
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Weighted average for the countries which have data for all the years examined. Does 
not include Argentina or Colombia.
3 There are some interesting examples in the region of measures aimed 
at increasing formalization. Brazil, for instance, has developed 
policies for promoting the formalization of microenterprises 
(Supersimples) and of non-professional independent workers (the 
individual entrepreneur scheme, MEI).
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Figure IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED POPULATION 
REGISTERED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS  
BY SECTOR OF WORK, WEIGHTED AVERAGE,  
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Employed in medium- and high-productivity sectors
Employed in low-productivity sectors
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Weighted average for the countries which have data for all the years examined. Does 
not include Colombia before 2006, since the data for previous years do not distinguish 
company size. Does not include Argentina or Colombia.
The first obvious bias is that social security registration 
is associated with higher income brackets: at the latest 
measurement, unregistered employed workers received on 
average just over half of the earnings of those registered 
with a social security scheme (US$ 288 compared to 
US$ 545 per month). The gap is slightly smaller than it 
was in 2002 and 2006, but still far wider than the income 
gap associated with social security contribution in the early 
1990s, when the average income of non-registered earners 
was 73% of that of registered earners (see figure IV.4). 
Figure IV.4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): REAL WAGES OF THE URBAN 
EMPLOYED BY SOCIAL SECURITY STATUS,  
AROUND 1990, 2002, 2006 AND 2009 a
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Registered Not registered
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Weighted average for the countries which have data for all the years examined. 
But beyond overall average wage trends and the 
recent narrowing of the gap between those registered and 
unregistered with social security, the association between 
income and registration is highly rigid. Examination of a 
group of countries with information available for 1990, 2000 
and 2009 shows a heavy drop in social security registration 
in the 1990s, and access become no  less stratified with 
the upturn in registration in the 2000s. On the contrary, 
the gap between higher- and lower-income sectors seems 
to have widened. In 1990 workers in the first quintile who 
were registered with a social security scheme represented 
56% of registered fifth quintile workers. In 2000, this ratio 
had worsened (42%), albeit amid a widespread decline in 
affiliation. But the data for 2009 confirm the observations 
made earlier: there was a strong overall upturn, but it applied 
much less to first quintile workers than to the rest, which 
deepened the divide between the higher- and lower-income 
sectors so much that first quintile social-security-registered 
workers represented just 34% of those registered in the 
fifth quintile in that year (see figure IV.5).
Figure IV.5  
LATIN AMERICA (9 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED POPULATION 
REGISTERED WITH A SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BY INCOME 











Quintile I Quintile II Quintile III Quintile IV Quintile V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru or Uruguay. 
 1990: The data for Mexico and Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those 
for Nicaragua to 1993.
 2000: The data for Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and El Salvador refer to 1999 and 
those for Nicaragua to 2001. 
 2009: The data for Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for Mexico to 
2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; those for Plurinational State 
of Bolivia to eight cities plus El Alto; and those of Ecuador to urban areas.
The other major bias has to do with gender inequality. 
The feminization of informal employment discussed in 
chapter III has led to women’s social security registration 
in lower-income sectors being almost 10 percentage points 
below the figure for men. The gap tends to narrow as income 
rises and practically disappears between men and women in 
the highest income quintile (see figures IV.6 and IV.7). As a 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)130
result, not only are the overall registration figures lower for 
female than for male workers —which prejudices women 
both during their working lives and beyond, since it reduces 
their chances of receiving a pension— but contributory access 
is also unevenly distributed between women. Accordingly, 
women must contend with clearly concentrated and overlapping 
risks and inequalities (ECLAC, 2010b).
In the past 20 years, the gap between higher-earning 
women and those living in first quintile households has 
widened, especially in the period during which social 
security coverage increased among employed workers: 
registration in quintile I represented 43% of quintile V 
registration in 1990, then dropped to 36% in 2000 and just 
24% in 2009. The pattern, though similar, was much less 
marked for male workers. Among men, social security 
enrolment in quintile I fell from 60% of quintile V male 
enrolment in 1990 to 46% in 2000 and 40% in 2009%. 
The gaps have certainly widened for both sexes, but much 
more alarmingly for women (see figures IV.7 and IV.8). 
Figure IV.7 
LATIN AMERICA (9 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED POPULATION REGISTERED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS BY INCOME QUINTILE  
AND SEX, SIMPLE AVERAGE, AROUND 1990, 2000 AND 2009 a






















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru or Uruguay. 
 1990: The data for Mexico and Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 1989 and those for Nicaragua to 1993.
 2000: The data for Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and El Salvador refer to 1999 and those for Nicaragua to 2001. 
 2009: The data for Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those for Mexico to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; those for Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
to eight cities plus El Alto; and those for Ecuador, to urban areas.
Figure IV.6 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED POPULATION 
REGISTERED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS BY INCOME 
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Men Women
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
Lower levels of labour-market participation, higher 
rates of unemployment, biases in labour regulations 
and the lack of policies for reconciling paid and unpaid 
work all conspire against women’s coverage through the 
channel of employment-related contributions (ECLAC, 
2010d). The many labour-related gaps between women 
and men and among women themselves are thus 
extensively reproduced.
The third bias concerns the fact that, beyond 
providing coverage for the employed, the contributory 
rationale is intended to protect not only workers, but 
also their families through health insurance. Here it 
should be recalled that, as discussed in chapter III, the 
workers who have most social protection are not only 
the most educated and better paid, but also those with 
fewest dependants or less numerous households. By 
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contrast, lower-paid and younger workers and those 
in more numerous households, as well as employed 
women with small children, have much less access to 
social security. 
Review of the data are at the household level shows 
not only narrow social security coverage (only 43% of 
households have at least one member registered and only 
32% have an registered head of household or spouse) 
but, here again, gender and generational gaps. Social 
security coverage is significantly above average (49.5%) 
in male-headed households, but much lower (41.3%) in 
female-headed households (see figure IV.8).
Figure IV.8 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLDS WITH  
SOME TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REGISTRATION,  























































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
Examination of the proportion of children living in 
households covered by contributory protection alongside 
figures for the economically active population shows 
children at a clear disadvantage. Half (50.2%) the 
population aged between 15 and 59 —but only 43.4% 
of the population aged under 15— lives in households 
which have at least one member registered with social 
security (see figure IV.9). This gap compounds the more 
limited female and youth access to formal employment 
with social protection, the regressive workings of 
contributory protection and the stratification of 
demographic changes, especially the drop in fertility 
rates (ECLAC, 2010b). 
The data also confirm, here again, territorial disparities 
in the contributory model’s coverage: 46.5% of the urban 
population, but only 27.3% of the rural population, lives 
in households with at least one member enrolled in a 
social security system (see figure IV.9). 
Figure IV.9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH SOME TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REGISTRATION, BY AGE 



















































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
Factors such as the sex of the head of household and the 
age of household members are certainly closely associated 
with contributory patterns and the possibilities of securing 
social protection through this channel. It is therefore no 
coincidence that the workings of the contributory system 
worsen inequality and that the gap between lower- and 
higher- income sectors is larger among female-headed 
than among male-headed households, and in the child 
and adolescent population (ages 0 - 15) than among those 
aged between 15 and 59.
In the case of the child population, as may be expected, 
inequality in the region’s countries tends to increase 
sharply where contributory systems encompass smaller 
proportions of the population. But even in countries with 
more consolidated systems (with the exception of Costa 
Rica) the gap between the lowest-income quintile and 
the other four is heavily stratified, with the economically 
worst-off more severely disadvantaged in terms of 
protection too (see figure IV.10). 
In Uruguay, for example, children aged under 15 
living in quintile I households with at least one member 
enrolled in a social security scheme represent only 40% 
of the comparable group in the highest income quintile. 
In Peru the figure in this respect is larger for children in 
quintile V than for those in quintile I by a factor of 9, in 
Colombia by a factor of 26 and in Paraguay by a factor 
of 35 (see figure IV.10).
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Figure IV.10  
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED UNDER 15 LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH SOME TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 














































































































Quintile I Quintile V Quintile I/Quintile V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Does not include data for Dominican Republic. Data for Guatemala and Mexico refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to 2008.
2. Protection of older persons through transfers: the contributory 
base and non-contributory benefits
In the contributory model, social protection for older 
persons is a deferred benefit of employment, which 
provides some replacement for wages in retirement. So, 
in principle, protection at this stage of life follows the 
same rationale as contributory protection during working 
life and the limitations and inadequacies of social security 
coverage are reproduced during old age. The outcome of 
this rationale is that, on average, in 2009 just 4 of every 10 
Latin American citizens aged 65 or over (40%) received 
some sort of pension or retirement benefit in the countries 
of the region (see figure IV.11). 
The data show major gaps between the countries 
with regard to the coverage of pensions and retirement 
benefits. Coverage rates are over 80% in the Southern 
Cone countries (and as high as 89% in Argentina), around 
65% in Costa Rica and slightly under 50% in Mexico and 
Panama. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia form a 
second group with coverage rates of between 20% and 
40%. Lastly, in a third group with coverage rates of under 
20% are Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Dominican Republic and Honduras, with a figure as low 
as 7% in this last country (see figure IV.11). So, with 
the exception of very few countries, the possibility of a 
retirement pension is fairly remote for most older persons 
in Latin America. The possibility of being an “exclusive 
retiree” is remoter still (Bertranou, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the percentage of the over-65 population 
covered by pension schemes and retirement benefits has 
risen considerably over the past decade. Coverage in 
the countries averaged 34% in 2000 but has risen in the 
last two measurements in 11 of the 16 countries which 
have information available. Within this group, Chile 
and Argentina have registered very considerable rises. 
Bycontrast, coverage has fallen in Brazil, Uruguay, Peru 
and Paraguay, though significantly only in this last country. 
Importantly, the rates of coverage recorded include 
the non-contributory transfers and benefits 4 which many 
of the region’s countries have put in place to offset the 
shortfalls in social security contributions made by women 
4 Contributory and non-contributory transfers are considered together 
here within the context of pension and retirement benefits because 
they cannot be differentiated in all the countries’ household surveys.
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during their working lives and to lessen the precariousness 
of certain sectors excluded from the contributory model. 
These efforts have produced a non-linear shift in the 
disparities between working-age men and women in some 
countries, although they do not appear to be sufficient 
to entirely close the gender gap. This gap is evident in 
virtually all the region’s countries (see figure IV.12). 
Figure IV.11  
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED 65 AND 
OVER RECEIVING A PENSION OR RETIREMENT  



















































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Simple average for the countries that have data for 2000 and 2009. Data for Plurinational 
State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, 
to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; those for Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, to eight cities plus El Alto; those for Ecuador and Uruguay, to urban areas; 
and those for Paraguay to Asuncion, and the Central Department.
Figure IV.12  
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED 65  
AND OVER RECEIVING A PENSION OR RETIREMENT BENEFIT  


















































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Data for Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 and those Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires; 
those for Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight cities plus El Alto; those for Ecuador 
and Uruguay, to urban areas; and those for Paraguay, to Asuncion and the Central 
Department.
The gap in the figures for women and men evidently 
results from a combination of factors, several of which have 
been discussed in this chapter and in chapter III. Uneven 
labour-market status, the feminization of informality, 
shortfalls in social security registration in female-dominated 
sectors and women’s still-low activity rates are some of 
the elements limiting women’s possibilities of having 
social protection in old age. 
But not everything comes down to the labour market. 
In many of the region’s countries, social security legislation 
contains specifically discriminatory provisions. Many 
still calculate benefits on the basis of actuarial tables that 
distinguish between male and female life expectancies. 
This practice transforms one of the few advantages enjoyed 
by women into a disadvantage, which is worsened in 
countries in which women retire earlier, since a smaller 
cumulative amount divided by a larger number of years 
obviously gives a smaller pension. And those women —a 
large proportion— who are devoted exclusively to care 
work, child-rearing and domestic work are social security 
system outsiders, unless they have been married to or 
cohabited with a man for a long period and providing that 
they meet a series of conditions such as having children 
with the contributor or retiree or not having remarried. The 
remaining option for women in this situation is a welfare 
pension which, where it exists, is usually significantly 
smaller (Marco, 2004).
Another clear indication of gender disparities in 
access to pension and retirement benefits is the large 
proportion of older persons who have no income of their 
own: 25% in the case of women over 60 living in urban 
areas. Particularly worrisome is the percentage of women 
with no income of their own in Colombia, El Salvador, 
Ecuador and Mexico, and the heavy gender disparity seen 
even in countries where pension and retirement benefit 
coverage is relatively high, such as Costa Rica, Brazil, 
Chile or Uruguay (see figure IV.13). 
Issues of economic autonomy at this life stage impact 
on well-being, inasmuch as they represent a differentiated 
pattern of access to income which is fundamental for 
acquiring, in turn, food, basic consumption goods, 
health services, care services and housing, precisely at 
a time when the possibility of obtaining them through 
employment is waning (Mesa-Lago, 2009). Employment 
is not a possible or viable option for a large proportion of 
older persons and particularly not for women.  As may be 
expected, rates of employment for the male population 
aged over 65 are higher where the coverage of pension 
and retirement benefits is lower. However, with few 
exceptions, female employment rates remain relatively 
low in those same countries. And where women aged 
over 65 do engage in paid employment, this tends to be 
in low-productivity sectors virtually across all the social 
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strata, which leaves them particularly vulnerable, since 
their jobs do not give them access to social protection or 
health coverage. 
Figure IV.13 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): PERSONS AGED 60 AND OVER 


















































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data compiled by the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
a  Simple average for the countries. Refers to the proportion of the population aged 
60 and over receiving no individual monetary income (in the form of wages, salaries, 
independent workers’ labour earnings, pensions and retirement benefits, household 
transfers and transfers from abroad, social benefits from the government, fixed-term 
investments, income from property or other income). Data for Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Mexico refer to 2008.
The evidence reviewed thus far shows how labour 
trajectories and the structure of social protection systems 
produce new inequalities in access to well-being in old 
age. The overlapping biases in these equalities combine 
with —and are sometimes deepened by— pension systems 
based on legal frameworks and assumptions that, far from 
correcting biases, entrench them further. Several points 
arising from this merit closer reflection.
The first is that gender inequalities carry over from 
working life to old age in a relatively linear fashion. The 
family-biased matrix on which welfare regimes in the 
region are based imposes inequalities between women and 
men, especially in the less developed countries (Martínez 
Franzoni, 2008; Bertranou, 2008). And the demographic 
context of population ageing in which this is occurring 
means that more and more older persons —especially 
women— are living alone and for longer (Huenchuan, 
2009). As a result, growing demands for care in old age 
are posing unprecedented challenges in terms of social 
protection systems, access to basic services, especially 
health, and the design of policies for a larger older 
population in general (Huenchuan and Guzmán, 2007; 
Huenchuan, 2009; Jaccoud, 2010).
The second point has to do with what systems of pension 
and retirement benefits do to reduce the income inequality 
seen at working ages. As noted in the 2009 edition of Social 
Panorama of Latin America, a number of countries are 
making significant efforts to guarantee income for older 
persons. The efforts are highly progressive inasmuch as 
they address primary income distribution, especially in 
those countries in which pension and retirement schemes 
are most developed (ECLAC, 2010b). It comes as no 
surprise that older persons gain a substantially improved 
position in the income distribution structure of the overall 
population after receipt of this sort of transfers. Figure 
IV.14 simulates the distribution of persons aged 65 and 
over in income quintiles in the overall population in the 
absence of pension and retirement benefits. The exercise 
shows that including receipt of guaranteed income transfers 
only 15% of those aged 65 and over fall into the poorest 
income quintile, compared with 30% in the absence of 
such transfers. 
Figure IV.14 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
POPULATION AGED 65 AND OVER IN PRIMARY INCOME 
QUINTILES BEFORE AND AFTER PENSION AND  
RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AROUND 2009 a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Simple average for the countries. Data for Plurinational State of Bolivia refer to 2007 
and those Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, to 2008. Data for Argentina 
refer to Greater Buenos Aires; those for Plurinational State of Bolivia, to eight cities 
plus El Alto; those for Ecuador and Uruguay, to urban areas; and those for Paraguay, 
to Asuncion and the Central Department.
The third point refers to the efforts which countries 
of the region need to make in terms of social spending 
in order to reduce inequalities in old age, the way that 
spending is targeted and the rules informing the design of 
social protection in old age (Prado and Sojo, 2010). The 
discussion presented here makes at least two contributions 
to the debate in these regards. 
First, it illustrates from another angle the limitations 
of Latin America’s incomplete adaptation of the formal-
employment-based protection model. Most older persons in 
Latin America do not transition from covered employment 
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to contributory pension benefits: many remain in the labour 
market, often in highly informal employment.
Second, it offers an insight into future problems 
with social protection systems in old age, insofar 
as these problems are linked to failings that are still 
accumulating throughout the life cycle. Poverty and 
vulnerability in childhood, low-productivity labour 
trajectories and difficulties in accessing social protection 
during economically active years will make future older 
generations more vulnerable. 
The failures of contributory coverage for older persons 
are leaving more and more ground to be made up by social 
spending, which is increasingly unable to do so. And, 
when combined with the population ageing under way in 
the region, they make the social protection challenges for 
the countries all the more obvious and urgent. In order to 
sustain generations of older persons over time, the region’s 
countries must lose no time in investing in the younger 
population whose productivity must finance and sustain 
the social protection provisions of the future.
5 This analysis does not cover the non-contributory pensions and other 
benefits for the vulnerable segments of the older adult population, 
which were covered in the discussion on social protection mechanisms 
for this specific sector of the population. Other benefits that might 
be regarded as components of the non-contributory pillar, such as 
health-care benefits, are not included here either.
C. The non-contributory pillar: scope and  
 risk-coverage of welfare transfers 5
In terms of transfers alone, the non-contributory pillar of social protection covers about 12% 
of all households and represents 0.25% of GDP.  Despite their limited coverage, these transfers 
do seem to target the risks faced by the population and make a big difference for the poorest 
households. They are therefore highly progressive, as demonstrated by the fact that this pillar 
provides coverage for a large proportion of the women-headed households and households 
with children and adolescents that fall into the first income quintile. 
The non-contributory pillar of the social security system 
was originally designed to provide coverage for a residual 
sector of the population which, for various reasons, did 
not fit into the contributory model. It was thus seen as a 
mechanism for providing this sector with access to health 
care or for making transfers to it. However, although for 
very different reasons from those explored in previous 
sections, the development of this pillar has produced 
mixed results. 
The high poverty rates and marked inequalities 
existing in the region, together with the Latin American 
governments’ weak fiscal capacity, place these countries 
in a difficult position, since there is a huge demand for 
public spending, while the efforts made thus far to provide 
coverage to the broad sectors of the population that have 
no secure income or insurance coverage fall far short of 
the mark (ECLAC, 2010b).
The coverage of the non-contributory pillar, when 
analysed exclusively on the basis of transfers, covers 
approximately 12% of all households and represents 0.25% 
of GDP (ECLAC, 2010b). These transfers do appear to 
target the risks facing this segment of the population 
quite accurately, and they actually double the income of 
households in the first income decile (ECLAC, 2010b), 
which indicates just how great an impact they have on 
the region’s poorest households. This goes to show that, 
despite their limited coverage, these transfers have a 
highly progressive distributional effect (ECLAC, 2010b). 
All in all, some 41% of the people in the first income 
quintile live in households that receive some type of 
public welfare transfer, whereas the figure for the third 
quintile verges on  15%. In the first income quintile, the 
coverage of welfare transfers for the 10-14 and 15-24 age 
groups amounts to about 45%. The figure is roughly the 
same for the 25-34 age group, which spans a period that 
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encompasses many of the landmark events in the transition 
to adulthood, such as emancipation and reproduction. 
A disproportionately large number of the low-income 
households that receive public welfare transfers and that 
have no member with social security coverage are headed 
by women. Nearly 4 out of every 10 households (38.4%) 
in the poorest quintile fall into this category, whereas, 
overall, 27% of the households in this quintile are headed 
by women (see figure IV.15). 
A larger percentage of the heads of these households 
state that they are unemployed (19.1% versus 12% for all 
households in this quintile). Welfare transfers that serve 
as the only form of social protection do not appear to be 
reaching a larger proportion of unemployed low-income 
heads of household than their employed counterparts, 
however, and, in fact, three out of every four heads of 
household in this category (75%) are employed (see 
figure IV.16). 
The profile of the employed heads of household 
in the bottom quintile for whom the only source of 
coverage is a public welfare transfer shows that more 
of these people are employed in low-productivity 
positions (primarily as unskilled independent workers, 
low-skilled wage earners and domestic servants) than 
is true of employed heads of household in that quintile 
as a whole (see figure IV.17).
Figure IV.15 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): SEX OF HEADS  
OF FIRST-QUINTILE HOUSEHOLDS, ALL HOUSEHOLDS  
AND THOSE RECEIVING PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS,  
HAVING NO CONTRIBUTORY-PILLAR COVERAGE AND 
RECEIVING NO RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS,  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires, while the statistics for Ecuador refer to urban areas. The data for Guatemala 
refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007 and those for Mexico, to 2008.
Figure IV.16 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT STATUS  
OF HEADS OF FIRST-QUINTILE HOUSEHOLDS, ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
AND THOSE RECEIVING PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS, HAVING 
NO CONTRIBUTORY-PILLAR COVERAGE AND RECEIVING  
NO RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS,  

















Households for which welfare transfers
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Employed Unemployed Economically inactive
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The data for Argentina correspond to Greater 
Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador correspond to urban areas. The statistics for 
Guatemala are from 2006, those for Honduras are from 2007 and those for Mexico 
are from 2008.
Figure IV.17 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY 
OF HEADS OF FIRST-QUINTILE HOUSEHOLDS, ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
AND THOSE RECEIVING PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS, HAVING 
NO CONTRIBUTORY-PILLAR COVERAGE AND RECEIVING  
NO RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS,  





















Households for which a welfare transfer
is the sole source of coverage
All households
Formal sector: employers
Formal public sector: wage earners
Formal private sector: professionals
Formal private sector: non-professionals
Formal sector: independent professionals
Informal sector: employers
Informal sector: domestic servants
Informal private sector: non-professionals
Informal sector: independent non-professionals
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires and those for Ecuador to urban areas. The data for Guatemala refer to 2006; 
those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, to 2008.
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D. Cracks and gaps in social protection systems
An analysis of the contributory and non-contributory portions of social protection systems in 
Latin America points to the existence of wide cracks in the system, and sizeable sectors of the 
region’s households fall through those cracks. A large percentage of the population in the region 
is not covered by the traditional type of employment-based social security system and does not 
receive public welfare transfers either. While this group does include some people in upper-income 
households, nearly half of those who belong to it are in the poorest 40% of the population. 
The discussion of the contributory (including both 
economically active persons and older adults) and non-
contributory pillars in earlier sections provides a number 
of clues as to how the existing inequalities in terms of 
social protection have arisen and what their significance 
is. The prospects for the continued implementation of the 
employment-based contributory model are fairly bleak, since, 
given the wide gaps opened up by the existing contributory 
pattern, the target figures for the non-contributory pillars 
which the region is just beginning to deploy are extraordinarily 
high. In addition, the data show up the many different cracks 
in the system of protection for older adults. 
As is also the case of most of the available 
studies, the analysis undertaken thus far suffers 
from a shortcoming: it does not provide the type of 
information needed to gauge how the different kinds 
of benefits are channelled to households (which are 
the end recipients) nor how they may be combined or 
how they may overlap. 
When these components are brought together 
and incorporated into a system of classification, they 
confirm the findings of a number of other studies but 
also yield some new results as well (see box IV.1). 
Box IV.1 
TYPOLOGY FOR A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION AND OF HOW IT IS LINKED TO EMPLOYMENT:  
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
There is a great deal of literature on social 
protection systems In Latin America. In 
methodological terms, most of the research 
done so far focuses on the coverage of both 
the contributory pillar (retirement pensions, 
the percentage of workers who pay into the 
social security system) and non-contributory 
pillar (coverage of non-contributory pensions 
and of public welfare transfers). These 
analyses have contributed a great deal 
to a better understanding of the scope 
of social protection systems in the region 
and of how they tie in with employment. 
This approach does not, however, provide 
a clear picture of the end result of these 
two types of benefits at the household 
level (i.e., how these two types of benefits 
are combined and what the results of that 
combination is).
An empirical analysis of the combined 
scope of the two main pillars of social 
protection systems in the region and, above 
all, how they tie in with employment is needed 
in order to put together such a picture.
The household is used as the unit of 
analysis for this typology, which categorizes 
households according to whether or not 
they include at least one member has social 
security coverage (including unemployment 
coverage), whether or not they receive public 
welfare transfers and whether or not they 
receive retirement or other pensions.
Using this classification, five categories 
or types of households can be identified: 
(1) households that receive contributory 
benefits only; (2) households that receive 
both contributory and non-contributory 
benefits; (3) households that receive non-
contributory benefits (public welfare transfers) 
only; (4) households that do not fit any of 
the preceding descriptions but in which one 
or more members receives a retirement or 
other pension; and (5) households that do 
not have any form of social protection (that 
do not fit into any of these categories).
Table 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY COMBINATIONS OF FORMS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION a
  Has social security coverage 
  At least one member has social security coverage or unemployment insurance No member has social security coverage
Receives public welfare transfers Yes Both types of benefits (2) Non-contributory benefits only (3) 
 No Contributory benefits only (1) No social security coverage and no public welfare transfers
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Box IV.1 (concluded)
As shown in the figure, the focus is on 
classifying the members of the economically 
active population, since the next objective is 
to analyse the way in which these categories 
are linked to different types of employment 
status.  This is why the category of households 
in which retirement or other pensions are 
received does not include all such households 
but only those that receive such pensions 
and that do not have social security coverage 
and do not receive public welfare transfers. 
Caution must be used in relation to 
four methodological aspects of this exercise 
when interpreting these results.
First, although, in constructing this 
typology, income variables were taken 
into account wherever possible (see the 
table below), the exercise as such shows 
whether or not there is coverage, but does 
not provide information about the quality or 
scope of coverage. Consequently, the fact 
that a household receives non-contributory 
benefits, for example, does not necessarily 
mean that it has a higher income or is 
better off than one that has no form of 
social protection at all. In other words, 
income levels are not part of this exercise, 
which is simply being used to show what 
percentages of households have and do 
not have some form of social protection, 
regardless of its quality. 
Second, it must be remembered that 
this analysis reflects the status of households 
as measured by household surveys, which 
is why some countries are not covered 
by this analysis (mainly because they do 
not collect data on the receipt of welfare 
transfers or because they collect data on 
some variables but not all the ones needed 
in order to gauge the coverage of this pillar).
Third, it is important to bear in mind 
that the analysis of retirement and other 
pensions included in this exercise is confined 
to recipient households that do not fall into 
any of the other categories because the 
chief aim is to establish the link between 
social protection and employment status. 
In addition, since not all household surveys 
distinguish between contributory and 
non-contributory retirement and other 
pensions, this distinction was not made 
here either. 
Finally, it should be noted that this 
is a general analysis of the way in which 
social security coverage and different 
types of transfers are combined in different 
households and thus does not include other 
basic determinants of well-being, such as 
housing, health care, education and access 
to social services in general.
Table 2 
CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY COMBINATIONS OF FORMS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION a
Unemployment insurance 
(additional contributory credit) Retirement and other pensions Public welfare transfers
Argentina Severance pay and/or 
unemployment insurance
Retirement or other pensions Social aid or subsidies from  the government, 
church organizations or other donors
Chile Unemployment benefits Retirement or other pensions Disability, 
old-age, widows’, orphans’ pensions, 
child support payments, other pensions  
Basic (non-contributory) old-age or 
disability pensions and subsidies
Family subsidies, disability subsidies, family protection 
allowance; drinking water, electricity and other subsidies
Colombia Unemployment benefits Retirement and other pensions Cash and in-kind subsidies for the purchase, construction or 
improvement of housing Cash or in-kind transfers from  the 
Family in Action Programme. Youth in Action Programme 
and the Families of Forest Wardens Programme
Costa Rica  Retirement and other pensions 
Non-contributory pensions
Benefits paid out by the Joint Institute for 
Social Aid  (IMAS) and other subsidies
Dominican 
Republic
Retirement and other pensions Government aid
Ecuador  Retirement and various other types of pensions Human Development Grant
El Salvador Severance pay or 
unemployment insurance
Retirement and other pensions Government aid in the form of cash transfers 
Guatemala  Retirement and other pensions Grants from public institutions
Honduras  Retirement and other pensions School meals, allowances or subsidies for households
Mexico Unemployment insurance 
or severance pay
Retirement and other national pensions   
Income Programme for Older Adults
Benefits provided by the Opportunities 
Programme, the Agricultural Development Plan 
(PROCAMPO) and other social programmes
Panama  Retirement and other pensions Transfers from the Housing Assistance Fund (FASHABI), 
housing grants (improved PARVIS), the Opportunities 
Network, subsidies from the Secretariat for Food 
Security and Nutrition of Panama and others
Paraguay  Retirement and other pensions Tekoporá transfers
Uruguay Unemployment and 
underemployment insurance
Retirement and other pensions paid out by 
industrial and commercial funds, civil and 
school funds, domestic service and rural 
funds of the Banco de Previsión Social [Social 
Insurance Bank] (BPS) Retirement pensions of 
the Postal Union, Armed Forces, Police Fund, 
Professional Fund and the Notarial Fund
Household allowances (Equity Plan)  Scholarships, 
subsidies, other grants, food cards
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Only those countries that compile enough data on public welfare transfers to households to permit their incorporation into this classification scheme have been included. Empty 
boxes in the unemployment insurance column indicate that the corresponding household surveys did not cover these variables.
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This cross-checking of different types of benefits shows, 
here again, that approximately 43% of all households are 
fairly well integrated into society and include employed 
persons who are covered by the contributory social 
security system. Within this sector, a very small portion 
of households (4% as a regional average) have combined 
forms of coverage (i.e., they have at least one member 
with social security coverage and receive some type of 
public welfare transfer) (see figure IV.18). 
Figure IV.18 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION 
BY COMBINATIONS OF SOCIAL BENEFITS, SIMPLE  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru 
or the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have 
the information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a 
typology or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The 
data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. 
The figure for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for 
Mexico, to 2008.
This analysis also shows that the only income received 
by a significant proportion (8%) of households is in the form 
of retirement or other pensions, with these households being 
concentrated, unsurprisingly, in the countries with more 
well-developed retirement and pension systems (Costa Rica, 
Uruguay and Argentina). In addition, as mentioned earlier, 
the only stream of income for 12% of all households in the 
region is in the form of non-contributory welfare transfers.
Perhaps the most striking finding, however, is that 
such a large portion of the region’s households receive 
no form of public protection whatsoever: an average of 
36% of all households in the 13 countries covered by this 
analysis do not have any member who has social security 
coverage and do not receive public welfare transfers or any 
sort of retirement or other pension. In the more developed 
countries, the proportion of unprotected households ranges 
from 9% (Costa Rica and Uruguay) to 20% (Argentina). 
In the poorer countries with lower per capita levels of 
GDP, less fiscal capacity and higher dependency rates, 
the proportion of households   with no form of protection 
whatsoever is closer to the regional average, but greatly 
exceeds it in some cases (58% in El Salvador, 63% in 
Guatemala and 69% in Paraguay).
These households are being bypassed by the multi-
component public social protection systems that are being 
set up in the region. The next question that arises is: What 
are these unprotected households like? 
As an average for the countries covered in this study, the 
profiles of the members of households which do not have the 
benefit of any type of social protection whatsoever can be 
broken down as follows: 48% of them are from the first and 
second income quintiles, 38% from middle-income sectors 
and 30% from the fourth and fifth quintiles (see figure IV.19).
Figure IV.19  
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLDS IN WHICH 
NO ONE HAS SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE OR RECEIVES 
RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS OR PUBLIC WELFARE 
























































































































Quintiles I and II Quintile III Quintiles IV and V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the information 
about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology or because 
the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for Argentina refer to 
Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas.. The data for Guatemala 
refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, to 2008.
As illustrated by the above figure, this pattern is 
repeated in all the countries to varying extents except Chile 
and the Dominican Republic, where households without 
social security coverage, welfare transfers or retirement 
or other pension benefits include a larger proportion of 
persons in upper-income categories.
The absence of social protection therefore appears to 
steam from a number of different factors. One of those 
—which has to do with the members of households in the 
middle- and upper-income categories— may be that public 
protection systems are skimming off these top layers by 
using the market as a filter. The most probable reason for 
this, however, is that a majority of the members of middle- 
and upper-income sectors who lack social protection are 
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workers in mid-level and high-productivity sectors (although 
some may also be employed in low-productivity sectors) 
who, as discussed in earlier sections, are unable to obtain 
social security coverage or an employment contract. In any 
event, this “skimming” effect poses a challenge in terms 
of the mid- and long-term outlook for the establishment 
of universal protection systems because it undermines 
the social security systems’ vertical solidarity (between 
upper-income and lower-income segments) components as 
well as threatening to undercut their financing mechanisms.
The most worrisome facet of this situation, however, 
has to do with the households in the poorest 40% of the 
distribution. These households include a larger number 
of women than the unprotected upper-income households 
do (53% in quintiles I and II versus 48% in quintiles IV 
and V) and a larger percentage of people between the 
ages of 15 and 24 (35% in quintiles I and II versus 30% 
in quintiles IV and V) (see figures IV.20 and IV.21).  
Female-headed households are also more likely to 
lack social protection. This is true of such households in 
both the lower- and the higher-income quintiles, but it 
especially marked among the poorer ones. In fact, 56% 
of the households in the poorest 40% of the distribution 
that are headed by women do not have any social security 
coverage and receive no public welfare transfers or 
retirement or other pension benefits (see figure IV.22). 
Figure IV.20  
LATIN AMERICA  (13 COUNTRIES): PROFILE OF THE 
POPULATION BETWEEN THE AGES OF 15 AND 59 LIVING 
IN HOUSEHOLDS WHERE NO ONE HAS SOCIAL SECURITY 
COVERAGE OR RECEIVES RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS 
OF PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS, BY SEX AND INCOME 














Quintiles I and II Quintile III Quintiles IV and V
Men Women
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the information 
about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology or because 
the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for Argentina refer 
to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. The data for Guatemala 
refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, to 2008.
Figure IV.21 
LATIN AMERICA  (13 COUNTRIES): PROFILE OF THE 
POPULATION BETWEEN THE AGES OF 15 AND 59 WHO LIVE 
IN HOUSEHOLDS IN WHICH NO ONE HAS SOCIAL SECURITY 
COVERAGE OR RECEIVES RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS 
OF PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS, BY AGE AND INCOME 
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15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries either do not have 
the information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a 
typology or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The 
data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. 
The data for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for 
Mexico, to 2008
Figure IV.22 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLDS IN WHICH 
NO ONE HAS SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE OR RECEIVES 
RETIREMENT OR OTHER PENSIONS OR PUBLIC WELFARE 
TRANSFERS, BY SEX OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND  









Quintiles I and II Quintile III Quintiles IV and V
Men Women
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru 
or the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have 
the information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a 
typology or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another.  The 
data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. 
The data for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for 
Mexico, to 2008.
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Another important point is that nearly 80% of the heads 
of households in quintiles I and II that receive no benefits are 
employed, although these households also include a larger 
number of unemployed and economically inactive heads 
of household than their counterparts in the upper-income 
quintiles do. A comparison of these households with those 
that receive only non-contributory benefits shows that 
households with no benefits have a higher proportion of 
employed persons (79% versus 74%), fewer economically 
inactive members (13% versus 19%) and more unemployed 
persons (see figures IV.23 and IV.24).
Figure IV.23 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): PROFILE OF HEADS (15-59 
YEARS) OF HOUSEHOLDS IN WHICH NO ONE HAS SOCIAL 
SECURITY COVERAGE AND NO ONE RECEIVES RETIREMENT  
OR OTHER PENSIONS OR PUBLIC WELFARE TRANSFERS,  














Quintiles I and II Quintile III Quintiles IV and V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the information 
about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology or because 
the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for Argentina refer 
to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. The data for Guatemala 
refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, to 2008.
The above analysis provides some clues as to why, with 
the same level of income, some households have access to 
the social safety net and others do not. An examination of the 
employment status of heads of households that receive no 
social benefits shows that informal employment (independent 
and low-productivity employment) and low-skilled wage 
employment in the formal sector are influential factors in 
this regard (see figure IV.25).
When compared to households in the same quintiles 
(I and II) that receive non-contributory forms of protection 
only, it can be seen that more of the households that receive 
no benefits at all are headed by non-professionals who 
work in the informal or formal private sector. Households 
that receive only non-contributory benefits have a larger 
proportion of workers in domestic service activities and 
unskilled independent workers.
Figure IV.24 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): PROFILE OF HEADS  
(15-59 YEARS) OF HOUSEHOLDS IN QUINTILES I AND II,  
BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLD  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the 
information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology 
or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for 
Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. The 
data for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, 
to 2008.
Figure IV.25 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): PROFILE OF HEADS OF 
HOUSEHOLD (15-59 YEARS) IN QUINTILES I AND II, BY 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLD  
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Formal public sector: wage earners
Formal private sector: professionals
Formal private sector: non-professionals
Formal sector: independent professionals
Informal sector: employers
Informal sector: domestic servants
Informal private sector: non-professionals
Informal sector: independent 
non-professionals
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the 
information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology 
or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for 
Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. The 
data for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, 
to 2008.
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In addition, households that receive non-contributory 
benefits tend to be larger than those receiving contributory 
benefits, while households that receive no social benefits 
tend to be smaller. Calculations based on all households 
indicate that, on average, households that receive non-
contributory benefits are made up of 5.1 persons, those 
that receive contributory benefits are composed of 3.9 
persons and households that receive no social benefits at 
all consist of 3.6 persons. This pattern is evident when all 
households are taken together and when the households 
in each income quintile are considered separately (see 
figure IV.26).
Figure IV.26 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE, 
BY LEVEL OF ACCESS TO SOCIAL BENEFITS AND BY INCOME 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household survey data for the countries concerned.
a  Does not include data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia,  Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru or 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela either because these countries do not have the 
information about public welfare transfers to households needed to construct a typology 
or because the corresponding variables are at odds with one another. The data for 
Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires and those for Ecuador, to urban areas. The 
data for Guatemala refer to 2006; those for Honduras, to 2007; and those for Mexico, 
to 2008.
There may be two reasons for this. Households where 
no social benefits are received have more members over 
60 years of age than the others do, which is unsurprising, 
given the large percentage of the older adult population 
that receives no retirement or other pension. These 
households also have fewer children than those which 
receive non-contributory benefits, which may be one 
of the reasons why, in some countries, they do not have 
access to public welfare transfers, since the presence of 
children is often one of the criteria used to determine 
eligibility for transfer programmes. 
Identifying the sector of the population that is being 
left out of the combined contributory and non-contributory 
forms of coverage will contribute to an understanding of 
the link between employment and social protection, the 
types of policies that should be implemented in the region 
to reduce inequalities in this area and the gaps that need 
to be closed if the region is to make headway towards the 
consolidation of universal protection systems. 
The data discussed above suggest that there is still 
a large percentage of people in Latin America who have 
been sidelined from the traditional employment-based 
model of social protection but who do not receive public 
welfare transfers either. And while it is true that this group 
includes some members of higher-income households, 
just under half of this group is in the poorest 40% of the 
population. 
This last group, which seems to have been stranded 
somewhere in between the two main components of the 
social protection system, includes a larger percentage 
of economically active persons and older adults than 
households that receive non-contributory benefits do. 
In addition, although some 10% of these households are 
headed by economically inactive persons, a considerable 
portion of the heads of household in this group (more 
than in the case of households receiving public welfare 
transfers only) are employed. Although most of them are 
in low-productivity jobs, they are in a less vulnerable 
position than those of their counterparts who receive 
public welfare transfers. 
Although more research is needed, it can reasonably 
be posited that, at least in some of the countries in which 
social protection systems are more fully developed, 
there is a segment of the population that is positioned 
between the sectors that have contributory coverage and 
non-contributory coverage. The people in this segment 
do not pay contributions and do not have access to social 
security coverage, but they are employed (primarily in 
the informal sector), have some income and do not meet 
the eligibility requirements for public welfare transfer 
programmes. In the less developed countries, on the 
other hand, this segment may more closely correspond to 
marginalized sectors whose incomes are even lower than 
those of the households covered by the non-contributory 
pillar and who are systematically bypassed by welfare 
transfer policies. 
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E. Social protection systems and their success  
 in dealing with inequalities
This evaluation of the performance of Latin America’s social protection systems shows up 
clear failings and shortcomings, although the implications of these problems differ from one 
country to the next in this extremely heterogeneous region. These fairly frail systems, which 
have limited fiscal capacity and relatively rigid —if any— welfare architectures, are facing 
tremendous redistributive challenges. A systemic approach to these challenges should draw 
both on the contributory pillar and on more or less targeted rights-based policies in order to 
progress towards truly universal, solidarity-based protection systems. 
This analysis has looked at how eligibility for contributory 
pension schemes is stratified in ways that generate a 
chain reaction of inequality. This chain starts with the 
countries’ structural heterogeneity, leads on to the labour 
market and continues on from there to the social protection 
system. This sequence can be mapped to provide a clear 
picture of who is included and who is excluded from the 
employment-based model of social protection.
This chapter has also traced the ways in which gaps 
in employment and the relationship they bear to payments 
into social protection systems carry over from the stage 
during which people are economically active into retirement. 
This situation is clearly reflected in inequalities of access 
to retirement and other pensions between different sectors 
of the population and between men and women. And this 
occurs despite the fact that a number of countries in the 
region have developed non-contributory or solidarity-based 
mechanisms for the specific purpose of making up for the 
shortfall in social protection generated by the absence or 
insufficiency of the contributions paid by people during 
their working lives. 
Finally, the data presented here also provide some 
idea of the scope of the growing but still limited non-
contributory pillar of public welfare transfers. These 
transfers are being fairly accurately tailored to address 
the risks faced by the population and are thus reaching 
households headed by women and those that include 
larger numbers of children and adolescents.
The examination of the major components of the social 
protection system undertaken in this chapter on the basis 
of data on social security coverage and on transfers of 
various sorts, together with their classification using the 
typology presented here, provides a window on some of 
the approaches that can be used to put together a systemic 
picture of social protection in the region. 
And this picture indicates that Latin America’s social 
protection systems have a number of serious weaknesses. 
First of all, the systems are riddled with deep cracks, 
and sizeable sectors of the population fall through those 
cracks. Second, they fall short of what is needed in 
ways that differ from country to country in this highly 
heterogeneous region. In the less developed countries 
of the region, the system provides coverage only for a 
relatively small percentage of the population. In the more 
developed ones, the combined coverage is greater, but 
there are still sectors that are not being reached by any 
of the components discussed here (see diagram IV.1). 
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the task 
of reducing inequality cannot be shouldered by the social 
protection system alone. If action is focused only on the 
third link in the chain of the generation and reproduction 
of inequality (structural heterogeneity, labour market, 
social protection), the results may be very disappointing 
or, at the least, the process may soon reach a point where 
no further progress can be made. 
The second conclusion is that the manoeuvring 
room in this area is limited by the relative rigidity of the 
existing social protection systems. This rigidity, which, in 
its turn, is clearly linked to the countries’ restricted fiscal 
capacity and ability to raise social spending levels, is 
also influenced by the difficulty of altering distributional 
options that were established in the past to deal with risks 
and combinations of risks that differed from those that 
most of the countries are facing today. 
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Diagram IV.1 
SOCIAL PROTECTION AND INEQUALITY: CRACKS, RIGIDITIES, FRESH GROUND AND OPPORTUNITIES
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Scope of combined system
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the social protection system] (predominantly households headed by persons working in the informal 
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But there are also members of high-income sectors (“skimming off the top” of public protection circuits 
by using the market as a shield)
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Still very limited coverage (41% of households in quintile I)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC).
Different courses of policy action relating to social 
protection can be used to work towards these objectives:
First, in a number of countries, reforms or new 
mechanisms need to be brought in to reinforce the 
contributory pillar. This includes unemployment insurance, 
which is an essential support for workers’ income levels. 
This kind of scheme is still underdeveloped in the region 
and its coverage needs to be expanded. 
Retirement and pension systems also need to be 
overhauled. There are at least two main lines of action 
for the establishment of an agenda for change that need 
to be widely debated. 
The first calls for an assessment of public, solidarity-
based alternatives to individually funded systems. The 
second focuses on the need to achieve greater equality 
between men and women. A gender perspective needs to 
be introduced in order to level the playing field in terms 
of access to contributory rights and benefits: age limits for 
certain benefits, the recognition of rights in households 
formed on the basis of common-law marriages, greater 
flexibility in the recognition of intermittent contributions, 
and, in the case of women, recognition of unpaid work and 
of dependent children.6 The introduction of affirmative 
action policies for women to provide fair compensation in 
key areas of existing retirement and pension systems is a 
tool of pivotal importance for reducing initial inequalities 
(those that carry over from the economically active stage 
of life) and biases in some of the actuarial practices still 
employed in the design of social security systems. The 
provisions regarding women who perform unpaid work 
also have to be reviewed and modified in order to promote 
the cultural changes that need to be made in regard to 
their role in society.
The review of the factors discussed in this chapter 
also demonstrates the need to step up direct cash transfers 
to the poorest sectors of society and to focus them even 
more on the promotion of employment. These mechanisms, 
which operate through monetary transfers and other 
benefits, make it possible to guarantee a minimum income 
6 Chile’s latest pension system reform provides an informative 
example in this connection. 
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for people living in poverty and to halt the decline in the 
incomes and buying power of those who find themselves 
in vulnerable positions. As  has been pointed out by 
ECLAC on other occasions as well (ECLAC, 2010a 
and 2010b), these transfers are particularly useful in 
combating the perpetuation of poverty among children 
and in reducing levels of inequality in the early years of 
life, which constitute a hardcore form of inequality that 
tends to be perpetuated throughout the life cycle and to 
generate, or deepen, other inequalities at later stages. 
ECLAC estimates attest to how great an influence these 
mechanisms could have on poverty levels.
There are also other components of the non-
contributory pillar that need to be strengthened in order 
to guarantee access to a basic minimum standard of 
well-being. The diagnostic analysis undertaken here 
points up at least two areas in which the region has 
to make a greater effort. One has to do with subsidies 
for the payment of contributions to insurance schemes 
(mainly social security and health-care plans) in order 
to bring the people who cannot afford those payments 
into the system. This line of action focuses on addressing 
the situations of vulnerability in which informal-sector 
workers, low-income young people and women (and, 
within that group, especially young women with small 
children) find themselves. The other deals with the 
conditions needed to ensure effective access to basic 
services. Discounted fees for certain types of priority social 
services and for mass transit (ECLAC, 2010b) should 
definitely be part of the social protection package and 
should be coordinated with income transfer programmes 
for the most vulnerable sectors of the population.
Finally, the data also show that older adults in the 
region are in a very precarious position. This is more 
true in the less developed countries, but even in the more 
developed ones where social protection systems for older 
adults have broader coverage, there are still pockets of 
inequality – areas or sectors in which many people have 
no access to social protection benefits at all. To rectify this 
situation, income transfers to persons aged 65 and over 
who have need of them seem to be part of the solution, and 
the idea of working towards a universal transfer system 
for persons in this age group should definitely remain on 
the table. These transfers could then be combined with 
contributory transfers from these insurance systems in 
order to “guarantee a basic level of income that is fiscally 
sustainable and fairer from the intergenerational viewpoint” 
(ECLAC, 2010a, p. 201). 
The inequalities discussed throughout this chapter 
provide a basis for revisiting the various mechanisms 
that (albeit not always on a systemwide basis) make up 
the different countries’ social protection schemes. The 
modification of these mechanisms should be informed 
by a rights-based approach and should reflect the policy 
lines examined earlier, with the ultimate objective being 
the establishment of universal social safety nets. To 
accomplish this, it will be necessary to draw upon both 
the contributory pillar and fairly well-targeted policies 
designed to make the transition to genuinely universal, 
solidarity-based social protection systems. The data 
presented here indicate that, far from being ruled out, 
the universalization of basic levels of social protection 
should be the cornerstone for the effort to strengthen and 
reform Latin America’s welfare architectures. 
Reaching a goal of this nature will inevitably require 
the State to take up a central role once again as a guarantor, 
regulator and —in some cases, perhaps— lender.  It 
will also require the formation of sturdy redistributive 
coalitions, which is not something that Latin American 
policy has generally promoted. This is why, as indicated by 
the analysis of the situation presented here, policymakers 
need to take up the proposals set forth in Time for equality: 
closing gaps, opening trails (ECLAC, 2010a) and reaffirm, 
yet again, the crucial role of policy in improving the 
effectiveness of the region’s social protection systems 
in combating inequality. 
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Chapter V
Trends in social spending during  
the crisis and challenges in financing 
social security expenditure
A.  Introduction
After a period of structural adjustment that occurred in virtually all the region’s economies 
and resulted in sharp public spending cuts —especially in social spending— countries in the 
region have done much over the past two decades to make more resources available to fund 
social policy. Nearly all items of social public spending have shown increases not only in 
relative terms but in absolute terms as well, albeit with some exceptions for certain countries 
and periods.
Much of this effort has been closely linked to economic 
growth, which facilitated the gradual but fairly systematic 
expansion of resources. Increases in total budgets, and 
social budgets in particular, have been outpacing GDP 
growth —particularly during the 1990s— but at the same 
time, minor contractions of GDP have sparked deeper-
than-expected budget cuts. While the procyclical behaviour 
of budgetary spending is in general consistent with the 
principles of fiscal responsibility and with international 
recommendations, in some areas of expenditure, such as 
education, health and social welfare, budgetary cutbacks, 
primarily on the current expenditure side, can entail high 
economic and social costs. Although occasional cutbacks 
in capital spending in a given sector may not have major 
repercussions on national economies, a medium and 
long-term adjustment is bound to result in the deterioration 
of the infrastructure and material inputs that are often 
needed to produce social services.
In a largely unprecedented effort to counter the 
procyclical tendency of spending at times when it would 
normally fall, most countries of the region have taken 
measures (for the most part temporary) to boost public 
spending in order to tackle the hardships caused by the 
global financial crisis and its repercussions. To a large 
extent, these measures were intended to alleviate the 
impact of the crisis on the real economy, to sustain activity 
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in local and regional economies, and to curb the rise in 
unemployment and, of course, in poverty. The following 
pages review the long-term trends as well as recent changes 
in the growth of social public spending, once the potential 
impact of the international economic crisis became clear. 
Lastly, this chapter reviews and projects the social security 
situation and the short and long-term financial possibilities 
of introducing a rights-based minimum old-age pension.
B.  Social spending in Latin America
For the region as a whole, public expenditure, and especially social spending, has increased 
sharply over the last two decades. The largest increase has been in social security and welfare 
(up by the equivalent of 3.5% of GDP), followed by education. Yet in countries where per 
capita social spending is less than US$ 1,000, education is the largest expenditure item. It is 
only in the relatively more developed countries that spending on social security and welfare 
accounts for more. These trends did not change with the onset of the international financial 
crisis, but the traditionally procyclical behaviour of social spending was altered. Generally 
speaking, countries reacted to the crisis by temporarily expanding public expenditure instead 
of shrinking it as in the past. Yet that expansion did not always have a social focus, although 
the social repercussions were considerable.
1. Long-term trends
Progressive recognition of the importance of social public 
spending as an instrument for channelling resources to 
the poorest population groups, and of the role of social 
development in fostering economic development, has 
led countries of the region to increase such spending 
gradually. At the regional level, public expenditure, 
and social expenditure in particular, has burgeoned in 
the last two decades: already figuring fairly steadily in 
macroeconomic priorities up to 2006-2007, albeit with 
slight decreases between 2002 and 2005, public spending 
then surged by 20% in 2008 and 2009 as the authorities 
took pre-emptive action to stave off the effects of the 
global financial crisis. With this fresh effort to increase 
public spending, both the absolute amounts allocated 
to social spending and their weight in GDP reached a 
two-decade high as the first decade of the new century 
came to a close (see figure V.1).
Figure V.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES):  TOTAL 
PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009 a
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a The figures for total public expenditure are official data based on a functional classification 
of public spending and may differ from those based on an economic classification.
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At the same time, although total public spending 
remained relatively stable during the period 1990-2009, 
it rose significantly in absolute terms: even with the 
absolute decline recorded in 2002 (down by 3.7% in that 
one year, region-wide), public spending nearly doubled 
between 1990 and 2009, and currently stands at around 
US$ 900 billion in the region.
Nevertheless, social public spending has grown 
steadily across the region, with some slowing associated 
with various subregional upheavals such as the tequila 
crisis of 1994-1995 or those of Argentina and Uruguay in 
2002-2003 (see figure V.2). Given the relative stability of 
total public spending, social expenditure has been gaining 
ground fairly systematically: whereas in 1990-1991 it 
corresponded to 45% of total spending, at the beginning 
of the third millennium it already represented 58%, and 
jumped to 63% in 2006-2007. The slight decline in its 
share in the most recent biennium considered (2008-2009) 
chiefly reflected the relatively steeper increase in non-social 
spending, mainly in 2008. Public spending soared again 
in 2009, with a spike in social spending (9.3% over the 
2008 level).
Figure V.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL 
PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
Yet the situation varies considerably from one 
country to the next, both in terms of the increase in social 
expenditure and also in the relative and absolute amounts 
of that increase. In 2008-2009, the macroeconomic 
priority attached to social spending varied significantly 
with Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, 
Paraguay and Peru spending less than 10% of GDP, 
while Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay 
spent twice as much (see the institutional coverage 
of social public spending in box V.1). This gap exists 
even though nearly all countries have made efforts to 
increase the macroeconomic priority of social spending 
since the 1990s.
Both decades saw a few exceptions where social 
spending declined as a percentage of GDP: Cuba, 
which cut such spending drastically from 1994 until 
1998 because of the sharp structural adjustment it had 
to make in the so-called “special period”, associated 
with the pronounced drop in GDP that occurred in the 
years prior to the adjustment in social spending; and 
Jamaica, which has kept its social spending relatively 
stable since 2000, with slight variations and an upward 
trend in 2008 and 2009.
Generally speaking, between the periods 1990-1991 
and 2000-2001, most countries made slightly greater 
efforts to increase social spending as a percentage of GDP 
than they did in the subsequent period: in the first period, 
the increase in the macroeconomic priority of spending 
averaged three percentage points of GDP, while between 
2000-2001 and 2008-2009 it was only 2.9 percentage 
points. The most notable exceptions to this trend were, 
as already indicated, to be found in Cuba, and to a lesser 
extent in Argentina (with increases of 2.7% and 4.1% 
of GDP in the respective periods), Costa Rica (2.4% 
and 2.9% of GDP), Honduras (2.0% and 3.1% of GDP), 
Nicaragua (1.5% and 4.5% of GDP) and Trinidad and 
Tobago (2.2% and 3.0% of GDP).
Differences between countries relate, however, not 
only to the share of social spending in GDP but also to 
each country’s level of wealth. Countries’ varying levels 
of development and tax burdens —and hence their very 
different general public budgets and, specifically, social 
budgets— lead to wide disparities in per capita allocations 
for social fields such as education, health, social security and 
welfare. At one end of the spectrum, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia achieve very low per capita spending (less 
than US$ 300, with Ecuador, Guatemala and Paraguay 
also recording lower macroeconomic priority for social 
spending) while, at the other end, the countries with the 
highest per capita social spending (over US$ 1,000) are 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Uruguay (with Chile and Trinidad and Tobago 
recording only intermediate macroeconomic priority for 
social spending). On average, the countries with the highest 
social spending manage to allocate up to eight times as 
much as those with the tightest budgets (see figure V.3).
Overall, the great majority of countries have 
systematically increased per capita social spending, and 
all recorded an increase in the period 2008-2009, which 
was dominated by the fallout from the international 
financial crisis.
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Box V.1 
UPDATING SOCIAL EXPENDITURE FIGURES
To update social expenditure figures for this 
edition of Social Panorama of Latin America, 
data on the functional classification of public 
spending were obtained in accordance with 
the total and sectoral series published in 
previous editions. Information up to 2010 
was obtained for 10 of the 21 countries 
considered, and these figures have been 
published because it is important to have 
recent data, even if they are provisional, 
estimated or incomplete. The figures were 
updated during the third quarter of 2011; the 
cut-off point was mid-September.
In most cases it was possible to collect 
data on central government budget execution, 
and in a number of countries figures were 
obtained for actual spending by agencies 
with budgetary autonomy, local governments 
and non-financial public enterprises. Although 
differences in institutional coverage make 
comparisons between countries difficult, 
the most extensive data available for each 
country are being published except when 
they involve significant constraints for 
constructing a series for 1990-2010. This is 
because the Commission’s primary interest 
is to establish the amount of public social 
spending in each country as accurately as 
possible, in order to convey the effort being 
made by States in this area.
The following is a classification of the countries by institutional coverage of the social expenditure series used:
Total public sector (NFPS + FPS): Costa Rica.
Non-financial public sector (GG + NFPE): Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Plurinational State of Bolivia.
General government (CG + LG): Peru.
Central government (BCG + AA): Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica and Panama.
General State budget (public sector minus social security, PFE, NFPE and autonomous and decentralized governments: 
Ecuador (the 2008 Constitution establishes the general State budget as the instrument for determining and managing State 
revenues and expenditures), Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
Budgetary central government: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
Budgetary public sector: Mexico,
where: AA: agencies with budgetary autonomy; BCG: budgetary central government; CG: central government; LG: local 
government; NFPE: non-financial public enterprises; PFE: public financial enterprises.
Considering that a number of countries 
only very recently adopted the classification 
system of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Government Finance Statistics Manual 
2001, which is harmonized with the 1993 
System of National Accounts (SNA), the 
1990-2010 series is not always compatible 
at the subfunctions or subgroups level, or 
both. Most of the countries publish the 
functional classification in aggregated form 
and use classifications of their own.
Data continuity problems brought about 
by the switch include a lack of information 
for the full series or for certain years or 
functions (or both) in particular cases. For 
example, there are no comparable data for 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia between 
1990 and 1994, and up-to-date figures on 
NFPS are missing after 2008; the series for 
El Salvador begins in 1993 and there is a 
change of methodology and coverage as of 
2004, which means that data after that year 
are not strictly comparable with those from 
previous years. The series for Ecuador refers 
to central government until 2007 and to the 
general State budget from 2008, and does 
not include figures on social security (social 
protection function); this is also the case with 
the series for Nicaragua. In Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago it was not possible to 
construct the full series from 1997 to 1999 
as data on intermediate periods were lacking. 
For Colombia, a methodological change and a 
switch in the basis for calculating GDP mean 
that the series is not comparable between 
1990- 1999 and 2000-2009. In Peru, whereas 
the 1990-1999 series covers budgetary 
central government, the series for 2000 
onward is for general government. Lastly, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has series 
for agreed public spending (budget act and 
amendments as of 31 December each year) 
and for disbursed public spending, the latter 
beginning in 1999. The institutional coverage 
of the country’s figures is budgetary central 
government. Because it is a federal country, 
the published figures may underestimate total 
social spending by more than those of other 
countries reporting this coverage. Similarly, 
the figures for Mexico relate to programmable 
spending of the budgetary public sector from 
the National Public Finance Account; what is 
known about highly decentralized spending 
execution in that country indicates that the 
figures should be read more carefully than in 
other cases because social spending execution 
may be substantially underestimated. (ECLAC 
(2002) gives examples of centralized and 
decentralized execution of social spending.)
Like previous editions, Social Panorama 
of Latin America 2011 uses biennial averages 
to present social spending data. The 
indicators published are for total public social 
spending and its component functions and 
sectors (education, health, social security 
and assistance, and housing, sanitation 
and other functions not included in the 
above categories) as a percentage of GDP, 
in dollars per capita, and as a percentage 
of total public spending. In the case of this 
last indicator, official information from the 
countries is used, but these figures may differ 
from those based on other systems (such 
as economic or administrative classification 
of spending) because some include interest 
payments on the public debt and others do 
not, and because different methodologies 
are used to classify disbursements.
In contrast with the practice in previous 
years, this edition includes the change 
made by ECLAC in the base year for GDP 
in constant dollars. Henceforth, all social 
spending calculations in constant dollars 
will be expressed at 2005 prices.
The figures used to calculate percentages 
are in current prices for each year and each 
country. These proportions are then applied 
to the GDP series in dollars at 2005 prices to 
obtain per capita social spending, expressed 
in dollars. This may result in certain variations 
in relation to the data in constant currency 
reported by the countries, which depend on 
the degree of exchange-rate appreciation or 
depreciation implicit in the official parity of 
each country’s currency in relation to 2005, 
and also on the population data on which the 
per capita calculations are based.
Figures at current prices on overall and 
social public spending (and the sectoral 
breakdown of the latter) are official data 
provided by the corresponding government 
bodies. Depending on the country, these may 
be directorates, departments, sections or 
units for planning, budgeting or social policy 
within the ministries of the treasury, finance 
or the economy. In addition, information on 
budgetary execution was obtained from 
the countries’ general accounting offices 
or treasury departments, and occasionally 
from central banks, national statistical 
institutes, and national social and economic 
information systems.
The figures for constant 2005 dollar GDP 
are official ECLAC statistics; the population 
figures come from projections by the Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Figure V.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-1991 TO 2008-2009 a
(Percentages of GDP and in 2005 dollars per capita)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a  NFPS = non-financial public sector; PS = public sector; GG = general government; BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government




























































































































SPP NFPS PS PGE GG BCG CG 
1990-1991 1994-1995 1998-1999
2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009
1990-1991: 459 dollars of 2005
2008-2009: 981 dollars of 2005981
459
Weighted averages:
2008-2009         981
2006-2007         853
2004-2005         740
1998 -1999         655
1994 -1995         581
1990 -1991         459
Simple average:
2008-2009           748
2006-2007           616
2004-2005           526
1998 -1999           438
1994 -1995           375
1990 -1991           315
































































































































SPP NFPS PS PGE GG BCG CG
1990-1991 1994-1995 1998-1999
2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009
1990-1991: 11.3 as % of GDP
2008-2009: 17.9 as % of GDP
Weighted averages: 
2008-2009       17.9
2006-2007       16.1
2004-2005       15.2
1998-1999       14.5
1994-1995       13.5
1990-1991       11.3         
Simple average: 
2008-2009        15.2
2006-2007        13.5
2004-2005        12.8
1998-1999        11.6
1994-1995        10.8
1990-1991          9.3
11.3
17.9
2.  Sector patterns in social spending
There have been increases in all major items of social 
spending, which have thus felt to a greater or lesser extent 
the procyclical variations associated with the performance 
of the region’s economies. Even so, this growth has been 
uneven: social security and social welfare are the categories 
that have grown the most (by 3.5 percentage points of 
GDP), accounting for more than half of the overall rise in 
social public spending. This is due, in part, to the boom in 
antipoverty policies, and especially in conditional transfer 
programmes. But an ageing population and government 
commitments to finance and pay retirement allowances 
and pensions, as well as the improvement in social security 
systems in various countries of the region, including a 
strengthening of their non-contributory components, 
have fostered greater growth in this sector than in others 
(see figure V.4).
The second-highest spending increase was recorded 
in education, consistent with the various international 
commitments that countries of the region have signed on 
to. The share of education spending in GDP climbed by 
just over 50%. But this significant increase in resources 
has not been immune to volatility since the education 
sector, together with the health sector, usually bears the 
brunt of fiscal adjustments, especially in the form of 
capital expenditure cuts and current expenditure freezes, 
the latter chiefly through the public-sector wage bill. 
Spending on social security and welfare, together with 
education, represented 80% of the total increase in social 
spending between the periods 1990-1991 and 2008-2009.
Figure V.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL 








































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a  Increase in spending between the periods 1990-1991 and 2008-2009 in percentage 
points.
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Among the sectors that can be identified across all 
countries considered, the public health budget has shown 
little growth in the past two decades. This has to do partly 
with the trend in several countries towards expansion of 
private-sector delivery of health services in the framework 
of reforms introduced following the structural adjustment of 
the 1980s. But it also reflects the fact that health spending is 
highly procyclical and has a significant capital expenditure 
component that is heavily penalized during economic 
downswings or periods of flat growth (ECLAC, 2008). 
Lastly, housing and other social expenditure (notably, 
water and sanitation) show the least public spending 
growth owing in part to the progressive privatization of 
investments in sanitation infrastructure and the tendering out 
of building contracts for social housing schemes in which 
public financing is combined with private (by households, 
through easier access to mortgage facilities).
Yet the importance of sectors varies among countries, 
as does the trend in spending in each of these items. For 
example, a grouping of countries by levels of their present 
per capita social spending reveals significant differences 
(see figure V.5).
Figure V.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING PER CAPITA, BY SECTORS  
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES,a 1990 TO 2009
(Dollars at constant 2005 prices)
B. El Salvador, Jamaica, Peru and Dominican RepublicA. Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, Guatemala, 










D. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay
C. Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
























































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a  Simple averages of expenditure data for individual countries.
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The first group, comprising Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, where current spending is below US$ 300 per 
capita (see figure V.5.A), focus the bulk of their social 
spending on education, which has also seen the greatest 
growth in absolute terms (from US$ 34 to US$ 96 per 
capita over the period). The remaining expenditure items 
show more modest per capita levels, although there has 
been a relatively greater increase in social security and 
welfare (up 8% per year throughout the period, to a level 
of US$ 42 per capita).
A second group, comprising countries that today 
devote between US$ 300 and US$ 500 per capita to 
the social sectors (El Salvador, Jamaica, Peru and 
Dominican Republic) show a similar trend: the greatest 
spending is in the education sector (currently US$ 152 
per capita), but spending on social security and welfare 
has been rising faster (9.4% per year), to a level of 
US$ 93 per capita. These last expenditure items have 
been approaching the level of health spending, which at 
the beginning of the 1990s was relatively more important 
(see figure V.5.B).
In the third group of countries (Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), where 
spending fluctuates between US$ 500 and US$ 900 per 
capita, while education still receives the lion’s share, 
spending on social security and welfare has also risen 
notably (by 8.5% a year, compared with 3.7% a year for 
education), to a level of US$ 229 per capita, just slightly 
below the US$ 252 earmarked for education (see figure 
V.5.C). In all these countries, the health sector has recorded 
the least growth (2.9% a year).
Lastly, the fourth group, comprising countries where 
per capita spending exceeds US$ 1000 (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay) 
reveals a different trend: spending on social security and 
welfare is by far the biggest item, and in 2008-2009 it was 
nearly double the level of spending on education (US$ 351 
per capita in 2009), the second most important item. Despite 
this, its rate of growth has been notably lower than that in 
the other groups of countries (3.6% per year), and less than 
growth in the health sector (4.6% per year), which however 
received less than half its funding per capita (US$ 322 in 
comparison with US$ 629 for social security and welfare).
3.  The procyclical nature of social spending relative  
to economic growth
Although the region’s countries have steadily increased 
their government budgets, particularly where social 
spending is concerned, in most cases these have 
fluctuated for reasons generally determined by local 
economic developments. 
Although budgeting tied to the economic cycle 
generally reflects responsible fiscal management, it can 
sometimes impair economic and social development 
processes that depend on a stable flow of resources. 
This is because many of the processes involved in the 
production of public services entail a large proportion of 
recurrent expenditure deriving from legal or contractual 
commitments, such as wages and retirement and other 
pensions. Budgetary fluctuations can sometimes 
affect pay levels and continuity for the personnel 
required to maintain public services. In other cases the 
non-discretionary nature of some public spending results 
in drastic cuts to investment (for example, in building, 
maintaining, renovating and equipping public facilities 
such as schools and hospitals). 
Prudential fiscal management is a key element in 
long-term economic development, but the over-adjustments 
which commonly occur in public and social expenditure 
during economic downswings dampen those very processes 
that prudent fiscal management seeks to safeguard. As a 
rule, cuts in social public spending outnumber episodes 
of falling growth in the region: between 1991 and 2009, 
there were 48 instances of absolute reductions in social 
public spending in the various countries and in 88% of 
these cases (42), the cut exceeded the decline in GDP, 
with some occurring even during periods when GDP 
continued to expand.
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Notwithstanding this, social spending is less sensitive 
to the economic cycle than the overall budget, as figure 
V.6 shows. For all its procyclicality, then, social spending 
has been better protected against economic fluctuations 
than non-social budget items.
Once again, there are outliers in the region. While GDP 
and social spending are highly correlated in countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Panama and Uruguay, in others such as Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago social spending 
is fairly independent of growth. However, this means not 
only that the social services budget is protected during 
economic downturns, but also that any budget growth can 
far outpace (or be outpaced by) upswings in the economy 
(ECLAC 2010a). 
Lastly, evaluation criteria based on how closely the 
budget tracks economic growth cycles provide only a 
general guide: the fact that social spending may not be 
highly procyclical does not mean that the social area 
is neglected. In most cases, spending has effectively 
expanded. Inertial social spending may be insensitive 
to economic downturns, but it will not be sensitive to 
economic expansion either, and wholly countercyclical 
social spending is not desirable because it would fall just 
when the economy was growing. Of course, it is to be 
expected that some specific spending items will indeed 
be countercyclical, like those which finance emergency 
programmes at times of crisis and rising poverty and 
tail off in periods of economic growth. Others may 
prove more stable because they involve regular payment 
commitments, as is the case with social security. Still others 
can be expected to expand along with the economy to a 
reasonable degree that does not trigger macroeconomic 
imbalances or a tendency towards deficit spending. 
Clearly, social public spending should be asymmetrical 
in terms of its countercyclical nature: it should be more 
procyclical at times of prosperity, with expenditure 
increasing so as to generalize the exercise of social rights 
(with due regard to the long-term sustainability of its 
financing), and much more countercyclical at times of 
economic downturn.
Figure V.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL 
CHANGE IN TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING, NON-SOCIAL PUBLIC 
SPENDING, SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING AND GDP, 1991-2010 a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a  Weighed averages. The spending figures for 2010 are estimates on the basis of data 
from 10 countries.
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The region’s countries adopted a broad range of measures 
in the face of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Unlike 
action taken on similar occasions (such as the crises of the 
1980s and 1990s), these measures set out not to shrink 
spending but to expand it, at least temporarily (see figure 
V.6). Measures of this kind encompassed monetary and 
financial policy, fiscal policy, exchange-rate and foreign 
trade policy, sectoral policies, employment and social 
policies and multilateral financing (ECLAC, 2010a).
The various economic policy measures taken can be 
divided, broadly, into those designed to restore confidence 
and get financial markets operating again, and those 
intended to boost flagging aggregate demand and create 
employment. Initially, central banks took a series of steps 
of various kinds to guarantee adequate liquidity in local 
financial markets. The generalized fall in the inflation 
rate, reflecting lower food and energy prices, allowed 
for more flexible monetary policy, both in countries that 
observe explicit inflation targets and in those that follow 
some monetary aggregate or other operational criterion. 
The cuts in benchmark interest rates were accompanied 
by the easing of liquidity requirements and stepped-up 
monetary expansion, especially in domestic credit, at a 
time when reserve assets were falling, a situation that 
reversed itself over the course of 2009.
However, the low degree of monetization and the 
thinness of the region’s financial markets, as well as the 
uncertainty that characterized financial activity from 
the end of 2008 and through much of 2009, limited the 
impact of these measures on activity levels. In some 
cases, governments attempted to offset the weak supply 
of financing by having the public banking system play an 
active role. The effectiveness of that instrument depends 
on the volume of credit in the economy and on the public 
banking system’s share of total credit, meaning that its 
usefulness is confined to a small number of countries.
More generally, and particularly from the first quarter 
of 2009, countries announced and gradually implemented 
a strategy based on increasing the fiscal stimulus in their 
economies. This involved both temporary selective tax 
reductions and higher public spending, the latter focused 
chiefly on current spending, usually in the form of direct 
transfers, and to a lesser extent on capital spending 
(ECLAC 2010c).
Not all the countries expanded their public spending 
in 2009: the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Uruguay all cut back 
on public spending although Dominican Republic was the 
only country to do so significantly (by 10.7% compared 
with 2008). But both this last country and Cuba had seen 
expenditure rise in 2008 by much more than the reduction 
in 2009. Several of the remaining countries, including 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay and 
Peru, stepped up their spending by over 10% in 2008 
and 2009. Brazil, Ecuador and Honduras boosted their 
spending by over 7% (see table V.1).
The rise in fiscal spending occurred mainly in social 
sectors, however, except in Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico 
and Paraguay, where non-social spending rose faster. In 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Uruguay, 
the spending cuts fell mainly upon non-social items, 
which favoured a sharp expansion in social spending. 
Jamaica reduced all types of spending, with the most 
significant cuts in social spending. Dominican Republic 
also compressed its expenditures, with the sharpest cuts 
in non-social areas. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Panama increased their total public spending even 
while cutting social spending and in the remaining 
countries, social expenditures grew more slowly than 
other spending items.
The most commonly used fiscal measures included 
cutting taxes, increasing tax benefits and subsidies and 
raising or bringing forward expenditure. In the social and 
production sectors, considerable extra resources were put 
into housing, water and sanitation, support for small and 
medium-sized enterprises and the agricultural sector 
(easier credit and repayment terms), enhanced employment 
policies (unemployment insurance, recruitment subsidies, 
job creation programmes) and social programmes, especially 
conditional cash transfer programmes.
Overall, while the region as a whole responded to 
the financial crisis by giving social spending an openly 
countercyclical thrust, even more pronounced than 
non-social spending and consequently than total spending 
(see figure V.6), this conclusion does not always follow 
from an examination of figures for individual countries: 
although total public spending had a countercyclical 
bias, this was primarily due to the considerable growth 
in non-social public spending, often to the detriment of 
social expenditure. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that 
the expansion in non-social public spending had a social 
impact, primarily through employment generation and 
wage increases, which are not counted as social spending.
Lastly, among the 10 countries for which information 
is available for 2010 (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, 
4.  Social spending in the region during the financial crisis
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Paraguay and Peru), public spending appears to have 
been reduced in only four (Chile, Colombia, Cuba and 
Honduras), but continued to expand in the others, although 
to varying degrees: Ecuador saw the biggest increase in 
social spending; Dominican Republic and Peru made the 
biggest increases in non-social spending; Paraguay raised 
both at the same pace, while Mexico, in a context of fiscal 
expansion, reduced its social spending. Of the four countries 
that cut spending in 2010, Chile and Colombia did so by 
reducing social expenditure but expanding non-social 
outlays. In contrast, Honduras did the opposite: it expanded 
social spending slightly and cut non-social spending more 
severely. Cuba shrank both forms of expenditure, although 
social spending was cut to a lesser extent.
Table V.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING, NON-SOCIAL PUBLIC SPENDING  
AND SOCIAL SPENDING, AND ANNUAL RATES OF VARIATION, 2007-2010
(Percentages of GDP and annual rates of variation)
Total public spending Social public spending Non-social public spending
2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
Percentages of GDP
Argentina 36.0 38.3 43.2 … 22.9 24.0 27.8 … 13.1 14.3 15.4 …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 41.9 45.1 45.0 … 17.4 18.4 … … 24.5 26.7 … …
Brazil 33.4 33.7 36.8 … 24.4 24.8 27.1 … 8.9 8.8 9.8 …
Chile 18.7 21.2 24.8 23.5 12.3 14.1 16.7 15.6 6.4 7.1 8.1 7.8
Colombia 17.5 18.1 20.8 19.8 12.7 12.6 14.5 13.6 4.8 5.5 6.3 6.2
Costa Rica 47.4 54.2 57.7 58.5 17.4 19.3 22.4 22.9 30.0 34.9 35.3 35.5
Cuba 68.2 78.1 75.6 70.0 36.9 40.7 40.7 38.2 31.3 37.5 34.9 31.8
Ecuador … 33.1 36.2 37.4 8.8 7.3 9.4 9.8 … 25.8 26.9 27.6
El Salvador 25.2 26.5 33.1 … 11.3 12.3 13.0 … 13.9 14.2 20.0 …
Guatemala 14.3 13.6 14.2 … 7.2 7.0 8.1 … 7.1 6.6 6.1 …
Honduras 18.8 22.2 24.3 23.2 10.2 10.7 12.2 12.0 8.6 11.5 12.1 11.2
Jamaica 42.6 49.9 50.9 … 9.0 10.7 10.7 … 33.6 39.1 40.2 …
Mexico 16.9 18.3 20.7 20.2 9.6 10.0 11.2 11.3 7.4 8.3 9.5 8.9
Nicaragua 22.8 22.8 23.6 … 11.8 12.3 13.0 … 11.0 10.6 10.6 …
Panama 19.4 20.3 20.6 … 9.3 9.3 10.5 … 10.1 11.0 10.0 …
Paraguay 18.6 16.3 21.6 21.6 9.2 8.4 11.0 11.0 9.4 7.9 10.6 10.6
Peru 17.6 18.7 20.8 21.5 8.8 8.7 10.0 10.0 8.7 10.0 10.8 11.6
Dominican Republic 17.7 19.7 17.0 16.4 8.0 8.6 7.7 7.3 9.6 11.2 9.3 9.2
Trinidad and Tobago 27.4 35.1 … … 8.9 12.1 … … 18.5 23.0 … …
Uruguay 30.8 28.7 28.0 … 22.0 21.7 23.3 … 8.8 7.1 4.6 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) a 26.4 26.9 27.5 … 12.0 11.7 13.2 … 14.3 15.2 14.4 …
Latin America and the Caribbean 26.0 27.4 30.2 … 16.4 17.0 18.9 … 9.6 10.5 11.3 …
Annual rates of variation (base: constant dollars at 2005 prices)
Argentina 19.9 13.5 13.7 … 19.5 11.9 16.8 … 20.8 16.4 8.5 …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 26.5 14.4 2.9 … 7.8 12.5 … … 44.3 15.8 … …
Brazil 9.8 6.2 8.7 … 9.1 7.0 8.3 … 11.8 4.0 9.7 …
Chile 8.1 17.3 15.3 -0.6 7.0 18.5 16.6 -1.7 10.3 15.1 12.8 1.6
Colombia 10.0 7.1 16.4 -0.6 12.8 2.8 16.4 -1.7 3.5 18.3 16.3 2.0
Costa Rica 6.5 17.5 5.1 5.5 11.0 14.0 14.7 6.4 4.0 19.5 -0.2 4.9
Cuba 15.8 19.2 -1.9 -5.5 23.6 14.7 1.5 -4.3 7.8 24.5 -5.6 -6.9
Ecuador … … 9.8 7.0 … … 28.5 9.0 … … 4.5 6.4
El Salvador -4.2 6.3 20.9 … -4.5 10.0 2.4 … -3.9 3.2 37.1 …
Guatemala 3.5 -1.3 4.7 … -1.2 0.0 15.9 … 8.8 -2.7 -7.0 …
Honduras 9.1 23.1 7.0 -1.9 12.0 9.2 11.6 1.3 5.8 39.6 2.7 -5.1
Jamaica -8.7 16.5 -1.1 … -7.5 19.3 -3.7 … -9.1 15.7 -0.3 …
Mexico 8.3 9.8 6.2 2.8 3.7 5.9 5.6 6.0 14.9 14.9 7.0 -1.0
Nicaragua 2.7 2.9 2.0 … 8.6 7.2 4.3 … -3.0 -1.7 -0.7 …
Panama 9.6 15.0 4.8 … 15.0 10.0 17.1 … 5.0 19.6 -5.6 …
Paraguay -1.5 -7.1 27.8 15.0 5.6 -3.1 26.0 15.0 -7.5 -11.1 29.6 15.0
Peru 4.5 16.9 12.1 12.4 7.8 8.4 15.9 8.1 1.3 25.6 8.8 16.4
Dominican Republic 20.3 17.5 -10.7 4.1 10.5 12.1 -6.5 1.3 29.8 22.1 -14.0 6.4
Trinidad and Tobago -10.3 31.0 … … 10.5 39.0 … … -17.7 27.2 … …
Uruguay 2.9 1.2 -0.1 … 15.5 7.0 10.5 … -19.0 -13.1 -32.7 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) a -6.7 6.2 -0.8 … -3.2 1.3 8.9 … -9.4 10.3 -8.3 …
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.4 14.3 3.5 … 9.3 7.7 9.3 … 0.3 23.8 -3.6 …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a  Figures for 2009 are estimated on the basis of information on social outlays.
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C.  Social security in the region and prospects  
for establishing a universal floor for pension  
and retirement benefits
The labour market has not shown sufficient capacity to collect resources through social 
contributions in the amount needed to introduce non-contributory components in social 
protection systems. These problems were intensified by the reforms that fragmented social 
security systems and privatized management of their funds in many countries. Given the need 
to develop rights-based social protection systems that are funded through contributory and 
non-contributory mechanisms and have a redistributive element, there is a clear need over 
the medium term, and especially over the long term, to reform many of the social security 
systems both in terms of their structure and of their parameters, and to reinforce participation 
in increasingly formalized labour markets. Otherwise, over the longer term, there will be 
mounting difficulties in financing universal social protection in societies that are ageing and 
where the workforce is becoming proportionately smaller.
One of the ongoing challenges for countries of the region 
is to generate positive synergies between economic growth 
and social equity. This challenge arises in the context of 
modernization of the productive apparatus, which is aimed 
at enhancing human capacities, productive employment 
and citizen participation.
Within this framework, social policy has a fundamental 
role to play, but social protection systems must shift their 
focus in light of the new global order and its impact on 
national societies. In this regard, it must be recognized 
that the labour market has not been able to promote 
inclusiveness either by creating decent job opportunities 
or by increasing social security contributions. The region’s 
labour markets have not succeeded in transforming 
themselves into a universal and dynamic gateway to 
social protection systems (ECLAC, 2006).
Consequently, social protection can no longer be 
restricted to contributory mechanisms mediated by the 
labour market. In addition to seeking ways to improve the 
capacity of domestic economies to generate decent jobs and 
extend the tax base, countries will have to guarantee adequate 
and stable financing to supplement employment-based 
protection with non-contributory protection mechanisms. 
The great challenge, then, is to rethink the redistributive 
dimension of social protection in a more integrated way 
—i.e., both within and beyond the world of work— in 
order to develop systems that combine contributory and 
non-contributory mechanisms. Hence the importance of 
promoting non-contributory social protection mechanisms, 
which today are generally limited by fiscal constraints, 
meaning that in practice broad sectors of the population 
are excluded from formal protection systems.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the resources 
derived from contributory mechanisms are important 
for financing social protection, and in particular social 
security benefits. This calls for consideration of the 
possibilities and the constraints of those mechanisms 
for incorporating redistributive components into social 
protection for the elderly, with particular attention to the 
recent ECLAC proposal of a minimum universal pension 
(ECLAC, 2010d). Naturally, this margin of funding 
that could be devoted to non-contributory financing 
of social security will depend to a large extent on the 
current schemes for financing security systems and any 
needed reforms to them. As well, part of the additional 
resources that could be collected through a stronger 
labour market can be earmarked to other non-contributory 
components of social protection, for example by devoting 
a portion of contributions to childhood in the name of 
intergenerational solidarity.
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The following pages examine the current and 
potential capacities for contributory financing of social 
security. This is compared with the total volume of 
retirement and pension transfers and the challenges of 
financing a basic universal old-age pension. The section 
examines countries’ possibilities to finance a universal 
social protection system for the elderly that combines 
contributory and non-contributory components through 
the labour market. This could also expand the volume of 
resources derived from other financing sources in order 
to build a social protection system that will cover other 
segments of the population.
1. Social security systems in the region
During the 1990s and the first decade of this century, 
countries of the region instituted structural and parametric 
reforms in pensions and health systems. The structural 
reforms have closed public systems (or social insurance 
systems) or have transformed them in fundamental ways, 
making them either wholly or to a large extent private. 
The parametric (non-structural) reforms have tended to 
strengthen public systems over the long term, regulating 
them, boosting contributions, improving efficiency, 
controlling costs and, in the case of pensions, raising 
the retirement age, restricting the calculation formula, 
or doing both.
In Latin America, 10 countries that had pension 
systems characterized by defined benefits and undefined 
contributions, a pay-as-you-go financing regime or 
partial collective capitalization and public administration 
have replaced those systems by one that entails defined 
contributions, undefined benefits (determined by the 
amount of salary, contributions paid in, earnings on 
investment and macroeconomic variables), a fully 
capitalized financing regime with individual accounts, 
and private management.
Those reforms have been tailored according to at least 
three models: (i) the substitution model, found in Chile 
(which pioneered it in 1981), Dominican Republic (not 
completed), El Salvador, Mexico and Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, “closes” the public system (no new members 
allowed) and replaces it by a private one; (ii) the parallel 
system (Colombia and Peru) does not close the public 
system, but reforms its parameters, creates a new private 
system, and puts them in competition; (iii) the mixed 
model, introduced in Argentina (where it was converted 
to a public system in 2008), Costa Rica, Panama (since 
2008) and Uruguay, combines a public programme, which 
is not closed and offers a basic pension (first pillar) with 
a private programme that offers a supplementary pension 
(second pillar).
In 2008, Chile introduced a comprehensive new reform 
that added a greater element of social solidarity to the 
private system, while Argentina closed the private system 
and transferred all its members and funds to the public 
system; Plurinational State of Bolivia is examining a new 
reform, and Dominican Republic allowed persons who 
had migrated to the private system to return to the public 
system. The remaining 10 Latin American countries still 
have entirely public systems, and several (most recently 
Brazil and Cuba) have introduced parametric reforms. 
Countries of the English-speaking Caribbean also have 
public systems and have not made any structural reforms 
(Mesa-Lago, 2009).
2.  Current levels of social security enrolment and coverage  
of social security benefits and pensions
The levels of enrolment in social security among the 
working population showed a sharp drop during the 1990s, 
due not only to the reforms of social security systems 
but also, and more importantly, to labour market reforms 
that were intended to bring greater hiring flexibility and 
that in most countries had the effect of making jobs more 
precarious, particularly with respect to social benefits. The 
first decade of the 21st century, however, has witnessed 
a slight increase in the weight of the formal sector of the 
economy and in social security enrolment (ECLAC, 2008). 
Currently, less than 44% of the working population up to 
64 years of age is enrolled in social security1 (with a simple 
average among countries of 39%), a figure that represents 
1 This does not necessarily mean that they have contributory continuity 
and, over the long run, the years of contributions required by law.
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around 91 million workers (projected that nearly 102 
million for 2012). Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have 
relatively high enrolment rates (about 60%); at the other 
extreme, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Plurinational State of Bolivia have rates of 20% or less.
On the other hand, a relatively significant proportion 
of persons over the normal retirement age (65 years) are 
still working and paying social contributions: around 15% 
of older workers (or some 1.5 million people) are still 
enrolled in and contributing to social security. The fact 
that people are still contributing at post-retirement age 
reflects in many cases a need to keep working in order to 
maintain living standards, for which the social benefits 
to which they are entitled would be clearly inadequate 
(see figure V.7).
Figure V.7 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL SECURITY 
ENROLMENT RATES OF WORKING PERSONS 15 TO 64  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Averages do not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, as the survey for that 
country does not distinguish retirement and pension benefits from other transfers. The 
figure for Argentina refers to urban areas.
Regionwide, 62% of older persons are receiving 
some form of pension or retirement benefit (23.5 million 
persons projected for 2012). Coverage is particularly 
high in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, with Costa 
Rica slightly behind. On the other hand, in Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Plurinational State of Bolivia fewer than 
20% of older adults have social security and pension 
coverage (see figure V.8).
As would be expected, there is a high correlation 
between levels of social security enrolment and coverage 
among older persons, as can be appreciated from figure 
V.9. Yet as noted earlier, some older persons continue to 
work and to be enrolled in social security, reflecting the 
inadequate benefits to which they would be entitled (in 
addition to older persons who are supplementing their 
retirement benefits or pensions through work), which, 
other things being equal, would imply lower coverage than 
the enrolment rates observed, as is the case in Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras. 
On the other hand, in countries with broader coverage 
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile), non-contributory pensions 
are more prevalent: in other words, they have more highly 
developed old-age protection, expressed in greater levels 
of coverage for a given degree of enrolment
Figure V.8 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): COVERAGE OF PENSIONS AND 
































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Data for Argentina refer to urban areas only.
Figure V.9 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): RATIO OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
ENROLMENT LEVELS FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS AND 
RETIREMENT BENEFIT AND PENSION COVERAGE AMONG  





















































Percentage of workers enrolled
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  Data for Argentina refer to urban areas only.
b  Pearson’s correlation coefficient squared.
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3.  Current social contribution levels (regardless of system) and 
total funding earmarked for pensions and retirement benefits
In the current decade, the thrust of government policies 
reveals a greater public commitment to protecting against 
events that involve loss of household income and combating 
income poverty and exclusion. That thrust also reflects the 
notion of equal rights and not only of equal opportunities, 
for it is by virtue of rights, given their universality, that 
societies can move from a targeted approach to a more 
universalist one, and from models focused on individual 
capitalization to systems that explicitly include mechanisms 
of solidarity for those who cannot finance their own 
well-being. These new outlooks, then, seek to combine the 
fight against poverty with the fight against inequality and 
the promotion of social cohesion. They strive to achieve 
this through an array of social programmes designed to 
articulate the achievements of traditional social security 
with the provision of social services, and the range of 
welfare programmes. In this sense, the “solidarity” 
(redistributive or non-contributory) pillar has now gained 
recognition in debates and on the public agenda is a key 
feature of social protection systems.
There is a clear meaning to this debate. Resources 
collected through public contributory systems fall far short 
of public spending on social security. When spending 
associated with other social welfare programmes is 
added in, public financing through social contributions 
is clearly in deficit, which means drawing upon general 
government revenues (see figure V.10). The few exceptions 
to this rule occur precisely in countries where a lower 
proportion of older persons are receiving pensions and 
retirement benefits.
Moreover, an examination of government revenue 
and expenditure as a whole shows that most countries 
of the region are facing great funding constraints and, 
indeed, fiscal deficits in implementing their overall 
budgets, and this reduces still further the prospect for 
boosting social welfare financing through non-contributory 
mechanisms (ECLAC, 2011). Given these constraints, any 
significant increase in the volume of funding earmarked 
for non-contributory social protection will require a 
restructuring of government spending or an increase in 
the tax burden. One way to achieve that increase is to 
strengthen and formalize the labour market, which would 
yield greater proceeds from social contributions and from 
direct and indirect taxes. In many countries, this would 
mean a significant overhaul of social security systems, 
which today are to a large extent privatized and which, 
although they allow the introduction of redistributive 
components for the most vulnerable population, make it 
very difficult to earmark funds for other non-contributory 
social protection programmes.
Figure V.10 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): REVENUES FROM SOCIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND PUBLIC SPENDING ON SOCIAL SECURITY 





















































































































































Revenues from social contributions
Social security and welfare spending
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures from the countries.
a  Institutional coverage of public revenues from social contributions is: general government 
for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba and Ecuador. In other 
cases, central government.  Social security accounts for around 80%-85% of total public 
spending on security and welfare. The institutional coverage is: central government in 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (actual outlays), Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay (consolidated); budgetary 
central government in Honduras and Paraguay; general government in Argentina, El 
Salvador and Peru; budgetary public sector in Mexico; non-financial public sector in 
Brazil and Plurinational State of Bolivia; public sector in Costa Rica. Countries are listed 
by decreasing deficit level. No information is available on social security spending in 
Nicaragua.
4.  Potential revenues from social contributions
In most countries public, mixed and private systems coexist. 
Generally speaking, the funds collected are managed by 
one or more autonomous public agencies or by private 
organizations: these bodies provide the various benefits 
defined by law (although the law does not necessarily 
stipulate the amount of the benefit), they invest the assets 
in fixed or variable income instruments, and they are 
paid a management fee. Depending on the country, the 
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worker will be responsible for paying the contributions, 
and this responsibility may be shared by the employer 
and, to a lesser extent, the state. These contributions are 
earmarked for one or several funds or agencies, depending 
on the country, that provide different types of specific 
benefits. A portion of the contribution may be earmarked 
for “solidarity” purposes, particularly in countries where 
the State also contributes.
The potential funds available for financing all social 
security benefits and pensions can be approximately 
estimated on the basis of workers basic taxable income. 
For analytical purposes, the estimate was based on the 
parameters and makeup of the contribution applied in 
each country, and did not include contributions for health 
coverage (see box V.2). This estimate of contributory 
capacity refers only to potential and not actual revenue 
flows, recognizing the variability of unemployment and 
the contribution gaps this may generate, as well as the 
fact that firms and workers will not always make their 
mandatory and voluntary contributions. Consequently, 
the calculation of available contributory resources does 
not claim to be accurate, but rather to establish orders of 
magnitude that can serve as a benchmark for comparisons 
between countries and across time.
Box V.2 
PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING AND PROJECTING THE TOTAL VOLUME OF POTENTIAL SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS  
ON THE BASIS OF HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
Estimates and projections of the potential volume 
of collectible funds in the social security area 
(social contributions) included in this chapter 
were obtained using information received from 
each country on social security and health 
contributions. In particular, these data relate 
to contributions that by law must be paid by 
each worker affiliated with social security and 
health systems, as shown in the following table:
WORKERS’ SOCIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH CONTRIBUTIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHER AGENTS
(Percentages of gross remuneration)
Country Factor for obtaining taxable remuneration
Contribution of each agent as a percentage 
of the worker’s taxable remuneration Sum of  
contributions
Worker Employer State
Percentage of gross remuneration
Argentina 17 11 16 0 27
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 12.21 10 1.71 0 11.71
Brazil 8 8 20 0 28
Chile 17 10 0 0 10
Colombia 7.875 3.875 11.625 0 15.5
Costa Rica 8 2.5 4.75 0.25 7.5
Dominican Republic 5.91 2.87 7.1 0 9.97
Ecuador 8.64 6.64 3.1 0 9.74
El Salvador 6.25 3.25 6.75 0 10
Guatemala 4.83 1.83 3.67 0 5.5
Honduras 3.5 1 2 1 4
Mexico 3.84 1.125 5.15 0.1125 6.3875
Nicaragua 6.25 4 7 0 11
Panama 9 8.5 4.5 0.8 13.8
Paraguay 9 9 14 0 23
Peru 14 10 0 0 10
Uruguay 18 15 7.5 0 22.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4.22 1.93 4.82 0 6.75
Simple average (excludes 
contributions equal to zero)
9.1 6.1 7.5 0.5 12.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information provided by the respective countries and Social 
Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World: The Americas, 2007,  No. 13-11804, Washington, D.C., March  2008.
As a rule, household surveys record 
workers’ net remuneration; for this reason, 
an estimate was made of gross remuneration 
for employed persons who declared that 
they were enrolled in social security and 
health systems, using the following formula:
where Yb is taxable remuneration, Yn is net 
remuneration reported in each household 
survey, and F is the factor corresponding 
to the percentage withholdings for the 
worker (column 1 of the table). F consists 
of the Social Security withholding (column 
2) and the health withholding (column 1 
minus column 2).
Next, the Social Security percentages 
of withholding or payment for each agent 
(worker, employer, state) were applied as 
a function of that taxable remuneration, 
and were analysed and expressed in 
2005 dollars:
 
( )( )1001 F
YY nb −
=
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Box V.2 (concluded)
where Vi is the amount of contribution Ai 
of agent i (columns 2, 3 and 4 of the table) 
obtained from the taxable remuneration of 
each affiliated worker, expressed in 2005 
dollars. IPCref  is the value of the consumer 
price index for the survey reference period, 
IPC2005 is the average CPI for the year 
2005 and TC2005 is the average exchange 
rate for the year 2005 (series rf). The sum 
of all potentially collectible resources was 
expressed in 2005 dollars in order to state it 
as a percentage of GDP in that currency. This 
percentage was projected in accordance with 
the latest available estimates from ECLAC and 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit (www.
eiu.org), updated to the end of September 
2011, which provides projections to 2015. 
From there out to 2030, average estimated 
growth between 2010 and 2015 was used 
as the GDP projection factor.
It must be noted that the estimated 
collectible resources are only potential, 
as the surveys provide no information on 
the continuity of workers’ payments over 
the year, episodes of unemployment, and 
the effective contribution to social security 
systems. Moreover, allowance must be made 
for the practice, common with household 
surveys, of underreporting income, particularly 
the earnings of independent workers, who 
as voluntary affiliates are more likely not to 
make their contributions.
On the other hand, where there are 
various social security subsystems or laws 
that differentiate among types of workers 
or levels of remuneration, the parameters 
of the general regimes or the contribution 
percentages of the largest group of affiliated 
workers were used.
In making the projections, the 
percentage of affiliated workers was kept 
constant, as were the employment rates 
(with the only variant being the number 
of workers). Social security payments 
were projected while keeping constant 
the percentage of persons over 65 with 
retirement or pension coverage (with the only 
variant being the number of older persons). 
Taxable remuneration, contributions and 
pension payments were projected using a 
real growth rate equivalent to one half the 
projected GDP growth rate.
In light of all these considerations, 
and the fact that countries may have 
a combination of public, private and 
mixed social security systems, and that 
consequently collections are not necessarily 
managed by a single social security fund, 
the figures estimated and projected here are 
only reference values and represent orders 
of magnitude for inter-country comparison 
and for illustrating social security financing 
capacities and needs over time, as well as 
the possible effects of changing the level of 
affiliation or the percentages of contribution, 
among other things. The projections, 
then, do not claim to portray precisely the 
available resources in countries’ social 
security systems.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information provided by the respective countries and Social Security Administration, 
Social Security Programs Throughout the World: The Americas, 2007,  No. 13-11804, Washington, D.C., March  2008.
According to the projections conducted, in 2012 no 
country should encounter a shortfall between the total 
of funds potentially collectible for social security and 
the outlays needed to cover all retirees and pensioners. 
Countries would in fact run a surplus, projected at an 
average of 1.6% of GDP (see figure V.11).
Figure V.11 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PROJECTED TOTAL VOLUME 
OF FUNDS RECEIVABLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PAYMENT 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries; Economist Intelligence Unit  www.eiu.org for official GDP 
and growth projections by country
a  Countries are listed according to the balance between contributions and payments. 
Contributions intended to finance health benefits, in whole or in part, are excluded 
from the total.
Whether or not all or a portion of the additional funds 
will be available depends to a large extent on the design 
of the social security systems which, as discussed earlier, 
are fragmented and at least partially privatized in nearly 
all countries. Yet, assuming that social security systems 
can be reformed and that these resources can be managed 
as a whole, it is clear that most countries would be in a 
position to incorporate or strengthen the redistributive pillar 
in order to offset differences in retirement transfers, extend 
the coverage of such transfers and of non-contributory 
pensions, and even establish a non-contributory pillar 
to supplement financing for other components of the 
social welfare system. Of course, attention will have to 
be paid to securing an adequate return on funds in order 
to ensure their long-term sustainability, given the ageing 
population profile and the imminent disappearance of 
the demographic bonus in many countries of the region.
The medium-term outlook is by no means bleak. 
According to long-term projections, and assuming no 
increase in labour market participation rates, in enrolment 
rates, or in the percentage cover of old-age security, the 
demographic impact of the change in the size of the 
workforce and the number of older persons would still 
leave a surplus of contributory funds in most countries, at 
least until 2030. With the exception of Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico, the long-term projections 
indicate that the annual balance of funds earmarked for 
social security is positive, although it tends to decline 
 ( )( )( ) ( ) 2005200512100 TCIPCIPCAYV refibi ⋅⋅=
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(see table V.2). It is the countries that have relatively 
younger populations but at the same time higher rates 
of poverty and lower levels of relative development that 
will gradually come to enjoy a greater margin of available 
resources, even without considering the cumulative return 
to those funds over the period analysed.
Table V.2 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PROJECTED ANNUAL BALANCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME AND EXPENDITURES,  
2012, 2015, 2020, 2025 AND 2030 a
(Percentages of GDP)
2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 Long-term situation
Argentina 4.7 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 Small surplus
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 Surplus maintained
Brazil 3.6 3.2 2.3 1.4 0.3 Small surplus
Chile 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -1.3 Progressive deficit
Colombia 1.9 1.6 1.0 0.3 -0.4 Progressive deficit
Costa Rica 0.7 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 Progressive deficit
Ecuador 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 Progressive deficit
El Salvador 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 Surplus maintained
Guatemala 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 Surplus maintained
Honduras 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 Surplus maintained
Mexico 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 Progressive deficit
Nicaragua 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 Surplus maintained
Panama 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 Small surplus
Paraguay 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.1 Small surplus
Peru 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 Small surplus
Dominican Republic 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 Small surplus
Uruguay 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 Small surplus
Average 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.5 ...
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries; 
Economist Intelligence Unit  www.eiu.org for official GDP and growth projections by country.
a  Projections are based on the assumption that levels of social security enrolment and coverage recorded in the surveys and the participation rates and contribution parameters remain 
the same, while GDP and numbers of employed and of the older population vary and wages increase in real terms by half the rate of GDP growth.
5.  Establishing a universal minimum old-age pension
Social protection cannot rely exclusively on contributory 
systems linked to the labour market, and this calls for a 
rethinking of redistribution mechanisms (ECLAC, 2006). 
Social security systems have provided only very limited 
coverage for the rural population. Yet an even greater 
constraint has been that imposed by the extensive informality 
in the region’s economies. Given the proportion of women 
among the older population and the fact that few of them 
have pursued careers that would entitle them to retirement 
benefits, pension systems must either recognize the cost 
in employment continuity and quality foregone by those 
who shoulder the burden of unpaid work or they must 
de-link a large share of future pensions from the formal 
labour market.
In the wake of the social security reforms, many 
governments have been attempting to offset the negative 
distributive effects of the reform through new public 
programmes. In particular they have begun to consider 
the most reasonable ways to ensure coverage for those 
who cannot build up the level of contributions required 
by legislation. This implies significant strengthening of 
the non-contributory component and generates fiscal 
pressures.
Following attempts to combine stratified pay-as-you-go 
contributory systems and privately administered individual 
capitalization models, public debate and policies are 
now embracing the option of non-contributory uniform 
pensions, whether universal or targeted (ECLAC, 2006; 
Filgueira and others, 2006; Tanzi, 2008). These systems 
or instruments are intended to guarantee a basic level 
of income that is fiscally sustainable and fairer from 
an intergenerational viewpoint. In Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay (at 
the provincial and national levels) as well as in Mexico 
(Federal District and some states) it has been found that 
a basic guarantee for older persons can be both fiscally 
prudent and socially desirable if subsidies to the better-off 
retirees and pensioners (generally men) are limited.
In a recent document prepared for its thirty-third 
session, entitled Time for equality: closing gaps, opening 
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trails, ECLAC proposes a universal pension for older 
persons, regardless of their income levels and the other 
social services to which they may be entitled. It also 
estimates the cost of a targeted pension for older persons 
in households with per capita incomes that leave them 
vulnerable (incomes equal to 1.8 times the poverty line 
or less in each country).
The annual transfer cost for a minimum universal 
pension equal to the value of the basic-needs basket 
in each country (the national poverty line) varies 
between 0.84% and 2.62% of GDP in 2012 (see 
table V.3). Inter-country differences are due primarily 
to the interaction between the age profile, the individual 
cost of the transfer, and the country’s relative level of 
development. For this reason, the countries that would 
have to devote the most resources as a percentage of 
GDP are the poorest countries of the region (Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Plurinational State of Bolivia), together with the country 
with the oldest population (Uruguay).
Table V.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): OLDER POPULATION AND RATES OF POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY, AROUND 2009,  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF UNIVERSAL AND TARGETED PENSIONS, 2012 a





Cost of universal 
minimum pension
Older persons living in...
Cost of targeted 
minimum pension
Balance between social contributions 
minus retirement allowances 













Percentage of 2012 GDP 
Argentina 10.6 1.53 3.0 11.9 0.08 3.21 4.67
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.8 1.99 51.2 71.0 1.37 -0.48 0.13
Brazil 7.9 1.14 4.9 17.0 0.16 2.45 3.43
Chile 10.8 1.03 5.8 25.3 0.26 -0.61 0.15
Colombia 6.7 1.76 39.7 61.7 1.06 0.11 0.82
Costa Rica 7.2 1.13 19.3 46.9 0.53 -0.43 0.18
Ecuador 8.1 2.60 29.1 56.2 1.34 -2.15 -0.89
El Salvador 7.4 2.08 42.7 72.4 1.50 -1.11 -0.53
Guatemala 4.7 2.27 43.3 68.4 1.51 -1.81 -1.05
Honduras 5.4 1.95 66.6 84.1 1.61 -1.51 -1.17
Mexico 6.7 1.27 26.8 55.1 0.67 -1.28 -0.69
Nicaragua 5.1 2.62 52.5 78.8 2.01 -0.40 0.20
Panama 8.3 0.84 21.9 44.6 0.38 0.36 0.82
Paraguay 7.0 2.38 51.6 77.0 1.86 0.34 0.86
Peru 8.2 1.25 29.1 55.8 0.68 -0.29 0.28
Dominican Republic 7.1 1.32 45.9 65.6 0.85 -0.56 -0.09
Uruguay 14.5 2.29 2.1 13.1 0.74 -0.69 0.86
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 5.5 1.60 20.6 47.0 0.69 … …
Latin America 7.5 1.33 18.3 37.2 0.48 … …
Simple average 7.6 1.73 30.9 52.9 0.96 … …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries; 
Economist Intelligence Unit www.eiu.org for officially GDP and growth projections by country.
a  Pension equivalent to the value of the national poverty line. The targeted pension is for older persons living in households with per capita incomes of 1.8 poverty lines or less. 
b  Includes older persons living in poverty.
Naturally, targeting the transfer at vulnerable older 
persons entails a much lower cost per year, although the 
difference within each country between the cost of a 
universal pension and the cost of a targeted pension will 
depend to a great extent on the incidence of poverty and 
vulnerability in the total population, and particularly among 
older persons. Indeed, it is the relatively less developed 
countries that have the greatest levels of income vulnerability 
among their older population: El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Plurinational State of Bolivia.
An analysis of the annual resources available from 
social security as a source of financing the universal or 
targeted pension in 2012 (last two columns of box V.3) 
shows that, for the universal pension, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Uruguay would need additional funds from 
other sources. On the other hand, for a targeted pension only 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mexico would need additional funds.
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Box V.3 
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING THE COST OF A UNIVERSAL MINIMUM PENSION FOR OLDER PERSONS
The cost of a universal minimum pension for 
persons 65 years and over was first estimated 
for the recent document Time for equality: 
closing gaps, opening trails, presented at 
the thirty-third session of ECLAC. The figures 
shown here have been updated on the basis 
of microdata from household surveys for 
the most recent years, parameterized with 
the most recent national accounts data to 
estimate costs in GDP terms. The model 
allocates an amount equivalent to one 
poverty line to each eligible older person 
(under the universal and targeted transfer 
scenarios) and computes the new household 
income. In this way, besides estimating the 
aggregate transfer, poverty and inequality 
indicators can be re-estimated and the 
impact of the transfer on those indicators 
can be simulated.
The mathematical procedure used is 
fairly simple:
where q represents the eligible population, 
pi represents each person eligible, and B 
represents the benefits stipulated for that 
population. The figure resulting from this 
simulation is multiplied by 12 (annualized 
monthly benefit) and expressed in dollars at 
the exchange rate ER. This amount is divided 
by GDP and multiplied by 100 to express the 
fiscal cost of benefits as a percentage of GDP.
In this chapter, these costs have been 
projected to 2030 taking into account the 
absolute increase in the older population 
and, for the vulnerable older population, 
a reduction in the percentage of persons 
in that situation based on the vulnerability-
growth elasticity observed in the period 
2002-2009, using household surveys and 
growth projections to 2030.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010.
It is important to note that some countries could fall 
into deficit in the payment of contributory retirement 
benefits and pensions (see tables V.2 and V.4). In fact, 
even assuming centralized management of social security 
contributions and a cumulative return over time equal 
to 2% per year on the funds available after payment of 
the respective obligations, under current labour market 
conditions (unemployment, participation rate, informality 
and level of affiliation, among others), Chile would find 
itself in deficit in 2025, Costa Rica in 2028, and Mexico in 
2013, and these countries would have to resort to additional 
financing sources to pay social security obligations.
In the foregoing scenario, with an annual return of 
2%, but with gradual expansion of the universal minimum 
pension to 100% coverage in 2030, more countries would 
at some point fall into a deficit situation: Mexico would 
see a deficit in the short term, while Ecuador would do 
so around 2017, Guatemala and Honduras in 2019, Chile 
in 2020, Costa Rica in 2022, Colombia and El Salvador 
in 2029, and Dominican Republic in 2030. Meanwhile, 
in Panama, Peru and Uruguay the funds available for 
paying pensions would gradually decline to around 3% 
of projected GDP in 2030.
One possible way of addressing the progressive deficit 
that could arise in the countries indicated is to strengthen 





































and independent workers in high productivity sectors. For 
example, if the affiliation rate for these workers (without 
considering the low-productivity sectors) were extended 
to reach full coverage between 2012 and 2020, in the 
latter year the deficit in Chile would drop from 0.7% of 
GDP to 0.02% of GDP, in Ecuador from 3.4% to 2.6% 
of GDP, in Costa Rica from 0.3% to 0.02% of GDP (in 
2022, the first deficit year), in Guatemala from 1.1% to 
0.3% of GDP, in Honduras from 0.6% to 0.2% of GDP, 
and in Mexico from 4.6% to 4.1% (see figure V.12). In 
the remaining countries (Colombia, Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador) the deficit would be virtually eliminated 
with such measures, at least until 2030.
Bearing in mind the need to move gradually in 
establishing a universal pension, whether by progressively 
extending its coverage or increasing the amount, and 
recognizing that pension funds not used up each year 
for these or other expenditures can earn yields on the 
international market, a medium and long-term financing 
and expenditure strategy can be designed to forestall a 
structural deficit in retirement benefit and pension payments 
already committed, making it possible to universalize (or 
generalize) the minimum old-age pension and even to 
finance other non-contributory components of a basic, 
rights-based social welfare system in many countries of 
the region.
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Figure V.12 
LATIN AMERICA (6 COUNTRIES): PROJECTED ACCUMULATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS, 2011-2030 a


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cumulative balance with progressive universalization of the minimum pension
Prior balance with progressive affiliation and contribution by formal employees until 2020
Prior balance with progressive affiliation and contribution by independent workers until 2020
Prior balance with increase in contribution rate to 12% of taxable remuneration
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries; 
Economist Intelligence Unit  www.eiu.org for official GDP and growth projections by country.
a  Assuming an annual return of 2%, after payment of retirement benefits and a progressive minimum pension, extending affiliation to all workers in the formal sector and raising the 
contribution rate.
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One way of securing long-term financing —particularly 
in countries that would face a social security funding 
deficit within the period under review, even if affiliation 
and the systems were strengthened— is to undertake 
some kind of parametric reform, specifically in the 
level of contributions (percentage of gross remuneration 
contributed). In all countries that would fall into deficit 
even if the labour market were strengthened, the legal 
percentage of withholding from taxable remuneration is 
below the regional median (12.8% of gross remuneration): 
in Chile it is 10%, in Costa Rica 7.25%, in Ecuador 9.74%, 
in Guatemala 5.5%, in Honduras 3%, and in Mexico 6.75% 
(with the exception of the Federal District, where the State 
contribution is greater). If these countries were to increase 
the contribution rate to 12%, they would eliminate the 
deficit, or at least postpone it by several years, as can 
be seen in figure V.12 (red line). In countries where the 
amount of withholding is closer to this benchmark (Chile 
and Ecuador), the effect of this change would be to cover 
the projected deficit for a few more years, although other, 
additional financing mechanisms would have to be used 
prior to 2030 for contributory and non-contributory social 
security payments.
In sum, the evidence indicates that several countries 
could begin to run deficits associated with retirement and 
pension benefits, particularly if they introduce a minimum 
pension, even if its coverage were extended only gradually. 
Within the period under review, most countries would have 
no great problem in financing both compulsory social 
security and the minimum pension, and even other social 
welfare programmes, but over a longer time horizon they 
can be expected to encounter difficulties with financing 
from labour market-sourced contributions.
It is absolutely essential, then, to re-think social 
protection on the basis of non-contributory systems, as the 
current functioning of Latin American labour markets —even 
if the great majority of workers were ultimately formalized 
over the medium term— cannot ensure the future of a 
rights-based social protection system exclusively through 
contributions. In the long run, social security systems 
will need to be restructured, and parametric reforms will 
be required, not only to strengthen their redistributive 
aspect but also to incorporate non-contributory financing 
components. This will mean broadening the funding base 
collected by other means. It will require the negotiation of 
new fiscal covenants that will make economic and social 
development sustainable over the long term.
Equality of rights provides the normative framework 
and the basis for social covenants that will create greater 
opportunities for those who have less, while promoting 
social integration and cohesion and, consequently, 
new social compacts. A fiscal covenant that calls for a 
more redistributive tax structure and burden, capable of 
strengthening the role of the State and of public policy 
in order to guarantee thresholds of well-being, is part of 
the equality agenda, one that includes but goes beyond 
the creation of labour institutions that will protect 
employment security.
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Chapter VI
Caribbean youth: exclusion  
and vulnerability
A. Introduction
In the Caribbean, as in Latin America, these are challenging times for youth inclusion. Such 
times call for new measures to improve and balance education achievements with smooth 
passage to employment. The demographic transition holds opportunities for young people, 
but these opportunities must be seized in the short term so that population ageing will not 
cut even more into the resources available for investing in developing youth capacities and 
productivity. Young people move from place to place more easily than children and older 
people do, especially in the Caribbean. This can be a source of both opportunities and 
risks. Young people are healthier and at less risk of disease than other age groups, but they 
are very much exposed to exogenous risks, especially accidents and assault. Persistently 
high adolescent maternity rates and exposure to sexually transmitted diseases, particularly  
HIV/AIDS, constitute a warning sign that needs to be forcefully addressed. 
Public and policy awareness has grown over the past few 
decades; government institutions have been established 
and tasked with developing youth plans and programmes. 
Instruments have been deployed to raise awareness and 
knowledge of youth issues and improve the effectiveness 
and focus of public policies in this area. Public youth 
policies have been strengthened in recent years, but 
strides need to be made on comprehensive approaches 
that can go beyond sector-based rationales, taking into 
account the very nature of this age group and its risks, 
capacities, opportunities, systems of belonging and 
modalities of involvement. 
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With the International Year of Youth1 having come to 
an end, this chapter assesses the main demographic and 
socio-economic trends relating to youth in the Caribbean, 
focusing on the conditions that determine their degree of 
social inclusion or exclusion. This year of international 
debate on youth policies has clearly drawn attention to 
the key role that young people play in the development 
process and to the need to target youth in poverty reduction, 
skills development and employment policies (United 
Nations, 2010a).
The International Year of Youth officially ended with 
the High-level Meeting on Youth,2 which highlighted the 
need to move forward with comprehensive, multisector 
policies and programmes that, together, tackle all the 
determinants of youth exclusion and vulnerability. An 
added challenge is how to make youth policies part of 
the Millennium Development Goals agenda and the 
decent work agenda. The Millennium Development 
Goals address youth issues by way of the following 
explicit targets affecting or benefiting young people: 
ensure full and productive employment and decent 
work for all, including women and young people 
(target 1.B); ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling (target 2.A); eliminate 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no 
later than 2015 (target 3.A); achieve, by 2015, universal 
access to reproductive health (target 5.B); and have halted 
by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
(target 6.A). Employment, education, reproductive health 
and closing gender gaps constitute explicit targets and 
goals under a global agenda for youth inclusion. This 
chapter covers employment, education and reproductive 
health, as well as demographic factors and the youth 
policy agenda in the countries of the Caribbean.
Some of the issues raised in previous chapters are 
covered again here (but with specific reference to the 
youth population in the countries of the Caribbean), 
particularly adolescent fertility, labour market insertion 
and social protection challenges that pose specific 
risks for young people, relating above all to sexual 
and reproductive health. With inequality as the central 
theme of this edition of Social Panorama, this chapter 
stresses that young people are at the receiving end of 
legacies shaped by their socio-economic background 
that determine their access to critical assets for capacity 
development. The assets that they accumulate now 
1 The International Year of Youth began on 12 August 2010 and ended 
on 11 August 2011. See [online] http://social.un.org/youthyear/
unapproach.html. 
2 See [online] http://iseek.un.org/webpgdept2001_3.asp.
have an impact on their reality as young people and 
will mould their personal and community life in the 
future, as adults.
In this context, society should ensure that young 
people have opportunities to participate in development 
processes, that is to say actions and investments that 
enable youth to consistently complete the transition 
into adulthood and take advantage of opportunities 
to develop and use their human capital in the process 
(United Nations, 2007). Failure to do so can lead to the 
exclusion and marginalization of youth while depriving 
society of their energy and innovativeness. Inadequate 
investment in education, ineffective social protection 
programmes and constraints in access to the labour 
market are among the factors that prevent young people 
from reaching their full potential and helping to improve 
the well-being of their communities. All of this holds 
for the Caribbean as well.
Decisive action by governments in the Caribbean is 
therefore required to involve youth in the development 
agenda, including measures to address exclusion and the 
opportunities actually available to young people to build 
or change their livelihoods. Efforts to promote youth 
inclusion in our societies should encompass recognition 
of the rights of young people and their appropriation and 
use of such rights. Several counties have tacitly recognized 
that the ways in which the challenges and potentials of 
young people are addressed by policy influence current 
social and economic conditions and the well-being and 
livelihood of future generations (United Nations, 1996).3
This chapter uses available data to assess the status 
of the youth population in the Caribbean, especially 
the English-speaking countries there, focusing on areas 
such as education and employment, as well as public 
youth policies implemented by governments. It presents 
a general and demographic overview, together with 
information on the education and employment situation 
of young people. The role of public policies targeting 
young people is examined, as is the need to strengthen, 
increase and expand the appropriation of assets (such 
as education, employment and participation) in youth 
development and inclusion. 
3 The World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and 
Beyond is one of the most important resolutions relating to young 
people. It provides a policy framework and practical guidelines 
for the adoption of measures to enhance the quality and quantity 
of opportunities available to young people for full, effective and 
constructive participation in society. The programme identifies 
10 priority areas for action: education, employment, hunger and 
poverty, health, environment, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, 
leisure activities, girls and young women, and the full and effective 
participation of youth in the life of society and in decision-making 
(United Nations, 1996).  
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B. Caribbean youth demographics,  
 poverty and health
1. Population change and the demographic dividend
The limitations and difficulties of defining youth and the age groups it encompasses have been 
widely discussed in the specialized literature. The countries of the Caribbean lack uniform 
official age ranges for youth. In some countries, including Dominica, Guyana and Trinidad 
and Tobago, the range is from ages 15 to 30. According to some authors, the reason for such 
a wide range is the high youth unemployment rate that keeps young people from acquiring 
the responsibilities and status of adults (Danns, Henry and LaFleur, 1997, cited in World 
Bank, 2003). Other countries (Belize and Jamaica are examples) follow the demographic 
definition established by the United Nations: men and women aged 15 to 24.  
For the general purposes of this chapter, the age range 
for young people is 15 to 29, thus providing more scope 
for the transition between key life stages such as school 
completion and entry into the labour market. In view of 
the marked differences within this age group, however, in 
some instances the data are broken down by sub-group. 
The Caribbean is no exception to global population 
decline. ECLAC estimates at 42,649,000 the population 
of this subregion in 2011 (4 million more than in 2000). 
But the average annual growth rate per 100 inhabitants 
is slowing compared with prior periods: it is expected 
to fall to 0.76 between 2010 and 2015 due in part to a 
sharp drop in the crude birth rate, which is expected to 
decline to 17.9 per 1,000 inhabitants during the same 
period (ECLAC, 2010b).
Young people (aged 15 to 29) represented a quarter 
of the total population of the Caribbean in 2010, just 
under the Latin American average. In this case, though, 
the average is not a proxy for the general trend in the 
composition of the youth population in the Caribbean 
because the proportion in several countries and territories 
is far from this average. In countries like Belize (29.4%), 
the Dominican Republic (27.3%) Haiti (30.1%), Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines (27%), Saint Lucia (28.2%) 
and Trinidad and Tobago (27.8%), the proportion of 
young people to the total population is several percentage 
points above the average for the region. In others, such as 
Barbados (20.9%), Cuba (20.6%), Puerto Rico (20.9%) 
and the United States Virgin Islands (21.4%), it is several 
percentage points below (ECLAC, 2010b).
Figure VI.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROPORTION OF YOUNG 










1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America The Caribbean
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, Population estimates and projections, revision 2008.
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Table VI.1 
THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES): 
POPULATION AGED 15 TO 29 AND TOTAL POPULATION, 2010 
 (Thousands)




Cuba 2 303 11 203
Dominican Republic 2 702 9 899
Haiti 3 032 10 089
Jamaica 725 2 730
Puerto Rico 864 3 998
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 30 109
Saint Lucia 50 174
Trinidad and Tobago 378 1 344
United States Virgin Islands 24 109
The Caribbean a (24 countries) 10 715 43 312
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical 
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/G.2483-P/B), Santiago, 
Chile, 2010.
a Countries and territories with a total population of less than 100,000 inhabitants in 
2010 are included in the regional aggregate figures but are not listed separately. For this 
reason, the regional aggregates are not equal to the sum total of the countries listed.
According to projections for the next few years, 
the youth population as a proportion of the total will 
decline gradually in the Caribbean except for Trinidad 
and Tobago and Saint Lucia, where by 2020 a sharper 
drop will bring it down by 8 and 5 percentage points, 
respectively, compared with 2010 (ECLAC, 2010b). This 
is part of what is known as the demographic dividend. 
The demographic dividend is a stage at which the ratio 
of dependents to working-age people is below three to two. 
It includes a period during which the dependency ratio is 
falling and also the early part of the phase in which it rises 
again, but while the balance between the age groups continues 
to favour investment. All of the countries of the Caribbean 
have entered this period. While the dividend has already 
ended in the United States Virgin Islands, in Guyana is it 
expected to last until 2050 (see figure VI.2). The dividend 
holds unique opportunities for the younger sectors of the 
population if it is capitalized on by policies promoting social 
investment in young people and boosting their access to, 
among other things, education, health and training. 
 Figure VI.2 
THE CARIBBEAN: DURATION AND STRUCTURE  
OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND
(Number of years)
















Dependency ratio >2/3, declining Dependency ratio <2/3, declining
Dependency ratio <2/3, rising
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population 
Division of ECLAC, Population estimates and projections, 2010.
The high emigration rate is also having a significant 
impact on young people and population dynamics in the 
Caribbean. It is estimated that some 5 million Caribbeans 
have emigrated over the past 50 years (CDB, 2010). But 
not much up-to-date data are available, making it riskier 
to draw forceful conclusions than to put forth hypotheses. 
Generally speaking, in the Caribbean the proportion of 
young people emigrating is lower than for adults. But 
young people and adults combined account for the bulk of 
emigrants: more than half (55%) are between the ages of 
22 and 40 (CDB, 2010). Nevertheless, if the trend has not 
changed substantially over the past decade there could be 
cases in which young emigrants make up a larger share. For 
example, data from 2000 indicate that in Belize, Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago almost one fourth of all emigrants 
are young people aged 15 to 24 (Thomas-Hope, 2009). It 
can be inferred that the emigrant flow of young people 
accelerates population ageing in their communities of origin.
Table VI.2 
THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EMIGRATION BY AGE GROUP AND SEX, 2000-2001 
(Percentages)
Country
Age group (male) Age group (female)
Under 15 15-24 25-44 45-64 65 and over Under 15 15-24 25-44 45-64 65 and over
Antigua and Barbuda 5 8 35 34 18 6 10 40 29 15
Bahamas …  13 49 25 13 …  16 56 21 7
Barbados … 4 20 38 38 … 4 21 41 34
Belize …  22 46 24 8 …  25 49 19 7
Bermudas …  7 41 38 14 …  7 40 38 15
Dominica 12 10 36 24 18 13 11 36 23 17
Grenada 4 5 32 32 27 4 8 30 31 27
Jamaica 10 25 42 10 4 10 23 38 14 5
Montserrat …  11 25 32 32 …  15 27 24 34
Saint Kitts and Nevis …  8 39 33 20 … 11 38 29 22
Saint Lucia …  13 37 29 21 …  16 39 26 19
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines …  7 38 33 22  … 11 41 28 20
Turks and Caicos Islands …  8 42 38 12  … 12 47 29 12
Trinidad and Tobago …  26 41 24 9  … 25 38 26 11
Source:  E. Thomas-Hope, “Regional special topic monography on international migration, based on the analysis of the 2000 round census data of eighteen Caribbean countries”, 
Greater Georgetown, Secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 2009.
175Social Panorama of Latin America • 2011
2. Youth and poverty: the risks  
of early emancipation
For young people, as for the rest of the population, 
the ratio of household income to consumption is an 
indicator of well-being but is not the only relevant 
factor. It is nevertheless one of the main assets for 
meeting basic needs and a key variable for defining 
indigence and poverty.
In the English-speaking Caribbean it is hard to 
make comparable estimates of poverty levels because 
of the scarcity of consistent data on the magnitude 
and trend of poverty there. Several agencies and 
governments have produced data on the incidence of 
income poverty by consumption level based on national 
income poverty lines, but the sources and measurement 
methodologies are so different that they pose an obstacle 
to comparative analysis of the data (ECLAC, 2010c). 
Nevertheless, and with these qualifications in mind, 
they do yield a general picture of the youth poverty 
rate in the English-speaking Caribbean.
As in Latin America, poverty in the English-speaking 
Caribbean is, generally, more concentrated in the 
child population (aged under 15). This does not mean, 
however, that the youth poverty rate should be ignored. 
For example, in the early 2000s, almost one fifth of the 
total poor population of the British Virgin Islands was 
between the ages of 15 and 24 (CDB/Government of 
the British Virgin Islands, 2003). According to more 
recent estimates, in Antigua and Barbuda 25.4% of 
the indigent population and 22.6% of the total poor 
population are in the 15-to-29-year age group. A further 
breakdown of this group shows that 40%, 33% and 22% 
of all young people aged 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, 
respectively, are below the corresponding poverty line 
(CDB/KCL, 2007a). In Saint Lucia, just over a quarter 
of the individuals identified as poor are young (aged 15 
to 29). This percentage is lower in the Cayman Islands 
(22%) but not in Grenada or Trinidad and Tobago, 
where a third of those living in poverty are in this age 
group. Unlike other countries, then, young people are 
proportionally overrepresented in the poor population 
(CDB/KCL, 2007b, 2008, 2009a; KCL, 2007).
In Dominica and Anguilla, 16.4% and 22.3%, 
respectively, of the population living below the poverty 
line is aged 15 to 24. The breakdown between Nevis 
and Saint Kitts shows that this age group accounts 
for 15.8% and 25.7%, respectively, of the total poor 
population (CDB/KCL, 2010a, 2010b, 2009b). In 
Belize, 21% of all poor are aged 15 to 24, while just 
over half of Belizeans aged 14 to 17 are living in 
poverty (Government of Belize/CDB, 2010). This 
confirms the general trend: the youth poverty rate is 
usually not higher than the overall population average, 
but the adolescent poverty rate is. 
From a life-cycle perspective, it is important to 
bear in mind that the increased likelihood of living in 
poverty is correlated with emancipation early in youth 
combined with taking on the role of head of household 
or his or her spouse. Data from some countries show 
that in the first income quintiles the proportion of young 
people aged around 20 who are heads of household or 
spouses is much higher than in the higher quintiles. A 
case in point is Grenada, where 58% of the young people 
in the first income quintile who are heads of household 
or spouses are aged 24 or under while just 19% of the 
young people in the last quintile are in this age group. 
In Guyana, 12% of all such young people in the first 
quintile are aged 15 to 19; 2.5% of all young people in 
the fifth quintile who are heads of household or spouses 
are aged 19 or under. Something similar is seen in Belize, 
where one half of all people aged 16 to 20 who are heads 
of household or spouses are in the first two quintiles 
and 27% are in the last quintiles.4
This phenomenon underscores the findings set 
out in chapter IV in that there are social protection 
gaps for some particularly vulnerable segments of 
the population and phases of the life cycle, penalizing 
low-income sectors. In the countries of the Caribbean, 
the fact that early emancipation is closely linked to 
low family income could suggest weak or non-existent 
social protections for young people for whom early 
emancipation means shouldering more responsibilities 
and taking on the role of household breadwinner. In 
this case, the lack of social protection networks is 
especially problematic because at this stage in the life 
cycle young people are in need of support if they are 
to continue to acquire capacities and assets. 
4 Calculated on the basis of special tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries.
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3. Youth mortality
Disease prevalence is lower among young people than 
in other age groups, and their mortality rate is lower 
both in the Caribbean and throughout the world (see 
figure VI.3). Nevertheless, they are more likely than 
other age groups to suffer the negative impacts of 
external risks linked to youthful behaviour or conduct. 
In other words, the leading causes of death among 
young people are not degenerative or microbiological 
diseases but rather violence and avoidable accidents. 
In the Caribbean, just over half of the deaths among 
young people aged 15 to 29 are from external causes 
(including homicides, accidents and suicide). Strikingly, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean the proportion of 
deaths among young people is above the world average, 
as the homicide rate for the region is also higher than 
the world average and violence is pretty much centred 
on youth (see figure VI.3). As table VI.3 shows, for a 
total of 25 countries and territories in the Caribbean 
assaults, accidents and suicide are common causes of 
death among the population aged 15 to 29.
 Figure VI.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: YOUTH  
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Aged 15-29 Aged 15-24 
World Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: United Nations, “World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision”, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011.
While there is no conclusive evidence, studies do 
suggest that segmenting the youth population and analysing 
mortality rate patterns reveal factors of social inequality 
and exclusion that make death more likely among persons 
living in poverty than among their peers who are not poor. 
In other words, mortality rates among poor young people 
are higher because this group is more exposed to disease, 
accidents and violence (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004). 
There is evidence that violence associated with 
crime is, unlike general violence, linked to levels of 
development. High crime rates lead to low levels of 
human and economic development (UNODC, 2011). 
Criminal violence is a problem in several societies in 
the Caribbean. Violence entails a high economic cost 
for countries. It has negative consequences in terms 
of well-being, especially for young people, who are 
overrepresented both as victims and as perpetrators of 
crime and violence (UNODC/World Bank, 2007). Recent 
data show that these and related issues should be high 
on government agendas in the Caribbean. Along with 
Central America, South America and Southern Africa, it 
is in the Caribbean that homicide rates are highest and 
(unlike elsewhere in the world, where rates have been 
falling for the past 25 years) have been rising except for 
a dip around 2006. The Dominican Republic, Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago are among the countries hit 
hardest by this trend (UNODC, 2011). 
Table VI.3 
THE CARIBBEAN (25 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES): LEADING 
CAUSES OF DEATH AMONG THE YOUNG POPULATION AND 
AMONG THE ADULT POPULATION, 2009 
(Percentages)
Aged 15 to 29 Aged 30 and above
Cause of death Percentage Cause of death Percentage
Assault, homicide 13.70 Ischaemic heart diseases 18.02
Land transport accidents 13.22 Cerebrovascular diseases 10.99
Intentional self-harm 
and suicide
9.69 Malignant neoplasm of 




4.78 Influenza and pneumonia 5.65
Malignant neoplasm of 
lymphoid, haematopoietic 
and related tissue
4.08 Dementia and Alzheimer 4.07
Human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV)









2.21 Hypertensive diseases 2.99
Influenza and pneumonia 2.01 Malignant neoplasm 
of prostate
2.97
Malignant neoplasm of brain 1.80 Heart failure and complications 
and ill-defined heart disease
2.97
Ischaemic heart diseases 1.38 Malignant neoplasm of 
colon, rectosigmoid junction, 
rectum and anal canal
2.55
Ill-defined causes 1.25 Ill-defined causes 0.73
Source: Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “Causas de mortalidad en las Américas” 
[online] http://ais.paho.org/phip/viz/mort_causasprincipales_lt_oms.asp.
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4. Sexual and reproductive health
There is no question that sexuality and reproduction are key 
youth issues. They are often approached one-dimensionally 
as a health matter alone, with a focus, inter alia, on fertility, 
the birth rate and sexually transmitted diseases. Initiatives 
arising from this approach confine sexuality and reproduction 
to the physical act itself and its repercussions despite the 
fact that these issues cut across other spheres as well. 
Sexuality and reproduction are linked to several aspects of 
well-being and spill over into other areas of development 
(Cornwall and Jolly, 2006; Jolly, 2010). 
Youth, sexuality and reproduction are particularly 
relevant issues in the Caribbean because for a large part of 
the population sexual initiation takes place at such an early 
age. Estimates indicate that around 30% of adolescents of 
both genders in the English-speaking Caribbean have had 
sexual relations, many at a very early age. On average, 
men who are sexually active during adolescence start at 
the age of 11, and women at the age of 14-15. Moreover, 
around half of sexually active adolescent girls report that 
their first sexual experience was non-consensual; almost a 
third of sexually active adolescents of both genders report 
having multiple sexual partners (Pilgrim and Blum, 2011). 
This presents policymakers with enormous challenges in 
terms of providing timely information, preventing sexual 
violence and tending to the victims.
One of the characteristics of Latin America and the 
Caribbean is a stubbornly high adolescent motherhood 
rate when compared with fertility rates for the population 
as a whole. Adolescent motherhood is markedly higher in 
the region among less-educated women and thus among 
women in lower-income socio-economic strata (ECLAC/
OIJ, 2008; Rodríguez, 2009). While the fertility rate among 
adolescents (aged 15 to 19) has fallen in recent years, it 
is still very high for Latin America as a whole and far 
above the world average (see table VI.4)
Table VI.4 
WORLD AND PRINCIPAL REGIONS: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY 
RATE FOR WOMEN AGED 15 TO 19, 2000-2015 
(Number of births per 1,000 women)
2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
Africa 110.87 101.43 91.75
World 60.36 55.68 51.96
Oceania 33.96 33.38 29.26
Asia 51.07 45.92 42.37
Latin America and the Caribbean 81.19 73.39 70.5
North America 40.49 38.62 25.89
Europe 19.68 19.29 15.42
Source: United Nations, “World Population Prospects, 2010 Revision”, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2011 [online] http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-
Data/fertility.htm.
However, the adolescent fertility rate (ratio of the 
number of births to total number of women in this age 
group) is markedly lower in the Caribbean than in Latin 
America: of the 19 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean whose rate is lower than 61 births per 1,000 
women aged 15 to 19, 17 are in the Caribbean. Only 
Belize, Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
come close to the Latin American average (see table VI.5).
In most of the countries of the Caribbean, adolescent 
fertility rates have been falling over the past few years, 
albeit at paces that differ by as much as 40 percentage 
points. But there are a few exceptions. Aruba, Guyana and 
Montserrat have posted increases; in Guyana, the rate is 
up by nearly 24% against the early 1990s (see table VI.5).
The fact that the adolescent motherhood rate is 
far higher among poor, less-educated women is cause 
for considerable concern because it reveals, first and 
foremost, unequal access to full reproductive rights 
especially when involuntary pregnancies are involved. 
Second, it denotes the intergenerational reproduction 
of inequality and exclusion because early motherhood 
among the poor and less educated considerably diminishes 
employment prospects throughout life. These mothers 
are highly unlikely to continue their studies or be 
able to turn to social networks for childcare. Thus the 
cycle of exclusion is perpetuated from one generation 
to the next.   
These unequal opportunities and life-cycle prospects 
do indeed pose a major challenge for social protection 
and care systems because they involve a population 
group (young mothers with small children) that is, as 
seen in Chapter IV, often excluded from access to these 
systems and lacks the resources to buy care services on 
the market.
HIV/AIDS is a priority for the Caribbean countries, 
given its high prevalence. Although the number of new 
HIV infections in the Caribbean has fallen slightly over 
the past decade (from an estimated 20,000 new cases in 
2001 to some 17,000 in 2009), estimates are that between 
220,000 and 270,000 people are carrying HIV, of whom 
approximately 53% are women. The Caribbean and 
sub-Saharan Africa are the only regions of the world 
where the proportion of women who are carriers of HIV 
is higher than that of men (UNAIDS, 2010). In Trinidad 
and Tobago, for example, women make up 75% of new 
cases among people aged 15 to 24, while in Jamaica the 
ratio of infected women to men in this age group is 3 
to 1 (CDB, 2010).
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Table VI.5 
THE CARIBBEAN: ADOLESCENT FERTILITY RATE AND PERCENTAGE VARIATION, AROUND 1990 AND 2000 a 
(Number of births per 1,000 women)
Country or territory Around 1990 Around 2000 Reference period b Percentage variation c
Anguilla 50.6 42.1 1996-2006 -16.8
Antigua and Barbuda 70.4 66.8 1991-2001 -5.1
Former Netherlands Antilles 50.2 34.2 1991-2006 -31.9
Aruba 39.8 41.2 1997-2007 +3.5
Bahamas 58.4 38.7 1997-2007 -33.7
Barbados 56.2 50.8 1998-2007 -9.6
Belize 110.2 90.7 1992-2002 -17.7
Bermudas 36.2 16.0 1998-2008 -55.8
Cuba 49.8 50.1 1998-2008 +0.6
Dominica 58.2 47.1 1998-2006 -19.1
Grenada 99.3 53.9 1990-2000 -45.7
Guyana 81.6 101.0 2000-2008 +23.8
Cayman Islands 65.7 … 1994 …
Turks and Caicos Islands 33.9 25.5 2001-2005 -24.8
British Virgin Islands 46.7 27.4 1997-2007 -41.3
United States Virgin Islands 83.2 51.5 1997-2007 -38.1
Jamaica 88.0 60.3 1996-2006 -31.5
Montserrat 31.6 33.7 1994-2004 +6.6
Puerto Rico 76.3 60.1 1996-2006 -21.2
Dominican Republic 115.0 50.8 1994-2005 -55.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis 81.2 67.3 1991-2001 -17.1
Saint Lucia 89.5 49.7 1994-2004 -44.5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 93.8 71.6 1993-2003 -23.7
Trinidad and Tobago 44.3 32.5 1994-2004 -26.6
Source: United Nations, “World Population Prospects: the 2010 Revision”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011, updated for 2011 on the basis of data from the Millennium 
Development Goals database [online] http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/fertility.htm.
a The data come from different sources, including official estimates published by the Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, Demographic 
and Health Surveys by Macro International, the Reproductive Health Survey, the Secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and national statistics.
b The reference period took the most recent year available for the 2000s and the year available for the previous decade, in order to illustrate the changes over a period of 10 years.
c Variation with respect to the starting year.
Also in the Caribbean, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
among young people and adults (aged 15 to 49), which 
equates to 1% of the total population, is the second-highest 
in the world and is surpassed only by sub-Saharan Africa. 
By comparison, the average for Central America and South 
America is half that for the Caribbean (UNAIDS, 2010). 
However, prevalence not only varies among subregions 
in the Americas, but within them as well. A prevalence 
of 0.1 in Cuba contrasts sharply with countries in which 
the prevalence is over 1%, such as the Bahamas (3.1%), 
Barbados (1.4%), Belize (2.3%), Haiti (1.9%), Jamaica 
(1.7%), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.5%) (WHO, 2011). 
HIV is a particularly important issue for the youth 
population of the Caribbean. Approximately 83% of HIV 
cases are diagnosed in people aged 15 to 54; a third of 
them are found among people aged 25 to 34. Given that 
the disease has an 8-year incubation period, it may be 
inferred that almost a third of new HIV cases occur among 
15-to-24-year-olds (World Bank, 2003). Recent studies 
indicate that 90% of sexually active adolescents in the 
English-speaking Caribbean report having used a condom, 
but only 16%-25% report doing so regularly (Pilgrim and 
Blum, 2011). When the group under examination is restricted 
to women aged 15 to 24 in Caribbean countries such as 
Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Trinidad and 
Tobago, almost 50% report using condoms during their most 
recent sexual encounter. This is a relatively high percentage 
in comparison with some Latin American countries. 
Figure VI.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (11 COUNTRIES): CONDOM 
USE AT LAST HIGH-RISK SEXUAL INTERCOURSE,  



















































































































Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Indicators Database in CEPALSTAT.
The concentration of HIV/AIDS among the youth 
population of the Caribbean also has economic repercussions 
for the countries because of the negative impacts on the 
population group with the highest productive potential. 
And because these young people are sometimes supporting 
their households economically or are contributing to 
household income, some of the consequences of living 
with the disease make them and their households more 
vulnerable and keep them in poverty —or push them into 
it (CDB, 2010).
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C. Access to education
Education is critical for people’s lives and for society as a whole. It provides the means for 
future income generation as well as skills for exercising new kinds of citizenship, living 
constructively in a multicultural environment and combining immediate experience with 
media-transmitted experience (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004, page 165). Education is even more critical 
for young people, for whom it holds the key to their livelihood.  
Modern formal schooling and teaching methods were 
designed above all for children and young people, based 
on the assumption that they are starting on their learning 
path and can absorb appropriate and necessary knowledge 
in homogeneous age groups. But many education 
indicators do not reveal much about young people as a 
social construct or as a population group at the receiving 
end of formal education, focusing as they do on people 
as participants in institutional processes of learning. This 
is due in part to the fact that defining and interpreting 
education outcomes, especially on a comparative basis, 
is complicated because they are highly context-driven. 
Education access and progress vary, and data quantity 
and quality are heterogeneous (United Nations, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the data do paint a picture in which the gaps 
and inequalities that already surfaced in primary education 
only to persist and deepen at tertiary levels spill over from 
education to impact a person’s livelihood. Learning that 
is less segmented by socio-economic level will help close 
inequality gaps from one generation to the next. It will 
offer greater opportunities for social and occupational 
mobility throughout the life cycle, thereby reducing future 
wage and well-being gaps (ECLAC, 2010a). 
Latin America and the Caribbean have high 
enrolment rates in the early levels of education, but they 
fall off substantially in the secondary and tertiary levels, 
especially in the Caribbean. The literacy rate for young 
people aged 15 to 24 in the Caribbean, at 89%, is below 
the 97% average for Latin America. The gross enrolment 
ratio at the primary and secondary levels is high: at or 
above 98% except for Dominica (82%, one of the lowest 
at these education levels), Anguilla, the Cayman Islands 
and Jamaica (in the area of 93.5%) (United Nations, 2010). 
Secondary education enrolment rates are trending 
down, but not everywhere. In Dominica (105%) the rate 
is higher than at the primary level; countries such as 
Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, the British Virgin Islands, 
Montserrat and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have 
secondary education enrolment rates at or above 100%). 
The most dramatic drops in the gross enrolment ratio 
at the secondary level from the immediately preceding 
level are Anguilla (from 94% to 80%), Aruba (from 
114% to 95%), the Bahamas (from 103% to 93%), Belize 
(from 120% to 75%), Cuba (from 104% to 90%), the 
Dominican Republic (from 104% to 75%) and Trinidad 
and Tobago (from 103% to 89%). In Saint Lucia (from 
98% to 93%) and Jamaica (from 93% to 91% the gross 
enrolment ratio falls off slightly between these two levels 
of education (UNESCO, 2011). However, secondary 
education completion rates in Jamaica are far lower, in 
the area of 85% for women aged 20 to 24 and 75% for 
men in the same age group. In Guyana the rate is 68% 
for women and 60% for men; in Belize it is just 24% for 
women and 19% for men.5
The sharpest declines in enrolment rates are at the 
tertiary level, except for Cuba where it is above 100%. 
Of the countries in the Caribbean on which data from 
2008 are available, Grenada has one of the highest gross 
enrolment ratios at this education level (59%), followed 
by the Cayman Islands (36%), Aruba (33%), Jamaica 
(24%) and Montserrat (17%). Saint Lucia and Belize 
are just above 10% (at 15% and 11%, respectively) and 
Anguilla, Dominica and the British Virgin Islands are 
below 6% (5%, 4% and 1%, respectively) (UNESCO, 
2011). However, these low gross enrolment ratios at 
the tertiary level might be due in part to the high rates 
of international mobility among students at this level. 
For example, 100% of the nationals of Antigua and 
Barbuda and Bermudas studying at the tertiary level are 
5 Calculated on the basis of tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries.
180 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
doing so in another country. The mobility rate at this 
level is 88.4% in Saint Lucia and 32.6% in the British 
Virgin Islands. Several other Caribbean countries have 
mobility rates above the 1% average for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Such is the case with Trinidad and 
Tobago (29.6%), Barbados (12.7%) and Aruba (6.7%) 
(UNESCO, 2009). The (five-year) university completion 
rate is much lower: for young people aged 25 to 29 it is 
just around 3% in Jamaica and 4% in Guyana.6
The data vary little according to sex. In many cases 
the enrolment rate for women is even higher than for 
men. Gender is, then, declining in importance as a 
factor behind unequal education. It would seem that 
other social inequalities, such as income disparity and 
territorial isolation, have a greater impact on educational 
opportunity gaps. For example, in Saint Lucia, the 
higher the consumption quintile the lower the proportion 
of persons aged 15 or over lacking a post-secondary 
certificate. In the lowest consumption quintile, 69% 
of the people in this age group lack a post-secondary 
certificate; for the highest quintile the proportion is 51%. 
Taking the tertiary level by itself, 1.1% of the people in 
the lowest quintile have had access; the proportion rises 
to 25.6% in the highest consumption quintile (CDB/
KCL, 2007b).
The picture is similar in Grenada and in Saint 
Kitts and Nevis. In Grenada, 67%, 11.3% and 16.6% 
of young people in the highest consumption quintiles 
aged 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, respectively, are 
attending school at any level. By contrast, just 55.5%, 
6.8% and less than 1% of persons in the same age groups 
in the poorest quintile are attending school (CDB/KCL, 
2009a). In Saint Kitts and Nevis, the difference between 
young people aged 15 to 19 in quintiles 1 and 5 who 
are attending school is just over 10 percentage points 
(55% and 67.9% respectively); the difference is greater 
among young people aged 20 to 29. Thirty-one percent 
of the people aged 20 to 24 in the highest consumption 
quintile are in school, compared with 5.9% in the same 
age group in the lowest quintile. For persons aged 25 
to 29, 4.9% of those in the first quintile have access to 
education, against 12.7% of young people in the same 
age group in the highest quintile (CDB/KCL, 2009b). 
In Dominica, almost all (95.3%) of the young 
people aged 15 to 19 in the fifth quintile are enrolled in 
school. This figure gradually declines to 81.7% in the 
first quintile. As in other countries in the Caribbean, the 
gaps for higher education are wider. For persons aged 20 
to 24, there is a difference of nearly 30 points between 
6 Calculated on the basis of tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries.
the proportion in the lowest quintile attending school 
(5.9%) and those in the highest quintile (34.7%) (CDB/
KCL, 2010a). School attendance figures in Antigua and 
Barbuda also show that persons in the lowest consumption 
quintiles are less likely than their peers in the higher 
quintiles to attend and complete secondary school (CDB/
KCL, 2007a).    
The data on the post-secondary and tertiary levels in 
Belize reveal a marked bias in favour of higher-income 
persons. Of the total enrolled in these levels, just 16% 
and 11%, respectively, are from the two lowest quintiles. 
Overall, 23% of young people aged 17 and 18 in the 
first and second income quintiles are enrolled at the 
post-secondary or tertiary level. The proportion for the 
same population group in the last two quintiles is 80% 
(Government of Belize/CDB, 2010). In Trinidad and 
Tobago, the difference in school attendance between the 
first income quintile and the last is 30 percentage points 
for persons aged 15 to 17 (61.1% for the first quintile and 
90.7% for the fifth quintile) (ECLAC, 2011b). 
Location also impacts education gaps among young 
persons. In Belize, 65% of all secondary-school age (13 to 
16) young people in rural areas attend school, compared 
with 88% in urban areas (Government of Belize/CDB, 
2010). In Jamaica, 11.6% of the urban population aged 
19 to 24 is attending school; only 8% of persons in the 
same age group living in rural areas are attending an 
educational institution (ECLAC, 2011b). 
The issue of education for young people has 
many facets and poses several challenges. It involves 
more than enrolment or insertion in an educational 
institution structure. Curriculum and quality are also a 
factor. A more- and better-educated society is in a better 
position to take advantage of current technologies and 
socio-economic conditions. So, while early childhood 
and primary education are indeed extremely important 
for later in life, the significance of post-secondary and 
tertiary education (where most of the enrollees are, 
traditionally, young people) for individuals and society 
should not be underestimated. Studies have shown that 
low education levels are strongly correlated with the risk 
of social exclusion (United Nations, 2003). It has also 
been established that improving the education supply 
can help dissociate the social origin of individuals from 
their well-being (ECLAC, 2010a). Governments and 
societies of the Caribbean should therefore take action to 
reduce the opportunity cost that continuing their studies 
poses for young people, especially for those in the lower 
income quintiles and for those living far from urban areas. 
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D. Youth unemployment
Employment is among the most significant factors in the development of young people. A 
decent job does more than provide the monetary income for meeting certain needs related 
to well-being. It is also a way to secure, enhance and consolidate a feeling of belonging, as 
individuals perceive they are contributing to collective progress and are part of a system 
of contributions and benefits (ECLAC/OIJ, 2008, page 169). What is more, a formal job 
is what determines access to many social protection and social security systems. In other 
words, the lack of a source of formal employment is a mechanism of exclusion from some 
of these systems. 
For these and other reasons a decent job is a necessity, 
especially for young people because the way they 
enter the labour market has a direct impact on their 
future. That is what makes the high prevalence of youth 
unemployment so worrisome. 
Estimates are that participation in employment 
by young people will continue to fall, as has been the 
trend over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2009, 
the labour force participation rate among young people 
went from 53.6% to 51.1%. And the recent economic 
crisis revealed how fragile their employment status is: 
around the world, 77.7 million young people aged 15 to 
24 were unemployed in 2010. That is 4.2 million more 
than the year before the crisis (2007) (ILO, 2011a) In 
addition, young people are more likely than adults to 
enter the labour market by means of a vulnerable job 
(ILO, 2010). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, unemployment 
among young people aged 15 to 24 rose by 1.5 percentage 
points between 2007 and 2009, to 15.7%. The result was 
that labour force participation for this population group 
shrank by 0.5 percentage points during the period, to 
52.7% (ILO, 2011a).
Focusing on the countries of the Caribbean, in the 
early 2000s young people aged 15 to 24 accounted for 40% 
to 60% of the unemployed but 20% to 30% of the labour 
force. In some Caribbean countries, the unemployment 
rate for this age group was two or even four times that 
of the adult population (World Bank, 2003). Recent data 
suggest no significant changes in this scenario. 
In Belize, the 2009 unemployment rate for young 
people aged 20 to 24 was 7 percentage points above 
the national average of 13%. Unemployment among 
women was higher: 43% for young women aged 14 to 
19 versus 26% for young men in the same age group. 
In the 20-to-24 age bracket, unemployment for women 
was 28% and the rate for men was 16% (Government of 
Belize/CDB, 2010). In Grenada, more than half (54%) 
of the unemployed were young people (aged 15 to 29) 
(CDB/KCL, 2009a). A survey of living conditions 
conducted in Saint Lucia found a high concentration of 
unemployment in the population group aged 19 to 35 
(CDB/KCL, 2007c). In Dominica, 34% of the unemployed 
are between 15 and 24 years of age (CDB/KCL, 2010a).
Table VI.6 
THE CARIBBEAN (8 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES): 
UNEMPLOYED YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24 
(Percentages)
Country or territory Year Percentage 
Bahamas 2008 33.2
Barbados 2003 33.7
Cayman Islands 2008 26.9
Guadeloupe 2006 16.4
Jamaica 2008 37.2 
Martinique 2008 19.0 
Saint Lucia 2004 40.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 2008 42.0 
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), LABORSTA Internet [online database] 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
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E. Youth and public policy
1. A framework for analysis
International Labour Organization data reveal a 
similar situation in other Caribbean countries. Young 
people aged 15 to 24 make up some 31% of the total 
unemployed, with Guadeloupe and Martinique several 
percentage points below the average. Saint Lucia and 
Trinidad and Tobago have the highest percentages 
among this group of countries. However, in several 
cases expanding the age cohort to between 15 and 29 
increases the proportion of unemployed young people 
relative to the total employed, to 29% in Martinique 
and nearly 57% in Trinidad and Tobago (ILO, 2011b).
High unemployment rates among young people in 
the Caribbean are wasting the demographic dividend and 
the window of opportunities that the demographic trend 
offers the countries of the Caribbean because they affect 
a high proportion of the economically active population. 
But, even more important, failure to create the right 
conditions for young people to find decent employment 
reduces their opportunities, limits their present and future 
development and in many cases heightens existing levels 
of inequality and poverty. In Antigua and Barbuda, for 
instance, 80% of unemployed men aged 25 to 29 live in 
precarious conditions, on less than US$ 2.51 a day; 30.6% 
of the total unemployed population in that country lives 
on even less (CDB/KCL, 2007a).
Another feature of youth unemployment is that 
young people in the lower consumption quintiles are 
overrepresented in the workforce compared with their 
peers in the higher quintiles, while the reverse is true 
for adults. For example, in Saint Kitts and Nevis, 21.2% 
of all working young people are from the first quintile 
and 15.2% are from the highest quintile. Taking the total 
workforce aged 30 and over, 12.5% are from the first 
quintile and 27.4% are from the fifth quintile. In Antigua 
and Barbuda, the percentage of young people aged 15 
to 29 who are in the workforce is similar for the highest 
and lowest quintiles, at 17% and 15.5%, respectively. 
Bringing older people (aged 30 to 64) into the equation 
widens the gap between the two, to 13.5% of the total 
adult workforce for the first quintile and 30% for the fifth 
quintile. In Grenada, young people aged 15 to 24 from 
low socio-economic strata are more likely to be part of 
the labour force than are young people in the same age 
group from high socio-economic strata (CDB/KCL, 
2007a, 2009a, 2009b). 
On top of the high opportunity costs of education 
for young people from low-income households that these 
data would suggest, the potential roadblocks to future 
employment are also worrisome. Early entry into the 
labour market can restrict the acquisition and development 
of the knowledge needed for access to more productive 
employment during adulthood, keeping young people 
from developing their capacities and making them more 
vulnerable throughout their working life.
Young people need to consolidate and develop capacities, 
and they need to generate and use assets.7 Education 
gaps and lags, barriers to decent employment, inadequate 
social protection and social security regimes and the lack 
of space for active participation are some of the factors 
that hamper young people as they transition through this 
7 Assets are understood to be the stock of capital or the accumulated 
capital that may be used directly or indirectly to generate the 
livelihood of a person or household and maintain or change levels 
of well-being (Ellis, 2000).
period of life. State action plays a critical role in removing 
these obstacles. 
Over the past few years the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean have implemented public 
policy measures geared towards youth development. 
Institutions have been established and tasked with 
crafting, implementing and coordinating youth plans and 
programmes. But progress has been uneven. State action 
has been rendered less effective by the region’s disparate 
institutional framework for youth policy and the failure to 
engage young people themselves in shaping the strategies 
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for putting their interests on the public agenda (ECLAC/
OIJ, 2004 and 2008).
This section examines the role of public youth 
policy in several Caribbean countries, stressing the 
importance of strengthening, enhancing and expanding 
the appropriation of youth development assets (such 
as education and employment). First comes a look at 
potential approaches to programme and government 
strategy design, how youth issues can be mainstreamed 
into public policy and the different ways in which the 
countries of the Caribbean have included youth policies 
in their institutions and action structures. There follows 
an analysis of how assets influence an individual’s 
livelihood and how useful classifying those assets can 
be for pinpointing areas in which public youth policies 
are having little or no impact. The review in this section 
on public youth policies adopted by the countries of the 
Caribbean is not exhaustive and is not intended to yield 
assessments or conclusions as to the effective impact of 
such policies on the target population.
2. Youth issues: focuses and institutions
Several years ago public mechanisms were implemented 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to establish an 
institutional framework for youth issues by, inter alia, 
creating ministries or departments for youth affairs, 
designing and implementing action plans that cut across 
sectors and changing the legal and regulatory framework. 
Policymakers followed a variety of approaches to better 
integrate youth into the public and social space. 
Beyond the difficulty of establishing age ranges for 
young people, some of the mechanisms used are based 
on a standard unit assuming that all young people and 
their needs are similar. The goal in this case is to offer 
services and programmes, without taking into consideration 
the different realities and opportunities young people 
face (social integration approach). Others focus more 
on disadvantages, with public policy action targeting 
young people with greater lags and social exclusions 
(risk approach). Still others centre on the role of young 
people as active participants in actions geared towards 
improving their standard of living (active approach, or 
young people as strategic development actors). Some put 
more emphasis on a voice and participation for young 
people, seeking to boost their leverage with policymakers 
(social capital approach). Last, there are mechanisms that 
approach young people as individuals on a path seeking 
more independence. Here, policies centre on factors such 
as employment and access to housing (emancipation 
approach) (ECLAC/OIJ, 2008, pages. 314-316).
These policy approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
They can complement each other or overlap within a given 
public policy strategy. How youth issues are positioned in 
the institutional policy framework is important too, i.e., 
whether themes and actions in this sphere are addressed 
more or less separately by different administrative sectors 
of the State, or whether they are a thread running through 
and cutting across sector boundaries. In the former 
arrangement, the subject can be a recipient or beneficiary 
of sector-based programmes (designed to meet a need or 
requirement under the purview of the sector in question) 
and tailored not to young people per se but rather to the 
purposes of the sector. In the latter, while young people 
are still the recipients or beneficiaries of the programmes 
implemented by departments in charge of different 
sectors, interventions on youth issues are guided not by 
individual programme mandates but rather by a consistent, 
comprehensive public policy framework. 
For this reason, some Caribbean countries have 
departments for liaising with other government agencies 
and civil society organizations involved in youth affairs. 
Anguilla is an example (CDB/KCL, 2010c). Sometimes 
these departments are at the ministerial level (usually 
education or social development), as in the British Virgin 
Islands and the Cayman Islands. They conduct youth 
programmes in the areas of job and sports training and 
community integration, among others (CDB/Government 
of the British Virgin Islands, 2003; CDB/KCL, 2008). 
Some ministries, while not being exclusively devoted 
to youth issues, do include these matters among their 
primary objectives. Saint Kitts and Nevis has the Ministry 
of Youth Empowerment, Sports, Information Technology 
and Telecommunications and Post. It also has a Department 
of Youth, which, as part of the Ministry of Education, 
is tasked with coordinating actions on youth issues in 
the country in order to avoid duplication of efforts. The 
activities of these offices encompass areas such as HIV/
AIDS and youth participation (CDB/KCL, 2009c).
Government agencies whose mandate is not limited 
to youth affairs but that do have sector-based programmes 
that explicitly target youth issues are found in Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada and Saint Lucia. In Barbados, the 
Youth Affairs Department of the Ministry of Family, 
Culture, Sports and Youth is charged with ensuring that the 
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government’s youth-related objectives are met. In Grenada, 
the functions of the Ministry of Youth Empowerment 
and Sports include planning and implementing youth 
development programmes and fostering youth involvement. 
In Dominica, the Youth Development Division, under the 
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, operates education, 
leadership, volunteer and training programmes (CDB/
KCL, 2010b). In Saint Lucia, the Ministry of Social 
Transformation, Human Resource Development, Youth 
and Sports has a similar mandate. 
For some Caribbean countries, youth affairs cut across 
the jurisdictions of several institutions and agencies and are 
governed by action plans that bring together, under a single 
public youth policy, both government and private-sector 
action. In Belize, the Ministry of Education and Youth is in 
charge of youth affairs, including the Youth for the Future 
initiative to coordinate government youth development 
policies and cooperation projects with civil organizations 
and international agencies (Government of Belize, 2011).
Jamaica’s national youth policy provides a multisector 
framework for youth development with clearly defined 
focal points. They are: the environment for development, 
education and training; employment and entrepreneurship; 
health, participation and empowerment; and care and 
protection. The National Centre for Youth Development, 
which is part of the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture, 
oversees implementation of youth policy, coordinates 
and integrates youth development activities and services 
and issues recommendations for designing and updating 
programmes in order to promote youth development 
(Government of Jamaica, 2003; 2009). 
Trinidad and Tobago has a national youth policy, too; 
instead of programmes per se it provides a framework 
for action on youth affairs by government agencies and 
civil society organizations. Some of the focal points are 
employment, infrastructure and services, training, leadership, 
violence and the creation of spaces for expression and 
financing (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2006). 
Youth policy is under the purview of the Ministry of 
Gender, Youth and Child Development.        
In other cases —Antigua and Barbuda is one— there 
is no specific government agency for youth affairs. Instead, 
the government provides support for civil organizations 
operating in this sphere (CDB/KCL, 2007a). 
3. Assets and capital: mapping the influence  
of public youth policies
In the sphere of public youth policy, it is worthwhile to 
look at how government action can improve the livelihoods 
of young people, at least by programs for developing 
opportunities and capacities. A livelihood is not just the 
activities in which an individual or a household engages 
to meet basic daily needs, but also the assets (the stock of 
knowledge and access to and use of certain resources) skills 
and activities required to generate meaning and determine 
the living gained (Chambers and Conway, 1991). Assets 
are therefore an intrinsic part of the conceptual frameworks 
associated with livelihoods, stressing the importance of 
capital and the use of tangible and intangible resources. 
Assets give meaning to a person’s world, enable 
being and doing, and are vehicles for three kinds of action: 
instrumental action (making a living and developing), 
hermeneutic action (making living meaningful) and 
emancipatory action (challenging the structures under 
which one makes a living) (Bebbington, 1999, page 2022). 
Assets are usually classed in five categories: physical 
capital (work and production of goods); financial capital 
(related to money); human capital (inter alia, nutritional, 
educational and health status); natural capital (related to 
aspects such as land ownership and access to water); and 
social capital (formal and informal institutions) (Ellis and 
Freeman, 2005; Ellis, 2006).
Assets play an important role in the actions and 
activities that individuals pursue to build a livelihood; the 
conditions for accumulating them are central to expanding 
the opportunities that young people have for exiting 
poverty or improving their livelihoods. But the value and 
meaning of assets is not the same for all individuals and 
households, and there is a range of processes whereby 
individuals transform assets into the appropriation and use 
of rights, and of ways in which they optimize their stock 
of assets. These and other factors, such as institutions and 
social relations, shape how households and individuals 
use assets to build their livelihoods. Put another way, the 
scope and limitations of some livelihoods are subject to 
formal and informal institutional processes (Ellis, 2000; 
Scoones, 1998).8 
8 There is a parallel here with the rights-based methodological 
framework developed by Sen (1982), which establishes that 
the appropriation of rights depends on the political, economic, 
legal and social characteristics of a society and an individual’s 
position in it.
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The livelihood-based conceptual framework thus 
seeks public policy instruments designed to boost both the 
accumulation and the value of the assets of the population 
and to promote and facilitate the optimal use of existing 
underutilized assets (Ellis, 2000 and 2006). Beyond the 
debate about asset categories, classifying them makes it 
possible to distinguish between those that are understood 
and are expected (either separately or together) from 
public policy and social action. In other words, classifying 
assets reveals the link between multidimensional aspects 
and the factors that influence the ways and means that 
individuals —especially young people— can access to 
build their lives.
A World Bank report noted that most Caribbean 
countries have identified youth as a target for social 
development planning, having set up youth desks and 
departments in government and assigned budget resources 
for youth, as discussed earlier in this section. But their 
focus has been on leisure and community service rather 
than on action to meet the needs and challenges of 
youth development (World Bank, 2003). This no longer 
seems to be the case, although policymakers and policy 
implementers have indeed tended to focus more on specific 
youth development issues. 
All of the countries of the Caribbean have action 
plans and strategies focused on the human capital of 
young people. This is understandable, because health, 
education and other factors exert such an influence on youth 
development. In the sphere of education, there are usually 
programmes providing scholarships and support for paying 
for books, meals and transportation for secondary-school 
students, as well as sports programmes. There are also some 
educational initiatives targeting specific segments of the 
youth population. Grenada, for example, has programmes 
designed to keep young single mothers from dropping out 
of school. And in the Cayman Islands there are support 
programmes for university studies. 
Health is also high on government agendas, although 
action in this sphere tends to be sector-based instead of 
specifically focused on youth. Most health initiatives 
targeting youth have to do with prevention, especially 
as related to HIV/AIDS. The governments of Bahamas, 
Belize, Granada, the Cayman Islands, Saint Lucia and 
Trinidad and Tobago have sexual health and HIV/AIDS 
programmes, as well as programmes for the prevention 
of sexually transmitted diseases. In many Caribbean 
countries, drug use prevention and rehabilitation is another 
pillar of youth strategy.
Job training for young people is a widespread 
practice among the countries of the Caribbean. Such 
programmes do help build the human capital of youth 
but, because they focus on labour skills, they may be 
regarded as contributing to physical capital. Anguilla, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the 
British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago 
are among the countries with government job training 
initiatives for young people. However, some of these 
programmes focus more on teaching trades instead of 
providing training or continuing education for accessing 
more sophisticated labour markets where wages and 
benefits have historically been better.
Initiatives to promote business development among 
young people are less common; there are a few in Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica and Jamaica. Scarcer still are direct 
youth job promotion and creation initiatives. The British 
Virgin Islands has an income generation project for single 
mothers, but youth job programmes are less frequent than 
those geared towards training alone.
There is not much information available on public 
youth policies in the spheres of financial capital and natural 
capital, but this does not mean that there are none. The 
countries of the Caribbean have quite a few programmes 
for supporting activities related to fishing, farming and 
microcredit and other financial services. Strictly speaking, 
young people are not barred from participating in these 
programmes or benefitting from the policies. But their 
participation is often limited by the fact that these 
initiatives are designed for generic beneficiaries and 
users. Young people have different potentialities and 
realities than adults; figuring them into the design and 
implementation of public policies for developing the 
natural and financial capital of the youth population 
could improve the outcomes of existing programmes.
Many governments have added youth desks. 
Institutional frameworks encompass youth affairs to 
varying degrees, but they are a constant throughout 
the countries of the Caribbean. There may be different 
approaches to integrating youth issues, with some countries 
stressing the role of young people as active participants 
in policies that target them. Such initiatives tend to 
develop youth social capital more because their impact 
goes beyond formal institutions (government structures) 
to act on informal structures as well by promoting the 
political and participatory empowerment of the youth 
population. Some of the Caribbean countries, such as 
Belize and Jamaica, have programmes whose primary 
objective is to enhance the voice of young people. But 
there is a need for broader institutional channels to 
harness the natural energy of this age group. It is during 
this stage in life that individuals claim some of their 
fundamental political rights (such as the right to vote and 
to be elected to represent the people). There is therefore 
a need for public policies designed to develop youth 
social capital and encourage young people to become 
more involved in the democratic process.   
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The range of realities that young people live calls for 
further study of the social and economic dynamics 
that both create and limit their space for development. 
Generally speaking, today’s youth population in the 
Caribbean has more assets than did their peers in 
previous generations. But there remain unequal structures 
of opportunities that continue to operate as cores of 
exclusion. The acquisition and appropriation of assets 
by young people is, to varying degrees, conditioned 
and stratified by factors such as household income and 
consumption, location and access to basic services. 
To provide an example, the data suggest that 
the high opportunity cost of education beyond the 
secondary level for young people in lower-income 
households or those who live far from urban areas can 
lead them to drop out of school and enter the labour 
market early. Premature entry into the workforce not 
only goes against international child labour standards 
if it takes place during early youth —it also interrupts 
the development of knowledge and capacities and thus 
affects the future by keeping these young people from 
accessing better-paid jobs and confining many of them 
to vulnerable work. 
F. Conclusions
The evidence suggests that there is a need for targeted 
action to guide public youth policy efforts towards the 
enhancement of capacities and opportunities, especially 
for the most socially excluded young people who are being 
deprived of opportunities to develop their capacities. This 
does not just mean improving and ensuring the equality 
of educational achievements and attainments. It also 
entails promoting access by vulnerable sectors of youth to 
social protections (such as health, care and cash transfers) 
political participation, labour intermediation and financial 
services, and providing them with productive support. 
The information provided here shows that in most of 
the countries of the Caribbean, some youth issues are part 
of the government action agenda and have been integrated 
into the government institutional structure. But there is 
a need for more comprehensive youth interventions and 
less sector-based action. Comprehensive social protection 
and promotion systems need to be designed and put in 
place to meet the specific needs of young people in the 
Caribbean and address the main obstacles that they face. 
These measures should be based on the acquisition of 
assets and capacities by youth and on the exercise of 
internationally recognized rights and guarantees.
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Table A-1 
















Annual average variations in the period










1990 10 017.6 ... ... ...
1999 10 990.9 ... ... ... 1990-1999 1.0 ... ... ...
2002 10 528.3 ... ... ... 2002 1.0 ... ... ...
2008 14 898.3 ... ... ... 2008 -0.4 ... ... ...
2009 13 071.2 ... ... ... 2009 -12.3 ... ... ...
2010 12 252.6 ... ... ... 2010 -6.3 ... ... ...
Argentina 1990 3 405.3 3 252.1 7.4 1 343.9
1999 4 584.4 4 317.4 14.3 -1.8 1990-1999 3.4 3.2 0.0 14.9
2002 3 756.2 3 470.2 19.7 41.0 2002 -11.8 -14.2 -19.4 -19.6
2008 5 771.1 5 901.6 7.9 7.2 2008 5.7 8.4 8.8 15.3
2009 5 762.2 5 745.6 8.7 7.7 2009 -0.2 -2.6 11.7 15.3
2010 6 228.7 6 235.4 7.7 10.9 2010 8.1 8.5 12.9 10.0
Bahamas 1990 21 800.9 … ... …
1999 23 184.7 … 7.8 … 1990-1999 0.7 … … …
2002 24 452.8 … 9.1 … 2002 1.4 … … …
2008 23 675.1 … 8.7 … 2008 -2.8 … … …
2009 22 139.8 … 14.2 … 2009 -6.5 … … …
2010 22 024.3 … ... … 2010 -0.5 … … …
Barbados 1990 12 462.0 … 14.7 3.4
1999 13 174.7 … 10.4 2.9 1990-1999 0.6 … … …
2002 13 124.7 … 10.3 0.9 2002 0.3 … … …
2008 15 462.4 … 8.1 7.3 2008 -0.2 … … …
2009 14 760.4 … 10.0 4.4 2009 -4.5 … … …
2010 14 788.8 … 10.8 6.5 2010 0.2 … … …
Belize 1990 2 860.7 … ... …
1999 3 130.0 … 12.8 … 1990-1999 1.0 … … …
2002 3 597.4 … 10.0 … 2002 2.7 … … …
2008 4 098.5 … 8.2 … 2008 1.7 … … …
2009 4 016.9 … 13.1 … 2009 -2.0 … … …
2010 4 034.4 … ... … 2010 0.4 … … …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
1990 849.5 815.3 7.3 18.0
1999 982.0 909.8 7.2 3.1 1990-1999 1.6 1.2 2.1 10.2
2002 986.8 925.6 8.7 2.5 2002 0.4 2.8 3.3 4.7
2008 1 145.8 1 232.4 6.7 11.8 2008 4.3 7.4 -7.4 -1.5
2009 1 164.0 1 203.1 7.9 0.3 2009 1.6 -2.4 3.8 8.3
2010 1 191.7 1 278.0 6.5 7.2 2010 2.4 6.2 … 2.5
Brazil 1990 4 002.2 3 900.2 4.3 2 101.3
1999 4 293.3 4 146.8 7.6 8.9 1990-1999 0.8 0.7 0.2 3.1
2002 4 464.6 4 311.9 11.7 12.5 2002 1.2 1.3 -2.1 4.1
2008 5 325.7 5 292.5 7.9 5.9 2008 4.1 4.6 2.1 3.9
2009 5 266.2 5 193.6 8.1 4.3 2009 -1.1 -1.9 1.3 7.4
2010 5 622.0 5 653.3 6.7 5.9 2010 6.8 8.9 2.1 5.4
Chile 1990 3 927.8 3 535.3 7.8 27.3
1999 6 051.3 5 313.9 10.1 2.3 1990-1999 4.9 4.6 4.0 5.5
2002 6 443.9 5 610.4 9.8 2.8 2002 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.9
2008 7 980.5 7 780.0 7.8 7.1 2008 2.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.2
2009 7 769.6 7 577.3 9.7 -1.4 2009 -2.6 -2.6 4.8 5.4
2010 8 095.7 8 501.3 8.2 3.0 2010 4.2 12.2 2.3 2.4
Colombia 1990 2 827.7 2 657.5 10.5 32.4
1999 3 049.0 2 913.4 19.4 9.2 1990-1999 0.8 1.0 2.6 -0.1
2002 3 112.9 2 954.0 18.1 7.0 2002 0.9 0.6 3.0 0.7
2008 3 845.8 3 805.4 11.5 7.7 2008 2.0 3.4 -1.9 -1.6
2009 3 846.2 3 714.6 13.0 2.0 2009 0.0 -2.4 1.1 3.2
2010 3 955.8 3 880.3 12.4 3.2 2010 2.9 4.5 2.5 1.2
Costa Rica 1990 3 200.4 3 097.3 5.4 27.3
1999 4 179.1 3 985.5 6.2 10.1 1990-1999 3.0 2.8 2.2 1.1
2002 4 149.5 4 178.3 6.8 9.7 2002 0.8 2.3 4.1 -0.7
2008 5 329.6 5 127.0 4.8 13.9 2008 1.4 2.1 -2.0 -1.3
2009 5 193.0 4 949.3 8.5 4.0 2009 -2.6 -3.5 7.7 3.8
2010 5 340.2 5 173.6 7.1 5.8 2010 2.8 4.5 2.1 2.4
Cuba 1990 3 648.2 … 5.4 …
1999 2 853.4 2 795.1 6.3 … 1990-1999 -2.7 … -9.5 …
2002 3 138.2 3 011.2 3.3 7.3 2002 1.2 0.8 9.3 5.2
2008 4 764.3 … 1.6 -0.1 2008 4.1 … 0.1 -1.6
2009 4 833.4 … 1.7 -0.1 2009 1.4 … 4.6 1.2
2010 4 932.7 … 2.5 1.6 2010 2.4 … 3.0 -1.3

















Annual average variations in the period








Dominica 1990 3 766.1 … … …
1999 4 817.7 … … … 1990-1999 2.8 … … …
2002 4 820.9 … … … 2002 -1.8 … … …
2008 6 371.7 … … … 2008 6.6 … … …
2009 6 343.3 … … … 2009 -0.4 … … …
2010 6 346.9 … … … 2010 0.1 … … …
Dominican 1990 2 180.1 2 119.3 ... 79.9
Republic 1999 3 168.3 3 153.8 13.8 5.1 1990-1999 4.2 4.5 … 2.6
2002 3 440.0 3 389.7 16.1 10.5 2002 4.2 4.2 … -0.6
2008 4 397.6 4 165.4 14.1 4.5 2008 3.8 4.2 … -6.5
2009 4 488.0 4 323.3 14.9 5.7 2009 2.1 3.8 … 7.1
2010 4 772.9 4 579.9 14.3 6.3 2010 6.3 5.9 … -0.4
Ecuador 1990 2 310.6 2 101.2 6.1 49.5
1999 2 269.6 2 065.8 14.4 60.7 1990-1999 -0.2 -0.2 3.7 2.1
2002 2 463.2 2 262.2 8.6 9.4 2002 2.2 3.5 10.9 0.9
2008 3 140.2 3 258.8 6.9 8.8 2008 6.1 11.3 … 8.6
2009 3 118.7 3 097.5 8.5 4.3 2009 -0.7 -4.9 … 3.6
2010 3 196.2 3 298.9 7.6 3.3 2010 2.5 6.5 … 6.3
El Salvador 1990 1 821.6 1 754.7 10.0 19.3
1999 2 521.7 2 476.3 6.9 -1.0 1990-1999 3.7 3.9 … 0.1
2002 2 642.4 2 605.9 6.2 2.8 2002 1.9 1.5 -0.7 -1.9
2008 3 045.7 2 955.5 5.5 5.5 2008 0.8 0.6 -3.1 0.2
2009 2 936.4 2 846.4 7.1 -0.2 2009 -3.6 -3.7 3.5 9.7
2010 2 963.9 2 871.0 ... 2.1 2010 0.9 0.9 1.0 -1.0
Grenada 1990 3 866.9 … … …
1999 4 702.4 … … … 1990-1999 2.2 … … …
2002 5 537.1 … … … 2002 3.6 … … …
2008 6 894.2 … … … 2008 0.5 … … …
2009 6 318.9 … … … 2009 -8.3 … … …
2010 6 266.5 … … … 2010 -0.8 … … …
Guatemala 1990 1 758.1 1 702.8 ... 59.6
1999 2 063.2 2 063.0 ... 4.9 1990-1999 1.8 2.2 5.4 -7.4
2002 2 112.6 2 101.3 5.4 6.3 2002 1.3 0.4 -0.9 0.3
2008 2 299.9 2 218.4 ... 9.4 2008 0.8 0.2 -2.6 -4.9
2009 2 256.1 2 198.0 ... -0.3 2009 -1.9 -0.9 0.1 5.2
2010 2 262.8 2 202.6 … 5.4 2010 0.3 0.2 2.8 3.7
Guyana 1990 1 099.6 … … …
1999 1 782.4 … … … 1990-1999 5.5 … … …
2002 1 801.3 … … … 2002 0.7 … … …
2008 2 007.0 … … … 2008 1.7 … … …
2009 2 070.8 … … … 2009 3.2 … … …
2010 2 143.3 … … … 2010 3.5 … … …
Haiti 1990 600.8 616.5 … 26.1
1999 502.1 508.6 … 9.7 1990-1999 -2.0 -2.1 … -7.3
2002 475.5 474.3 … 14.8 2002 -1.8 -2.3 … -8.9
2008 453.3 440.9 … 17.0 2008 -0.8 -3.7 … -13.0
2009 458.8 458.2 … 2.1 2009 1.2 3.9 … 28.0
2010 428.6 428.8 … 6.2 2010 -6.6 -6.4 … 58.0
Honduras 1990 1 147.8 1 068.8 7.8 36.4
1999 1 204.1 1 269.7 5.3 10.9 1990-1999 0.5 1.9 … -1.1
2002 1 275.2 1 259.1 6.1 8.1 2002 1.7 -0.1 … 2.0
2008 1 570.9 1 431.9 4.1 10.8 2008 2.2 -1.0 … 0.2
2009 1 507.2 1 424.8 4.9 3.0 2009 -4.1 -0.5 … 70.5
2010 1 518.9 1 449.1 6.4 6.5 2010 0.8 1.7 … -4.5
Jamaica 1990 4 041.1 … 15.3 29.8
1999 3 994.4 … 15.7 6.8 1990-1999 -0.1 … … …
2002 4 009.1 … 14.2 7.3 2002 0.1 … … …
2008 4 250.4 … 10.6 16.9 2008 -1.0 … … …
2009 4 107.9 … 11.4 10.2 2009 -3.4 … … …
2010 4 040.7 … 12.4 11.8 2010 -1.6 … … …

















Annual average variations in the period








Mexico 1990 6 528.7 6 281.5 2.7 29.9
1999 7 410.2 7 196.7 3.7 12.3 1990-1999 1.4 1.5 0.7 -4.1
2002 7 650.6 7 423.9 3.9 5.7 2002 -0.5 -0.1 1.9 0.8
2008 8 573.8 8 520.3 4.9 6.5 2008 0.2 0.9 2.2 -2.1
2009 7 953.1 7 865.2 6.6 3.6 2009 -7.2 -7.7 0.6 -1.5
2010 8 333.5 8 287.4 6.4 4.4 2010 4.8 5.4 … 0.8
Nicaragua 1990 722.5 599.4 7.6 1 3490.2
1999 798.4 781.9 10.7 7.2 1990-1999 1.1 3.0 3.1 0.8
2002 824.5 793.1 11.6 4.0 2002 -0.6 -0.0 3.5 3.7
2008 952.3 900.9 8.0 12.7 2008 1.4 -0.5 -3.7 7.6
2009 926.2 897.6 10.5 1.8 2009 -2.7 -0.4 5.8 16.9
2010 955.6 926.0 9.7 9.1 2010 3.2 3.2 1.3 5.5
Panama 1990 3 170.1 3 236.7 20.0 0.8
1999 4 214.5 4 149.7 13.6 1.5 1990-1999 3.2 2.8 0.7 1.7
2002 4 205.2 4 261.5 16.5 1.8 2002 0.4 2.3 -3.0 -1.1
2008 6 096.0 5 428.3 6.5 6.8 2008 8.3 5.3 -4.1 2.7
2009 6 230.2 5 695.9 7.9 1.9 2009 2.2 4.9 2.7 -2.5
2010 6 600.8 5 948.8 7.7 4.9 2010 5.9 4.4 1.9 6.4
Paraguay 1990 1 299.7 1 335.7 6.6 44.0
1999 1 300.7 1 363.1 9.4 5.4 1990-1999 0.0 0.2 1.3 -1.3
2002 1 206.1 1 216.8 14.7 14.6 2002 -2.0 -4.1 -5.0 -0.8
2008 1 412.3 1 509.6 7.4 7.5 2008 3.9 9.2 -0.7 -2.5
2009 1 334.2 1 392.6 8.2 1.9 2009 -5.5 -7.8 4.5 0.7
2010 1 508.6 1 581.7 7.8 7.2 2010 13.1 13.6 0.7 0.5
Peru 1990 1 999.2 1 889.0 8.3 7 646.8
1999 2 453.4 2 343.5 9.2 3.7 1990-1999 2.3 2.4 0.6 2.3
2002 2 543.3 2 399.5 9.4 1.5 2002 3.6 3.5 4.6 -0.2
2008 3 544.5 3 436.4 8.4 6.6 2008 8.5 6.5 2.2 2.5
2009 3 534.6 3 405.3 8.4 0.2 2009 -0.3 -0.9 3.1 -2.9
2010 3 800.7 3 763.0 7.9 2.1 2010 7.5 10.5 2.6 -1.0
Suriname 1990 2 627.6 … 15.8 …
1999 2 348.1 … 14.0 … 1990-1999 -1.2 … … …
2002 2 490.6 … 10.0 … 2002 1.2 … … …
2008 3 044.2 … ... … 2008 3.3 … … …
2009 3 080.3 … ... … 2009 1.2 … … …
2010 3 185.2 … ... … 2010 3.4 … … …
Trinidad  
and Tobago
1990 5 827.6 … 20.1 9.5
1999 7 936.4 … 13.2 3.4 1990-1999 3.5 … … …
2002 9 429.1 … 10.4 4.3 2002 7.5 … … …
2008 14 691.8 … 4.6 14.5 2008 2.0 … … …
2009 14 118.7 … 5.3 1.3 2009 -3.9 … … …
2010 14 419.6 … 5.8 13.4 2010 2.1 … … …
Uruguay 1990 3 964.6 4 118.6 8.5 128.9
1999 5 092.0 5 164.5 11.3 4.2 1990-1999 2.8 2.5 1.4 -5.3
2002 4 286.6 4 447.8 17.0 25.9 2002 -11.0 -10.5 -10.7 -10.1
2008 6 302.6 6 139.0 7.9 9.2 2008 8.3 8.3 3.6 10.8
2009 6 444.1 6 318.5 7.6 5.9 2009 2.2 2.9 7.3 9.9




1990 5 286.9 4 326.7 10.4 36.5
1999 5 168.5 3 781.7 15.0 20.0 1990-1999 -0.3 -1.5 -3.9 -0.8
2002 4 772.3 3 741.0 15.8 31.2 2002 -10.5 -10.8 -11.0 -5.5
2008 6 509.4 7 591.3 7.3 31.9 2008 3.5 9.5 -4.5 -6.4
2009 6 198.9 6 350.1 7.8 26.9 2009 -4.8 -16.3 -6.6 -7.2
2010 6 010.1 6 437.0 8.6 27.4 2010 -3.0 1.4 -5.2 -5.6
Latin America and 
the Caribbean c
1990 3 970.9 3 687.3 ... 1 376.8
1999 4 456.1 4 214.4 11.0 9.7 1990-1999 1.3 1.5 … …
2002 4 514.5 4 272.3 11.1 12.2 2002 -0.9 -0.9 … …
2008 5 478.2 5 373.2 7.3 8.2 2008 2.8 2.1 … …
2009 5 309.6 5 120.2 8.1 4.7 2009 -3.1 -4.7 … …
2010 5 571.1 5 473.1 7.3 6.5 2010 4.9 6.9 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries.
a Real per capita gross national income.
b Simple average of December-to-December variations for each year.
c The aggregate figure for Latin America and the Caribbean was calculated by weighting the figures for all the countries for which information was available for each indicator.
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Table A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 1980-2020
(Thousands at mid-year) 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Latin America
Argentina  28 094  30 305  32 581  34 835  36 896  38 747  40 738  42 676  44 486
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  5 355  5 964  6 669  7 482  8 317  9 182  10 031  10 854  11 638
Brazil  121 618  136 124  149 527  161 620  174 167  186 110  195 498  202 954  209 090
Chile  11 174  12 102  13 179  14 395  15 412  16 294  17 133  17 914  18 606
Colombia  26 881  29 984  33 186  36 436  39 763  43 046  46 299  49 385  52 278
Costa Rica  2 347  2 697  3 076  3 475  3 929  4 327  4 639  4 962  5 255
Cuba  9 823  10 064  10 564  10 885  11 075  11 189  11 203  11 213  11 193
Dominican Republic  5 808  6 487  7 179  7 888  8 560  9 237  9 899  10 515  11 077
Ecuador  7 961  9 099  10 272  11 397  12 305  13 060  13 773  14 550  15 349
El Salvador  4 660  4 996  5 326  5 724  5 942  6 057  6 192  6 381  6 616
Guatemala  7 014  7 935  8 908  10 004  11 229  12 709  14 376  16 195  18 076
Haiti  5 691  6 388  7 109  7 837  8 578  9 295  10 089  10 918  11 752
Honduras  3 634  4 236  4 901  5 589  6 234  6 898  7 621  8 392  9 141
Mexico  69 321  76 808  83 906  91 621  98 957  105 001  110 675  115 735  120 099
Nicaragua  3 250  3 709  4 137  4 658  5 100  5 455  5 822  6 189  6 529
Panama  1 949  2 176  2 411  2 670  2 950  3 231  3 508  3 773  4 027
Paraguay  3 198  3 702  4 248  4 799  5 349  5 904  6 460  7 007  7 533
Peru  17 324  19 519  21 765  23 927  25 997  27 833  29 495  31 197  32 881
Uruguay  2 914  3 009  3 106  3 218  3 318  3 324  3 372  3 430  3 493
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  15 091  17 317  19 731  22 078  24 402  26 724  29 043  31 291  33 412
Latin America  353 109  392 620  431 779  470 537  508 479  543 622  575 867  605 531  632 530
The Caribbean
Anguilla   7   7   8   10   11   14   15   17   17
Antigua and Barbuda   70   66   62   69   78   84   89   93   97
Aruba   60   63   62   80   90   101   107   109   111
Bahamas   211   235   256   280   298   319   343   363   383
Barbados   249   254   260   263   268   271   273   276   279
Belize   144   166   190   220   251   281   312   344   377
British Virgin Islands   11   13   16   18   20   22   23   24   25
Cayman Islands   17   20   26   33   40   52   56   59   60
Dominica   75   74   71   71   70   69   68   68   68
Grenada   89   100   96   100   102   103   104   107   108
Guyana   777   752   725   728   733   746   754   763   773
Jamaica  2 132  2 297  2 365  2 462  2 582  2 682  2 741  2 790  2 828
Montserrat   12   11   11   10   5   6   6   6   6
Netherlands Antilles   173   182   191   190   180   186   201   208   212
Puerto Rico  3 196  3 379  3 529  3 702  3 814  3 782  3 749  3 742  3 747
Saint Kitts and Nevis   43   42   41   43   46   49   52   56   59
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   100   104   107   108   108   109   109   109   110
Saint Lucia   118   126   138   147   157   165   174   183   190
Suriname   366   376   407   436   467   499   525   548   569
Trinidad and Tobago  1 078  1 173  1 215  1 261  1 292  1 315  1 341  1 363  1 373
Turks and Caicos Islands   8   10   12   15   19   31   38   41   43
United States Virgin Islands   98   105   103   107   109   109   109   108   106
The Caribbean a  29 695  31 903  34 205  36 439  38 441  40 177  41 646  43 041  44 322
Latin America and the Caribbean b  362 326  402 393  443 032  482 647  521 429  557 038  590 082  622 437  652 182
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database and Social Indicators and Statistics Database (BADEINSO);  Latin American 
and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, 2010 revision and United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision [online] 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.
a Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.         
b Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Puerto Rico, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay.  
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Table A-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GLOBAL FERTILITY RATES BY COUNTRY AND FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1980-2020
(Children per woman) 
Country 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Latin America
Argentina   3.15   3.05   2.90   2.63   2.35   2.25   2.16   2.08
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)   5.30   5.00   4.80   4.32   3.96   3.50   3.09   2.75
Brazil   3.80   3.10   2.60   2.45   2.25   1.90   1.70   1.60
Chile   2.67   2.65   2.55   2.21   2.00   1.94   1.89   1.85
Colombia   3.68   3.24   3.00   2.75   2.55   2.45   2.30   2.19
Costa Rica   3.53   3.37   2.95   2.58   2.28   1.96   1.97   1.85
Cuba   1.85   1.85   1.65   1.61   1.63   1.50   1.54   1.57
Dominican Republic   4.15   3.65   3.31   2.98   2.83   2.67   2.48   2.32
Ecuador   4.70   4.00   3.40   3.10   2.82   2.58   2.38   2.22
El Salvador   4.80   4.20   3.73   3.30   2.60   2.35   2.22   2.13
Guatemala   6.10   5.70   5.45   5.00   4.60   4.15   3.71   3.29
Haiti   6.21   5.70   5.15   4.62   4.00   3.54   3.19   2.91
Honduras   6.00   5.37   4.92   4.30   3.72   3.31   2.95   2.66
Mexico   4.25   3.63   3.19   2.67   2.40   2.21   2.04   1.89
Nicaragua   5.85   5.00   4.50   3.60   3.00   2.76   2.55   2.37
Panama   3.52   3.20   2.87   2.79   2.70   2.56   2.41   2.29
Paraguay   5.20   4.77   4.31   3.88   3.48   3.08   2.76   2.51
Peru   4.65   4.10   3.57   3.10   2.80   2.60   2.38   2.22
Uruguay   2.57   2.53   2.49   2.30   2.20   2.12   2.03   1.96
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)   3.96   3.65   3.25   2.94   2.72   2.55   2.39   2.26
Latin America   3.95   3.44   3.04   2.74   2.50   2.27   2.09   1.98
The Caribbean
Aruba   2.36   2.30   2.17   1.95   1.82   1.74   1.67   1.63
Bahamas   3.05   2.65   2.64   2.33   1.87   1.91   1.88   1.85
Barbados   1.92   1.77   1.73   1.64   1.50   1.53   1.58   1.62
Belize   5.40   4.70   4.35   3.85   3.35   2.94   2.68   2.48
Grenada   4.23   4.14   3.46   2.81   2.43   2.30   2.17   2.06
Guyana   3.26   2.70   2.55   2.50   2.43   2.33   2.19   2.07
Jamaica   3.55   3.10   2.84   2.67   2.54   2.40   2.26   2.15
Netherlands Antilles   2.36   2.30   2.28   2.12   2.09   1.98   1.90   1.84
Puerto Rico   2.46   2.26   2.18   1.99   1.84   1.83   1.76   1.70
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   3.64   3.10   2.85   2.55   2.24   2.13   2.00   1.88
Saint Lucia   4.20   3.65   3.15   2.60   2.10   2.05   1.91   1.79
Suriname   3.70   3.00   2.60   2.80   2.60   2.42   2.27   2.14
Trinidad and Tobago   3.22   2.80   2.10   1.73   1.61   1.64   1.63   1.62
United States Virgin Islands   3.70   3.09   3.09   2.50   2.15   2.05   1.94   1.85
The Caribbean a   3.41   3.14   2.84   2.62   2.49   2.36   2.25   2.15
Latin America and the Caribbean b   3.93   3.42   3.02   2.73   2.53   2.30   2.17   2.05
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database and Social Indicators and Statistics Database (BADEINSO);  Latin American 
and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC, 2010 revision and United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision [online] 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.
a Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.       
b Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Puerto Rico, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay.  
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Table A-4 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE LEVELS, 1990-2010
(Percentages) 
Country Year




















Argentina 1990 … … 21.2 … … … … 5.2 … …
1999 … 23.7 19.7 28.5 … … 6.7 4.8 8.8 …
2006 … 21.0 19.3 22.8 … … 7.2 6.7 7.9 …
2009 … 11.3 9.6 13.3 … … 3.8 3.1 4.5 …




1989 … 52.6 … … … … 23.0 … … …
1999 60.6 48.7 45.0 63.9 80.7 36.4 19.8 17.5 29.0 64.7
2002 62.4 52.0 48.0 58.2 79.2 37.1 21.3 18.8 25.0 62.9
2007 54.0 42.4 40.6 44.9 75.8 31.2 16.2 15.4 17.4 59.0
Brazil 1990 48.0 41.2 … … 70.6 23.4 16.7 … … 46.1
1999 37.5 32.9 … … 55.3 12.9 9.3 … … 27.1
2002 37.8 34.4 … … 55.7 12.6 10.0 … … 26.4
2008 25.8 22.8 … … 41.2 7.3 5.5 … … 16.5
2009 24.9 22.1 … … 39.3 7.0 5.5 … … 15.2
Chile 1990 38.6 38.5 32.1 43.5 38.8 13.0 12.5 9.3 14.9 15.6
1998 21.7 20.7 14.6 25.0 27.5 5.6 5.1 3.3 6.4 8.6
2003 18.7 18.5 12.4 22.7 20.0 4.7 4.4 2.8 5.6 6.2
2006 13.7 13.9 10.4 16.4 12.3 3.2 3.2 2.4 3.7 3.5
2009 11.5 11.7 8.4 14.0 10.4 3.6 3.5 2.5 4.1 4.4
Colombia 1991 56.1 52.7 … … 60.7 26.1 20.0 … … 34.3
1999 54.9 50.6 43.1 53.1 61.8 26.8 21.9 19.6 22.7 34.6
   2008 b 46.1 40.0 22.6 44.8 65.3 17.9 13.1 3.9 15.7 32.7
   2009 b 45.7 39.7 22.1 44.7 64.5 16.5 12.4 4.1 14.7 29.2
   2010 b 44.3 38.5 20.2 43.7 62.7 14.8 11.1 3.3 13.3 26.7
Costa Rica 1990 26.3 24.9 22.8 27.7 27.3 10.1 6.9 5.7 8.4 12.5
1999 20.3 18.1 17.5 18.7 22.3 7.8 5.4 4.3 6.5 9.8
2008 16.4 15.6 13.9 22.3 17.5 5.5 4.3 3.7 6.4 7.3
2009 18.9 18.5 16.7 25.4 19.5 6.9 5.4 4.9 7.3 9.1
2010 18.5 17.0 15.3 24.5 20.8 6.8 4.8 4.3 7.3 9.9
Dominican 
Republic
2002 47.1 42.4 … … 55.9 20.7 16.5 … … 28.6
2008 44.3 42.0 … … 49.1 22.6 19.5 … … 29.0
2009 41.1 39.3 … … 44.7 21.0 19.4 … … 24.3
2010 41.4 39.6 … … 45.2 20.9 18.1 … … 26.5
Ecuador 1990 … 62.1 … … … … 26.2 … … …
1999 … 63.5 … … … … 31.3 … … …
2008 42.7 39.0 … … 50.2 18.0 14.2 … … 25.6
2009 42.2 40.2 … … 46.3 18.1 15.5 … … 23.3
2010 39.2 37.1 … … 43.2 16.4 14.2 … … 20.8
El Salvador 1995 54.2 45.8 34.7 55.1 64.4 21.7 14.9 8.8 20.1 29.9
1999 49.8 38.7 29.8 48.7 65.1 21.9 13.0 7.7 19.0 34.3
2004 47.5 41.2 33.2 48.6 56.8 19.0 13.8 8.4 18.8 26.6
2009 47.9 42.3 32.6 49.5 57.6 17.3 12.8 7.3 16.8 25.2
2010 46.6 41.1 29.7 49.3 55.8 16.7 12.7 6.4 17.2 23.5
Guatemala 1989 69.4 53.6 … … 77.7 42.0 26.4 … … 50.2
1998 61.1 49.1 … … 69.0 31.6 16.0 … … 41.8
2002 60.2 45.3 … … 68.0 30.9 18.1 … … 37.6
2006 54.8 42.0 … … 66.5 29.1 14.8 … … 42.2
Honduras 1990 80.8 70.4 59.9 79.5 88.1 60.9 43.6 31.0 54.5 72.9
1999 79.7 71.7 64.4 78.8 86.3 56.8 42.9 33.7 51.9 68.0
2002 77.3 66.7 56.9 74.4 86.1 54.4 36.5 25.1 45.3 69.5
2007 68.9 56.9 47.8 64.0 78.8 45.6 26.2 18.0 32.5 61.7
2010 67.4 56.3 46.2 64.2 76.5 42.8 26.0 18.3 31.9 56.8
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Cuadro A-4 (concluded)
Country Year




















Mexico 1989 47.7 42.1 … … 56.7 18.7 13.1 … … 27.9
1998 46.9 38.9 … … 58.5 18.5 9.7 … … 31.1
2002 39.4 32.2 … … 51.2 12.6 6.9 … … 21.9
2008 34.8 29.2 … … 44.6 11.2 6.4 … … 19.8
2010 36.3 32.3 … … 42.9 13.3 8.5 … … 21.3
Nicaragua 1993 73.6 66.3 58.3 73.0 82.7 48.4 36.8 29.5 43.0 62.8
1998 69.9 64.0 57.0 68.9 77.0 44.6 33.9 25.8 39.5 57.5
2001 69.3 63.8 50.8 72.1 77.0 42.4 33.4 24.5 39.1 55.1
2005 61.9 54.4 48.7 58.1 71.5 31.9 20.8 16.4 23.7 46.1
Panama 1991 … 31.0 … … … … 10.8 … … …
1999 … 19.5 … … … … 5.5 … … …
2008 27.7 17.0 … … 46.3 13.5 4.7 … … 28.8
2009 26.4 16.3 … … 43.9 11.1 4.6 … … 22.3
2010 25.8 15.1 … … 44.8 12.6 4.7 … … 26.6
Paraguay 1990 … … 43.2 … … … … 13.1 … …
1999 59.0 49.1 39.6 61.2 70.4 31.8 17.1 8.9 27.7 48.8
2008 56.9 50.3 45.7 57.4 66.3 30.1 20.9 17.4 26.2 43.1
2009 56.0 48.2 43.9 54.9 67.1 30.4 19.0 15.8 23.9 46.6
2010 54.8 46.5 46.5 46.5 66.6 30.7 19.4 19.0 20.0 46.8
Peru 1997 47.5 33.6 … … 72.7 25.0 9.7 … … 52.7
1999 48.6 36.1 … … 72.5 22.4 9.3 … … 47.3
    2008 c 36.2 23.5 … … 59.8 12.6 3.4 … … 29.7
    2009 c 34.8 21.1 … … 60.3 11.5 2.8 … … 27.8
    2010 c 31.3 19.1 … … 54.2 9.8 2.5 … … 23.3
Uruguay 1990 … 17.9 11.3 24.3 … … 3.4 1.8 5.0 …
1999 … 9.4 9.8 9.0 … … 1.8 1.9 1.6 …
2008 13.7 14.0 15.2 13.1 9.4 3.4 3.5 4.6 2.7 2.4
2009 10.4 10.7 12.8 9.1 5.9 1.9 2.0 3.1 1.1 1.3




1990 39.8 38.6 29.2 41.2 46.0 14.4 13.1 8.0 14.5 21.3
1999 49.4 49.4 … … … 21.7 21.7 … … …
2002 48.6 48.6 … … … 22.2 22.2 … … …
2008 27.6 27.6 … … … 9.9 9.9 … … …
2010 27.8 27.8 … … … 10.7 10.7 … … …
Latin
America e
1980 40.5 29.5 … … 59.8 18.6 10.6 … … 32.7
1990 48.4 41.4 … … 65.2 22.6 15.3 … … 40.1
1999 43.8 37.1 … … 64.1 18.6 12.0 … … 38.7
2009 33.0 27.3 … … 54.9 13.1 8.4 … … 31.4
2010 31.4 26.0 … … 52.6 12.3 7.8 … … 30.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries.
a Includes persons below the indigence line or living in extreme poverty.
b Figures from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) of Colombia. The values shown for 2002 on are not strictly 
comparable with those for earlier years owing to methodological changes made by DNP and DANE.
c Figures from the Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. The values shown for 2004 on are not strictly comparable with those for earlier years owing to methodological 
changes made by INEI.
d From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
e Estimate for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti.
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Table A-5 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE LINES (PL AND IL)









IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Argentina    1990 c September A 255 928 511 856 … … 5 791.0 44.2 88.4 … …
1999 September $  72  143 … …  1.0 71.6 143.3 … …
2006 2nd semester $  138  276 … …  3.1 45.1 90.2 … …
2009 Year $  165  342 … …  3.7 44.6 92.1 … …




1989 October Bs  68  137 … …  2.9 23.8 47.5 … …
1999 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  333  130  228  5.9 28.0 56.1 21.9 38.3
2002 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  334  133  234  7.4 22.6 45.2 18.1 31.6
2007 Year Bs  232  449  180  307  7.9 29.6 57.2 22.9 39.1
Brazil 1990 September Cr$ 3 109 6 572 2 634 4 967  75.5 41.2 87.0 34.9 65.8
1999 September R$  51  126  43  91  1.9 26.7 66.2 22.7 48.1
2002 September R$  63  155  54  114 3.35 18.9 46.3 16.3 34.0
2008 September R$  96  225  84  177 1.80 53.2 125.3 46.7 98.6
2009 September R$  100  238  88  188 1.82 54.8 130.7 48.2 103.4
Chile 1990 November Ch$ 9 297 18 594 7 164 12 538  327.4 28.4 56.8 21.9 38.3
1998 November Ch$ 18 944 37 889 14 598 25 546  463.3 40.9 81.8 31.5 55.1
2003 November Ch$ 21 856 43 712 16 842 29 473  625.5 34.9 69.9 26.9 47.1
2006 November Ch$ 23 549 47 099 18 146 31 756  527.4 44.7 89.3 34.4 60.2
2009 November Ch$ 31 422 56 383 24 213 38 638  507.8 61.9 111.0 47.7 76.1
Colombia 1991 August Col$ 18 093 36 186 14 915 26 102  645.6 28.0 56.1 23.1 40.4
1999 August Col$ 69 838 139 716 57 629 100 851 1 873.7 37.3 74.6 30.8 53.8
2008 Year Col$ 124 310 292 973 92 449 195 775 1 967.7 63.2 148.9 47.0 99.5
2009 Year Col$ 128 600 305 781 95 319 204 448 2 166.8 59.4 141.1 44.0 94.4
2010 Year Col$ 129 398 312 989 95 407 208 886 1 898.6 68.2 164.9 50.3 110.0
Costa Rica 1990 June ¢ 2 639 5 278 2 081 3 642  89.7 29.4 58.9 23.2 40.6
1999 June ¢ 10 708 21 415 8 463 14 811  285.3 37.5 75.1 29.7 51.9
2008 June ¢ 31 325 58 245 24 423 40 165  519.7 60.3 112.1 47.0 77.3
2009 June ¢ 34 514 63 099 26 910 43 626  576.7 59.9 109.4 46.7 75.7
2010 June ¢ 36 475 67 171 28 403 46 300  535.1 68.2 125.5 53.1 86.5
Dominican
Republic
2002 September RD$  793 1 569  714 1 285  18.8 42.2 83.5 38.0 68.4
2008 September RD$ 2 091 4 010 1 882 3 263  35.0 59.7 114.5 53.8 93.2
2009 September RD$ 2 080 3 933 1 872 3 206  36.2 57.5 108.6 51.7 88.6
2010 September RD$ 2 204 4 152 2 062 3 465  37.1 59.4 111.8 55.5 93.3
Ecuador 1990 November S/. 18 465 36 930 … …  854.8 21.6 43.2 … …
1999 October S/. 301 716 603 432 … … 15 656.8 19.3 38.5 … …
2008 November US$  49  91  34  57  1.0 48.7 90.6 34.3 56.5
2009 November US$  50  94  36  59  1.0 50.4 94.2 35.6 58.7
2010 November US$  53  98  38  61  1.0 53.4 1.8 20.5 3.0
El Salvador 1995 Jan.-Dec. ¢  254  508  158  315  8.8 29.0 58.1 18.0 35.9
1999 Jan.-Dec. ¢  293  586  189  378  8.8 33.5 66.9 21.6 43.2
2001 Jan.-Dec. ¢  305  610  197  394  8.8 34.9 69.7 22.5 45.0
2009 Year ¢  417  829  270  536  8.8 47.7 94.8 30.8 61.2
2010 Year ¢  420  837  271  541  8.8 48.0 95.6 31.0 61.8
Guatemala 1989 Abril Q  64  127  50  88  2.7 23.6 47.1 18.7 32.7
1998 Dec. 1997-
Dec. 1998
Q  260  520  197  344  6.4 40.7 81.5 30.8 54.0
2002 Oct.-Nov. Q  334  669  255  446  7.7 43.6 87.2 33.3 58.2
2006 Mar.-Sept. Q  467  935  362  633  7.6 61.5 123.0 47.6 83.3
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Table A-5 (concluded)
 Honduras: (L) Lempira
 Mexico: ($) Peso; (MN$) Nuevo Peso
 Nicaragua: (C$) Córdoba
 Panama: (B/.) Balboa
 Paraguay: (G/.) Guaraní
 Peru: (N$) Peso
 Dominican Republic: (RD$) Peso
 Uruguay: (Nur$) Nuevo Peso; ($) Peso









IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Honduras 1990 August L  115  229  81  141  4.3 26.5 52.9 18.6 32.6
1999 August L  561 1 122  395  691  14.3 39.3 78.6 27.7 48.4
2002 August L  689 1 378  485  849  16.6 41.6 83.3 29.3 51.3
2007 August L  945 1 872  665 1 155  18.9 50.0 99.1 35.2 61.1
2010 April L 1 145 2 263  806 1 396  18.9 60.6 119.7 42.6 73.9
Mexico 1989 3rd quarter $ 86 400 172 800 68 810 120 418 2 510.0 34.4 68.8 27.4 48.0
1998 3rd quarter MN$  537 1 074  385  674  9.5 56.8 113.6 40.7 71.3
2002 3rd quarter MN$  742 1 484  530  928  9.9 75.0 150.1 53.6 93.8
2008 Aug.-Nov. MN$ 1 006 1 955  719 1 227  11.6 87.1 169.3 62.2 106.3
2010 Aug.-Nov. MN$ 1 147 2 100  819 1 330  12.7 90.4 165.6 64.6 104.9
Nicaragua 1993 21 feb.-12 jun. C$  167  334  129  225  4.6 36.6 73.3 28.2 49.4
1997 October C$  247  493 … …  9.8 25.3 50.5 … …
1998 15 Apr.-31 Aug. C$  275  550  212  370  10.4 26.4 52.7 20.3 35.5
2001 30 Apr.-31 July C$  369  739  284  498  13.4 27.6 55.2 21.3 37.2
2005 July-Oct. C$  491  981  378  661  16.9 29.1 58.2 22.4 39.2
Panama 1991 August B 35.0 70.1 … …  1.0 35.0 70.1 … …
1999 July B 40.7 81.4 … …  1.0 40.7 81.4 … …
2008 July B 54.8 103.1 42.4 70.5  1.0 54.8 103.1 42.4 70.5
2009 July B 57.4 105.8 44.5 72.6  1.0 57.4 105.8 44.5 72.6
2010 July B 59.2 109.3 45.9 74.9  1.0 59.2 109.3 45.9 74.9
Paraguay    1990 d June, July, Aug. G 43 242 86 484 … … 1 207.8 35.8 71.6 … …
1999 July-Dec. G 138 915 277 831 106 608 186 565 3 311.4 42.0 83.9 32.2 56.3
2008 Oct.-Dec. G 295 998 562 817 226 691 379 950 4 712.7 62.8 119.4 48.1 80.6
2009 Oct.-Dec. G 312 371 580 796 239 191 393 347 4 786.9 65.3 121.3 50.0 82.2
2010 Oct.-Dec. G 348 002 628 577 266 431 427 538 4 724.3 73.7 133.1 56.4 90.5
Peru 1997 4th quarter N$  103  192  83  128  2.7 42.2 84.3 31.6 55.3
1999 4th quarter N$  109  213  89  141  3.5 31.2 61.2 25.5 40.5
2008 4th quarter N$  146  280  128  194  3.1 47.3 90.6 41.5 62.9
2009 4th quarter N$  150  286  133  203  2.9 52.1 99.3 46.2 70.5
2010 4th quarter N$  155  293  137  208  2.8 55.3 104.8 48.9 74.4
Uruguay 1990 2nd semester NUr$ 41 972 83 944 … … 1 358.0 30.9 61.8 … …
1999 Year $  640 1 280 … …  11.3 56.5 112.9 … …
2008 Year $ 1 588 2 957 1 223 2 013  21.0 75.8 141.1 58.4 96.1
2009 Year $ 1 652 3 095 1 298 2 148  22.6 73.2 137.1 57.5 95.2




1990 2nd semester Bs 1 924 3 848 1 503 2 630  49.4 39.0 77.9 30.4 53.2
   1999 e 2nd semester Bs 48 737 95 876 … …  626.3 77.8 153.1 … …
   2002 e 2nd semester Bs 80 276 154 813 … … 1 161.0 69.2 133.4 … …
   2008 e 2nd semester Bs 301 540 525 958 … … 2 147.0 140.5 245.0 … …
   2010 e 2nd semester Bs 515 529 865 826 … … 2 582.0 199.7 335.3 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a National currencies:
 Argentina: (A) Austral; ($) Peso
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of): (Bs) Boliviano
 Brazil: (CR$) Cruzeiro; (R$) Real
 Chile: (Ch$) Peso
 Colombia: (Col$) Peso
 Costa Rica: (¢ ) Colón
 Ecuador: (S/.) Sucre, 1990-2001. Since 2002, United States dollar (US$).
 El Salvador: (¢ ) Colón
 Guatemala: (Q) Quetzal
b International Monetary Fund “rf” series.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Asunción.
e National total.
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Table A-6 



















Argentina a 1999 74 53 94 97 59 44 36 62 61 27
2002 72 48 93 96 60 46 35 64 67 27
2006 75 54 94 96 64 50 38 67 69 34
2009 74 51 93 96 61 49 34 68 70 33




1997 82 60 94 99 83 60 46 66 73 56
1999 81 59 94 98 82 62 48 67 75 61
2002 83 64 94 98 85 62 46 72 75 58
2007 82 61 94 99 82 62 44 69 77 62
Brazil 1990 84 81 96 95 63 44 47 54 52 22
1999 82 75 95 94 64 54 52 67 66 33
2002 81 73 94 94 63 56 53 69 68 33
2008 80 72 95 94 63 58 54 73 71 36
2009 80 71 95 94 62 58 54 74 72 36
Chile 1990 74 51 94 95 58 33 27 44 42 18
1998 75 46 93 96 64 39 30 54 50 23
2003 73 42 92 96 64 42 30 58 56 27
2006 73 43 92 95 65 43 30 61 59 29
2009 71 43 91 94 62 42 30 64 59 28
Colombia 1991 85 71 97 98 76 44 40 57 52 25
1999 81 64 97 97 71 50 44 66 63 26
2008 79 58 95 96 68 51 39 67 66 32
2009 81 61 96 97 71 54 43 70 70 36
2010 81 62 97 97 72 56 44 73 72 38
Costa Rica 1990 83 74 96 96 64 33 35 41 39 12
1999 82 68 96 96 64 39 37 48 49 18
2008 78 60 96 97 66 45 38 62 57 25
2009 77 58 96 96 64 45 36 62 58 27
2010 76 57 95 95 63 43 34 62 58 26
Cuba b 2002 65 40 82 86 47 35 19 46 54 18
2008 68 43 89 94 48 41 31 59 62 20
Dominican
Republic
2002 75 54 91 94 68 39 29 54 54 22
2008 75 56 90 93 66 40 29 52 57 24
2009 73 50 90 93 66 39 26 53 56 24
2010 72 50 89 92 65 41 29 57 58 27
Ecuador 2004 84 66 97 98 79 56 48 67 68 44
2007 83 64 96 98 81 54 42 64 67 45
2008 82 62 96 98 78 52 40 63 65 42
2009 80 60 95 98 77 51 39 63 65 43
2010 78 55 94 97 75 48 34 63 62 40
El Salvador 1995 82 70 95 96 75 42 32 55 57 29
1999 78 65 93 94 70 44 34 58 59 31
2001 79 67 93 95 70 44 33 59 61 32
2009 79 63 95 96 71 46 32 61 63 34
2010 79 61 95 96 71 46 31 60 62 35
Guatemala 1989 90 82 98 98 84 28 28 32 32 22
1998 88 79 97 98 84 46 41 49 55 38
2002 91 87 97 99 85 48 44 53 57 38
2006 88 80 97 98 84 47 41 54 57 39




















Honduras 1990 87 78 96 97 81 32 26 39 42 25
1999 87 78 98 97 81 44 36 52 57 34
2007 83 70 95 97 80 40 28 51 52 33
2009 82 72 93 93 80 42 30 51 56 36
2010 82 71 92 93 79 43 31 53 58 38
Mexico 1989 79 64 94 94 73 30 26 38 35 21
1998 82 68 94 94 73 41 37 48 48 31
2002 81 65 94 95 75 43 34 51 54 32
2008 81 65 96 97 71 45 36 55 58 32
2010 81 64 96 97 70 43 34 55 57 30
Nicaragua 1993 77 62 89 91 70 36 24 47 51 26
1998 85 77 95 94 77 43 31 56 56 31
2001 86 79 97 96 77 46 36 55 61 36
2005 84 74 95 95 79 44 32 53 59 34
Panama 2002 80 63 97 97 67 45 34 61 61 24
2008 82 67 98 98 69 47 34 62 65 31
2009 81 65 97 97 69 48 34 63 65 34
2010 80 63 98 97 69 48 33 63 65 33
Paraguay 1999 85 73 96 96 80 48 39 59 60 38
2001 85 76 96 97 77 53 46 64 64 42
2008 85 73 97 97 78 55 46 65 67 44
2009 85 77 96 96 76 56 50 67 67 45
2010 83 71 96 97 75 54 44 66 67 42
Peru 1997 85 70 97 98 83 64 56 74 76 53
2001 79 61 92 95 75 59 47 69 72 48
2008 84 68 94 97 80 66 55 75 78 57
2009 84 68 94 97 81 66 55 75 80 58
2010 83 67 94 97 80 67 55 75 80 60
Uruguay 2007 75 64 96 97 58 54 46 76 77 35
2008 75 61 95 96 59 54 45 78 78 36
2009 75 61 96 97 60 55 45 79 78 36
2010 75 61 95 97 59 55 45 79 80 36
Venezuela 1990 79 59 93 96 74 35 23 48 49 20
(Bolivarian 1999 83 66 97 97 74 47 35 60 63 30
Republic of) 2008 79 56 95 97 72 50 31 65 69 37
2009 79 56 94 97 72 51 31 66 70 37
2010 78 54 95 97 71 50 29 66 71 37
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a Urban total.
b National Statistical Office (ONE) of Cuba, on the basis of tabulations of the National Occupation Survey.
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Table A-7 
 LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION,  
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1990-2010
(Population aged 15 years and over, in percentages) 
Country Year Employers











Argentina c 1999 4.4 72.6 15.5 57.1 10.7 46.3 23.0
2002 4.0 72.0 21.7 50.3 10.5 39.8 24.0
2006 4.1 75.8 16.2 59.5 9.4 50.2 20.1
2009 4.4 75.9 15.9 60.0 10.3 49.7 19.7
2010 4.5 76.4 16.0 60.4 10.9 49.5 19.1
Bolivia 1997 5.2 28.5 6.7 21.8 3.7 18.1 66.3
(Plurinational 1999 2.8 29.8 6.6 23.2 4.1 19.1 67.4
State of) 2002 4.3 30.4 6.7 23.7 3.3 20.4 65.3
2007 5.2 36.2 8.3 27.9 5.4 22.5 58.5
Brazil 1990 4.7 65.5 … 65.5 17.2 48.2 29.9
1999 4.1 58.8 11.1 47.7 8.8 39.0 37.1
2002 4.2 61.9 11.0 50.9 7.1 43.8 33.8
2008 4.5 65.8 11.3 54.5 8.0 46.5 29.7
2009 4.3 66.4 11.6 54.8 8.2 46.6 29.3
Chile 1990 2.6 73.0 … 73.0 11.4 61.6 24.5
1998 4.0 74.6 … 74.6 15.3 59.3 21.4
2003 3.9 74.4 10.6 63.8 11.0 52.8 21.6
2006 3.1 75.7 9.8 65.9 10.3 55.6 21.3
2009 3.1 76.3 11.6 64.7 12.6 52.1 20.6
Colombia 1991 5.1 58.6 6.6 52.0 3.9 48.0 36.3
1999 4.0 53.6 6.8 46.7 4.3 42.5 42.4
2008 4.8 49.4 5.2 44.1 4.7 39.4 45.8
2009 5.0 47.2 4.6 42.7 4.1 38.5 47.8
2010 5.0 46.3 4.2 42.1 4.8 37.4 48.6
Costa Rica 1990 5.3 70.0 17.0 53.0 3.6 49.4 24.7
1999 8.1 71.0 13.0 58.0 5.8 52.2 20.9
2008 7.5 72.9 14.1 58.7 12.9 45.8 19.6
2009 7.2 72.7 15.6 57.1 12.3 44.8 20.1
2010 3.5 76.1 11.1 65.0 14.5 50.5 20.4
Dominican 2002 3.2 53.1 12.0 41.1 7.0 34.1 43.8
Republic 2008 4.0 51.9 11.2 40.7 8.3 32.4 44.1
2009 4.8 50.8 12.2 38.6 7.1 31.6 44.3
2010 3.7 50.4 13.0 37.4 6.8 30.5 45.9
Ecuador 2004 5.6 49.4 7.8 41.6 6.0 35.6 44.9
2007 5.0 52.7 7.3 45.4 6.4 39.0 42.3
2008 5.2 54.9 8.0 46.8 6.4 40.4 40.0
2009 4.1 53.4 8.1 45.3 6.0 39.3 42.5
2010 3.4 54.8 9.3 45.5 6.1 39.4 41.8
El Salvador 1995 6.1 56.2 8.7 47.5 4.6 42.8 37.7
1999 4.4 59.8 9.1 50.7 6.1 44.6 35.8
2001 4.6 56.4 8.5 48.0 5.6 42.4 39.0
2009 4.1 55.4 7.6 47.8 5.8 42.1 40.5
2010 3.9 56.5 7.7 48.8 5.4 43.4 39.6
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Country Year Employers











Guatemala 1989 1.5 48.6 7.3 41.3 2.8 38.4 49.9
1998 3.2 49.8 4.5 45.3 4.8 40.6 47.1
2002 6.5 42.3 3.3 39.0 4.2 34.8 51.2
2006 3.5 48.5 5.0 43.5 5.8 37.6 48.1
Honduras 1990 1.0 48.2 8.5 39.7 2.4 37.3 50.8
1999 4.6 46.1 6.6 39.6 4.1 35.5 49.3
2007 2.3 47.5 6.5 41.0 6.6 34.4 50.2
2009 2.3 45.6 6.0 39.6 5.9 33.6 52.1
2010 2.5 43.1 6.0 37.1 5.9 31.2 54.4
Mexico 1989 3.0 67.0 … 67.0 6.2 60.8 30.0
1998 4.7 62.0 10.9 51.1 4.3 46.8 33.4
2002 3.9 65.1 11.2 53.9 4.5 49.4 31.0
2008 5.0 71.9 11.3 60.6 6.5 54.1 23.1
2010 9.6 72.9 11.0 57.4 9.5 47.9 17.5
Nicaragua 1993 0.5 50.9 14.2 36.7 4.2 32.5 48.6
1998 3.6 52.4 … 52.4 9.3 43.1 44.1
2001 5.0 49.6 7.6 42.0 5.1 37.0 45.4
2005 4.5 48.5 6.9 41.5 4.8 36.8 47.1
Panama 2002 2.9 62.0 16.1 45.9 6.1 39.8 35.1
2008 3.1 65.2 14.6 50.7 6.8 43.9 31.6
2009 3.1 63.9 14.6 49.2 7.0 42.2 33.1
2010 3.2 65.2 15.6 49.6 7.3 42.3 31.6
Paraguay 1999 5.2 46.4 8.0 38.4 3.2 35.2 48.4
2001 5.8 44.9 7.1 37.8 4.7 33.1 49.3
2008 5.2 50.8 9.2 41.6 5.4 36.2 44.1
2009 5.5 48.1 8.4 39.7 4.5 35.2 46.3
2010 5.1 51.6 8.8 42.7 4.5 38.3 43.4
Peru 1997 5.6 41.8 8.6 33.3 5.2 28.0 52.5
2001 5.0 41.0 7.8 33.2 4.4 28.8 53.9
2008 5.5 42.8 8.1 34.7 5.5 29.2 51.7
2009 5.5 42.9 8.2 34.7 5.6 29.1 51.7
2010 5.8 42.7 8.1 34.7 5.5 29.1 51.5
Uruguay 2007 4.9 69.8 15.0 54.8 6.5 48.3 25.3
2008 4.8 70.1 15.0 55.2 6.6 48.6 25.0
2009 4.8 70.4 14.5 56.0 6.9 49.1 24.7
2010 4.8 71.7 14.6 57.1 7.1 50.0 23.5
Venezuela 1990 7.5 66.6 20.0 46.6 5.0 41.6 25.9
(Bolivarian 1999 5.2 57.8 15.3 42.6 4.9 37.7 37.0
Republic of) 2002 5.4 54.6 13.9 40.6 4.0 36.7 40.0
2008 4.1 57.8 18.1 39.8 5.3 34.5 38.1
2010 3.4 56.5 19.1 37.4 5.6 31.8 40.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  The figures for Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994 and 1998), Mexico (1989, 2004-2006) and Nicaragua (1998) include public sector wage-earners.
b  Includes professional and technical workers.
c  Urban total.
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Table A-8 
LATIN AMERICA: URBAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET, 1990-2010




















Argentina d 1990 44.1 3.8 11.7 0.4 11.4 5.7 23.0 6.9 16.1
1999 40.1 3.2 15.1 1.4 13.6 5.3 16.5 5.0 11.5
2006 40.2 2.7 14.7 1.0 13.3 7.5 15.2 5.0 10.1
2009 38.9 3.0 14.8 1.4 13.2 6.6 14.4 5.0 8.9
2010 37.8 3.0 14.4 1.6 12.6 6.4 14.0 4.9 8.5
Bolivia 1989 e 56.5 … 10.1 0.9 9.2 5.2 41.2 9.8 30.0
(Plurinational 1999 63.0 2.6 12.9 1.0 11.7 2.7 44.9 12.1 30.2
State of) 2002 66.0 3.4 14.7 0.9 13.0 3.7 44.2 12.4 28.2
2004 71.0 4.2 19.2 1.5 16.7 4.6 42.9 10.9 28.2
2007 61.8 5.4 15.5 1.6 13.6 5.3 35.5 8.4 24.0
Brazil f 1990 47.9 … 20.9 5.4 15.5 5.8 21.3 3.5 15.7
1999 46.7 2.3 10.1 1.7 8.3 8.5 25.8 5.1 16.1
2002 44.4 2.3 10.6 1.1 9.5 8.6 23.0 6.7 12.2
2008 40.1 2.4 10.1 1.1 9.1 7.8 19.9 5.9 10.6
2009 41.0 2.4 10.3 1.2 9.2 8.4 19.8 6.1 10.6
Chile 1990 38.9 0.8 10.3 0.9 9.4 7.0 20.9 5.7 14.0
1998 34.2 2.6 10.7 1.0 9.7 5.8 15.1 4.1 10.0
2003 31.9 2.4 8.0 0.8 7.1 6.5 14.9 4.9 9.1
2006 30.6 1.7 7.2 0.7 6.5 5.8 15.9 4.8 9.9
2009 30.0 1.1 7.1 0.8 6.3 5.0 16.8 4.1 11.7
Colombia 1991 … … … … … 5.3 27.1 6.4 19.9
1999 … … … … … 5.2 35.5 7.5 26.6
2008 58.7 3.9 11.5 0.6 10.9 4.0 39.2 8.3 28.9
2009 59.9 4.1 11.2 0.5 10.7 4.2 40.4 8.2 29.7
2010 59.7 4.1 10.8 0.6 10.3 4.1 40.7 8.2 30.1
Costa Rica 1990 37.3 4.4 11.1 0.8 9.6 4.3 17.5 6.4 10.1
1999 41.9 6.0 13.8 1.4 11.7 5.1 17.1 4.4 11.8
2008 37.2 5.7 12.1 1.6 10.0 4.4 15.0 3.4 11.0
2009 36.5 5.5 11.7 1.9 9.4 4.5 14.8 3.6 10.5
2010 36.0 2.4 12.2 1.8 10.2 7.1 14.3 2.9 10.4
 
Dominican 2002 46.1 2.4 6.9 0.7 6.2 4.3 32.5 7.4 21.8
Republic 2008 49.8 3.4 5.7 0.9 4.8 5.6 35.1 8.2 22.9
2009 49.8 3.5 5.9 0.6 5.3 5.8 34.6 7.6 22.9
2010 50.2 3.1 5.3 0.5 4.8 5.4 36.4 7.6 24.3
Ecuador 1990 54.5 3.7 12.6 0.6 11.1 4.3 34.0 7.8 23.9
1999 57.4 7.2 14.9 1.0 13.8 5.4 30.0 5.6 22.4
2008 56.9 4.9 16.0 1.2 14.9 4.2 31.8 5.2 24.5
2009 56.4 3.6 15.9 1.1 14.8 4.1 32.8 5.6 24.6
2010 54.9 3.1 15.8 0.9 14.9 3.4 32.5 5.6 24.6
 
El Salvador 1995 50.8 4.8 10.1 0.2 9.8 4.3 31.6 8.4 20.6
1999 51.5 4.2 14.3 0.7 13.4 4.2 28.8 6.5 19.8
2001 53.6 4.5 14.2 0.8 13.4 4.2 30.7 6.4 22.3
2009 56.4 4.0 14.7 0.8 13.8 4.6 33.0 6.1 23.7
2010 55.0 3.9 14.8 0.9 13.8 3.8 32.5 6.0 23.5
Guatemala 1989 53.7 2.1 14.9 0.8 13.7 6.6 30.0 7.2 14.8
1998 56.0 3.7 24.5 3.0 19.2 3.7 24.0 7.1 12.1
2002 56.9 5.9 14.1 1.1 12.2 3.9 33.0 8.5 19.3
2006 55.9 4.5 16.1 1.5 13.7 3.9 31.4 7.5 18.4
Honduras 1990 52.6 1.1 13.7 0.7 12.9 6.5 31.3 8.7 18.5
1999 53.4 5.3 12.0 0.7 11.3 4.6 31.5 7.1 20.7
2007 42.9 2.9 10.3 1.1 9.2 3.8 25.8 9.1 12.7
2009 46.8 3.3 12.7 1.2 11.5 3.6 27.2 9.6 13.1
2010 50.8 3.2 12.8 1.5 11.3 4.0 30.8 9.4 16.6




















Mexico g 1989 … … … … … 2.7 18.6 2.9 12.5
1998 44.6 3.6 16.9 1.0 14.8 4.1 20.0 3.1 16.2
2002 46.8 3.3 18.3 1.3 16.9 4.0 21.2 4.1 16.5
2008 44.4 3.5 21.3 1.8 18.4 4.4 15.2 2.7 12.1
2010 45.1 6.4 22.9 3.0 17.7 3.7 12.1 2.1 9.8
Nicaragua 1993 48.9 0.6 13.5 1.7 11.8 6.3 28.5 7.7 17.0
1998 59.4 3.1 16.3 1.8 14.5 6.2 33.8 4.4 25.4
2001 58.6 3.8 17.4 1.4 15.5 4.2 33.2 5.5 24.1
2005 57.6 4.7 14.8 0.7 14.1 4.1 34.0 7.8 22.4
Panama 1991 32.3 1.8 5.9 0.8 5.1 7.4 17.2 3.9 11.5
1999 33.9 2.2 7.0 0.8 6.2 6.0 18.8 4.3 13.7
2008 35.2 2.7 7.9 0.9 7.0 6.3 18.4 3.8 13.8
2009 35.0 2.5 7.7 0.9 6.9 5.5 19.2 4.3 14.0
2010 34.3 2.5 8.1 1.2 7.0 5.1 18.6 4.1 13.8
Paraguay 1990 h 54.9 7.0 16.6 1.1 15.4 10.0 21.4 5.3 15.5
1999 58.9 5.0 16.3 0.9 14.3 9.0 28.6 5.3 20.7
2008 54.7 5.4 15.0 1.4 12.7 9.0 25.3 4.6 18.1
2009 59.8 5.1 19.4 1.7 15.8 8.4 26.9 5.4 18.0
2010 54.3 4.8 15.8 1.3 13.5 9.5 24.2 4.7 17.1
Peru 1997 60.3 4.9 13.0 1.3 11.7 4.3 38.2 5.4 28.6
2001 63.0 4.1 14.5 1.1 13.4 5.2 39.3 5.0 28.7
2008 59.5 4.6 12.9 1.0 11.9 4.4 37.6 5.0 27.9
2009 58.2 4.9 12.1 1.0 11.1 4.3 36.9 4.9 27.7
2010 58.9 5.2 12.1 1.0 11.1 4.1 37.6 4.8 28.4
Uruguay 1990 35.2 2.8 8.1 1.3 6.4 6.9 17.4 5.5 11.6
1999 39.8 2.1 9.6 0.5 9.1 7.5 20.6 7.0 12.6
2008 39.1 2.9 11.9 0.6 11.2 7.4 17.0 6.0 9.5
2009 38.8 3.0 11.6 0.6 11.1 7.6 16.6 5.9 9.2
2010 38.0 2.9 11.9 0.6 11.3 7.5 15.7 5.7 8.6
Venezuela 1990 36.7 4.9 8.6 0.2 8.2 1.9 21.3 4.2 15.3
(Bolivarian 1999 53.4 3.9 12.2 0.5 11.7 2.1 35.2 6.7 23.9
Republic of) i 2008 51.2 3.4 10.5 0.6 9.9 1.8 35.6 6.9 24.2
2009 51.7 3.2 10.4 0.6 9.8 1.5 36.5 7.6 24.5
2010 51.9 2.8 10.1 0.7 9.4 1.4 37.5 7.6 25.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Refers to establishments employing up to five persons. In the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile (1996), the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama (up to 
2002), the Plurinational State of Bolivia (1999 and 2002) and Uruguay (1990), establishments with up to four employees were counted.
b  Refers to own-account and unpaid family workers without professional or technical skills.
c Includes persons employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing.
d Greater Buenos Aires.
e  Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
f  In 1990, the category of “microenterprises” referred to wage-earners with no employment contract. Since 1993, however, this category refers to wage-earners in establishments 
employing up to five persons. 
g  In the 1989 and 1994 surveys, no information was gathered on the size of the establishments employing wage-earners.
h  Asunción metropolitan area.
i  Since 1997, the sample design for the survey does not distinguish between urban and rural areas. The figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-9 
LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE IN URBAN AREAS,  
AROUND 1990, 1999, 2008, 2009 AND 2010 a  
Country Sex
Age groups










































































Total 5.9 14.7 … 9.1 8.2 13.0 24.3 … 21.8 20.0 4.9 12.0 … 8.3 7.1 4.1 11.6 … 5.7 5.1 3.8 12.9 … 6.0 5.6
Men 5.7 13.4 … 8.1 6.7 11.5 22.8 … 19.5 16.6 5.0 11.3 … 7.5 5.7 3.9 8.0 … 4.4 3.4 4.2 12.7 … 5.6 5.0




Total 9.2 7.1 7.7 … … 17.5 15.2 19.2 … … 8.5 6.3 8.6 … … 5.2 3.8 2.6 … … 6.7 3.7 2.5 … …
Men 9.4 6.0 6.3 … … 18.5 12.5 16.4 … … 7.6 4.8 6.2 … … 5.6 2.3 2.5 … … 8.5 4.9 2.1 … …
Women 8.9 8.5 9.4 … … 16.4 18.5 23.2 … … 9.8 8.2 11.5 … … 4.5 5.5 2.8 … … 3.9 1.8 3.2 … …
Brazil Total 4.5 11.4 8.0 9.2 … 8.3 21.7 17.4 19.7 … 4.4 10.5 8.0 9.4 … 2.4 7.0 4.9 5.8 … 1.5 5.5 3.4 4.2 …
Men 4.8 9.4 5.9 7.0 … 8.7 18.4 13.8 15.9 … 4.7 8.0 5.2 6.4 … 2.8 5.5 3.2 4.0 … 2.0 5.3 2.8 3.3 …
Women 3.9 14.1 10.5 12.0 … 7.7 26.2 22.0 24.5 … 3.8 13.8 11.3 12.8 … 1.7 9.0 6.8 7.9 … 0.6 5.8 4.1 5.3 …
Chile Total 8.7 10.1 … 10.5 … 17.9 21.9 … 25.5 … 8.3 9.9 … 11.5 … 5.1 7.3 … 7.4 … 5.3 6.3 … 5.8 …
Men 8.1 9.3 … 9.2 … 17.0 20.5 … 23.3 … 7.4 9.2 … 10.6 … 4.6 6.3 … 6.1 … 5.6 6.6 … 5.0 …
Women 9.7 11.2 … 12.3 … 19.3 23.8 … 28.5 … 9.7 10.9 … 12.6 … 5.8 8.9 … 9.1 … 4.7 5.6 … 7.1 …
Colombia Total 9.3 19.2 12.1 13.2 12.7 19.7 36.6 24.6 26.3 25.7 8.3 17.8 12.5 12.9 12.7 4.2 13.2 8.3 9.4 9.0 3.8 10.3 7.0 8.1 7.7
Men 6.7 16.2 10.2 11.1 10.6 15.3 32.0 21.2 22.6 22.2 5.5 14.0 9.9 9.8 9.5 2.8 10.5 6.3 6.8 6.6 3.7 10.6 7.1 8.3 7.5
Women 13.0 23.0 14.4 15.7 15.2 24.8 41.6 28.8 30.9 30.0 11.8 22.1 15.6 16.5 16.3 6.2 16.4 10.7 12.3 11.5 3.9 9.7 7.0 7.9 7.9
Costa Rica Total 5.3 6.1 4.8 7.7 7.1 10.5 14.8 11.3 18.0 17.1 4.9 5.3 5.1 7.7 5.9 2.5 3.0 2.5 4.9 5.3 2.9 2.3 1.9 3.2 3.5
Men 4.9 5.3 4.3 6.5 6.0 9.8 14.8 10.8 16.0 15.6 4.1 3.8 3.8 6.5 3.9 2.3 2.1 2.1 3.7 4.3 3.1 1.9 1.9 2.7 3.2
Women 6.2 7.4 5.6 9.3 8.8 11.6 14.9 12.0 21.0 19.3 6.2 7.4 6.6 9.4 8.4 2.8 4.2 3.0 6.2 6.6 2.3 2.9 2.0 4.2 4.0
Cuba b Total 5.4 6.3 1.6 … … … … 3.8 … … … … 2.2 … … … … 1.5 … … … … 0.7 … …
Men 3.6 4.3 1.5 … … … … 3.5 … … … … 1.9 … … … … 1.4 … … … … 0.7 … …
Women 8.5 9.6 1.8 … … … … 4.1 … … … … 2.6 … … … … 1.6 … … … … 0.6 … …
Dominican
Republic
Total … … 5.1 6.2 5.6 … … 10.5 15.0 10.9 … … 5.9 6.2 5.9 … … 3.8 3.4 4.7 … … 1.2 2.6 2.3
Men … … 3.8 4.5 4.6 … … 7.1 9.5 8.7 … … 5.4 5.2 4.3 … … 2.1 2.1 4.6 … … 1.2 2.6 2.2
Women … … 7.2 8.7 7.0 … … 16.0 24.2 13.9 … … 6.7 7.6 8.0 … … 6.5 5.1 5.0 … … 1.3 2.6 2.5
Ecuador Total 6.1 14.2 7.3 7.9 6.1 13.5 25.9 18.0 17.9 15.3 6.4 13.6 6.7 9.6 7.0 2.7 9.0 3.9 4.3 3.9 1.3 8.3 3.9 3.5 2.7
Men 4.2 10.5 5.6 6.5 5.3 11.2 20.0 15.2 15.3 13.9 3.2 8.0 4.8 7.1 4.9 1.7 5.5 1.6 2.9 3.0 1.3 8.6 3.3 3.3 2.8
Women 9.2 19.5 9.6 9.8 7.2 17.2 33.9 22.1 21.8 17.4 11.3 21.3 9.2 13.0 9.7 4.5 13.6 6.7 6.0 5.0 1.4 7.7 4.7 3.7 2.6
El Salvador Total … 6.9 … 7.1 6.8 … 13.9 … 15.5 15.4 … 6.1 … 7.0 6.8 … 4.4 … 5.1 3.7 … 3.8 … 3.5 3.7
Men … 8.9 … 9.1 8.3 … 16.2 … 17.0 15.7 … 7.0 … 8.5 7.4 … 6.0 … 6.6 5.2 … 6.1 … 6.0 6.2
Women … 4.6 … 4.9 5.1 … 10.6 … 13.5 14.9 … 5.1 … 5.4 6.2 … 2.6 … 3.4 2.0 … 1.0 … 0.7 0.9
Guatemala Total 3.5 2.8 … … … 7.1 4.8 … … … 2.9 3.8 … … … 1.6 1.8 … … … 1.2 0.9 … … …
Men 3.3 3.6 … … … 7.2 6.0 … … … 2.6 4.5 … … … 1.5 2.4 … … … 1.4 1.3 … … …
Women 3.8 1.9 … … … 7.0 3.4 … … … 3.4 2.8 … … … 1.8 1.0 … … … 0.9 0.4 … … …
Honduras Total 6.9 5.3 3.9 5.0 6.5 11.2 9.0 7.6 9.8 12.7 7.0 4.7 3.7 5.5 7.3 4.3 2.9 2.3 2.9 3.7 3.7 3.0 1.8 1.6 2.4
Men 7.6 6.2 4.0 4.7 5.9 11.5 10.3 7.4 8.3 10.6 6.6 5.3 3.6 4.7 5.9 6.0 3.6 2.4 3.1 3.5 5.3 4.3 2.5 2.4 3.2
Women 5.9 4.0 3.7 5.3 7.2 10.7 7.4 7.9 12.0 15.7 7.6 4.1 4.0 6.5 9.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.9 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.4
Mexico Total 3.3 3.2 4.8 … 6.3 8.1 7.4 10.7 … 12.8 2.4 2.8 4.6 … 6.2 0.7 1.5 2.5 … 3.6 0.8 1.1 2.8 … 4.4
Men 3.4 3.6 5.7 … 7.6 8.4 8.1 11.8 … 14.3 2.5 3.1 5.1 … 6.9 0.9 1.8 2.8 … 4.2 1.0 1.5 4.1 … 6.3
Women 3.1 2.6 3.5 … 4.3 7.6 6.2 9.0 … 10.1 2.0 2.3 3.9 … 5.4 0.2 0.8 2.0 … 2.9 0.1 0.4 0.7 … 1.3
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Country Sex
Age groups







































































Nicaragua Total … 13.8 … … … … 20.9 … … … … 11.0 … … … … 12.3 … … … … 10.5 … … …
Men … 14.0 … … … … 17.9 … … … … 10.3 … … … … 14.3 … … … … 12.9 … … …
Women … 13.6 … … … … 25.8 … … … … 11.7 … … … … 9.9 … … … … 7.0 … … …
Panama Total 20.0 13.6 6.5 7.9 7.7 38.8 28.3 16.6 18.8 18.0 21.7 13.5 6.7 8.3 8.5 10.4 8.4 3.6 5.3 5.5 8.1 5.9 2.3 3.6 3.4
Men 17.9 11.4 5.4 6.3 6.5 37.0 24.3 14.1 15.7 15.2 17.8 9.7 4.9 5.6 6.7 8.4 6.5 2.4 3.7 4.9 9.1 6.8 2.3 3.6 2.9
Women 22.8 16.7 7.9 9.9 9.3 41.0 33.6 20.9 23.8 22.3 26.5 19.0 9.1 11.7 10.9 12.7 10.5 5.0 7.4 6.3 6.4 4.5 2.4 3.6 4.1
Paraguay c Total 6.3 9.1 7.1 8.3 6.9 15.5 16.7 15.2 17.1 15.8 4.8 6.7 5.1 6.0 5.3 2.3 5.9 3.2 3.5 3.1 1.4 6.8 4.5 5.1 3.8
Men 6.2 9.0 6.2 7.9 6.2 14.7 17.3 13.5 16.0 14.0 5.0 5.5 2.7 4.3 3.8 3.2 6.2 2.8 4.3 2.7 2.0 7.5 5.5 5.5 4.1
Women 6.5 9.2 8.3 8.8 7.8 16.5 16.1 17.4 18.5 18.5 4.7 8.4 8.1 8.1 7.2 1.1 5.4 3.6 2.5 3.6 0.0 5.8 3.3 4.6 3.3
Peru Total … 7.3 5.9 5.6 5.0 … 15.3 12.9 12.2 12.2 … 5.5 5.6 5.3 4.6 … 4.1 3.0 3.1 2.4 … 4.5 3.2 3.4 2.7
Men … 7.0 5.1 5.4 4.4 … 15.3 12.2 12.9 11.5 … 4.7 4.1 4.5 4.0 … 3.8 2.2 2.0 1.5 … 5.0 3.0 3.5 2.1
Women … 7.7 6.8 5.9 5.8 … 15.2 13.7 11.4 13.0 … 6.3 7.3 6.3 5.4 … 4.5 3.9 4.3 3.3 … 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.5
Uruguay Total 8.9 11.2 7.8 7.6 7.0 24.4 25.8 21.5 20.8 20.4 8.2 10.0 7.5 7.8 6.6 4.3 7.2 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.5 6.1 3.9 3.8 3.2
Men 7.3 8.6 5.7 5.5 5.2 22.2 21.4 17.6 16.8 16.7 6.0 7.2 4.3 4.7 3.9 2.5 3.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.0 4.9 2.8 2.8 2.3
Women 11.1 14.5 10.4 10.0 9.1 27.5 32.0 26.9 26.2 25.6 11.0 13.5 11.2 11.0 9.4 6.4 11.2 7.4 7.1 6.4 4.4 7.7 5.2 4.9 4.3
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of) d
Total 9.6 14.4 6.8 8.0 8.4 17.8 25.8 13.6 16.1 17.2 10.7 14.5 7.3 8.1 9.0 5.6 9.9 4.6 5.5 5.6 4.1 7.8 3.9 5.2 5.0
Men 10.2 13.5 6.4 7.4 7.7 17.8 22.1 12.4 13.7 15.1 11.3 12.6 6.3 6.7 7.2 6.5 9.8 4.3 5.2 5.3 4.9 9.4 4.3 5.6 5.4
Women 8.2 15.8 7.3 8.9 9.3 17.8 32.5 15.9 20.4 21.2 9.4 17.5 8.6 9.9 11.4 3.9 10.1 5.0 5.8 6.0 1.7 4.6 3.2 4.6 4.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  For the exact years of the surveys in each country, see table A-5.
b  Based on special tabulations of data from the National Occupation Survey supplied by the National Statistical Office of Cuba. The figures for 1990-1999 relate to total unemployment 
(urban and rural); those for 2003-2008 relate to urban unemployment.
c Total for urban areas, with the exception of the figure for 1990, which relates to the Asunción metropolitan area.
d  The sample design for the surveys conducted since 1997 does not distinguish between urban and rural areas. The figures therefore refer to the national total.
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Table A-10 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE INCOME OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION  
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2010
(Multiples of the relevant per capita poverty line)
Country Year  Total Employers
























Argentina c 1990 6.5 20.6 4.7 … 4.7 9.4 4.5 3.6 2.5 8.4 7.6
1999 7.0 23.8 5.6 6.9 5.3 9.4 4.8 3.5 2.4 8.5 6.5
2006 6.0 21.0 4.8 5.7 4.6 7.4 4.9 3.4 1.7 7.8 6.6
2009 9.5 28.6 7.8 11.1 7.2 11.9 7.2 5.0 2.7 12.1 10.1




1989 d 4.6 16.6 3.8 4.2 3.6 8.0 3.6 2.7 1.5 4.9 4.5
1999 3.8 8.2 4.2 4.7 4.0 7.4 3.9 2.5 2.0 2.8 2.7
2002 3.6 7.3 4.1 5.2 3.8 9.3 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.6 2.4
2007 3.8 7.7 4.1 5.4 3.7 6.6 3.6 2.5 1.9 2.4 2.3
Brazil  1990 e 4.9 16.1 4.2 … 4.2 7.5 3.3 2.5 1.0 4.3 3.9
1999 4.7 14.8 4.1 6.6 3.5 6.9 3.2 2.1 1.4 4.2 3.7
2002 4.5 14.3 4.0 6.6 3.4 8.4 3.0 2.1 1.4 3.8 3.0
2008 5.0 15.0 4.6 7.7 3.9 8.6 3.5 2.4 1.7 4.2 3.4
2009 5.1 15.0 4.7 7.9 4.0 8.7 3.6 2.6 1.8 4.1 3.3
Chile 1990 4.9 26.2 4.0 … 4.0 7.7 3.6 2.5 1.8 5.7 5.3
1998 7.8 35.5 6.0 … 6.0 12.6 4.4 3.1 2.4 9.0 6.8
2003 7.8 38.1 6.0 8.3 5.6 13.1 4.2 3.1 2.6 8.1 6.0
2006 7.8 31.0 6.5 9.1 6.1 13.7 5.0 3.6 2.6 9.2 6.9
2009 8.7 38.3 7.1 10.2 6.6 13.2 5.2 3.7 2.9 10.4 7.9
Colombia 1991 2.9 7.4 2.8 3.9 2.5 5.3 2.4 … 1.2 2.7 2.4
1999 3.4 9.5 3.7 6.3 3.2 6.8 2.8 … 2.1 2.3 2.0
2008 4.4 12.0 4.4 8.1 3.8 8.7 3.7 2.2 1.9 3.6 2.9
2009 4.2 10.9 4.2 8.1 3.8 9.0 3.7 2.1 1.8 3.3 2.8
2010 4.2 10.4 4.3 8.4 3.9 9.2 3.7 2.0 1.9 3.3 2.7
Costa Rica 1990 5.3 6.8 5.4 7.3 4.5 9.0 4.4 3.2 1.5 4.2 3.9
1999 6.1 10.5 6.0 8.8 5.1 9.7 4.8 3.7 1.8 4.8 4.4
2008 6.0 12.2 5.9 8.9 5.0 8.5 4.1 3.2 1.7 4.0 3.0
2009 6.3 10.7 6.3 9.4 5.3 9.6 4.3 3.1 1.7 4.1 3.0
2010 5.8 10.7 5.9 9.2 5.3 9.8 4.2 3.2 2.1 4.2 3.1
Dominican
Republic
2002 4.3 15.6 4.0 4.7 3.7 7.8 3.1 2.2 1.3 3.6 3.4
2008 4.9 17.9 3.0 3.8 2.8 5.1 2.4 1.5 1.1 6.3 5.6
2009 5.4 21.1 3.2 4.2 2.8 5.3 2.4 1.8 1.2 6.9 5.9
2010 5.1 22.5 3.0 3.7 2.8 5.3 2.4 1.6 1.2 6.3 5.4
Ecuador 1990 3.1 4.8 3.3 4.1 2.9 6.1 2.9 2.3 0.8 2.3 2.3
1999 3.1 7.6 2.8 3.8 2.6 5.6 2.6 1.7 0.9 2.2 2.0
2008 4.1 11.6 3.8 6.4 3.3 5.8 3.1 2.3 1.9 3.1 2.9
2010 4.2 14.0 4.1 6.7 3.5 6.0 3.4 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7
El Salvador 1995 3.7 9.2 3.6 5.3 3.2 6.9 2.9 2.1 1.0 2.6 2.5
1999 4.4 9.6 4.5 6.9 4.0 8.3 3.7 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.8
2001 4.4 10.5 4.4 6.7 3.9 8.7 3.5 2.3 2.0 3.2 3.0
2009 3.6 8.3 3.8 6.5 3.3 6.9 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.2
2010 3.4 7.4 3.6 6.3 3.0 5.6 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.2
Guatemala 1989 3.8 17.7 3.1 4.8 2.6 5.2 2.7 1.8 1.4 4.0 3.7
1998 3.8 16.0 3.3 4.5 3.1 6.3 2.9 1.9 1.3 2.9 2.4
2002 4.1 11.2 3.6 5.8 3.2 6.5 2.8 1.6 1.7 3.1 2.8
2006 3.9 17.0 2.8 4.7 2.5 4.9 2.3 1.5 1.3 3.7 3.4
217Social Panorama of Latin America • 2011
Table A-10 (concluded)
Country Year  Total Employers
























Honduras 1990 3.0 16.4 3.1 4.9 2.6 6.5 2.8 1.6 0.8 2.0 1.8
1999 2.1 5.1 2.1 2.9 1.9 3.7 2.0 1.2 0.5 1.6 1.5
2007 2.8 5.8 3.2 5.2 2.7 5.0 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.4
2009 2.8 6.0 3.3 5.3 2.8 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.5
2010 2.8 5.0 3.3 5.6 2.8 4.8 2.7 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.3
Mexico 1989 4.5 21.7 3.4 … 3.4 6.8 3.1 … 1.4 5.8 5.4
1998 4.2 18.0 3.5 5.1 3.1 6.7 3.1 1.9 1.2 3.7 3.3
2002 4.3 15.7 3.6 5.3 3.2 6.9 3.3 2.1 1.4 4.4 4.0
2008 4.0 17.0 3.3 5.2 2.9 5.8 3.0 1.9 1.3 3.9 3.4
2010 3.3 6.0 3.2 5.0 2.8 5.5 2.5 1.7 1.2 2.6 2.4
Nicaragua 1993 3.8 8.6 3.3 3.4 3.3 6.2 3.1 2.4 2.1 4.5 3.8
1998 3.5 11.1 3.3 … 3.3 6.3 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.7
2001 3.6 14.3 3.1 4.2 2.8 6.3 2.6 1.8 1.5 2.7 2.5
2005 3.1 9.9 3.0 4.2 2.7 5.6 2.6 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.1
Panama 1991 5.9 15.4 6.0 8.0 4.8 9.9 4.3 2.9 1.3 3.5 3.2
1999 6.4 12.6 6.8 9.2 5.9 11.4 5.0 2.9 2.1 3.9 3.6
2008 6.0 19.2 5.4 7.5 4.8 8.5 4.6 3.1 1.9 5.7 5.2
2009 6.3 19.3 5.8 7.8 5.1 9.3 4.8 3.3 2.0 5.9 5.1
2010 6.2 18.4 5.7 7.3 5.1 9.2 4.7 3.3 2.1 6.1 5.2
Paraguay 1990 f 3.5 10.3 2.5 3.4 2.3 4.7 2.6 1.8 0.8 3.9 3.7
1999 3.5 8.6 3.3 4.8 2.9 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.6 2.5 2.2
2008 2.9 6.7 2.8 4.0 2.5 4.4 2.6 1.9 1.4 2.0 1.8
2009 2.8 6.1 2.7 3.9 2.5 4.6 2.5 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.7
2010 3.1 8.9 2.8 3.9 2.5 4.5 2.6 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.3
Peru 1997 3.5 7.9 3.8 4.2 3.7 6.5 3.8 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.1
2001 3.2 6.9 3.5 4.1 3.3 6.8 3.3 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.1
2008 3.6 7.8 3.9 4.9 3.7 6.6 3.8 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2
2009 3.8 7.5 4.3 5.2 4.1 7.4 4.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2
2010 3.7 7.3 4.1 5.1 3.8 6.7 3.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2
Uruguay 1990 4.5 18.0 3.7 4.0 3.5 5.4 3.4 2.3 1.5 3.4 3.1
1999 5.5 14.1 5.3 6.7 4.9 11.2 4.8 3.1 2.1 4.4 3.9
2008 4.3 11.8 4.2 5.7 3.8 8.1 3.8 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.0
2009 4.6 11.5 4.6 6.3 4.1 8.6 4.2 2.4 2.0 3.1 2.1




1990 4.6 11.9 3.7 3.9 3.6 6.6 3.6 2.3 1.4 4.8 4.6
1999 3.6 9.2 3.2 3.7 3.0 6.4 2.9 2.0 1.4 3.6 3.4
2008 4.0 7.5 4.1 5.2 3.5 5.2 3.7 2.7 1.8 3.5 3.4
2009 4.0 7.4 4.1 5.3 3.5 4.9 3.6 2.7 1.9 3.7 3.5
2010 3.8 7.1 3.8 4.7 3.3 4.5 3.4 2.6 1.9 3.4 3.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a Figures for Argentina (1990-1997), Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994 and 1998), Mexico (1989, 2004-2006) and Nicaragua (1998) include public-sector wage-earners. In addition, 
in the case of non-professional, non-technical workers, the figures for the following countries include establishments with up to four employees: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chile (1996), the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama (up to 2002), the Plurinational State of Bolivia (1999 and 2002) and Uruguay (1990). Where no information is available 
on the size of establishments, no figures are given for the total number of employed in low-productivity sectors.
b Includes professional, technical and own-account workers.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
e No information is available on the size of establishments for 1990. Therefore the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing more than five persons refers to 
wage-earners who have an employment contract (“carteira”), while the column for establishments employing up to five persons refers to workers who do not have such contracts.
f Asunción metropolitan area.
g The sample design for the surveys conducted since 1997 does not distinguish between urban and rural areas. The figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-11 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF AVERAGE FEMALE INCOME TO AVERAGE MALE INCOME,  
BY AGE GROUP, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2010
 (Percentages) 
Country Year



































Argentina c 1990 65 87 77 61 59 52 65 87 77 61 59 52 
1999 65 94 76 64 58 54 65 94 76 64 58 54 
2006 65 78 76 62 62 52 65 78 76 62 62 52 
2009 72 79 74 69 70 71 72 79 74 69 70 71 




1989 d 59 71 65 54 54 62 59 71 65 54 54 62 
1999 63 72 70 55 68 54 63 72 70 55 67 54 
2002 61 80 69 57 53 44 61 80 68 56 53 44 
2007 63 75 71 54 67 52 63 75 71 54 67 52 
Brazil 1990 56 73 64 54 47 35 55 73 64 53 47 35 
1999 65 81 72 63 57 55 64 80 71 62 57 54 
2002 67 84 77 64 57 55 66 83 77 64 57 54 
2008 68 83 75 67 63 57 68 82 75 67 62 56 
2009 68 83 74 66 64 58 68 83 74 66 63 57 
Chile 1990 62 87 70 61 57 51 62 87 70 61 57 51 
1998 66 90 76 68 59 54 66 90 76 68 59 54 
2003 64 88 79 64 55 55 64 88 79 64 55 55 
2006 68 89 78 66 63 60 68 89 78 66 63 60 
2009 64 85 81 62 63 50 64 85 81 62 63 50 
Colombia 1991 69 88 77 64 56 55 68 88 77 64 56 55 
1999 75 101 87 69 68 56 75 101 86 69 68 55 
2008 73 90 84 71 67 53 72 89 83 70 67 54 
2009 75 92 83 71 70 60 75 91 83 71 70 61 
2010 72 90 84 69 63 58 72 89 83 69 63 58 
Costa Rica 1990 72 86 75 66 60 61 72 86 75 66 60 61 
1999 70 87 75 67 64 58 70 87 75 67 64 59 
2008 70 94 82 59 66 51 70 94 82 59 66 51 
2009 76 91 81 75 75 57 76 91 81 75 75 57 
2010 79 86 86 74 73 77 79 86 86 74 73 78 
Dominican
Republic
2002 72 92 74 70 63 62 72 92 74 70 63 62 
2008 61 72 72 53 57 55 61 72 72 53 57 55 
2009 62 67 67 66 47 59 62 67 67 66 47 59 
2010 70 84 75 57 79 63 70 84 75 57 79 63 
Ecuador 1990 66 80 70 61 60 64 66 80 70 61 60 64 
1999 67 99 82 61 51 55 67 99 82 61 51 55 
2008 69 90 80 62 65 64 69 90 80 62 65 64 
2009 71 91 74 72 64 64 71 91 74 72 64 64 
2010 74 93 82 68 69 68 74 93 82 68 69 68 
El Salvador 1995 62 76 70 57 51 46 62 76 70 57 51 46 
1999 76 84 79 71 69 64 76 84 79 71 69 64 
2001 73 87 79 73 62 51 73 87 79 73 62 51 
2009 81 95 86 78 70 77 81 95 86 78 70 77 
2010 84 93 92 76 84 72 84 93 92 76 84 72 
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Table A-11 (concluded)
Country Year



































Guatemala 1989 68 80 81 65 62 55 68 78 80 65 61 55 
1998 55 88 76 51 34 39 55 87 74 51 34 39 
2002 56 80 60 54 41 45 56 78 59 54 41 46 
2006 58 91 64 55 55 42 58 89 65 55 55 42 
Honduras 1990 59 77 68 51 56 43 59 77 68 51 56 43 
1994 63 80 73 69 48 42 63 80 73 69 48 42 
1997 60 81 72 58 47 37 60 81 72 58 47 37 
2007 81 96 84 75 76 64 81 96 84 75 76 64 
2009 80 97 87 78 66 65 80 97 87 78 66 65 
2010 84 104 85 82 64 86 84 104 85 82 64 86 
Mexico 1989 55 72 64 53 45 48 55 72 64 53 45 48 
1998 58 84 73 51 54 40 58 84 73 51 54 40 
2002 62 83 66 62 56 42 62 83 66 62 56 42 
2008 62 83 69 66 48 49 62 83 69 66 48 49 
2010 70 85 74 68 63 60 70 85 74 68 63 60 
Nicaragua 1993 77 107 87 62 64 67 77 107 87 62 64 67 
1998 65 93 73 61 47 43 65 93 73 61 47 43 
2001 69 87 85 72 34 85 69 87 85 72 34 85 
2005 71 87 73 80 48 53 71 87 73 80 48 53 
Panama 1991 78 73 89 81 68 78 78 72 88 80 67 77 
1999 78 98 87 74 73 57 78 97 86 74 73 57 
2008 74 83 81 76 67 54 74 83 81 76 67 54 
2009 78 86 87 81 72 62 78 86 87 81 72 62 
2010 76 85 82 79 65 72 76 85 82 79 65 72 
Paraguay 1990  e 55 63 68 52 50 60 55 63 68 52 50 60 
1999 71 96 84 67 69 43 71 96 84 67 69 43 
2008 71 83 79 68 68 54 71 83 80 68 67 53 
2009 75 85 82 65 76 69 75 85 82 64 75 68 
2010 71 89 75 69 75 44 70 89 75 69 75 44 
Peru 1997 60 84 69 58 49 37 59 80 67 58 49 41 
2001 68 94 76 59 59 56 68 94 76 59 59 56 
2008 61 76 73 55 55 48 61 76 73 55 55 48 
2009 63 73 66 65 62 46 63 73 66 65 62 46 
2010 60 79 63 58 53 55 60 79 63 58 53 55 
Uruguay 1990 44 63 60 46 37 30 44 63 60 46 37 30 
1999 68 81 78 64 65 55 67 79 77 63 65 54 
2008 68 84 76 67 65 58 67 80 75 66 63 57 
2009 69 83 77 68 65 58 68 80 75 67 65 57 
2010 71 81 78 69 68 61 70 78 76 68 67 61 
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of)
1990 66 81 72 65 57 48 66 80 72 64 57 48 
1994 70 95 75 64 56 56 69 95 75 64 56 56 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a Refers to the income differential in the total employed population. This differential is calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income, multiplied by 100.
b Refers to the income differential in total income among wage-earners. This differential is calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income, multiplied 
by 100.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
e Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table A-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING, 1990-2010
(In dollars at constant 2005 prices)
Country 
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 680 823 906 903 982 954 757 885 1 153 1 493 …
Bolivia (Estado 
Plurinacional de) b … … 115 138 157 168 186 184 186 211 …
Brazil 661 640 831 850 934 936 986 1 052 1 203 1 371 …
Chile 486 584 638 758 875 953 967 936 933 1 213 1 266
Colombia c 168 209 324 441 384 344 349 399 454 520 539
Costa Rica 498 529 580 621 667 745 792 795 876 1097 1 224
Cuba 944 851 690 615 620 722 843 1 122 1 523 1 946 1 876
Dominican Republic  85 108 117 130 162 213 218 236 326 362 347
Ecuador d 92 90 103 97 86 88 106 124 200 261 314
El Salvador e … 61 120 149 203 258 287 322 351 379 …
Guatemala 66 85 87 95 136 143 155 156 168 172 …
Honduras 73 77 66 68 76 104 123 137 150 176 183
Jamaica f 339 327 343 373 … 383 356 367 404 450 …
Mexico 393 505 544 527 619 686 697 739 810 879 943
Nicaragua 47 44 49 48 60 67 78 95 107 119 …
Panama 247 328 310 339 406 400 353 371 493 609 …
Paraguay 42 88 107 119 120 99 108 98 123 133 147
Peru g 78 103 151 169 208 222 246 266 279 332 378
Trinidad and Tobago h 405 417 393 406 … 783 970 1 170 1 219 1 770 …
Uruguay 677 832 950 1 061 1 038 1 057 944 992 1 195 1 434 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i 483 536 433 479 475 613 530 610 795 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 315 350 375 404 438 473 478 526 616 748 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 459 494 581 600 655 678 685 740 853 981 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database.
a Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b The figure for the biennium 1994-1995 is from 1995 and the figure for the biennium 2008-2009 is from 2008.
c The Ministry of Finance figures from the year 2000 are not comparable with those from earlier years. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and 
the National Adminstrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget.
e The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f The figure listed for 1996-1997 is from 1996.
g  The figures for 1990 to 1998 correspond to data from the budgetary central government, while those from 1999 onwards correspond to the general government. The figure for 
1998-1999 is from 1999.
h The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i The figure for 2006-2007 is from 2006.
j Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
k Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
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Table A-13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 19.1 20.1 21.1 20.0 21.0 21.8 19.4 19.4 21.8 25.9 …
Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of) b … … 12.4 14.4 15.8 17.1 18.8 17.9 17.1 18.4 …
Brazil 16.6 16.1 19.5 19.4 21.6 21.2 22.1 22.4 24.1 25.9 …
Chile 12.0 12.4 12.2 12.8 14.3 15.1 14.8 13.2 12.2 15.4 15.6
Colombia c 5.9 7.0 10.2 13.6 12.2 11.1 11.1 11.9 12.4 13.5 13.6
Costa Rica 15.6 15.2 15.8 16.8 16.4 18.0 18.7 17.6 17.2 20.9 22.9
Cuba 27.6 32.8 28.5 23.1 22.4 23.7 26.5 31.0 34.5 40.7 38.2
Dominican Republic 3.9 4.5 4.6 4.6 5.2 6.4 6.4 6.7 8.0 8.1 7.3
Ecuador d 3.9 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.5 6.8 8.3 9.8
El Salvador e … 2.9 5.4 6.3 8.2 10.0 10.8 11.6 11.8 12.7 …
Guatemala 3.7 4.6 4.6 4.8 6.7 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.5 …
Honduras 6.3 6.3 5.5 5.5 6.2 8.4 9.5 9.9 10.0 11.5 12.0
Jamaica f 8.4 8.0 8.2 9.0 … 9.5 8.7 8.8 9.4 10.7 …
Mexico 5.9 7.4 8.1 7.7 8.4 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.6 10.6 11.3
Nicaragua 6.6 6.5 7.2 6.5 7.6 8.1 9.3 10.8 11.5 12.6 …
Panama 7.5 8.9 8.3 8.8 9.7 9.5 8.3 8.0 9.2 9.9 …
Paraguay 3.2 6.6 7.8 8.7 9.1 8.0 8.9 7.7 9.2 9.7 11.0
Peru g 3.9 5.1 6.5 6.9 8.5 9.0 9.5 9.6 8.9 9.4 10.0
Trinidad and Tobago h 6.9 7.3 6.6 6.4 … 9.1 9.7 9.9 8.7 12.1 …
Uruguay 16.8 18.9 20.2 21.3 20.0 21.6 21.8 19.6 21.2 … …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i 8.8 9.2 7.8 8.6 8.8 11.6 11.7 11.7 13.5 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 9.3 10.3 10.8 11.0 11.6 12.3 12.7 12.8 13.5 15.2 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 11.3 11.9 13.5 13.5 14.5 14.6 14.9 15.2 16.1 17.9 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database. 
a Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b The figure for the biennium1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 corresponds to 2008.
c Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget. 
e The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to the year 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
g From 1990 to 1998, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 1999 onwards, to the general government. The figure for 1998-1999 corresponds 
to 1999.
h The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
j Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. 
k Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
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Table A-14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 b
Argentina 62.2 63.4 65.7 65.6 64.4 62.9 66.3 64.2 63.7 63.5 …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) c … … 36.3 43.4 43.9 45.6 51.3 52.6 45.1 40.8 …
Brazil 48.9 47.2 58.6 51.0 55.8 62.1 70.4 73.2 73.4 73.6 …
Chile 61.2 63.0 64.5 65.5 66.4 68.4 68.1 67.3 66.3 67.0 66.7
Colombia d 28.8 32.2 36.5 … … … … 74.8 71.5 69.5 68.7
Costa Rica 38.9 41.2 38.2 42.0 40.7 40.5 37.8 36.1 36.0 37.2 39.2
Cuba 35.6 34.7 39.4 45.7 44.8 47.0 51.4 53.0 52.4 53.0 54.5
Dominican Republic 40.4 39.9 42.9 41.2 42.1 48.7 47.1 44.7 47.5 44.4 44.2
Ecuador e 25.3 26.0 24.0 20.0 16.2 15.6 19.2 20.5 30.3 23.9 26.3
El Salvador f … 22.2 23.2 28.1 32.5 46.6 39.5 45.4 45.0 42.9 …
Guatemala 29.9 33.3 41.3 42.7 45.1 47.3 50.4 53.8 51.8 54.1 …
Honduras 40.7 36.6 40.6 40.5 39.5 45.4 49.9 52.8 53.6 49.2 51.9
Jamaica g 26.8 23.2 20.6 19.2 … 17.1 17.3 17.1 20.9 21.3 …
Mexico 41.3 50.2 53.1 52.7 60.5 61.3 56.6 58.8 57.9 54.4 55.9
Nicaragua 34.0 38.5 39.9 37.0 37.1 38.4 42.0 47.9 50.2 54.4 …
Panama 45.7 52.4 52.0 48.3 50.8 46.8 44.9 42.1 46.8 48.5 …
Paraguay 39.9 42.9 43.3 47.1 44.5 38.3 40.4 39.3 47.8 51.3 50.9
Peru h 33.0 35.0 39.4 39.6 54.3 48.6 48.2 48.7 49.4 47.4 46.3
Trinidad and Tobago i 40.6 40.6 42.8 40.7 … 43.5 44.6 37.9 29.4 34.4 …
Uruguay 62.3 67.7 70.8 70.8 67.3 68.1 61.4 61.8 67.5 79.4 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) j 32.8 40.1 35.3 35.4 36.6 37.8 38.6 41.0 44.0 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 39.4 41.7 44.3 45.3 46.2 47.5 48.3 49.0 50.1 50.3 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean l 44.9 47.2 54.2 52.0 55.7 58.3 61.2 62.8 63.0 62.2 …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database. 
a  The official public spending totals are based on a functional classification of countries’ public spending, but may differ from other official reports based on different classifications.
b  Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
c  The figure for the biennium 1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 is from 2008.
d  Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and 
the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Discontinued series. The figure for the biennium 1994-1995 corresponds to 1994 and the figure for the biennium 
2004-2005 to 2005.
e  The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget. 
f  The figure for 1992-1993 corresponds to 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
g  The figure for 1996-1997 is from 1996. 
h  From 1990 to 1999, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 2000 onwards, to the general government. 
i  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
j  The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
k  Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
l  Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
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Table A-15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON EDUCATION  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.1 4.2 4.5 5.3 6.3 …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.7 7.4 7.5 8.0 …
Brazil 3.4 2.8 5.1 4.3 5.5 5.0 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.6 …
Chile 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.6 3.3 4.4 4.4
Colombia c 2.4 2.9 3.0 4.2 4.1 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.1
Costa Rica 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.4 5.1 5.7 5.5 5.2 6.4 7.5
Cuba 10.8 11.9 9.0 7.3 7.7 9.1 11.1 13.3 14.6 17.9 17.1
Dominican Republic 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.5
Ecuador d 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.6 2.6 4.3 4.5 5.5
El Salvador e … 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.5 …
Guatemala 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 …
Honduras 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.3 3.8 5.2 6.0 6.6 6.7 7.6 7.7
Jamaica f 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.9 … 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.6 6.5 …
Mexico 2.4 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.8
Nicaragua 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.8 …
Panama 3.6 3.7 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.9 …
Paraguay 1.3 2.9 3.6 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.7
Peru g 1.6 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.1
Trinidad and Tobago h 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 … 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.8 5.0 …
Uruguay 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.7 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.2 4.0 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.5 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.5 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 3.1 3.2 4.1 3.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.9 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database. 
a  Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b  The figure for the biennium1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 corresponds to 2008.
c  Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d  The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget. 
e  The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to the year 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
g  From 1990 to 1998, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 1999 onwards, to the general government. The figure for 1998-1999 corresponds 
to 1999.
h  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i  The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
j  Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. 
k  Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
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Table A-16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON HEALTH  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 4.3 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.9 5.0 4.4 4.3 4.7 5.7 …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.2 …
Brazil 3.3 2.4 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.0 …
Chile 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.7 3.9
Colombia c 0.9 1.1 2.6 2.9 3.3 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9
Costa Rica 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.7 5.0 5.0 6.2 6.6
Cuba 5.0 6.6 5.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.5 8.5 10.8 9.7
Dominican Republic 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.8
Ecuador d 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.1
El Salvador e … 1.1 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.9 …
Guatemala 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 …
Honduras 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.5
Jamaica f 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.3 … 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.8 …
Mexico 2.7 3.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.7
Nicaragua 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.9 …
Panama 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 …
Paraguay 0.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.3
Peru g 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6
Trinidad and Tobago h 2.6 2.8 2.2 2.0 … 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.3 3.4 …
Uruguay 2.9 3.0 3.4 2.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.8 4.7 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.4 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.7 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database. 
a  Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b  The figure for the biennium1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 corresponds to 2008.
c  Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d  The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget. 
e  The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to the year 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
g  From 1990 to 1998, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 1999 onwards, to the general government. The figure for 1998-1999 corresponds 
to 1999.
h  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i  The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
j  Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. 
k  Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing.
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Table A-17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 9.6 9.9 10.3 9.8 9.9 10.3 9.7 9.2 10.0 12.0 …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 1.4 4.0 5.2 5.6 6.0 5.3 4.7 5.7 …
Brazil 8.5 9.7 10.0 10.6 11.7 11.2 12.0 12.1 12.8 13.4 …
Chile 7.7 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.6 7.9 7.5 6.5 5.8 6.9 7.0
Colombia c 2.3 2.6 4.0 5.4 3.8 4.8 4.9 6.0 7.0 7.8 7.8
Costa Rica 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.5 5.3 5.2 6.0 6.6
Cuba 7.0 9.9 8.6 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.1 8.2 8.7 9.2 8.7
Dominican Republic 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 1.8
Ecuador d 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.9
El Salvador e … 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 3.8 3.9 4.4 …
Guatemala 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 …
Honduras 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6
Jamaica f 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 … 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 …
Mexico 0.1 0.1 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.8 3.1
Panama 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.6 …
Paraguay 1.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.1 3.3 2.5 3.2 3.3 3.9
Peru g 1.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.2 3.4
Trinidad and Tobago h 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 … 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.8 …
Uruguay 11.2 13.1 13.9 15.3 12.6 13.7 13.6 11.7 12.0 11.3 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i
2.0 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.7 4.1 4.1 4.6 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j
3.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.1 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 4.4 4.9 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7 7.1 7.9 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database. 
a  Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or from the budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b  The figure for the biennium1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 corresponds to 2008.
c  Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d  The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the overall State budget. 
e  The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to the year 1993. Series adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
g  From 1990 to 1998, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 1999 onwards, to the general government. The figure for 1998-1999 corresponds 
to 1999.
h  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i  The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
j  Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. Does not include Nicaragua.
k  Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. Does not include Nicaragua.
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Table A-18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON HOUSING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010 a
Argentina 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.9 …
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 …
Brazil 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.9 …
Chile 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Colombia c 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.8
Costa Rica 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3
Cuba 4.8 4.4 5.3 4.0 2.3 2.6 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.7
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.2
Ecuador d 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.4
El Salvador e 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 2.1 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 …
Guatemala 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.9 …
Honduras … … … … … … … … … … 0.3
Jamaica f 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.4 … 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 …
Mexico 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6
Nicaragua 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 …
Panama 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.5 2.1 …
Paraguay 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
Peru g 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.9
Trinidad and Tobago h 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 … 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.8 …
Uruguay 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) i 1.7 1.4 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.4 … …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database.
a  Biennial series with official data from the ministries of finance or social development or budgeting departments of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
b  The figure for the biennium1994-1995 corresponds to 1995, and the figure for 2008-2009 corresponds to 2008.
c  Figures since 2000 are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier figures. The previous series is from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d  The data on social spending do not include information on social security spending. The figures up to the biennium 2006-2007 correspond to the central government and those 
for the period 2008-2010 correspond to the general State budget. 
e  The figure listed for 1992-1993 corresponds to the year 1993. Series  adjusted to reflect methodological changes introduced since 2004.
f  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
g  From 1990 to 1998, the figures correspond to the budgetary central government, and from 1999 onwards, to the general government. The figure for 1998-1999 corresponds 
to 1999.
h  The figure for 1996-1997 corresponds to 1996.
i  The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
j  Simple average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. Does not include Honduras.
k  Weighted average of the countries; includes estimates in cases where information on certain countries is missing. Does not include Honduras.
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Table A-19 




Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.A Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion  
of people whose income is less than one dollar a day
Indicator 1.1 
Population living in extreme 
poverty according to 
national poverty lines b
Indicator 1.2 
Extreme poverty gap ratio
Indicator 1.3 
Share of poorest quintile in 
national consumption
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Latin America and the Caribbean c 22.5 12.9 8.6 4.4 3.2 3.5
Latin America c 22.5 12.9 8.6 4.4 3.2 3.5
Argentina d 8.2 5.8 1.6 2.6 4.2 3.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 39.5 32.4 9.7 4.5 3.2 4.3
Brazil 23.4 7.3 9.7 3.3 2.1 2.6
Chile 13.0 3.7 4.4 1.1 3.5 4.1
Colombia 26.1 22.9 13.8 8.3 2.0 2.9
Costa Rica 10.1 5.5 4.8 2.2 4.3 4.4
Cuba … … … … … …
Dominican Republic … 22.6 8.8 8.8 3.2 2.9
Ecuador d 26.2 14.2 9.2 4.7 4.8 4.4
El Salvador 27.7 18.2 9.1 8.1 3.4 3.4
Guatemala 41.8 29.3 18.5 11.3 2.7 2.8
Haiti
Honduras 60.9 47.1 31.5 23.9 2.3 1.9
Mexico 18.7 11.2 5.9 3.2 3.9 4.0
Nicaragua 51.4 33.8 24.3 12.3 2.1 3.5
Panama 16.2 13.5 5.2 1.6 3.2 4.6
Paraguay 35.0 30.8 3.6 5.7 5.2 5.0
Peru 25.0 12.6 10.1 4.0 3.0 4.0
Uruguay d 3.4 3.5 0.9 0.9 4.8 4.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 14.4 9.9 5.0 3.5 4.3 5.2
The Caribbean c … … … … … …
Anguila … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … …
Aruba … … … … … …
Bahamas … … … … … …
Barbados … … … … … …
Belize e 13.4 … … … … …
British Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … … … …
Dominica … … … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … …
Grenada … … … … … …
Guadeloupe … … … … … …
Guyana e 5.8 7.7 … … … …
Jamaica e 2 2 … … … …
Martinique … … … … … …
Montserrat … … … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … … … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … … … … …
Saint Lucia e 20.9 … … … … …
Suriname e 15.5 … … … … …
Trinidad and Tobago e 4.2 … … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a  The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b  Does not include the Dominican Republic. The figures for 1990 are not comparable with those for 2000 and onwards.
c  Weighted averages.
d  The figures refer to urban areas.
e  Corresponds to the proportion of the population with income below one purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar per day. Data available on the official United Nations site for Millennium 
Development Goals Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx.
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Table A-20 




Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.B Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all,  
including women and young people 
Indicator 1.4 






Proportion of employed 
people living in extreme 
poverty according to 
national poverty lines b
Indicator 1.7 
Proportion of own-
account and contributing 
family workers in 
total employment c
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
1992-1997 2003-2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Latin America and the Caribbean d 0.3 2.2 54.3 59.5 17.8 11.3 32.0 31.1
Latin America d 0.3 2.2 54.5 59.6 17.8 11.3 32.0 31.2
Argentina c 3.5 6.0 52.5 57.0 … … 25.6 19.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.1 1.1 53.5 58.7 30.7 43.7 36.0
Brazil -0.5 1.8 61.1 63.7 15.8 3.9 28.9 29.1
Chile 5.8 2.7 47.7 53.1 6.5 1.2 24.5 21.3
Colombia 0.9 1.7 58.6 56.9 18.7 13.3 44.6 45.6
Costa Rica 1.8 3.0 54.7 57.9 4.5 1.9 24.3 19.5
Cuba … 5.3 70.1 73.6 … … … 2.8
Dominican Republic 1.4 4.1 52.9 54.5 … 10.7 41.7 43.8
Ecuador c -1.4 2.3 57.1 61.1 … 12.1 35.6 36.2
El Salvador 3.5 1.0 55.8 55.5 13.4 11.9 36.2 35.3
Guatemala 3.9 -1.1 56.5 64.9 30.4 20.2 48.0 44.5
Haiti -6.1 -1.7 56.0 55.9 … … … …
Honduras -0.4 4.0 56.1 58.0 49.6 37.0 49.6 48.9
Mexico -0.6 1.5 52.1 59.4 12.9 7.1 29.4 22.6
Nicaragua 0.8 -0.2 49.6 60.4 34.4 24.5 46.5 44.9
Panama 0.6 4.2 48.1 60.3 11.4 8.0 33.8 30.7
Paraguay -1.2 0.3 61.4 63.8 … 22.5 22.9 26.4
Peru 2.4 4.0 67.9 71.3 19.5 10.8 52.4 51.4
Uruguay c 3.0 6.9 52.6 58.8 … 1.5 20.1 24.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -1.2 2.5 51.6 60.8 5.4 4.3 25.7 37.5
The Caribbean d 0.9 2.0 47.3 51.2  … … 32.2 27.1
Anguilla … … … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … … 14.6
Aruba … … … … … … 3.9 …
Bahamas -0.6 0.0 63.0 66.6 … … … …
Barbados -0.9 1.9 56.9 66.9 … … 11.7 …
Belize e -1.2 0.9 47.6 56.8 … … … 23.5
British Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … …
Dominica … … … … … … 29.1 …
French Guiana … … … … … … … …
Grenada … … … … … … … …
Guadeloupe … … 44.5 43.1 … … … …
Guyana e 5.1 1.6 51.7 58.9 … … … …
Jamaica e 1.7 0.1 61.5 58.2 … … 42.3 35.4
Martinique … … 46.2 42.5 … … … …
Montserrat … … … … … … 12.6 …
Netherlands Antilles … … 49.0 53.5 … … 8.1 11.2
Puerto Rico … … 38.1 42.4 … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … … … … 12.1 …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … … … … … 20.2 …
Saint Lucia e … … … … … … 23.5 …
Suriname -0.3 4.3 44.6 44.7 … … 15.6 …
Trinidad and Tobago -2.4 5.7 45.0 61.5 … … 21.7 15.6
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a   The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.  
b   Does not include the Dominican Republic. Figures for 1990 are not comparable with those for 2000 and onwards.
c  The figures refer to urban areas. 
d   Weighted averages.
e   Corresponds to the proportion of the population with income below one purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar per day. Data available on the official United Nations site for 
Millennium Development Goals Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx.
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Table A-21 




Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.C Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Indicator 1.8 
Prevalence of underweight children 
under 5 years of age
Indicator 1.9 
Proportion of the population below minimum 
level of dietary energy consumption
Level Level Level Level
1989-1999 1996-2008 1990-1992 2007
Latin America and the Caribbean b 10.1 7.3 15.7 12.2
Latin America b 10.1 7.6 18.1 13.9
Argentina c 1.9 3.8 <=5 <=5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 11.2 5.9 24 27
Brazil 7.0 4.6 10 6
Chile 0.9 0.6 7 <=5
Colombia 10.1 6.9 15 9
Costa Rica 2.8 4.0 <=5 <=5
Cuba 6.1 4.0 5 <=5
Dominican Republic 10.3 4.3 27 24
Ecuador c 14.6 8.6 24 15
El Salvador 11.2 8.6 9 9
Guatemala 26.6 22.7 14 22
Haiti 26.8 22.2 63 57
Honduras 18.0 11.4 19 12
Mexico 7.5 5.0 <=5 <=5
Nicaragua 11.0 6.9 52 19
Panama 6.1 6.8 18 15
Paraguay 3.7 4.2 16 10
Peru 10.8 7.6 28 16
Uruguay c 4.4 6.0 5 <=5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7.7 4.6 10 7
The Caribbean b 9.7 6.0 11.8 9.7
Anguilla … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 1.6 … 21
Aruba … … … …
Bahamas … … 9 6
Barbados … … … <=5
Belize 6.2 6.1 7 <=5
British Virgin Islands … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … …
Dominica … … 4 <=5
French Guiana … … … …
Grenada … … 9 21
Guadeloupe … … … …
Guyana 18.3 12.4 21 8
Jamaica 4.6 4.0 11 <=5
Martinique … … … …
Montserrat … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … 14 <=5
Puerto Rico … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … 13 16
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … 22 <=5
Saint Lucia … … 8 8
Suriname … … 13 15
Trinidad and Tobago … 5.9 11 11
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a  The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.  
b  Simple averages.
c  The figures refer to urban areas. 
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Achieve universal primary education
Target 2.A Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, 
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Indicator 2.1 
Net enrolment ratio in 
primary education
Indicator 2.2 
Proportion of pupils starting 
grade 1 who reach last 
grade of primary
Indicator 2.3 
Literacy rate of 15-24 year-
olds, women and men
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1991 2007-2009 1992-1999 2004-2008 1991 2007-2009
Latin America and the Caribbean b 84.8 94.3 78.8 88.7 90.4 96.1
Latin America b 81.0 95.1 78.2 90.2 89.5 95.8
Argentina … 99.1 97.1 97.8 98.3 99.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) … 95.0 67.1 96.4 93.9 99.1
Brazil 85.4 95.1 82.2 94.7 91.8 97.8
Chile 89.4 95.1 95.5 98.7 98.4 98.9
Colombia 69.5 93.1 85.6 93.6 90.5 97.9
Costa Rica 87.6 … 84.6 94.1 97.4 98.2
Cuba 98.6 99.3 96.0 99.3 96.2 100.0
Dominican Republic 54.6 82.4 76.3 88.3 87.5 96.0
Ecuador 99.2 97.4 89.8 96.2 96.2 96.8
El Salvador … 95.6 69.0 76.1 84.9 95.0
Guatemala … 96.4 52.2 62.6 76.0 86.5
Haiti 22.0  … 38.4 … 54.8 81.7
Honduras 87.6 97.2 61.7 79.2 79.7 93.9
Mexico 98.6 99.5 86.7 95.7 95.4 98.5
Nicaragua 69.0 93.4 60.2 70.8 68.2 87.0
Panama … 97.5 89.3 94.6 95.1 96.4
Paraguay 92.8 85.6 78.3 95.0 95.6 98.8
Peru … 97.3 85.4 93.9 95.4 97.4
Uruguay 92.4 99 96.2 96.7 98.6 99.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 88.9 93.9 88.3 93.5 95.4 98.4
The Caribbean b 91.4 93.4 79.8 86.1 93.3 96.6
Anguilla … 92.9 77.4 … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 89.7 … … … …
Aruba … 96.8 95.6 91.4 … 99.4
Bahamas 90.3 91.6 … 90.7 … …
Barbados 84.3 … 91.2 95.8 99.8 99.8
Belize 94.4 99.6 74 94.7 76.4 84.2
British Virgin Islands … 95 … … … …
Cayman Islands … 82.2 … … … 99.9
Dominica … 97.5 80.9 88.9 … …
French Guiana … … … … … …
Grenada … 98.5 … … … …
Guadeloupe … … 93.4 … … 99.9
Guyana 95.4 98.8 65.1 83.5 … …
Jamaica 97.1 80.5 85.4 81 91.2 95.2
Martinique … … … … … 99.8
Montserrat … … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … 82.2 … 97.0 98.4
Puerto Rico … … … … 96.1 87.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 93.7 … 67.4 … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … 98.3 … … … …
Saint Lucia 96.4 93.1 88.4 92.8 … …
Suriname 82.1 90.1 … 67.8 … 99.4
Trinidad and Tobago 91.1 95.8 … 93.1 99.3 99.5
Turks and Caicos Islands … … 44 … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a  The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b  Simple averages.
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Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3.A Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Indicator 3.1 
Ratio of girls to 
boys in primary 
education
Indicator 3.1 
Ratio of girls to 
boys in secondary 
education
Indicator 3.1 
Ratio of girls to 
boys in tertiary 
education
Indicator 3.2 
Share of women in 
wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector
Indicator 3.3 
Proportion of seats 
held by women in 
national parliament
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
1991 2008-2009 1991 2008-2009 1991 2008-2009 1990-2002 2008-2009 1990-1992 2011
Latin America and the Caribbean b 0.98 0.97 1.14 1.06 1.02 1.75 40.95 45.34 9.20 18.01
Latin America b 0.98 0.97 1.12 1.07 1.01 1.37 38.18 41.46 9.17 21.10
Argentina … 0.99 … 1.14 … 1.52 37.1 … 6.3 38.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.92 0.99 … 0.98 … … 35.2 … 9.2 25.4
Brazil … 0.93 … 1.11 1.11 … 35.1 … 5.3 8.6
Chile 0.98 0.95 1.07 1.03 … 1.03 34.7 36.9 7.5 14.2
Colombia 1.02 1.00 1.19 1.10 1.07 1.05 41.8 47.5 4.5 12.7
Costa Rica 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.06 … … 37.2 41.3 10.5 38.6
Cuba 0.92 0.95 1.10 0.90 1.34 1.72 39.6 42.6 34.3 43.3
Dominican Republic 1.00 0.86 … 1.13 … … 31.0 … 7.5 20.8
Ecuador 0.99 1.01 … 1.03 … 1.15 34.1 … 4.5 32.3
El Salvador 1.01 0.97 1.22 1.02 … 1.09 45.6 … 11.7 19.0
Guatemala 0.87 0.94 … 0.93 … … 36.8 … 7.0 12.0
Haiti 0.95 … 0.94 … … … 44.2 … 3.6 11.1
Honduras 1.04 1.00 1.23 1.27 0.79 1.51 33.3 … 10.2 18.0
Mexico 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.06 0.74 0.97 36.5 39.4 12.0 26.2
Nicaragua 1.06 0.98 1.20 1.13 0.96 … … … 14.8 20.7
Panama … 0.97 … 1.08 … 1.54 45.4 42.1 7.5 8.5
Paraguay 0.97 0.97 1.05 1.05 … 1.43 41.0 39.5 5.6 12.5
Peru 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.99 … … 37.2 … 5.6 27.5
Uruguay 0.99 0.97 … 1.13 … 1.75 42.3 … 6.1 15.2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.03 0.97 1.38 1.09 1.69 35.2 41.6 10.0 17.0
The Caribbean b 0.98 0.97 1.16 1.05 1.03 2.08 43.4 49.2 9.3 13.3
Anguilla … 1.00 … 0.95 … 5.01 42.8 … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 0.94 … 1.00 … 2.21 … 50.6 0.0 10.5
Aruba … 0.97 … 1.03 … 1.40 43.9 … … …
Bahamas 1.03 1.00 … 1.03 … … 49.6 50.2 4.1 12.2
Barbados 1.00 … … 1.24 … 46.8 50.7 3.7 10.0
Belize 0.98 0.97 1.15 1.08 … 1.85 33.9 … 0.0 0.0
British Virgin Islands ... 0.94 … 1.03 … 1.64 49.9 … … …
Cayman Islands ... 0.94 … 1.10 … 2.16 50.0 50.5 … …
Dominica ... 0.99 1.06 … 3.22 39.7 … 10.0 12.5
French Guiana ... ... … … … … 36.1 … … …
Grenada 0.85 0.94 1.16 1.01 … 1.36 40.4 … 20.0 13.3
Guadeloupe ... ... … … … … 46.6 … … …
Guyana 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.01 … 0.96 38.5 … 36.9 30.0
Jamaica 0.99 0.97 1.06 1.04 0.74 2.22 46.2 48.2 5.0 13.3
Martinique … … … … … … 45.4 50.8 … …
Montserrat … … … … … … 43.4 … … …
Netherlands Antilles … 1.19 … … 42.7 51.0 … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … 1.56 46.5 41.7 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.02 1.02 1.11 1.08 … 2.10 … … 6.7 6.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.98 0.93 1.24 1.04 … … … … 9.5 14.3
Saint Lucia 0.94 0.97 1.45 1.03 1.35 2.58 51.8 … 0.0 11.1
Suriname 1.03 0.95 1.16 1.28 … … 39.5 … 7.8 9.8
Trinidad and Tobago 1.00 0.96 1.04 1.07 0.78 … 35.6 … 16.7 28.6
Turks and Caicos Islands ... ... … … 0.90 43.1 … … …
United States Virgin Islands ... … … … … … … … …
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included. 
b Simple averages.
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Target 4.A Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Indicator 4.1 
Under-five mortality rate  
(per 1,000 live births)
Indicator 4.2 
Infant mortality rate  
(per 1,000 live births)
Indicator 4.3  
Proportion of 1 year-old children 














Latin America and the Caribbean b 45.9 23.4 34.4 18.3 79.7 90.9
Latin America b 57.3 27.4 42.9 21.0 77.6 90.1
Argentina 30.1 14.9 25.8 12.9 93.0 99.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 114.6 57.1 82.6 42.6 53.0 81.0
Brazil 60.1 27.6 47.5 22.5 78.0 99.0
Chile 19.1 8.5 16.3 7.0 97.0 91.0
Colombia 42.5 25.3 31.5 18.7 82.0 95.0
Costa Rica 18.4 11.2 16.0 9.7 90.0 90.0
Cuba 13.4 6.1 10.7 4.5 94.0 100.0
Dominican Republic 64.2 31.3 55.3 28.0 96.0 96.0
Ecuador 65.5 24.4 49.9 20.0 60.0 99.0
El Salvador 64.8 24.6 47.1 20.0 98.0 98.0
Guatemala 85.5 36.5 61.0 27.6 68.0 93.0
Haiti 137.3 68.2 92.7 46.6 31.0 58.0
Honduras 70.8 40.2 48.0 27.2 90.0 89.0
Mexico 44.2 18.9 36.3 15.6 75.0 96.0
Nicaragua 75.9 23.8 56.5 20.0 82.0 99.0
Panama 35.9 22.9 28.3 17.5 73.0 89.0
Paraguay 57.8 37.0 44.8 31.0 69.0 80.0
Peru 85.1 30.7 57.8 18.5 64.0 99.0
Uruguay 24.3 15.8 21.4 12.7 97.0 96.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 31.6 21.1 25.0 16.4 61.0 55.0
The Caribbean b
Anguilla 31.7 18.8 24.4 15.3 83.1 92.3
Antigua and Barbuda ... ... ... ... ... ...
Aruba ... 13.4 16.1 12.4 ... ...
Bahamas 21.2 17.4 18.3 14.9 ... ...
Barbados 24.7 11.2 16.6 8.0 86.0 96.0
Belize 17.8 10.1 15.1 9.5 87.0 75.0
British Virgin Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Dominica 38.5 19.8 30.6 15.9 86.0 96.0
French Guiana 20.4 8.7 15.6 6.7 ... ...
Grenada ... ... ... ... 88.0 96.0
Guadeloupe 40.5 14.1 33.0 12.8 85.0 98.0
Guyana 26.3 14.4 22.5 13.0 ... ...
Cayman Islands 90.2 52.4 64.9 40.3 73.0 96.0
Jamaica 18.3 9.7 15.8 8.8 ... ...
Martinique 33.9 27.1 27.8 22.5 74.0 76.0
Montserrat 12.4 7.7 9.8 6.5 ... ...
Netherlands Antilles ... ... ... ... 89.0 99.0
Puerto Rico ... ... ... ... ... ...
Saint Kitts and Nevis 14.9 8.7 12.7 6.9 ... ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ... ... ... ... 99.0 99.0
Saint Lucia 39.3 26.8 32.3 22.3 96.0 99.0
Suriname 24.4 15.1 18.5 12.0 82.0 94.0
Trinidad and Tobago 49.4 30.4 36.5 21.7 65.0 85.0
Turks and Caicos Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
United States Virgin Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with 
Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.  
b Simple averages.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Target 7.C Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
Target 7.D By 2020, to have achieved 
a significant improvement in the lives 
of at least 100 million slum dwellers
Indicator 7.8 
Proportion of population using an 
improved drinking water source 
Indicator 7.9  
Proportion of population using  
an improved sanitation facility 
Indicator 7.10  
Proportion of urban population  
living in slums
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1990-1995 2008 1990-1995 2008 1990 2001-2007
Latin America and the Caribbean b 86.4 92.9 77.1 82.5 32.2 25.1
Latin America b 80.5 89.9 67.7 75.1 42.4 28.7
Argentina 94.0 97.0 81.0 90.0 30.5 23.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 72.0 86.0 33.0 25.0 70.0 48.8
Brazil 83.0 97.0 71.0 80.0 45.0 28.0
Chile 91.0 96.0 84.0 96.0 4.0 9.0
Colombia 89.0 92.0 68.0 74.0 26.0 16.1
Costa Rica 96.0 97.0 94.0 95.0 11.9 10.9
Cuba 78.2 92.4 88.7 96.1 ... 0.6
Dominican Republic 84.0 86.0 68.0 83.0 56.4 16.2
Ecuador 73.0 94.0 71.0 92.0 28.1 21.5
El Salvador 69.0 87.0 73.0 87.0 44.7 28.9
Guatemala 79.0 94.0 70.0 81.0 65.8 40.8
Haiti 52.0 63.0 29.0 17.0 84.9 70.1
Honduras 72.0 86.0 45.0 71.0 24.0 34.9
Mexico 88.0 94.0 56.0 85.0 23.1 14.4
Nicaragua 70.0 85.0 42.0 52.0 80.7 45.5
Panama 90.0 93.0 72.0 69.0 30.8 23.0
Paraguay 52.0 86.0 60.0 70.0 36.8 17.6
Peru 75.0 82.0 55.0 68.0 60.4 36.1
Uruguay 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 89.0 83.0 40.7 32.0
The Caribbean b 92.7 97.2 87.7 93.4 18.0 20.1
Anguilla 60.0 ... 99.0 99.0 40.6 36.7
Antigua and Barbuda 91.0 ... 96.0 6.9 4.8
Aruba 100.0 100.0 ... ... ... ...
Bahamas 96.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Barbados 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Belize 91.0 99.0 47.0 90.0 54.2 47.3
British Virgin Islands 98.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Cayman Islands ... 95.0 ... 96.0 ... ...
Dominica 97.0 … 83.0 … 16.6 14.0
French Guiana 84.0 … 78.0 … 12.9 10.5
Grenada 95.0 … 97.0 97.0 6.9 6.0
Guadeloupe 98.0 … 64.0 … 6.9 5.4
Guyana 83.0 94.0 69.0 81.0 4.9 33.7
Jamaica 92.0 94.0 83.0 83.0 29.2 60.5
Martinique ... … ... ... 2.0 1.6
Montserrat 100.0 100.0 96.0 96.0 ... ...
Netherlands Antilles ... ... ... ... ... ...
Puerto Rico ... … ... ... ... ...
Saint Kitts and Nevis 99.0 99.0 96.0 96.0 ... ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ... … ... ... ... ...
Saint Lucia 98.0 98.0 89.0 … 11.9 11.9
Suriname 91.0 93.0 92.0 84.0 6.9 3.9
Trinidad and Tobago 88.0 94.0 93.0 92.0 34.7 24.7
Turks and Caicos Islands 100.0 100.0 96.0 ... ...
United States Virgin Islands ... … ... ... ... ...
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included. 
b Simple averages.
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Table A-30 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
Country
Goal 8 
Develop a global partnership for development
Target 8.F In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies,  
especially information and communications
Indicator 8.14  
Fixed telephone lines  
per 100 inhabitants
Indicator 8.15  
Mobile cellular subscriptions  
per 100 inhabitants
Indicator 8.16  














Latin America and the Caribbean b 14.4 25.3 11.1 110.6 6.4 35.6
Latin America b 5.2 15.0 9.5 97.9 3.8 27.9
Argentina 9.3 24.7 17.6 141.8 7.1 36.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.7 8.5 7.0 72.3 1.4 20.0
Brazil 6.3 21.6 13.3 104.1 2.9 40.7
Chile 6.6 20.2 22.1 116.0 16.5 45.0
Colombia 6.9 14.7 5.4 93.8 2.1 36.5
Costa Rica 9.2 31.8 5.4 65.1 5.8 36.5
Cuba 5.6 10.4 0.1 8.9 0.5 16.0
Dominican Republic 4.8 10.2 8.5 89.6 4.0 39.5
Ecuador 4.8 14.4 3.9 102.2 1.5 24.0
El Salvador 2.5 16.2 11.8 124.3 1.1 15.0
Guatemala 2.1 10.4 7.7 125.6 0.7 10.5
Haiti 0.7 0.5 0.7 40.0 0.3 8.4
Honduras 1.8 8.8 2.4 125.1 1.2 11.1
Mexico 6.4 17.5 14.1 80.6 5.1 31.0
Nicaragua 1.2 4.5 1.8 65.1 1.0 10.0
Panama 9.0 15.7 13.9 184.7 6.6 42.8
Paraguay 2.7 6.3 15.0 91.6 0.7 23.6
Peru 2.6 10.9 4.9 100.1 3.1 34.3
Uruguay 13.4 28.6 12.3 131.7 10.5 43.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7.5 24.4 22.3 96.2 3.4 35.6
The Caribbean b 22.8 34.7 12.7 124.0 9.2 43.3
Anguilla 30.5 41.0 19.3 156.3 22.3 48.0
Antigua and Barbuda 25.2 47.1 28.8 184.7 6.5 80.0
Netherlands Antilles 24.7 44.9 … 1.1
Aruba 28.2 32.6 16.3 122.6 15.2 42.0
Bahamas 27.4 37.7 10.5 124.9 4.4 43.0
Barbados 28.1 50.3 10.7 128.1 3.8 70.2
Belize 9.3 9.7 6.9 62.3 6.2 14.0
British Virgin Islands 39.3 86.5 ... 105.4 ... 39.0
Cayman Islands 46.9 66.4 27.0 177.6 44.4 66.0
Dominica 16.2 22.9 1.5 144.9 7.7 47.5
French Guiana ... ... ... ... ...
Grenada 15.8 27.2 4.2 116.7 4.1 33.5
Guadeloupe ... ... ... ... ...
Guyana 2.2 19.9 5.4 73.6 6.7 29.9
Jamaica 4.4 9.6 14.2 113.2 3.1 26.1
Martinique ... ... ... ... ...
Montserrat 34.5 43.8 12.5 70.8 ... 35.0
Puerto Rico 27.8 23.8 24.2 78.3 10.4 45.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 23.9 39.3 3.0 161.4 6.7 32.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 12.0 19.9 2.0 120.5 3.0 69.6
Saint Lucia 12.4 23.6 1.6 102.9 5.2 36.0
Suriname 9.1 16.2 9.5 169.6 2.7 31.6
Trinidad and Tobago 13.6 21.9 12.6 141.2 7.8 48.5
Turks and Caicos Islands 24.8 9.7 ... … ...
United States Virgin Islands 45.6 69.5 31.6 13.5 27.4
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with 
Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2010. 









Publicaciones de la CEPAL / ECLAC publications 
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe / Economic Commission for Latin America and  the Caribbean 
Casilla 179-D, Santiago de Chile. E-mail: publications@cepal.org 
Véalas en: www.cepal.org/publicaciones 
Publications may be accessed at: www.eclac.org 
Revista CEPAL / CEPAL Review 
La Revista se inició en 1976 como parte del Programa de Publicaciones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, con el 
propósito de contribuir al examen de los problemas del desarrollo socioeconómico de la región. Las opiniones expresadas en los artículos 
firmados, incluidas las colaboraciones de los funcionarios de la Secretaría, son las de los autores y, por lo tanto, no reflejan necesariamente 
los puntos de vista de la Organización. 
La Revista CEPAL se publica en español e inglés tres veces por año. 
Los precios de suscripción anual vigentes son de US$ 30 para la versión en español y US$ 35 para la versión en inglés. El precio por 
ejemplar suelto es de US$ 15 para ambas versiones. Los precios de suscripción por dos años son de US$ 50 para la versión en español y 
US$ 60 para la versión en inglés. 
CEPAL Review first appeared in 1976 as part of the Publications Programme of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, its aim being to make a contribution to the study of the economic and social development problems of the region. The views 
expressed in signed articles, including those by Secretariat staff members, are those of the authors and therefore do not necessarily reflect 
the point of view of the Organization. 
CEPAL Review is published in Spanish and English versions three times a year. 
Annual subscription costs are US$ 30 for the Spanish version and US$ 35 for the English version. The price of single issues is US$ 15 for 
both versions. The cost of a two-year subscription is US$ 50 for the Spanish version and US$ 60 for the English version. 
 
Informes periódicos institucionales / Annual reports 
Todos disponibles para años anteriores / Issues for previous years also available 
• Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe, 2010, 176 p. 
 Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010, 160 p. 
• Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2010-2011, 344 p. 
 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011, 334 p.  
• Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe, 2010-2011, 140 p. 
 Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2010-2011, 168 p.  
• Panorama social de América Latina, 2010, 266 p. 
 Social Panorama of Latin America, 2010, 256 p. 
• La inversión extranjera directa en América Latina y el Caribe, 2010, 216 p. 
 Foreign Direct Investment of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010, 204 p. 
• Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe / Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010, 310 p. 
 
Libros de la CEPAL 
112 El desarrollo inclusivo en América Latina y el Caribe. Ensayos sobre políticas de convergencia productiva para la igualdad, Ricardo 
Infante (editor), 384 p. 
111 Protección social inclusiva en América Latina. Una mirada integral, un enfoque de derechos, Simone Cecchini y Rodrigo Martínez,  
284 p. 
110 Envejecimiento en América Latina. Sistema de pensiones y protección social integral, Antonio Prado y Ana Sojo (eds.), 304 p. 
109 Modeling Public Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, Carlos de Miguel, José Durán Lima, Paolo Giordiano, Julio 
Guzmán, Andrés Schuschny and Masazaku Watanuki (eds.), 322 p. 
108 Alianzas público-privadas. Para una nueva visión estratégica del desarrollo, Robert Devlin y Graciela Moguillansky, 2010, 196 p. 
107 Políticas de apoyo a las pymes en América Latina. Entre avances innovadores y desafíos institucionales, Carlos Ferraro y Giovanni 
Stumpo, 392 p. 
106 Temas controversiales en negociaciones comerciales Norte-Sur, Osvaldo Rosales V. y Sebastián Sáez C. (compiladores), 322 p. 
105 Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America, Jürgen Weller (ed.), 2009, 236 p. 
104 La República Dominicana en 2030: hacia una sociedad cohesionada, Víctor Godínez y Jorge Máttar (coords.), 2009, 582 p. 
103 L’Amérique latine et les Caraïbes au seuil du troisième millénaire, 2009, 138 p. 
102 Migración interna y desarrollo en América Latina entre 1980 y 2005, Jorge Rodríguez y Gustavo Busso, 2009, 272 p. 
101 Claves de la innovación social en América Latina y el Caribe, Adolfo Rodríguez Herrera y Hernán Alvarado Ugarte, 2009, 236 p. 
100 Envejecimiento, derechos humanos y políticas públicas, Sandra Huenchuan (ed.), 2009, 232 p. 
99 Economía y territorio en América Latina y el Caribe. Desigualdades y políticas, 2009, 212 p. 
98 La sociedad de la información en América Latina y el Caribe: desarrollo de las tecnologías y tecnologías para el desarrollo, Wilson Peres 
y Martin Hilbert (eds.), 2009, 388 p. 
97 América Latina y el Caribe: migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, Jorge Martínez Pizarro (ed.), 2008, 375 p. 
96 Familias y políticas públicas en América Latina: una historia de desencuentros, Irma Arriagada (coord.), 2007, 424 p. 
95 Centroamérica y México: políticas de competencia a principios del siglo XXI, Eugenio Rivera y Claudia Schatan (coords.), 2008, 304 p.  
94 América Latina y el Caribe: La propiedad intelectual después de los tratados de libre comercio, Álvaro Díaz, 2008, 248 p. 
 
Copublicaciones recientes / Recent co-publications 
Sentido de pertenencia en sociedades fragmentadas. América Latina desde una perspectiva global, Martín Hopenhayn y Ana Sojo (compiladores), 
CEPAL/Siglo Veintiuno, Argentina, 2011. 
Las clases medias en América Latina. Retrospectiva y nuevas tendencias, Rolando Franco, Martín Hopenhayn y Arturo León (eds.),  
CEPAL/Siglo XXI, México, 2010. 
Innovation and Economic Development. The Impact of Information and Communication Technologies in Latin America, Mario Cimoli, 
André Hofman and Nanno Mulder, ECLAC/Edward Elgar Publishing, United Kingdom, 2010. 
Sesenta años de la CEPAL. Textos seleccionados del decenio 1998-2008, Ricardo Bielschowsky (comp.), CEPAL/Siglo Veintiuno, Argentina, 2010. 
El nuevo escenario laboral latinoamericano. Regulación, protección y políticas activas en los mercados de trabajo, Jürgen Weller (ed.), 
CEPAL/Siglo Veintiuno, Argentina, 2010. 
Internacionalización y expansión de las empresas eléctricas españolas en América Latina, Patricio Rozas, CEPAL/Lom, Chile, 2009. 
Gobernanza corporativa y desarrollo de mercados de capitales en América Latina, Georgina Núñez, Andrés Oneto y Germano M. de Paula 
(coords.), CEPAL/Mayol, Colombia, 2009. 
EnREDos. Regulación y estrategias corporativas frente a la convergencia tecnológica, Marcio Wohlers y Martha García-Murillo (eds.), 
CEPAL/Mayol, Colombia, 2009. 
Desafíos y oportunidades de la industria del software en América Latina, Paulo Tigre y Felipe Silveira Marques (eds.), CEPAL/Mayol, 
Colombia, 2009. 
¿Quo vadis, tecnología de la información y de las comunicaciones?, Martin Hilbert y Osvaldo Cairó (eds.), CEPAL/Mayol, Colombia, 2009. 
O Estruturalismo latino-americano, Octavio Rodríguez, CEPAL/Civilização Brasileira, 2009. 
L’avenir de la protection sociale en Amérique latine. Accessibilité, financement et solidarité, CEPALC/Eska, France, 2009. 
Fortalecer los sistemas de pensiones latinoamericanos. Cuentas individuales por reparto, Robert Holzmann, Edward Palmer y Andras Uthoff 
(eds.), CEPAL/Mayol, Colombia, 2008. 
Competition Policies in Emerging Economies. Lessons and Challenges from Central America and Mexico, Claudia Schatan and 
Eugenio Rivera Urrutia (eds.), ECLAC/Springer, USA, 2008. 
 
Coediciones recientes / Recent co-editions 
Perspectivas económicas de América Latina 2012.Transformación del Estado para el desarrollo, CEPAL/OCDE, 2011. 
Latin America Outlook 2012. Transforming the State for Development, ECLAC/OECD, 2011. 
Espacios iberoamericanos: Hacia una nueva arquitectura del Estado para el desarrollo, CEPAL/SEGIB, 2011. 
Espaços ibero-americanos: A uma nova arquitetura do Estado para o desenvolvimento. CEPAL/SEGIB, 2011. 
Perspectivas de la agricultura y del desarrollo rural en las Américas: una mirada hacia América Latina y el Caribe,  
CEPAL/FAO/IICA, 2011. 
The Oulook for Agriculture and Rural Development in the Americas: A Perspective on Latin America and the Caribbean,  
ECLAC/FAO/IICA, 2011. 
Pobreza infantil en América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL/UNICEF, Chile, 2010. 
Espacios iberoamericanos: vínculos entre universidades y empresas para el desarrollo tecnológico, CEPAL/SEGIB, 2010 
Espaços ibero-americanos: vínculos entre universidades e empresas para o desenvolvimento tecnológico, CEPAL/SEGIB, 2010 
Clases medias y desarrollo en América Latina, Alicia Bárcena y Narcís Serra (eds.), CEPAL/SEGIB/CIDOB, Chile, 2010. 
Innovar para crecer. Desafíos y oportunidades para el desarrollo sostenible e inclusivo en Iberoamérica, CEPAL/SEGIB, Chile, 2010. 
Espacios iberoamericanos. Iberoamérica frente a la crisis, CEPAL/SEGIB, Chile, 2009. 
Espaços Ibero-Americanos. A Ibero-América em face da crise, CEPAL/SEGIB, Chile, 2009. 
The United Nations Regional Commissions and the Climate Change Challenges, ECLAC/ECA/ECE/ESCAP/ESCWA, 2009. 
Hacia un desarrollo inclusivo. El caso de Chile, Osvaldo Sunkel y Ricardo Infante (eds.), CEPAL/OIT/Fundación Chile 21, Chile, 2008. 
Reformas para la cohesión social en América Latina. Panorama antes de la crisis, Alicia Bárcena y Narcís Serra (eds.), 
CEPAL/SEGIB/CIDOB, Chile, 2008. 
El envejecimiento y las personas de edad. Indicadores sociodemográficos para América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL/UNFPA, 2009. 
Espacios iberoamericanos: la economía del conocimiento, CEPAL/SEGIB, Chile, 2008. 
 
Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
95 Programas de transferencias condicionadas. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe, Simone Cecchini y Aldo 
Madariaga, 2011, 226 p. 
95 Conditional cash transfer programmes. The recent experience in Latin America and the Caribbean, Simone Cecchini and Aldo 
Madariaga, 2011, 220 p. 
94 El cuidado en acción. Entre el derecho y el trabajo, Sonia Montaño Virreira y Coral Calderón Magaña (coords.), 2010, 236 p. 
93 Privilegiadas y discriminadas. Las trabajadoras del sector financiero, Flavia Marco Navarro y María Nieves Rico Ibáñez (eds.), 2009, 300 p. 
92 Estadísticas para la equidad de género: magnitudes y tendencias en América Latina, Vivian Milosavljevic, 2007, 186 pp. 
 
Cuadernos estadísticos de la CEPAL 
39 América Latina y el Caribe: indicadores macroeconómicos del turismo. Solo disponible en CD, 2010. 
38  Indicadores ambientales de América Latina y el Caribe, 2009. Solo disponible en CD, 2010. 
37 América Latina y el Caribe: Series históricas de estadísticas económicas 1950-2008. Solo disponible en CD, 2009. 
36 Clasificaciones estadísticas internacionales incorporadas en el Banco de Datos de Comercio Exterior de América Latina y el Caribe de la 
CEPAL (Revisión 3). Solo disponible en CD, 2008. 
 
Observatorio demográfico / Demographic Observatory  
Edición bilingüe (español e inglés) que proporciona información estadística actualizada, referente a estimaciones y proyecciones de 
población de los países de América Latina y el Caribe. Incluye también indicadores demográficos de interés, tales como tasas de natalidad, 
mortalidad, esperanza de vida al nacer, distribución de la población, etc. 
El Observatorio aparece dos veces al año, en los meses de enero y julio. Suscripción anual: US$ 25. Valor por cada ejemplar: US$ 15. 
Bilingual publication (Spanish and English) proving up-to-date estimates and projections of the populations of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Also includes various demographic indicators of interest such as fertility and mortality rates, life expectancy, measures 
of population distribution, etc. 
The Observatory appears twice a year in January and July. Annual subscription: US$ 25. Per issue: US$ 15. 
 
Notas de población 
Revista especializada que publica artículos e informes acerca de las investigaciones más recientes sobre la dinámica demográfica en la región, en 
español, con resúmenes en español e inglés. También incluye información sobre actividades científicas y profesionales en el campo de población.  
La revista se publica desde 1973 y aparece dos veces al año, en junio y diciembre. 
Suscripción anual: US$ 20. Valor por cada ejemplar: US$ 12. 
Specialized journal which publishes articles and reports on recent studies of demographic dynamics in the region, in Spanish with abstracts in 
Spanish and English. Also includes information on scientific and professional activities in the field of population.  
Published since 1973, the journal appears twice a year in June and December. 
Annual subscription: US$ 20. Per issue: US$ 12. 
 
Series de la CEPAL 
Comercio internacional / Desarrollo productivo / Desarrollo territorial / Estudios estadísticos y prospectivos / Estudios y perspectivas (Bogotá, 
Brasilia, Buenos Aires, México, Montevideo) / Studies and Perspectives (The Caribbean, Washington) / Financiamiento del desarrollo / 
Gestión pública / Informes y estudios especiales / Macroeconomía del desarrollo / Manuales / Medio ambiente y desarrollo / Mujer y 
desarrollo / Población y desarrollo / Políticas sociales / Recursos naturales e infraestructura / Seminarios y conferencias. 





































Las publicaciones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) y las del Instituto 
Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificación Económica y Social (ILPES) se pueden adquirir a los 
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Publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas Publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas 
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Publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and those of the 
Latin American and the Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) can be ordered from 
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United Nations Publications United Nations Publications 
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